IN THE MATTER OF: )
)
WILLIAM R. JONES, No. 99951 ) DEATH PENALTY CASE
) EXECUTION SET FOR 12:01 A.M.
Potosi Correctional Center ) NOVEMBER 20, 2002
Mineral Point, MO 63660 )
TO: THE HONORABLE BOB HOLDEN
Governor of the State of Missouri:
COMES NOW William R. "Billy" Jones, by and through counsel, Charles M. Rogers and Cheryl A. Pilate, and petitions the Governor for an order under Article IV Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution and Sections 217.800 and 552.0070, Mo. Rev. Stat., ordering that his sentence be commuted from death by lethal injection to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole; or, in the alternative, for an order staying the execution presently scheduled for November 20, 2002 and appointing a board of inquiry under Section 552.070 to investigate this case. This written Application is accompanied by a videotape which supports and supplements it, and which is incorporated by reference.
Billy Jones has not been treated fairly by the courts which have reviewed his death sentence, because his very strong claim that his attorneys were ineffective by failing to prepare for the penalty phase of his trial has been overlooked by the same courts which have granted relief to other petitioners with similar but weaker claims. The United States Supreme Court granted relief to Terry Williams on a similar, but weaker claim. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has granted relief on similar claims numerous times, including to Willie Simmons, Calvert Antwine, Darrell Hill and Kenny Kenley. The court system has failed Billy Jones and has treated him unfairly. Only you, Governor Holden, can remedy this breakdown of the judicial system through the use of executive clemency.
Because of his trial attorneys' failure, the jury which sentenced Billy Jones to die never heard the extensive and substantial mitigating evidence which explains in real, human terms how he came to kill Stanley Albert. This includes evidence of an abusive upbringing in a chaotic, dysfunctional family; evidence of mental illness, and evidence of serious brain damage suffered by Billy when he was attacked and violently beaten just a few months before the offense. This evidence is powerful and largely uncontested. If the jurors had heard this evidence, they would not have sentenced Billy Jones to die, but would have sentenced him instead to life imprisonment. Since this evidence is now before you, Governor Holden, it is up to you to do what the jury would have done if it had been before them; to commute Billy's death sentence to life imprisonment.
William Jones' case has received a great deal of international attention, both because he is married to Gerti Jones, an Austrian business woman, and because the international community correctly perceives this case as one in which the American justice system has broken down. The government of Austria, the Council of Europe, and the Vatican have all sent written pleas, asking that Mr. Jones' sentence be commuted to life imprisonment. The legal inequities in this case implicate treaties to which the United States is a signatory. To execute Mr. Jones would tarnish Missouri's international image, but a grant of executive clemency would vindicate our constitutional system in which the executive has the power to remedy a failure of the judicial system.
William R. "Billy" Jones has not been treated fairly by the courts, state and federal, which have reviewed his death sentence. Billy Jones has a very strong and compelling claim that his trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance at the penalty phase of his trial. Other death-sentenced inmates with similar but weaker claims have been granted relief by the courts, but Mr. Jones has not. Billy's two trial lawyers, neither of whom had ever tried a capital case or even a murder case before (and neither of whom is currently practicing law) (1) did nothing whatsoever to prepare for the penalty phase prior to trial. No mental evaluation, no social history, no mitigation investigation; nothing whatsoever. Even though Billy had given them a written account of what he remembered of the events surrounding Mr. Albert's death, an account which clearly revealed Billy's mental disorder, they took no steps to investigate this account or to have Billy's mental condition evaluated.
The jury which sentenced Billy Jones to die never heard that he had significant brain damage as a result of being savagely attacked and beaten just a few short months before Mr. Jones shot and killed Stanley Albert. The jury which sentenced Billy Jones to die never heard of the abusive, chaotic and dysfunctional family in which Billy grew up. They never heard how Billy's father smashed a guitar over young Billy's head, probably inflicting lasting brain damage. The jury which sentenced twenty-one-year-old Billy Jones to die never heard that Billy's brain damage would have caused him to misinterpret the forty-nine-year-old Mr. Albert's advances as aggressive and threatening. They never heard that Billy was suffering from a mental disorder which made him panic and enter a "dissociative" state when Mr. Albert came on to him sexually, even though Billy was living a bisexual lifestyle at the time. Certainly, if the jury had heard all of this evidence about Billy Jones and what led him to kill Stanley Albert, they would never have sentenced Billy to die.
Billy Jones is married to Gerti Jones, an Austrian businesswoman. Mrs. Jones has brought the facts of Billy's case to the attention of the Austrian government, the Council of Europe, and many prominent Europeans. The Vatican has also urged that Mr. Jones be granted clemency. This case has garnered international attention, in large part because of the extremely strong mitigating evidence which the jury never heard, and the failure of the judicial system to grant any sort of relief. Indeed, in Europe, this case is rightly viewed as showing a breakdown in the American criminal justice system. In fact, the legal inequities in this case amount to a violation of international law as set forth in treaties to which the United States is a signatory. Europeans generally oppose the death penalty, and they point to this case to show how flawed the administration of the death penalty can become in the United States. Executing Billy Jones will forever tarnish the international image of Missouri. On the other hand, commuting Billy's sentence to life imprisonment will demonstrate that our system of separation of powers works, that a misfunction of the judiciary can be corrected through the exercise of the constitutional powers of the executive branch.
The essence of judicial fairness is that similarly situated litigants be treated similarly. In light of this indisputable principle, it is indeed baffling that the courts have not granted Mr. Jones relief on his claim that his lawyers were ineffective by not preparing for the penalty phase of his trial. Similar, but weaker, claims have resulted in relief in numerous cases. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and ordered relief on such a claim in Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected Mr. Jones' claim, has granted relief on similar claims in many cases, most recently in Simmons v. Luebbers, 299 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 2002). Other Eighth Circuit cases where relief was granted on such claims include Antwine v. Delo, 54 F. 3d 1357 (8th Cir.1995); Hill v. Lockhart, 28 F. 3d 832 (8th Cir. 1994); and Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir. 1991). A brief discussion of those cases will demonstrate that Mr. Jones' claim warrants the relief he has been denied.
In Williams, the United States Supreme Court ordered the granting of habeas relief to a state prisoner whose trial lawyers "failed to investigate and to present substantial mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury." Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1511. In support of its decision that the trial attorneys were ineffective and that Mr. Williams was prejudiced within the meaning of Strickland, the Supreme Court relied on the following facts:
* Mr. Williams' trial counsel did not "begin to prepare for [the penalty] phase of the proceeding until a week before trial."
* Counsel "failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing Williams' nightmarish childhood."
* Counsel failed to investigate evidence that Williams' parents severely neglected and physically abused him.
* Counsel failed to introduce available evidence that Williams had a mental deficiency, was identified as "borderline mentally retarded," and had difficulties in school.
* Counsel failed to introduce any evidence concerning Williams' positive accomplishments.
* Counsels' decisions not to investigate or present evidence were not strategic and "clearly demonstrated" counsels' failure to fulfill "their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background."
See Williams, 120 S. Ct. 1514-15.
What is striking about these observations of the Supreme Court is that each one of them could have been made about Mr. Jones' case. In fact, one almost could substitute the name "Jones" for "Williams" throughout the Supreme Court's discussion because each failure by Mr. Williams' counsel was nearly identical to a failure by Mr. Jones' counsel. Mr. Jones' lawyers did not start penalty phase preparation the week before trial, like Williams' lawyers did, but waited until after the guilty verdict to even think about it. Similarly to Mr. Williams' counsel, Mr. Jones' lawyers failed to introduce available evidence that Billy was learning disabled and had difficulties in school, but they also failed to develop and present evidence that Billy had suffered brain damage and suffered from other mental disorders as well. In this regard, certainly, Mr. Jones' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase is stronger than Terry Williams'.
The Simmons case also presents facts that are materially indistinguishable from those presented in Mr. Jones' case. And, like Mr. Williams, Willie Simmons obtained relief. In Simmons, the Eighth Circuit found that Mr. Simmons' attorneys performed ineffectively during the penalty phase because they failed to introduce evidence of Simmons' traumatic childhood, which included domestic violence, substance abuse by his father and severe beatings by both parents. They also failed to introduce evidence of Simmons' difficulties as a juvenile, which would have included an assault and possible homosexual rape by a stranger. A report from one of the mental health professionals who later examined Simmons "would have introduced the possibility that Simmons's inability to control his violent behavior was caused by childhood trauma and abuse." Simmons, 299 F.3d at 936.
Significantly, the evidence of aggravation was much more extensive in Simmons than it was in Mr. Jones' case. Still, the Eighth Circuit found prejudice to Mr. Simmons from his attorneys' failures. "By the time the state was finished with its case, the jury's perception of Simmons could not have been more unpleasant. Mitigating evidence was essential to provide some sort of explanation for Simmons's abhorrent behavior." Id. at 938 (emphasis added).
Calvert Antwine's trial counsel, like Mr. Jones' counsel, failed to investigate and present evidence that he was suffering from a mental disease (bi-polar disorder) at the time of his offense. Antwine, 54 F.3d at 1365. At Antwine's state post-conviction hearing, Dr. William O'Connor (2) testified that Antwine suffered from the disorder. Id. at 1366-67. The state motion court professed to disbelieve that evidence, just as Mr. Jones' state post-conviction motion court professed to reject Dr. O'Connor's diagnosis of Mr. Jones' condition. Id. at 1365-66. In fact, Mr. Jones' case is more compelling than Antwine's, since Antwine's trial counsel at least had the benefit of a perfunctory court-ordered mental examination. Id. at 1365. In contrast, Mr. Jones' trial attorneys did not seek or obtain any mental health information whatsoever. However, in Mr. Antwine's case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found a reasonable probability that evidence of Antwine's mental impairment at the penalty phase could have resulted in a different outcome, and held that Antwine's sentence was constitutionally invalid under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 1368.
In Hill v. Lockhart, Hill's lawyers acquired substantial information about Hill's history of psychiatric treatment, and secured evaluations of Hill by a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist. However, they did not obtain or seek to obtain records of Hill's 1968 hospitalization in Oklahoma. Hill, 28 F. 3d 832, 839-845. Those records contained information concerning Hill's positive response to anti-psychotic drugs, which, coupled with the evidence of his failure to take anti-psychotic drugs in the days leading up to the crime, "would have been critical in attempting to show the mitigating circumstances either of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, or of impaired capacity, caused by mental disease or defect, to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Id. at 845. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found, "because Mr. Hill's lawyers failed to present evidence with respect to his history and anti-psychotic drugs, and his regression to a psychotic state when he stopped taking those drugs, the penalty phase of his state court trial was rendered fundamentally unfair." Id. at 847. Again, no principled reason appears to justify withholding from Mr. Jones the relief which the Court of Appeals granted Mr. Hill.
The Eighth Circuit case of Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir. 1991), involved a crime spree in which, "Kenley committed one murder, shot two bystanders, abducted two bystanders, stole two cars, committed several assaults and robbed four businesses in just a few hours." Id. at 1299. Before trial, Kenley's counsel corresponded with Kenley's former social worker, Mrs. Crownover and received her records and had Kenley evaluated by a state psychiatrist. Mrs. Crownover referred counsel to a Dr. Manion who had previously examined and treated Kenley, but counsel never contacted Manion. Id. at 1300. Counsel failed to obtain and review medical reports from Dr. Richards, Kenley's military records, and family testimony regarding Kenley's background and behavior, id. at 1302, although this information was documented in the records provided to counsel. Id. at 1306. Not only did the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals find that counsel's failure to further investigate this mitigating evidence was unreasonable, id. at 1308, it also found prejudice from counsel's failure, and reversed the denial of penalty phase relief. Id. at 1309-1310. Again, a thorough reading of Kenley discloses no principled distinction between that case and the case of Mr. Jones, where the denial of relief was affirmed.
Mr. Jones' trial lawyers were even less effective in terms of the penalty phase than the trial lawyers in Williams, Simmons, Antwine, Hill and Kenley. Mr. Jones' attorneys did nothing whatsoever before trial to prepare for the penalty phase. After Mr. Jones was found guilty, but before the penalty phase began, his attorneys asked his family members if they were aware of anything showing Mr. Jones to be a "good person" or to show why "He's the way he is for whatever reason." Beyond this belated and cursory inquiry, Mr. Jones' attorneys took no steps to investigate possible mitigating evidence.
Although the lawyers were aware that Mr. Jones' home life was troubled, they failed to investigate his background in any way, or to develop any evidence which would have allowed them to cast their client as a more sympathetic figure during the penalty phase. The importance of such mitigating evidence can scarcely be doubted. In fact, the Supreme Court, in discussing Terry Williams' background - which was very similar to Mr. Jones' background - refers to Williams' "nightmarish childhood" which is "graphically" documented in various records. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1514. The Supreme Court also refers to the fact that Williams was "severally and repeatedly beaten by his father." Id. These facts are indistinguishable from the facts present in Mr. Jones' background.
Trial counsel failed to investigate in any way the account of the offense given them by Mr. Jones in his letter, even though that account certainly contained details that should have apprised any attorney that Mr. Jones was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the killing. Despite this clear indication, counsel failed to have a mental evaluation of petitioner conducted.
Rather, trial counsel based their entire strategy on a ludicrously unrealistic assessment of the prosecution's case. Mr. Frankum, the lead trial counsel, testified that he believed it likely the case would result in a directed verdict of acquittal. That assessment, apparently also shared by his co-counsel, Mr. Morgens, proved to be nothing but a pipe dream. In fact, the prosecution's evidence that Mr. Jones killed Mr. Albert can fairly be characterized as overwhelming.
Had counsel investigated Mr. Jones' mental health at the time of the offense, they would have found that Mr. Jones was suffering not only from ego dystonic homosexuality and borderline personality disorder, but that he also had suffered severe neurological impairment due to head injuries some five months before the offense. Counsel could have presented persuasive testimony that, at the time Mr. Albert was killed, Mr. Jones was not capable of deliberating upon the matter. Even if the jurors were not completely convinced by this testimony, and found Mr. Jones guilty of first degree murder, there is certainly a reasonable probability that they would not have sentenced him to death.
Just as the petitioners in Williams, Simmons, Antwine, Hill and Kenley were able to conclusively demonstrate prejudice from their counsel's failure to investigate, develop and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, Mr. Jones similarly has presented overwhelming evidence that his attorneys performed deficiently and that he was grossly prejudiced by their failures. Just as the petitioners in Williams, Simmons, Antwine, Hill and Kenley were entitled to relief, Mr. Jones is entitled to relief. Inexplicably, the courts have treated Mr. Jones differently than those other petitioners. It is up to you, Governor Holden, to restore basic fairness to the judicial process by granting Mr. Jones executive clemency and commuting his sentence to life imprisonment without parole.
They Would Have Sentenced Mr. Jones to Life Imprisonment.
At his trial, William Jones was represented by two attorneys who had never tried a capital case before. Before the trial, they did absolutely nothing whatsoever to prepare for the penalty phase of the trial. Because of this total lack of representation in this crucial area of representation, the jury which sentenced Mr. Jones to die never heard extensive and significant evidence in mitigation, which could have explained Mr. Jones' involvement in the murder. That evidence, which would have been developed and presented by even minimally competent trial counsel, was developed in the post-conviction process. It includes evidence of an abusive upbringing in a chaotic and dysfunctional family, evidence of mental disorders, and a very significant history of brain damage. In fact, just a few short months before he killed Stanley Albert, Billy Jones had been viciously attacked and beaten about the head. He was hospitalized for several days, and underwent marked behavioral changes as a result of the injuries he sustained. The jury which sentenced him to die never knew any of this information.
William Jones, who was 21 at the time of his arrest, was the second child in a violent, chaotic and dysfunctional family. His parents fought frequently, both verbally and physically. They engaged in sexual conduct in front of their children, freely used alcohol and marijuana in the home, and introduced their children to those substances. The father, William Jones, Sr., had a hot temper and was quick to resort to his fists. He frequently hurled objects, dragged his daughter by her hair, beat his son with a belt, and during one especially violent episode, broke a guitar over his son's head. Violence and substance abuse permeated the Joneses' family life.
In addition to the constant violence, Mr. Jones and his sister also suffered from neglect. The parents divorced when Mr. Jones was approximately 12 years old. During his adolescence, he drifted from one parent's household to the other, seeking attention but finding none. Mr. Jones soon became involved in petty thievery. (His father was a petty thief throughout the marriage, often stealing things while the children were present.) Billy's sister, Kathy, began working as an "exotic dancer" at the age of 15 and quickly lured her younger brother into the dancing world, where drug use and promiscuity were the norms. As a teenager, Mr. Jones experienced transient heterosexual and homosexual relationships. His schooling suffered; he was an extremely poor student and had problems with reading and comprehension. Teachers placed him in classes for the learning disabled.
During his childhood, Mr. Jones suffered numerous head injuries which resulted in concussions and short term physical impairment. One of those incidents involved the guitar bashing by his father. In July 1985, just five months before the death of Stanley Albert, two male assailants severely beat Mr. Jones at the Liberty Memorial (a homosexual meeting area in Kansas City). Mr. Jones sustained numerous injuries, including significant trauma to his head and a skull fracture. During a week-long stay at St. Mary's hospital, tests revealed that Mr. Jones had suffered a cerebrum contusion of the left temporal and parietal lobes, and hematoma with associated edema in the right temporal lobe. (3) Following his release from the hospital, family members observed changes in Mr. Jones' conduct and mannerisms. He became volatile, moody, impulsive, and unable to control his temper.
Dr. William O'Connor, a neuropsychologist, later concluded, based on his interview of Mr. Jones and the results of psychological testing, that Mr. Jones had a "mental disease or defect" called "ego dystonic homosexuality" and also suffered from borderline personality disorder and "dissociative disorder with panic attacks." Dr. O'Connor diagnosed Mr. Jones according to the criteria set forth in the DSM III (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition, the edition which was current at the time of that evaluation). Dr. O'Connor explained that "ego dystonic homosexuality" disorder was a condition in which someone with homosexual tendencies suffers from substantial conflict and confusion regarding his sexual identity and may be distressed or revolted by homosexual conduct. Dr. O'Connor further concluded that, at the time of the offense, Mr. Jones suffered from an "acute depersonalization disorder" and was not capable of appreciating the criminality of his conduct or conforming his conduct to the law. According to Dr. O'Connor, Mr. Jones had described a sexual proposition and explicit advance by Mr. Albert and a panicked reaction on his part. He did remember shooting a gun, but experienced intermittent memory loss concerning the actual killing.
Dr. O'Connor also reviewed Mr. Jones' records from St. Mary's hospital, where he was treated after suffering the July 1985 beating at the Liberty Memorial. After examining the records of a CT scan and EEG, Dr. O'Connor concluded that Mr. Jones suffered residual brain damage resulting from the severe assault. Dr. O'Connor noted that the area of the damage could cause certain types of memory loss, gaps in thinking, and the inability to concentrate when in a state of panic. Dr. O'Connor opined that Mr. Jones, because of the confusion as to his sexual identity, entered into a dissociative state in which he reacted in panicked manner when propositioned by Mr. Albert. Because of the head injury and his mental disorder, Mr. Jones was incapable of appreciating the nature, quality and wrongfulness of his conduct.
In his first meeting with his attorneys, Mr. Jones told them he committed the killing. He later wrote a letter in which he described the events surrounding Mr. Albert's death. Although Mr. Jones told his lawyers that Albert had sexually propositioned him and that he may have acted in self defense, his attorneys did nothing to investigate such a defense. They also did nothing to investigate a possible mental defense, even though the letter put them on notice that Mr. Jones may have had a dissociative experience during his encounter with Mr. Albert.
At the state court post-conviction hearing, lead trial attorney John Frankum admitted that he did nothing to locate school records of Mr. Jones, that he did not recall whether he discussed Mr. Jones' childhood with him, that he did not discuss with Mr. Jones' mother the reasons for her divorce or its impact on young William, and that he did not recall whether he spoke to Mr. Jones' sister about life in the Jones' household. The only conversation he clearly recalled which could be deemed an inquiry into mitigation occurred after Mr. Jones was convicted and the penalty phase was set to begin the next day. Frankum and co-counsel Ken Morgens asked Mr. Jones' parents and sister to "search their minds" and tell them anything that would show Mr. Jones to be a "good person" or to show why "he's the way he is for whatever reason." According to Frankum, an "embarrassing silence" followed, and the family members did not offer any information. No other effort was made to develop this evidence.
Dr. Richard Sweetland, a Kansas City psychologist, interviewed Mr. Jones and administered psychological tests. He concurred with Dr. O'Connor's diagnosis of ego dystonic homosexuality and depersonalization disorder along with borderline personality disorder. He also found that Mr. Jones' medical history suggested neurological deficits based on various head traumas.
Dr. Bernard Abrams, a psychiatrist and neurologist who practices in Kansas City, Missouri, reviewed Mr. Jones' medical history and conducted an MRI and EEG. His findings confirmed that Mr. Jones showed atrophy in the left parietal region of the focal type and that such atrophy indicated brain damage. The area of the brain suffering atrophy was the same area where Mr. Jones sustained an injury in the 1985 beating incident. Dr. Abrams also noted that this type of brain injury is known to have significant effects on neurobehavioral functioning, including diminished ability to control oneself, diminished reasoning and calculating power as well as general diminution of one's personal sense of self-esteem. Dr. Abrams opined that significant neurobehavioral aberrations would have occurred from the time of the injury - July 12, 1985 - through the time of the offense, and that it was possible that there would be a predilection to a breakdown of social norms and panic in a poorly compensated individual.
All of this information fits together to show a coherent picture of Billy Jones - emotionally scarred, sexually ambivalent, mentally ill and brain damaged - at the time he killed Stanley Albert. It explains that killing in far more human terms than the picture the jury was given by the prosecution. It makes a compelling case that Billy should not be put to death for that killing. It has the power of truth. But the jury never heard any of it, and they sentenced Billy to die.
Billy Jones does not deny killing Stanley Albert. He freely acknowledges that he deserves harsh punishment for that crime. Life imprisonment without any prospect of release is, indeed, a harsh punishment. You, Governor Holden, have before you this compelling mitigating evidence. You have the picture which explains both the crime and the criminal. It is up to you to do what the jurors would have done if they had possessed this information; to sentence William Jones to life imprisonment without parole.
The case of William R. Jones has drawn international attention for several reasons:
1. Mr. Jones is married to an Austrian citizen, Gertrude Seidwaldstatter (now Gertrude Jones).
2. The failure of Mr. Jones to obtain a new sentencing trial even though other defendants have obtained such relief on lesser grounds highlights the arbitrariness that often attends the application of the death penalty in the United States. Certainly, fundamental fairness and due process require that Mr. Jones be granted the same relief that has been afforded to other defendants. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987).
3. Treaties which the United States has ratified favor granting relief. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains articles prohibiting the arbitrary taking of human life (ICCPR, art. 6), prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment (ICCPR, art. 7), and guaranteeing the right to due process (ICCPR, art. 14).
4. From an international perspective, the death penalty is viewed very negatively. The United States is the only western democracy that permits the death penalty. Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, succinctly summarized international sentiment against the death penalty:
The increasing use of the death penalty in the United States and in a number of other states is a matter of serious concern and runs counter to the international community's expressed desire for the abolition of the death penalty.
A. Appeals from Austrians to Spare the Life of Mr. Jones
Since December 2000, Mr. Jones has been married to Gertrude Seidwaldstatter, who is now known by the name Gerti Jones. Mr. Jones' connection with Austria and his marriage to an Austrian citizen has galvanized European opposition to the scheduled execution. Hundreds of Austrians as well as the Austrian government itself have forcefully spoken out, beseeching you, Mr. Governor, to grant clemency.
A letter to you from Peter Moser, the Austrian Ambassador to the United States, makes an "urgent humanitarian appeal" in the name of the President of Austria, to spare the life of William Jones. The letter, attached as part of Exhibit 11, states: "Austria, as all European Union members, is opposed to the death penalty in all cases and has strongly been advocating its universal abolition." Mr. Moser cites numerous mitigating factors in Mr. Jones' case, particularly focusing on the failure to present mental and other mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. The letter concludes:
In the name of the Federal President of Austria, I therefore respectfully ask you, Mr. Governor, to take into consideration all the aforementioned mitigating factors and to exercise all the powers vested in your office to commute Mr. Jones' penalty to any penalty other than capital punishment.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, also sent a letter to you, seeking fairness and mercy for Mr. Jones. Ms. Ferrero-Waldner's letter observes that "in the case of Mr. Jones there are a number of mitigating circumstances which may not have been taken into account in the court proceedings against him." See Exhibit 11.
Several other Austrian dignitaries also urge clemency. The Governor of Salzburg, Dr. Franz Schausberger, states there are good reasons for clemency, including brain damage. The Governor also voices the heartfelt concern of his populace: "William R. Jones is married to a woman from Salzburg. This explains why so many people here and in Austria are concerned with what will happen to him." See Exhibit 11.
Dr. Helmut Zilk, the former governor of the Province of Vienna states that he has studied Mr. Jones' case at length and believes that he deserves to be pardoned. "I was particularly taken aback by the fact that both of the defendant's defense attorneys admitted that they hardly touched upon the defendant's family and social environment or the medical and psychological aspects of the crime. . . .I believe the death penalty is inappropriate in this case." See Exhibit 11.
Another Austrian official, Dr. Heinz Fischer, cites Mr. Jones' violent upbringing, youth at the time of the crime, brain damage, and poor legal representation as proper grounds for sparing Mr. Jones' life. He appeals to you, Mr. Governor, "to check these arguments once again and to spare William Robert Jones' life." See Exhibit 11.
Other officials throughout Europe have also lent their support to Mr. Jones' request for clemency. Walter Schwimmer, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, states that the planned execution of Mr. Jones is "particularly abhorrent" because Mr. Jones suffers from a mental disorder. Mr. Schwimmer states: "His execution would not only flout Resolution 2002/77 adopted by the UN Human Rights Commission on 25 April 2002 but would also contravene international legal standards, including those drawn up by the Council of Europe." See Exhibit 11.
Mr. Jones' scheduled execution has also drawn the attention of hundreds of Austrian citizens, who have signed a petition on the Internet urging that Mr. Jones' life be spared. To date, the petition has been signed by more than 350 Austrians. Other countries whose citizens have signed the petition include: Italy, France, Britain, Portugal, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Ireland, Hungary, Romania, Belgium, Sweden, Taiwan, and Switzerland. Although the petition has not been widely circulated in the United States, it has attracted several signatures here as well.
B. United States Is Alone Among Western Democracies in Supporting the Death Penalty.
The European community strongly opposes the death penalty, and membership in the European Union is contingent upon the member country abolishing the death penalty. For instance, the Turkish Parliament recently approved legislation to abolish the death penalty to improve its chances of joining the European Union. The United States is alone among western democracies in its use of the death penalty. Recent statistics compiled by the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) reveal that the United States is one of the world leaders in executions, coming in third behind China and the Congo and running just ahead of Iran. Other countries making regular use of execution include Egypt, Belarus, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Vietnam, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Jordan. Although the trend is toward abolition - more than half of the countries in the world have abolished the death penalty in law or practice - the United States executes dozens of its citizens every year.
The regular resort to execution in the United States baffles our European allies. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Schwimmer of the Council of Europe writes to you to express his "deepest concern and abhorrence about the imminent execution of William Robert Jones." Unfortunately, the case of Mr. Jones has shone a harsh spotlight on the inequities and caprices of the American system of justice, which sometimes allows one person to be put to death while another, with the very same claim to relief, obtains justice.
Under these circumstances, international treaties may provide some guidance. As noted above, various articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protect against the arbitrary deprivation of life, prohibit cruel and unusual punishment and guarantee due process. (See ICCPR, art. 6, 7, 14). Certainly, the hallmarks of due process include equality before the court or tribunal and a fair hearing before an impartial decision maker. In fact, article 14 of the ICCPR specifically provides for these rights.
The provisions of the ICCPR constitute more than lofty sentiments and pretty language. The provisions of this treaty reflect the highest ideals of our country and deserve our scrupulous respect. For reasons unknown, the federal courts and the courts of Missouri have not yet granted relief to Mr. Jones. It is now up to you, Mr. Governor, to consider the principles of the ICCPR as well as the principles of justice and mercy as you review Mr. Jones' request for clemency.
C. The Vatican Urges Clemency
Mr. Jones' plea for justice and mercy has also obtained the support of Pope John Paul II. In the name of the Holy Father, Archbishop Gabriel Montalvo, of the Apostolic Nunciature, has dispatched an urgent appeal requesting clemency for Mr. Jones. In a separate letter to Mr. Jones' supporters, the Archbishop states: "Please be assured of my unity in spirit in your endeavor. . . .Let God be your strength and guide." See Exhibit 11.
As all of the above petitions and letters indicate, international sentiment cries out against the impending execution of Billy Jones. To carry out this execution would surely tarnish the image of Missouri and the United States throughout the world. Our Missouri Constitution gives you, Mr. Governor, the power and, therefore, the duty to stop this execution. We implore you to exercise that power and show the world that our system truly provides fair and equal justice. We urge you to commute Mr. Jones' sentence to life imprisonment.
William Jones will be killed in the name of the State of Missouri at one minute after midnight on November 20, unless you, Governor Holden, act. The courts have failed Billy Jones. Billy's trial lawyers failed him, and the jury did not hear the compelling evidence which would have spared his life. The international community asks mercy for Billy, even as it watches in fear that its negative view of American capital punishment will be fulfilled. The Missouri Constitution gives you the power, and the facts of this case give you the duty, to remedy this unjust sentence by commuting it to life imprisonment. We implore you to do your duty, to show mercy, and to exercise that constitutional power. We implore you, Governor Holden, to spare Billy's life.
Respectfully submitted,
WYRSCH HOBBS & MIRAKIAN, P.C.
By: CHARLES A. ROGERS MO#25539
CHERYL A. PILATE MO#42266
1101 Walnut Suite 1300
Kansas City, Missouri 64106
816-221-0080 Telephone
816-221-3280 Facsimile
ATTORNEYS FOR WILLIAM R. JONES
1. John Frankum lead trial counsel, has been disbarred. He manages a tavern in Warrensburg, Missouri. Ken Morgens, the other trial attorney, is working as a pit boss at a Kansas City riverboat casino.
2. The same psychologist who testified at Mr. Jones' state post-conviction hearing.
3. The medical records from that hospitalization are attached. Trial counsel made no attempt to obtain these records or to use them as mitigation at trial.