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EDUCATION

The University of Virginia, Department of Economics, B.A., 1989, Highest Distinction.

The University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, Ph.D., 1997, Honors.

TEACHING APPOINTMENTS

Lynde and Harry Bradley Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University Honors Program, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1997-2000.

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2000-2006.

Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2006-2018.

Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2018-present.

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Ethics, Moral Psychology.

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Social Epistemology, Philosophy of Law, Political Philosophy.

BOOKS

Reasons (2012). Continuum Press.

ARTICLES

1. Is there Ethical Knowledge?, *Southwestern Philosophical Review* 14:1 (1998), 63-8.
2. Personal Identity and Quasi-Responsibility, in *Moral Responsibility and Ontology*, ed. Ton van den Beld, Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000), 77-87.
3. A Fallacy in Korsgaard's Argument for Moral Obligation, *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 34:1 (2000), 103-4.
4. Unconscious Violinists and the Use of Analogies in Moral Argument, *Journal of Medical Ethics* 26:6 (2000), 466-8.
5. Advice and Moral Objectivity, *Philosophical Papers* 29:1 (2000), 1-19.

6. Good Advice and Rational Action, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 60:3, (2000), 561-9.
7. Theories of Practical Reason, *Metaphilosophy* 33:4 (2002), 450-467.
8. On the Rationality of Desiring the Forbidden, *Analysis* 62:4 (2002), 296-9.
9. Psychologism, Practical Reason, and the Possibility of Error, *Philosophical Quarterly* 53 (2003), 68-78.
10. Stories, Autobiographies, and Moral Inquiry, *Journal of Social Philosophy* 34 (2003), 188-98.
11. Some Advice for Moral Psychologists, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 84 (2003), 299-310.
12. Trusting Advice and Weakness of Will, *Social Theory and Practice* 30 (2004), 371-89.
13. Monkeys, Typewriters, and Objective Consequentialism, *Ratio* 18 (2005), 352-60.
14. How Indirect can Indirect Utilitarianism Be?, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (2007), 275-301.
15. Intentional Action and 'In Order to', *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology* 27 (2007), 113-8.
16. On Indirectly Self-Defeating Moral Theories, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 5 (2008), 384-393.
17. The Ethics of Terror and Torture, *Review Journal of Political Philosophy* (2008), 139-52.
18. The Incoherence Objection in Moral Theory. *Acta Analytica* 25 (2010), 279-284.
19. The Limits of Maximization: Actions, Decision Procedures, and Meta-Decision Procedures, *The Polish Journal of Philosophy* 4 (2010).
20. Williams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for Action, in *Thick Concepts* (ed. Simon Kirchin), Oxford University Press (2013).
21. In the Beginning was the Doing, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 43 (2013), 303-21.
22. Rossian Deontology and the Possibility of Moral Expertise, in *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*, ed. M. Timmons, Oxford University Press (2014).
23. Peer Disagreement and the Dunning-Kruger Effect, *Episteme* (2016) , 1–18. doi: 10.1017/epi.2016.18.
24. Moral Testimony: Going on the Offensive, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 12 (2017), 51-75.
25. The Problem of Evil and the Grammar of Goodness, *Religions* 9 (2018).
26. Psychologism and Anti-psychologism about Motivating Reasons, in *Oxford Handbook on Reasons and Normativity*, ed. D. Star, Oxford University Press (2018).
27. Peer Disagreement: Special Cases, *Logos & Episteme* (2018), 221-226.
28. Should Children Have the Right to Vote?, *Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy*, ed. D. Boonin, Palgrave MacMillan (2018), 215-224.

29. Moral Advice and Joint Agency, *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics* 8, ed. M. Timmons, Oxford University Press (2018), 102-123.
30. (En)joining Others, promised to *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility*, ed. D. Shoemaker, Oxford University Press (2019).

EDITED VOLUME

Special issue of *American Philosophical Quarterly* (2015), co-edited with John Brunero, featuring a selection of papers from the St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality, 2010-2013; papers from Nomy Arpaly & Tim Schroeder, Patricio Fernandez, Anton Ford, Sarah Paul, Mark Schroeder, Paulina Sliwa, and Michael Smith.

BOOK AND ARTICLE REVIEWS

1. Review of Nicholas Smith, *Strong Hermeneutics*, in *Philosophy in Review* 19:1, 1999.
2. Review of Roger Crisp, *Mill on Utilitarianism*, in *Ethics* 109:4, 1999.
3. Wiland Reviews Jones, *Brown Electronic Article Review Service* 5, eds. Dreier and Estlund, <http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/homepage.html>, posted July 23, 1999.
4. Review of Joseph Hamburger, *John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control*, in *Ethics* 111:3, 2001, 637-8.
5. Review of Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metathics, Vol 3.*, in *Ethics* 120: 202-5.

ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES

1. Objective and Subjective Utilitarianism and Indirect Utilitarianism, In James E. Crimmins, ed. *The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism* (London & New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).
2. Virtue Ethics, Doctrine of Double Effect, Moral Luck, The Experience Machine and Weakness of Will, In *The Continuum Companion to Ethics*, 2011.
3. Metaethics and Ethics, In *International Encyclopedia of Ethics*, Routledge (with John Brunero), 2013.
4. Reasons for Action, In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2015).

PROFESSIONAL TALKS

1. The Ins and Outs of Reasons, Mid-South Philosophy Conference, University of Memphis, 1997.
2. Advice and the Objectivity of Ethics, Honors Program and the Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1997.

3. Is there Ethical Knowledge?, Southwestern Philosophical Society, 1997.
4. Personal Identity and Quasi-Responsibility, Moral Responsibility and Ontology Conference, Zeno Institute for Philosophy and The Leiden-Utrecht Research Institute, The Netherlands, 1998.
5. Explaining Evil: Why the Metaethicist Should Study the Holocaust, Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust, Eastern Meeting, 1998.
6. Comment on Michael Ridge's "Why Particularists Cannot Explain Supervenience", American Philosophical Association, Central Division, 1999.
7. Advice and Moral Objectivity, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri–St. Louis, 2000.
8. Stories, Histories, and Moral Knowledge, North American Society for Social Philosophy, Eastern Michigan University, 2001.
(Also at the Central States Philosophical Association, University of Oklahoma, 1999.)
9. Psychologism, Practical Reason, and The Possibility of Error, Central States Philosophical Association, 2001.
10. Do as I Want, Not as I Say, American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, 2001.
(Also at the 29th Conference on Value Inquiry, 2001.)
11. Psychologism, Practical Reason, and The Possibility of Error, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2002.
12. Comment on Valerie Tiberius's, "Cynicism, Optimism, and the Endorsement of Ends", Central States Philosophical Association, University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002.
13. A Refutation of Utilitarianism, Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 2002.
(Also at Washington University, 2002; University of Missouri-Columbia, 2003, the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2003, and the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, 2003.)
14. Hurray for Heteronomy!: Comment on Travis Butler's, "Trusting Moral Experts", American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, 2002.
15. Trusting Advice and Weakness of Will, Philosophers' Forum, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2004.
16. On Some Limits of Trying To Do One's Best, Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University—Edwardsville, 2004. (Also at Workshop for Politics, Ethics, and Society, Washington University, 2004.)
17. Comment on Tedesco's "Indirect Consequentialism, Suboptimality, and Friendship", American Philosophical Association, Central Division, April 2006.
18. Comment on Ben Eggleston and Dale Miller's, "India House Utilitarianism", Central States Philosophical Association, University of Memphis, 2006.
19. On Indirectly Self-Defeating Moral Theories, Northwest Philosophy Conference, University of Portland, November 2006.

20. The Problem of Evil and the Grammar of Goodness, Baylor Philosophy of Religion Conference, Baylor University, Waco, TX, 2007.
21. Intentional Action, and “In Order To”, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, 2007.
22. On Some Limits of Trying to Do One's Best, Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference, University of Colorado, 2008.
23. Feed the Musicians, Soak the Rich, Music and Morality Conference, London, 2009.
24. Williams on Thick Concepts and Reasons for Actions, Thick Concepts Conference, University of Kent, Canterbury, England.
25. Practical Gettier Problems, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, The University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, 2009.
26. Four Ways to Think about Kinds of Moral Theories, Department of Philosophy Colloquium Series, New School for Social Research, 2010.
27. Comments on Driver's Objective Consequentialism, WPES at Washington University, 2011.
28. Rethinking the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise, Brackenridge Conference at University of Texas-San Antonio, 2012.
29. Getting Real about Trusting Moral Expertise, WPES at Washington University, 2012.
30. Belief, Knowledge and the Quaternary Value Problem, European Epistemology Network, Bologna, 2012. (Also at the Joint Session, Stirling, 2012.)
31. Rossian Deontology and the Possibility of Moral Expertise, Saint Louis University, 2012. (Also at Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics, Tucson, 2013).
32. In the Beginning was the Doing: The Premises of Practical Reasoning, Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference, University of Colorado, 2013.
33. Against Advice. Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference, University of Colorado, 2014.
34. Peer Disagreement and the Dunning-Kruger Effect, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Charleston, 2014. (Also at the APA-Eastern, 2014; SLU Epistemology Workshop 2015).
35. Marx, Epistemic Solidarity and Happiness, Kansas Workshop on Well-Being, 2015.
36. Moral Testimony: Going on the Offensive, Chapel Hill Metaethics Workshop, 2015. (Also at the St. Louis Ethics Workshop, 2015).
37. Comments on Miles Tucker, “Thomson and Goodness: A Defense of Moorean Moral Philosophy”, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, 2016.
38. Comments on Pamela Hieronymi, “Standpoints and Freedom”, Saint Louis University Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, 2016.
39. Moral Advice and Joint Agency, Bled Philosophical Conferences, 2016. (Also at the Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference 2016, Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics 2017, and British Society for Ethical Theory 2017).

40. Critic of Lisa Tessman's *Moral Failure*, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, 2017.
41. (En)joining Others, New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility, 2017.
42. Advice, Autonomy, and Empowering the Powerless, Virtue and Moral Reasoning under Oppressive Social Conditions Workshop, Concordia University, Montreal, 2018 (invited keynote speaker).
43. Comments on Sergio Tenenbaum, "Instrumental Virtues", Normativity and Reasoning VI Workshop, The NYU Abu Dhabi Institute, 2018.
44. Comments on Amelia Hicks, "Exculpation and Moral Theories", Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop, 2018.
45. The Logic of Collective Well-Being, Kansas Workshop on Well-Being, 2018. (Also at Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 2018, and St. Louis Ethics Workshop 2019.) [Also titled, "What is Group Well-Being?"]
46. Comments on Elizabeth Cohen, "Out of Line: The Political and Distributive Saliency of Queues, Lines, and Ordered Waiting", Workshop in Politics, Ethics, and Society, Washington University, 2018.
47. Comments on Christopher Blake-Turner, "What Basing Might Be", American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, 2019.
48. Mince Pie Reasons (invited symposium paper), American Philosophical Association, Central Division, 2019.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE AND ASSOCIATIONS (SUMMARY)

Outside Examiner, Honors Program, Knox College, 2002.

Referee, Stenner Prize, Washington University (four times).

SLACRR, co-founder and organizer, 2010-present.

SLEW, co-founder and organizer, 2011-present.

APA Central Division Program Committee, 2014.

Referee: Oxford University Press, *Social Theory and Practice*, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, *Ethics*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, and many others.

Member: American Philosophical Association, Southwestern Philosophical Society, Central States Philosophical Association, British Society for Ethical Theory

HONORS AND AWARDS

Echols Scholar, University of Virginia, 1986-89.

University Fellowship, University of Chicago, 1990-94.

Mellon Foundation Summer Stipend, University of Chicago, 1993.

Zallys and Shaw Stipends, University of Chicago, 1994-95.
Mellon Foundation Dissertation Fellowship, University of Chicago, 1995-96.
University Junior Nominee for NEH Grant, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2000-01.
University of Missouri-St. Louis Research Grant, 2001.
Meritorious Service Award, Students with Disabilities Association, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2001-4.
University of Missouri-St. Louis Small Grants Award, 2002.
University of Missouri-St. Louis Research Grant, 2002.
University of Missouri Research Board Award, 2002.
University of Missouri-St. Louis Small Grants Award, 2003.
University of Missouri-St. Louis Research Grant, 2006.
University of Missouri-St. Louis Small Grants Award, 2006.
University of Missouri-St. Louis Small Grants Award, 2008.
University of Missouri Research Board Award, 2010-11.
University of Missouri Research Board Award, 2015.
University of Missouri-St. Louis Research Grant, 2018.