

## **Description of Variables and Question Wording**

### **Immigrant Resentment (CCES 2014 and 2015 $\alpha = .84$ )**

*We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions. Responses recoded to indicate that higher values reflect more resentment.*

In your view, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
(Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree)

1. The more influence that immigrant have in politics the less influence people like me will have in politics.
2. English will be threatened if other languages are frequently used in large immigrant communities in the U.S.
3. New immigrants have increased the level of crime in the United States.
4. The Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Today's immigrants should do the same without any special favors.
5. Immigrants are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
6. Legal immigrants should have same rights as an American.

### **Black resentment (CCES 2014 $\alpha = .75$ ; CCES 2015 $\alpha = .72$ ).**

*We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions. Responses recoded to indicate higher values reflect more resentment.*

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

(Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree)

1. The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

### **Voter fraud ( $\alpha = .91$ )**

*We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions. Responses recoded to indicate higher values reflect beliefs that voter fraud occurs more frequently.*

How often do the following illegal practices occur in U.S. elections?

(It is very common; It occurs occasionally; It occurs infrequently; It almost never occurs)

1. People voting more than once in an election
2. People stealing or tampering with ballots that have been voted
3. People pretending to be someone else when going to vote
4. People voting who are not U.S. citizens

### **Party Identification**

*Partisanship is coded so that higher scores indicate Republicans.*

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party? (Strong Democrat; Not very strong Democrat; Lean Democrat; Independent; Lean Republican; Not very strong Republican; Strong Republican)

In Table S-1, we show the distribution of support for several election reform proposals, taken from the post-election wave of the 2014 CCES and the 2015 CCES. The order of the questions was randomized. The two voter identification policies enjoy the strongest support compared to the other reforms. All of the other reform proposals are supported by a majority of the public except voting by mail. For each policy we also find very similar levels of aggregate support across the two surveys.

**Table S-1. Support for Election Reform Proposals**

Reform Proposal	Survey	Support strongly	Support somewhat	Oppose somewhat	Oppose strongly
Require all people to show proof of citizenship when they register to vote	2014 CCES (N=852)	56%	25%	10%	9%
	2015 CCES (N=1000)	59%	18%	11%	12%
Require all people to show government issued photo ID when they vote	2014 CCES (N=853)	57%	24%	10%	10%
	2015 CCES (N=988)	57%	24%	9%	10%
Allow convicted felons to vote once they are released from prison	2014 CCES (N=852)	25%	36%	21%	18%
	2015 CCES (N=983)	23%	37%	23%	17%
Run all elections by mail (vote by mail)	2014 CCES (N=849)	10%	21%	28%	41%
	2015 CCES (N=981)	12%	25%	29%	34%
Allow people to register on Election Day at the polls	2014 CCES (N=847)	29%	28%	21%	23%
	2015 CCES (N=991)	31%	31%	19%	19%
Automatically register all citizens over 18 to vote	2014 CCES (N=846)	29%	28%	22%	21%
Allow people to register to vote online	2015 CCES (N=986)	35%	26%	16%	23%
Move Election Day to a weekend	2014 CCES (N=840)	26%	37%	24%	13%

In Table S-2, we show the distribution of six immigrant resentment questions, taken from the pre-election wave of the 2014 CCES and the 2015 CCES.

**Table S-2. Summary Immigrant Resentment Items**

Question	Survey	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree
New immigrants have increased the level of crime in the United States	2014 CCES (N=981)	13%	25%	31%	18%	12%
	2015 CCES (N=992)	21%	26%	26%	16%	11%
Legal immigrants should have the same rights as an American	2014 CCES (N=991)	26%	43%	15%	10%	6%
	2015 CCES (N=993)	34%	35%	13%	12%	7%
Immigrants are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights	2014 CCES (N=990)	19%	28%	24%	16%	13%
	2015 CCES (N=996)	31%	23%	22%	14%	10%
The Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Today's immigrants should do the same without any special favors	2014 CCES (N=992)	27%	39%	21%	9%	5%
	2015 CCES (N=998)	44%	26%	15%	9%	6%
English will be threatened if other languages are frequently used in large immigrant communities in the U.S.	2014 CCES (N=988)	17%	27%	21%	21%	13%
	2015 CCES (N=995)	25%	25%	20%	16%	13%
The more influence that immigrants have in politics the less influence people like me will have in politics	2014 CCES (N=987)	11%	24%	29%	22%	15%
	2015 CCES (N=994)	20%	22%	31%	16%	11%

In Table S-3, we show the distribution of responses on our main voter fraud belief measures, taken in the post-election wave of the CCES. Three out of four of the voter fraud questions measure malfeasance by individual voters, while one measures fraud committed by election officials or poll workers. There is considerable variation in public beliefs about the frequency of voter fraud. A majority or near majority of respondents believe that each type of fraud is very common or occurs occasionally. Non-citizen voting is the activity that respondents are most likely to believe is “very common.”

**Table S-3. Beliefs about the Frequency of Voter Fraud**

How often do these activities occur?	Very common	Occurs occasionally	Occurs infrequently	Almost never
Voting more than once in an election (n=869)	17%	33%	27%	24%
Stealing or tampering with ballots (N=868)	19%	35%	27%	18%
Pretending to be someone else when voting (N=868)	18%	36%	26%	20%
People voting who are not U.S. citizens (N=866)	25%	32%	22%	20%

For each question listed in Table S-2, responses are coded from 1 to 4 with the most frequent category at the high end of the scale. An exploratory factor analysis of the four items reveals just one factor, with the item dealing with official vote tampering producing the weakest factor loading. Furthermore, the four items form a reliable scale.

Figure 1. Support for Voting Restrictions by General Framing Condition




Figure 2. Support for Voting Restrictions by Partisan Framing Condition




Figure 3. Predicted Support for Proof of Citizenship by Framing Condition




Figure 4. Predicted Support for Photo ID Requirement by Framing Condition






Figure 5. Predicted Support for Proof of Citizenship by Respondent Party






Figure 1. Support for Voter Restrictions Among 3rd Generation Whites by Treatment Condition



Source: 2014 CCES. Note: Third generation is defined as respondent, parents, and grandparents born in the U.S.

Figure 2. Predicted Strong Support for Proof of Citizenship Among 3rd Generation by Treatment Condition



Source: 2014 CCES. Note: Third generation defined as respondent, parents, and grandparents born in the U.S.

**Table 1. Predictors of Support for Proof of Citizenship Laws**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	<u>coef.</u> <u>(s.e.)</u>	<u>coef.</u> <u>(s.e.)</u>	coef. (s.e.)
Fraud frame	0.45* (0.27)	-0.17 (0.42)	-0.24 (0.41)
Suppression frame	-0.43 (0.27)	-0.38 (0.26)	-0.43 (0.27)
Immigrant resentment	5.49* (0.52)	4.91* (0.58)	4.02* (0.60)
Fraud frame X Immigrant resentment		1.45* (0.76)	1.69* (0.77)
Racial resentment	0.76* (0.31)	0.75* (0.31)	0.63* (0.32)
Party identification	1.16* (0.35)	1.16* (0.35)	0.96* (0.38)
Non-white	-0.14 (0.21)	-0.14 (0.21)	-0.15 (0.21)
Voter fraud scale			1.87* (0.47)
_ cut1	1.00 (0.31)	0.73 (0.33)	0.94 (0.33)
_ cut2	2.20 (0.30)	1.94 (0.33)	2.20 (0.32)
_ cut3	3.63 (0.32)	3.37 (0.35)	3.67 (0.36)
<i>N</i>	994	994	994
<i>Pseudo R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.25	.26	.27

Source: 2015 CCES.

\*  $p < .1$ , two-tailed. Cell entries are ordinal logit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate stronger support for proof of citizenship policies.

**Table 2. Predictors of Support for Photo ID Laws**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	<u>coef.</u>	<u>coef.</u>	coef.
	<u>(s.e.)</u>	<u>(s.e.)</u>	(s.e.)
Fraud frame	0.35 (0.26)	0.44 (0.49)	0.41 (0.48)
Suppression frame	-0.28 (0.27)	-0.29 (0.26)	-0.33 (0.28)
Immigrant resentment	3.27* (0.50)	3.35* (0.54)	2.49* (0.59)
Fraud frame X Immigrant resentment		-0.18 (0.77)	-0.06 (0.77)
Racial resentment	1.27* (0.31)	1.27* (0.31)	1.15* (0.33)
Party identification	0.88* (0.32)	0.88* (0.32)	0.63* (0.34)
Non-white	0.15 (0.22)	0.15 (0.22)	0.15 (0.23)
Voter fraud scale			1.82* (0.41)
_ cut1	0.21 (0.31)	0.25 (0.35)	0.44 (0.35)
_ cut2	1.26 (0.32)	1.29 (0.36)	1.53 (0.36)
_cut3	2.90 (0.35)	2.94 (0.37)	3.24 (0.37)
<i>N</i>	982	982	982
<i>Pseudo R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.18	.18	.20

Source: 2015 CCES.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , two-tailed. Cell entries are ordinal logit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate stronger support for photo ID requirements.

**Table 3. Predictors of Support for Proof of Citizenship by Partisan Frame**

	All	Democrats	Republicans
	<u>coef.</u>	<u>coef.</u>	coef.
	<u>(s.e.)</u>	<u>(s.e.)</u>	(s.e.)
Immigrant resentment	4.48*	4.62*	1.87
	(0.61)	(0.93)	(1.35)
GOP Fraud frame	0.15	-0.20	-0.73
	(0.49)	(0.58)	(2.20)
Dem Fraud frame	-0.44	-0.90	0.98
	(0.51)	(0.57)	(2.07)
R Fraud frame X Imm. resentment	0.66	1.66	1.72
	(0.92)	(1.47)	(3.41)
D Fraud frame X Imm. resentment	2.66*	3.69*	0.77
	(1.03)	(1.45)	(3.24)
GOP Suppression frame	-0.18	-1.02*	-0.28
	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.71)
Dem Suppression frame	-0.50*	-0.82*	-0.94*
	(0.29)	(0.43)	(0.55)
Racial resentment	0.81*	0.55	1.43*
	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.86)
Non-white	-0.19	0.40	0.06
	(0.21)	(0.28)	(0.56)
Voter fraud scale	1.96*	1.45*	2.97*
	(0.46)	(0.70)	(0.84)
_ cut1	0.98	0.82	0.22
	(0.34)	(0.36)	(1.16)
_ cut2	2.23	2.21	0.84
	(0.33)	(0.38)	(1.12)
_ cut3	3.69	3.72	2.66
	(0.37)	(0.43)	(1.11)
<i>N</i>	995	460	330
<i>Pseudo R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.27	.25	.19

Source: 2015 CCES.

\*  $p < .1$ , two-tailed. Cell entries are ordinal logit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate stronger support for proof of citizenship policies.

**Table 4. Predictors of Support for Photo ID by Partisan Frame**

	All	Democrats	Republicans
	<u>coef.</u>	<u>coef.</u>	coef.
	<u>(s.e.)</u>	<u>(s.e.)</u>	(s.e.)
Immigrant resentment	2.80*	2.90*	0.52
	(0.59)	(1.00)	(1.10)
GOP Fraud frame	0.19	0.27	-0.03
	(0.50)	(0.62)	(3.04)
Dem Fraud frame	0.74	0.73	1.04
	(0.66)	(0.77)	(1.65)
R Fraud frame X Imm. resentment	0.38	0.10	0.79
	(0.81)	(1.38)	(4.15)
D Fraud frame X Imm. resentment	-0.68	-0.35	-1.34
	(1.09)	(1.50)	(2.31)
GOP Suppression frame	-0.26	-0.16	-0.37
	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.54)
Dem Suppression frame	-0.30	-0.46	-0.82*
	(0.31)	(0.47)	(0.44)
Racial resentment	1.28*	1.27*	1.87*
	(0.31)	(0.39)	(0.60)
Non-white	0.12	0.47	-0.19
	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.46)
Voter fraud scale	1.88*	1.80*	2.05*
	(0.41)	(0.63)	(0.66)
_ cut1	0.46	0.52	-1.12
	(0.35)	(0.42)	(0.98)
_ cut2	1.55	1.87	-0.49
	(0.36)	(0.45)	(0.93)
_ cut3	3.25	3.48	1.81
	(0.37)	(0.47)	(0.99)
<i>N</i>	983	453	326
<i>Pseudo R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.19	.18	.13

Source: 2015 CCES.

\*  $p < .1$ , two-tailed. Cell entries are ordinal logit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate stronger support for proof of citizenship policies.

**Table 5. Results from Models of Support for Voter Restrictions, 2014 CCES.**

	(1) Proof of Citizenship	(2) Photo ID
	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>
White vote share decreases	0.26 (0.72)	0.65 (0.67)
White vote share unaffected	-0.01 (0.30)	0.47 (0.32)
White vote share decreases X Immigrant resentment	0.80 (1.30)	-0.86 (1.25)
Immigrant resentment	2.11* (0.90)	1.51 (0.86)
Racial resentment	1.94** (0.61)	2.79*** (0.67)
Party identification	0.24 (0.14)	0.42** (0.14)
Non-white	-0.37 (0.34)	0.70* (0.33)
Voter fraud	0.46* (0.19)	0.63*** (0.18)
_cut1	1.11* (0.55)	2.33*** (0.65)
_cut2	2.16*** (0.53)	3.43*** (0.69)
_cut3	3.70*** (0.57)	5.11*** (0.80)
Wald $\chi^2$	92.53***	63.25***
Pseudo- $R^2$	0.20	0.22
$N$	515	513

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$