Inflation, output growth, and stabilization in Turkey, 1980–2002

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Received 12 September 2002; received in revised form 11 March 2003; accepted 2 April 2003

Abstract

We study output and inflation in Turkey in the last two decades using a dynamic aggregate supply and aggregate demand model with imperfect capital mobility and structural Vector Autoregressions (VAR). Empirical results show terms of trade, monetary, and balance of payments shocks figure prominently in the inflationary process. Output is mostly driven by terms of trade and supply shocks. The results highlight the importance of a credible disinflation program and structural reforms that restrain discretionary aggregate demand policies.

JEL classification: E31; E23; C32

Keywords: Inflation; Stabilization; Turkish economy

1. Introduction

The Turkish economy has been plagued by high and persistent inflation in the last two decades. Although the economy grew at reasonable levels, economic growth has been volatile and macroeconomic instability became the hallmark of the post-1980 period. Despite many attempts to stabilize the economy, these stabilization attempts have been unsuccessful. Common explanations of inflation since late 1970s include (1) high public sector deficits (due to, among other things, populist government expenditures before elections,
military expenditures, massive infrastructure projects, bankrupt social security institutions, losses incurred by state owned enterprises), (2) monetization of public sector deficits, (3) increases in prices of major imported inputs (particularly, crude-oil prices), (4) inflationary effects of rising exchange rates via increases in prices of imported goods, (5) persistent inflationary expectations of economic agents. High and persistent inflation has been blamed for, among other things, major distortions in the economy, worsening of the income distribution, increase in directly unproductive activities, an increase in the underground economy, and curtailing of foreign direct investment.

The unprecedented hovering of inflation at levels short of hyperinflation over the last two decades in Turkey poses a challenge yet a systematic macroeconomic account of the underlying shocks has attracted scant attention in the literature. The main objective of this paper is to examine the sources of fluctuations in inflation and output growth in Turkey over the last two decades. To that end, we use a dynamic open-economy aggregate supply–aggregate demand model and structural Vector Autoregressions (VAR) to decompose inflation and output movements into those attributable to terms of trade, supply, balance of payments, fiscal, and monetary shocks. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt in documenting the sources of inflation within the context of a dynamic, open-economy aggregate supply, aggregate demand model. An advantage of our model is that it does not assume perfect capital mobility and uncovered interest parity. Moreover, following Quah and Vahey (1995), we estimate core inflation as inflation driven by aggregate demand shocks in the broad sense. The issue is germane in that if inflation is driven by shocks to the economic environment or the terms of trade, the government has little leverage in attempting a successful stabilization program. Finally, it is possible to decompose output into components driven by particular shocks. The resulting decomposition may provide an idea on the output costs of disinflation in Turkey. To preview our results, inflation is mainly driven by terms of trade, balance of payments, and monetary shocks while output is mostly driven by supply-side shocks. Moreover, a substantial portion of inflation is demand-driven “core inflation.”

Section 2 of the paper details major macroeconomic developments since 1970. Section 3 presents a selective survey on sources of Turkish inflation. In Section 4, we develop a dynamic open-economy aggregate supply–aggregate demand model with imperfect capital mobility to identify various macroeconomic shocks. Section 5 presents the empirical results based on variance decompositions and impulse response functions and estimates “core inflation.” The last section has the concluding remarks.

2. An overview of major macroeconomic developments in Turkey

Chronic inflation in Turkey is accompanied by volatile output growth. Year-to-year changes in consumer prices sampled monthly from January 1970 to December 2002 and some sub-period averages of these annual inflation rates are shown in Fig. 1. As seen in the figure, Turkey experienced many accelerations in inflation since 1970. Common explanations of these episodes in inflation rates are devaluations, oil-price shocks, balance-of-payments crises, public sector deficits, the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990–1991, financial crises at home and abroad, and recent earthquakes.
Fig. 1. Annual CPI inflation in Turkey, January 1970 to December 2002. Source: State Institute of Statistics; our calculations. Note: Horizontal lines show selected period averages.

Fig. 2 shows real growth rates for gross domestic product (GDP) of the Turkish economy. Oil-price shocks in the 1970s and related balance-of-payments problems contributed substantially to a deep economic recession and a political and social crisis in the late 1970s. After the introduction of a broad stabilization and liberalization program in January 1980, the government installed by the military regime in September 1980 was able to lower inflation below 40% per year and accelerate economic growth in the following 4 years. However, after 1983, the volatility of annual GDP growth rates increased substantially. Other events such as the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf crisis, the 1994 Turkish financial crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, two earthquakes in 1999, and the 2000–2002 disinflation and economic restructuring program which failed in early 2001 contributed to rising output volatility in the economy.

On the institutional and policy side, Turkey embarked on far reaching structural reforms after 1979. In 1980, in response to a strong balance-of-payments crisis accompanied by a deep recession and accelerated inflation, Turkey abandoned its inward-oriented development strategy and gradually started to introduce free-market based reforms. The Government devalued the Turkish lira to eliminate its excess overvaluation, increased the prices
of public sector products and removed restrictions on interest rates. The first step of ex-
ternal liberalization concentrated on current account transactions. The 1980 stabilization
and liberalization program was aimed not only at reducing inflation and accelerating output
growth but also hoped to liberalize the capital account in a reasonable future. All of these
were done at the cost of an initial jump in the annual inflation rate over 100% in 1980.

In May 1981, the Government took the first step from fixed to a managed floating-
exchange-rate system. In 1984, domestic citizens were allowed to open foreign exchange
deposit (FED) accounts in Turkish banks. In 1989, the Government took serious steps to
liberalize the capital account. Following the introduction of convertibility, the overvaluation
of the Turkish lira and high domestic interest rates on government bonds attracted short-term
capital inflows to the country. The change in the deficit financing method of the public sector
from money to bond-finance starting in 1986, and attempts to stabilize the exchange rate to
prevent the inflationary effects of rising exchange rates made this fiscal policy combination
unsustainable within a short period of time. This led to an “exchange-rate” crisis in the
first half of 1994 without a “balance-of-payments” crisis typical of the 1970s. In 1994, the
annual inflation rate exceeded 100% as in 1980.

Turkish governments introduced new disinflation measures to stabilize the economy after
the 1994 financial crisis. However, these efforts in 1995, 1998 and 2000 failed to reduce
the inflation rate to levels below 25% per year, as it had been in the early 1970s. Although
the government introduced a 3-year program in December 1999, the program had to be
revised in light of the two successive liquidity and interest-rate crises; first in November
2000, and then in February 2001. The government abandoned the crawling peg regime under

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2 The subsequent increase in FED may be interpreted as a gross indication of rising currency substitution in
Turkey.
the original plan and floated the Lira in February 2001. The revised 3-year plan adopted in early 2002 contained provisions for fiscal adjustment to help bring about debt sustainability, reform of the banking sector through an operational and financial restructuring of public banks, and regulation and supervision of private banks. The early elections on November 3, 2002 dramatically changed the political climate in Turkey; currently the newly established government is in contact with the International Monetary Fund to make minor changes in the program to disinfl ate and restructure the Turkish economy.

3. Macroeconomic determinants of inflation in Turkey: a selective survey

There is a large body of literature focusing on specific aspects of post-1979 inflation in Turkey. These empirical studies differ in their sample period, methodology, and hence, their conclusions. Using monthly data from 1981 to 1987, Onis and Ozmu cur (1990) explore inflationary dynamics in Turkey. The authors reject a pure monetary explanation of inflation based on a VAR and a simultaneous equation model. Although they find devaluations of the Turkish lira to have a strong impact on domestic inflation, supply-side factors seem to have significant effects on inflation. On the other hand, using annual data from 1960 to 1988, Atesoglu and Dutkowsky (1995) present supportive evidence that the Turkish economy behaves consistent with predictions of a real business cycle model. Particularly they find none of the aggregate demand variables are significant in influencing output, and prices respond to monetary expansions at the same rate.

Using a broad data set with annual and quarterly data, Metin (1995) finds that fiscal expansion dominates Turkish inflation from 1950 to 1988. An implication is that, in order to reduce inflation successfully, governments have to reduce public sector deficits. Moreover, devaluations have some inflationary effects. Inflationary effects of the depreciation of domestic currency are also implicated by Agenor and Hoffmaister (1997), Erol and Van Wijnbergen (1997), Leigh and Rossi (2002), and Lim and Papi (1997). The link between devaluations and inflation highlights the importance of stabilizing the exchange rate in order to achieve price stability in Turkey. Using input–output tables, Kibritcioglu and Kibritcioglu (1999) find negligible role of oil prices on inflation in Turkey. Recently, Alper and Ucer (1998), Baum, Barkoulas, and Caglayan (1999) and Lim and Papi (1997) emphasize the increasing role of \textit{inertia} in the process of inflation in Turkey. This makes government stabilization attempts difficult given the unusual resistance these disinflationary measures face.

Table 1 presents averages of changes in consumer price index, real GDP, exchange rate, crude-oil import price, money supply and public sector borrowing requirement in the 1980–2002 period. The figures in last two columns on the current account balance and short-term capital inflows are given as period averages in millions of US dollars. According to overall figures, the consumer price index increased 287 times in the 1990–2000 period but it increased only 53 times from 1979 to 1989. The recent acceleration of inflation in the 1990s seems to have been accompanied by a slowdown in output growth. Depreciation of the Turkish lira also seems to have accelerated in the 1990s. In real terms, however, the depreciation of the Turkish lira in the 1980s is followed by a slight appreciation in the first half of the 1990s if we ignore changes in foreign price levels in the same period. This development along with increases in real domestic interest rates after 1989 explain the rise
Table 1
Selected macroeconomic indicators for Turkey, 1980–2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consumer price inflation (%)</th>
<th>Real GDP growth (%)</th>
<th>Change in nominal TL/US$ exchange rate (%)</th>
<th>Change in CPI-deflated TL/US$ exchange rate (%)</th>
<th>Change in average crude-oil import price in US$ (%)</th>
<th>Change in nominal money supply M2 (%)</th>
<th>Change in real money supply M2 (%)</th>
<th>Nominal change in public sector borrowing requirement (%)</th>
<th>Real change in public sector borrowing requirement (%)</th>
<th>Current account balance (millions of US$)</th>
<th>Short-term capital inflow (millions of US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980–1984</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>−1,931.6</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985–1989</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>−4.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>−145.4</td>
<td>−104.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–1994</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>−0.5</td>
<td>−6.6</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>−2.8</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>−1,430.2</td>
<td>−164.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–1999</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>−5.7</td>
<td>−10.7</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>117.9</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>−1,358.0</td>
<td>1,726.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–2002</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>−10.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>−13.8</td>
<td>−1,943.0</td>
<td>−2,595.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–2002</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>−1,311.1</td>
<td>−6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Institute of Statistics, Central Bank of Turkey, and State Planning Organization; our calculations.

Note: The figures represent annual period averages. Figures for 2002 are preliminary.
in short-term capital inflows in the 1990s. In contrast to the oil-price shocks of the 1970s, crude-oil price changes in the 1981–1998 period were relatively small.

From 1979 to 2001, the broad money supply M2 has increased substantially which points to an accommodating monetary policy. In real terms, the M2 measure of the money supply rose 133% while the increase in real reserve-money (the IMF definition) was limited to about 53% in the same period. The borrowing requirement of the Turkish public sector (PSBR) increased in nominal as well as real terms particularly in the second half of the 1990s. The overall increase in PSBR in real terms from 1979 to 2001 is about 261%. There is evidence that monetization of public sector deficits decreased as a result of the availability of bond-financing since 1986 in Turkey (Alper & Ucer, 1998). Moreover, Central Bank credits to the public sector have been sharply declining since 1998. However, sustained monetary growth, despite the diminishing role of monetization of government deficits, indicates that inflation in Turkey may still have a monetary character rather than being a fiscal one.

The foregoing discussion highlights the importance of identifying shocks driving inflation and output, since observed movements in the data are combinations of macroeconomic “shocks” and responses to these shocks. Did inflation arise because of negative supply shocks? What is the significance of terms-of-trade shocks in driving inflation? Do shocks to the balance of payments play a role in the inflationary process? What role did fiscal deficits play in the inflation process? In the following two sections, we address these questions using a dynamic aggregate supply–aggregate demand model. We also isolate components of inflation due to particular shocks based on historical realizations of the shocks. The resulting decomposition can be used to pin down the size of policy driven inflation versus inflation due to the macroeconomic environment. It is also possible to assess the output costs of disinflation.

4. Sources of inflation: an illustrative aggregate supply–aggregate demand model

This section presents a dynamic aggregate supply, aggregate demand model that incorporates some important elements of a developing economy, namely balance of payments problems and finite capital mobility. The model is consistent with a vertical long-run Phillips curve, and represents a middle ground between market clearing approaches and models based on short-run nominal inertia and nominal rigidities. A similar small, open-economy model based on household optimization can be found in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001). Moreover, Quah and Vahey (1995) propose a technique for measuring core inflation based on aggregate demand neutrality: Core inflation is defined as that component of measured inflation that has no long-run impact on real output, a notion consistent with the vertical long-run Phillips curve. Recently, Wehinger (2000) use aggregate demand neutrality to derive core inflation for the G7 countries and we follow a similar strategy in this paper.

In order to motivate the restrictions embedded in the structural VAR model, consider a dynamic, open-economy aggregate supply–aggregate demand model:

\[ r_t = r_{t-1} + \epsilon_r^t \]  
\[ y^*_t = \bar{y}_t + \theta r_t \]  
\[ \bar{y}_t = \bar{y}_{t-1} + \epsilon^*_t \]

Evolution of terms of trade
Aggregate supply
Evolution of capacity output
$k[i_t - i^*_t + (E_t s_{t+1} - s_t) - \rho_t] + \eta_1(s_t - p_t) - \eta_2 y_t + b_t = 0$

Balance of payments (BOP)

(4)

$i_t = (E_t s_{t+1} - s_t) - \left(\frac{\eta_1}{k}\right) (s_t - p_t) + \left(\frac{\eta_2}{k}\right) y_t + \left[i^*_t + \rho_t - \left(\frac{1}{k}\right) b_t\right]

(4')

$z_t = \left[i^*_t + \rho_t - \left(\frac{1}{k}\right) b_t\right]$ “BOP” shock

(5)

$z_t = z_{t-1} + \varepsilon^z_t$ Evolution of “BOP” shock

(5')

$y^d_t = \beta d_t - y[i_t - E_t(p_{t+1} - p_t)] + \eta_1(s_t - p_t) - \eta_2 y_t$ Aggregate demand/IS

(6)

$\Delta d_t = -t \Delta y_t + \varepsilon^y_t$ Evolution of the budget deficit

(7)

$m^d_t = p_t + y_t - \lambda i_t - \mu z_t$ Money demand

(8)

$\Delta m^d_t = \alpha_1 \Delta d_t + \alpha_2 \Delta z_t + \varepsilon^m_t$ Money supply growth

(9)

$y^d_t = y^d_t = y_t$ Goods market equilibrium

(10)

$m^d_t = m^d_t = m_t$ Money market equilibrium

(11)

where $r$ is the terms of trade, $y$ is domestic output, $\hat{y}$ is capacity output, $i$ is domestic nominal interest rate, $i^*$ is the foreign interest rate, $s$ is the exchange rate expressed as the domestic currency price of foreign currency, $p$ is the domestic price level, $m$ is the money stock, $d$ is the budget deficit, $\rho$ is a risk premium on domestic currency investments, $b$ represents an exogenous shift in net exports due to, e.g., a change in competitiveness, $z$ represents exogenous elements in the balance of payments equation, $\varepsilon^j$ are stochastic disturbances, and $E_t$ is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time $t$. In the model, all variables except interest rates are in logarithms, and Greek letters designate positive parameters.

Equation (1) is the evolution of the terms of trade, which is assumed to follow a random walk. Equation (2) is an aggregate supply equation, where aggregate supply depends on capacity output and terms of trade. Capacity output is a function of the productive capacity of the economy (e.g., the capital stock and employment), and for simplicity, it is assumed to follow a random walk. Supply shocks are interpreted broadly to include productivity enhancing developments such as increases in the capital stock and improvements in technology as well as “cost-push” elements stemming from input markets.

A distinguishing feature of the model is that, it can accommodate noninstantaneous adjustment in the balance of payments. Capital inflows are a function of the net domestic rate of return adjusted for a risk premium. The parameter $k$ represents the degree of capital mobility where large values indicate higher levels of capital mobility. The trade balance is a function of the real exchange rate ($s_t - p_t$) and domestic income. Moreover, $b_t$ represents exogenous increases in net exports. Although Eq. (4) may seem to impose a zero balance of payments, the existence of the shift term $b_t$ provides a more general specification. For example, one can view $b_t$ as the residual value of the balance of payments. Equation (4')
rewrites Eq. (4) in terms of the domestic nominal interest rate while Eq. (5) pools all the exogenous elements in the balance of payments equation to define \( z_t \). Equation (5') specifies the evolution of \( z_t \) as a nonstationary stochastic process.\(^3\)

Equation (6) is an aggregate demand (IS) equation where aggregate spending depends on the budget deficit, the expected real interest rate, and net exports. The growth in the budget deficit \( \Delta d_t \) in Eq. (7) depends negatively on output growth (through increases in tax revenues) and a random fiscal shock \( (\varepsilon_f) \). Equation (8) is a conventional money demand equation. In order to obtain a simple solution, money demand is assumed to have unitary income elasticity. Money demand is also a function of the exogenous elements in the balance of payments. This specification allows for reductions in money demand when there are exogenous shifts in the balance of payments which may necessitate a depreciation of domestic currency. Moreover, when there is a risk premium associated with domestic currency or self-fulfilling fads in exchange-rate expectations, \( z_t \) will be positive. In such cases, money demand is reduced by \( \mu z_t \).

Equation (9) specifies the growth of the money supply as a function of the budget deficit and balance of payments. The former captures money creation through lending to the government sector while the latter introduces the influence of the balance of payments on the money supply through changes in foreign exchange reserves. Finally, we close the model by postulating goods and money market equilibrium relationships (Eqs. (10) and (11)) and proceed to solve the model for a rational expectations equilibrium.

In order to solve the model, we eliminate the interest rate from Eqs. (6) and (8) using Eq. (4') to obtain the following system:

\[
\begin{align*}
| \lambda (1 + \eta_1) & 1 - \frac{\lambda \eta_1}{k} | & \lambda & 0 | & E_t \eta_{t+1} & \quad + & m_t - \left( \frac{\lambda \eta_1}{k} - 1 \right) \gamma y_t + (\mu - \lambda) z_t \\
| \gamma (1 + \eta_1) + \eta_1 & - \gamma (1 + \eta_1) - \eta_1 | & \gamma & -\gamma | & E_t \rho_{t+1} & \quad + & \left( 1 + \eta_2 + \frac{\eta_2 \gamma}{k} \right) y_t - \beta d_t - \gamma z_t \\
\end{align*}
\]

The system can be written compactly as \( AY_t = BE_t Y_{t+1} + W_t \), or \( Y_t = \Pi E_t Y_{t+1} + CW_t \), where \( C = A^{-1} \) and \( \Pi = A^{-1} B \). The eigenvalues of the matrix \( \Pi \) are \( \{ 1/(1 + \lambda); \gamma k/(\gamma k + \gamma \eta_1 + k \eta_1) \} \). Both eigenvalues are within the unit circle for finite values of the parameters, hence the forward looking solution is convergent. The forward looking solution to the system in (12) is

\[
E_t Y_{t+1} = C \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \Pi^i E_t W_{t+i+1} \tag{13}
\]

Given the stochastic processes for the exogenous variables, it is evident that \( E_t W_{t+i} = W_t \) for \( i = 1, 2, \ldots \). Then, the solution for the real exchange rate is:

\[
s_t - p_t = \left[ \frac{k}{\eta_1 (\gamma + k)} + \frac{\eta_2}{\eta_1} \right] y_t - \frac{\gamma k}{\eta_1 (\gamma + k)} z_t - \frac{\beta k}{\eta_1 (\gamma + k)} d_t \tag{14}
\]

\(^3\) Although \( \varepsilon_z \) is labeled a “balance of payments shock,” it is evident that it captures foreign interest rate shocks, risk premium shocks, and competitiveness shocks. Without further structure, it is impossible to disentangle \( \varepsilon_z \) into its constituent parts. To keep the dimensions of the VAR tractable, \( \varepsilon_z \) will be a composite shock of the above.
The observed movements in the vector of variables $X_t = [rt, yt, dt, (s_t - pt) pt]$ are due to five mutually uncorrelated “structural” shocks with finite variances, $\varepsilon_t = [\varepsilon_{rt} \varepsilon_{yt} \varepsilon_{dt} \varepsilon_{(s_t - pt) pt}]$. These are terms of trade shocks, $\varepsilon_{rt}$; aggregate supply shocks, $\varepsilon_{yt}$; fiscal shocks, $\varepsilon_{dt}$; BOP shocks, $\varepsilon_{(s_t - pt) pt}$; and monetary/nominal shocks, $\varepsilon_{m}^m$.

It can be shown that the long-run impact of the structural shocks on the endogenous variables has a recursive structure. In order to show the long-run effect of structural shocks, $\varepsilon_t$, on $X_t$, we express the solution to the model in first differences:

$$\Delta r_t = \varepsilon_{rt}^r \quad (15)$$

$$\Delta y_t = \theta \varepsilon_{rt}^r + \varepsilon_{yt}^y \quad (16)$$

$$\Delta d_t = -t(\varepsilon_{rt}^r + \theta \varepsilon_{yt}^y) + \varepsilon_{dt}^d \quad (17)$$

$$\Delta (s_t - pt) = \left[ \frac{k(1 + t)}{\eta_1 \gamma + k} + \frac{\eta_2}{\eta_1} \right] (\varepsilon_{rt}^r + \theta \varepsilon_{yt}^y) - \frac{\gamma k}{\eta_1 (\gamma + k)} \varepsilon_{yt}^y - \frac{\beta k}{\eta_1 (\gamma + k)} \varepsilon_{dt}^d \quad (18)$$

$$\Delta p_t = \left( a_1 + \frac{\lambda \beta}{\gamma + k} \right) \varepsilon_{yt}^y - \left[ t \left( a_1 + \frac{\lambda \beta}{\gamma + k} \right) + \frac{2\lambda \eta_2 + \lambda k}{k(\gamma + k)} - 1 \right] (\varepsilon_{rt}^r + \theta \varepsilon_{yt}^y)$$

$$+ \left( a_2 - \frac{\lambda k}{\gamma + k} + \mu \right) \varepsilon_{yt}^y + \varepsilon_{m}^m \quad (19)$$

Note that the model does not impose a priori restrictions on capital mobility. If capital mobility is high as may be expected in Turkey especially after the capital account liberalizations undertaken in the late 1980s, then empirical estimates of the structural parameters would reflect a high $k$. We do not impose “uncovered interest parity” which would correspond to $k$ tending to infinity. Equation (19) indicates that the effects of terms of trade, supply, and balance of payments shocks on inflation can be of either sign. Although all endogenous variables are unit root stochastic processes, the vector $X_t$ is difference stationary. Finally, the long-run impact of the structural shocks on the endogenous variables has a recursive structure, and we use this property to identify the shocks.

4.1. Identification of the shocks

Since the vector $\Delta X_t$ is covariance stationary, it can be written as an infinite moving average process in the structural shocks:

$$\Delta X_t = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} A_i \varepsilon_{t-i} = A(L) \varepsilon_t \quad (20)$$

where $A(L)$ is a matrix whose elements are polynomials in the lag operator $L$. Denote the elements of $A(L)$ by $a_{ij}(L)$. The time path of the effects of a shock in $\varepsilon_j$ on variable $i$ after $k$ periods can be denoted $o_{ij}(k)$. We also adopt the notation such that $A(1)$ is the matrix of long-run effects whose elements are denoted $a_{ij}(1)$; each element gives the cumulative effect of a shock in $\varepsilon_j$ on variable $i$ over time. Similarly, $A_0$ is the matrix of the contemporaneous impact effects. The objective of identification is to discern the 25 elements of $A_0$. Given the
model structure above, the long-run effects of the shocks on the endogenous variables are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta r_t & = a_{11}(1) 0 0 0 0 \varepsilon_{1t}^r \\
\Delta y_t & = a_{21}(1) a_{22}(1) 0 0 0 \varepsilon_{2t}^y \\
\Delta d_t & = a_{31}(1) a_{32}(1) a_{33}(1) 0 0 \varepsilon_{3t}^d \\
\Delta(s_t - p_t) & = a_{41}(1) a_{42}(1) a_{43}(1) a_{44}(1) 0 \varepsilon_{4t}^s \\
\Delta p_t & = a_{51}(1) a_{52}(1) a_{53}(1) a_{54}(1) a_{55}(1) \varepsilon_{5t}^m
\end{align*}
\]

(21)

In Eq. (21), the matrix of long-run effects is lower triangular. Since the variance–covariance matrix is symmetric, it provides 15 restrictions on the elements of the \( A_0 \) matrix. Eq. (21) provides the additional 10 restrictions to recover the structural shocks.

5. Empirical results

We use quarterly data from 1980:1 to 2002:3. The measures of the variables are: \( r_t \), terms of trade (relative price of exports in terms of imports), \( y_t \), GDP in constant prices, \( d_t \), the budget deficit as a share of GDP, \( q_t \), real exchange rate measured as the SDR exchange rate deflated by the consumer price index, \( p_t \), consumer price index. Data sources are explained in the Appendix A.

In order to properly specify the VAR, variables ought to be tested for unit roots. We use the KPSS test, which tests stationarity as the null hypothesis, and the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test with a unit root null hypothesis. The maximum lag in the ADF test is determined by pairing down the model starting with a maximum lag of 10, depending on whether the maximum lag coefficient is significant at the 10% significance level. The test results for all variables in levels and first differences are given in Table 2.

Statistical evidence in the table points to nonstationary variables in levels. The ADF test fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all variables at the 5% significance level. The KPSS test concurs except for the terms of trade which seems stationary. As for first differences of the variables, all seem stationary except the inflation rate. For the empirical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>KPSS ( \eta_u ) statistic</th>
<th>ADF ( \tau_u ) statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Levels   | \begin{align*}
& 1.19 \quad 1.89 \quad 1.45 \quad 1.83 \quad 0.36 \\
& 0.04 \quad 0.63 \quad 0.03 \quad 0.04 \quad 0.14
\end{align*} & \begin{align*}
\text{Levels} & -1.31 (3) \quad -0.48 (8) \quad 0.48 (7) \quad -2.21 (8) \quad -1.50 (10) \\
\text{First differences} & -7.13 (2) \quad -1.58 (7) \quad -7.21 (6) \quad -3.31 (10) \quad -4.06 (9)
\end{align*} |

Note. Critical values for the KPSS \( \eta_u \) test at the 10% level is 0.35 and at the 5% level is 0.46. The critical value of the ADF \( \tau_u \) test at the 5% level is -2.89. Lag truncation for the KPSS test is set at \( l = 4 \). The maximum lag for the ADF test is given in parenthesis.
model, we proceed with the assumption that all variables are difference stationary except for the inflation rate, which is a unit root process, hence the vector $\Delta X_t = [\Delta r_t, \Delta y_t, \Delta d_t, \Delta q_t, \Delta \pi_t]$ is stationary, where $\pi_t$ is the inflation rate.

In order to account for seasonality in the data, we include three seasonal dummies in the VAR, denoted, $sd_i$. As an initial step, we estimate the VAR with eight lags. We then test whether the model can be pared down using likelihood ratio tests. The null hypothesis of a VAR(7) cannot be rejected against a VAR(8) as the test statistic is, $\chi^2(25) = 32.56$. However, the test statistic for the null hypothesis of VAR(6) against VAR(7) yields $\chi^2(25) = 34.64$ rejecting VAR(6) at the 10% significance level. Hence, we conclude seven lags are appropriate for the empirical model. Table 3 presents the VAR estimation results. Even though it is hard to interpret the coefficients directly, the statistics may give an idea about model adequacy. For example, some coefficients on higher order lags are highly significant indicating that a VAR with seven lags is justified. Moreover, the Ljung–Box $Q$-statistics for 24th order serial correlation fail to reject serially uncorrelated residuals except for the residual in the real exchange-rate equation, which seems to be serially correlated with a 7.8% marginal significance level. Given degrees of freedom considerations and likelihood ratio tests presented above for the order of the VAR, seven lags seem adequate to capture the dynamics in the data. After imposing the identification restrictions implied by Eq. (21), we present impulse response functions and variance decompositions to assess the dynamic effects of each shock.

5.1. Impulse response functions

Fig. 3 presents responses of inflation and output to each shock (terms of trade, supply, fiscal, balance of payments, and monetary). We present the median responses and 10–90% bands based on bootstrapping with 1000 draws for the impulse response functions. Fig. 3a indicates that in response to a terms of trade shock, inflation falls and then gradually rises. The inflation rate falls in response to a supply shock but the responses are not statistically significant. The effect of fiscal shocks on inflation is insignificant. On the other hand, the impact effect of a BOP shock on inflation is negative. Finally, inflation responds positively and significantly to a monetary shock. Notice that monetary shocks have everlasting effects on inflation. This points to inflation inertia which may be due to the existence of backward looking expectations in contracts for wages, sales, rents, etc., in the economy.

Output responses to various shocks are given in Fig. 3b. The output response to a terms of trade shock (an increase in the relative price of exportables) is a pronounced and significant increase in output. Note that terms of trade shocks have permanent effects on output. Output responds positively and significantly to a supply shock and reaches its long-run level within the second year. Although output responds to a fiscal shock by alternating between contraction and expansion, the response is not significant. Output falls in response to a balance of payments deterioration but the response is largely insignificant. It is apparent from the figure that a balance of payments deterioration has a demand deflationary effect on inflation and output. Similarly, the output response to a monetary shock is significant. This is in line with Agenor and Hoffmaister (1997) who found that a monetary shock has significant expansionary short-term effect on output. Overall, the responses of inflation and

---

4 The estimations in this paper are carried out using the RATS software, version 5.
Table 3
VAR estimation results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>$\Delta r_1$</th>
<th>$\Delta y_1$</th>
<th>$\Delta d_1$</th>
<th>$\Delta q_1$</th>
<th>$\Delta \pi_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta r_{1-1}$</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta r_{1-2}$</td>
<td>-0.130</td>
<td>0.257*</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta r_{1-3}$</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta r_{1-4}$</td>
<td>-0.162</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta r_{1-5}$</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta r_{1-6}$</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta r_{1-7}$</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
<td>0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta y_{1-1}$</td>
<td>0.303*</td>
<td>-0.368**</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.243*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta y_{1-2}$</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
<td>-0.331*</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.015</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\Delta y_{1-3}$</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>-0.201</td>
<td>-0.353*</td>
<td>0.689*</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta y_{1-4}$</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>-0.174</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta y_{1-5}$</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\Delta y_{1-6}$</td>
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<td>-0.380**</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta y_{1-7}$</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>-0.227</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{1-1}$</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.858**</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>0.039</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{1-2}$</td>
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<td>-0.158</td>
<td>-0.723**</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{1-3}$</td>
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<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.558**</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.046</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{1-4}$</td>
<td>-0.184</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>-0.494**</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{1-5}$</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>-0.245</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{1-6}$</td>
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<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{1-7}$</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.254*</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta q_{1-1}$</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>-0.214**</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.398**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta q_{1-2}$</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.185</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta q_{1-3}$</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta q_{1-4}$</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.285**</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta q_{1-5}$</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
<td>-0.252</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta q_{1-6}$</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.399*</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta q_{1-7}$</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \pi_{1-1}$</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>-0.673**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \pi_{1-2}$</td>
<td>-0.273</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.508*</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>-0.543**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \pi_{1-3}$</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
<td>-0.267</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>-0.482</td>
<td>-0.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \pi_{1-4}$</td>
<td>-0.431*</td>
<td>-0.191</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \pi_{1-5}$</td>
<td>-0.454*</td>
<td>-0.205</td>
<td>-0.328</td>
<td>-0.299</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \pi_{1-6}$</td>
<td>-0.157</td>
<td>-0.521**</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \pi_{1-7}$</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.284**</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>-0.247</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$sd_1$</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.120*</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.046</td>
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<tr>
<td>$sd_2$</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.116*</td>
<td>0.063</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
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<td>$sd_3$</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.132**</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Q(24)$</td>
<td>20.39</td>
<td>27.36</td>
<td>22.06</td>
<td>34.38*</td>
<td>30.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $Q(k)$ gives the Ljung–Box statistic for up to $k$th order residual serial correlation.

* Denotes 10% level of significance.

** Denotes 5% level of significance.
Fig. 3. Responses of inflation and output to various shocks.
Table 4
Variance decomposition of inflation and output

| k | Inflation | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|   | ε_r | ε_s | ε_f | ε_z | ε_m | ε_r | ε_s | ε_f | ε_z | ε_m |
| 1 | 29.8 | 5.1 | 1.2 | 17.4 | 46.5 | 10.0 | 72.3 | 0.1 | 5.4 | 12.1 |
| 4 | 21.8 | 4.1 | 7.4 | 24.7 | 42.0 | 21.8 | 54.4 | 1.6 | 15.8 | 6.3 |
| 8 | 18.9 | 5.3 | 10.1 | 23.0 | 42.7 | 32.9 | 47.1 | 1.7 | 11.0 | 7.3 |
| 12 | 17.3 | 5.7 | 12.0 | 25.3 | 39.7 | 35.4 | 47.3 | 1.8 | 8.9 | 6.6 |
| 16 | 15.7 | 5.1 | 13.0 | 24.3 | 42.0 | 34.9 | 50.0 | 1.6 | 7.8 | 5.7 |
| 20 | 14.5 | 5.0 | 12.4 | 24.4 | 43.7 | 36.1 | 49.4 | 1.5 | 7.0 | 5.9 |
| 24 | 13.1 | 4.6 | 12.6 | 25.9 | 43.8 | 36.5 | 50.2 | 1.5 | 6.3 | 5.6 |
| LR | 0.1 | 0.6 | 8.5 | 30.8 | 59.9 | 44.1 | 55.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |

output conform to the predictions of a conventional aggregate supply–aggregate demand framework.

5.2. Variance decompositions

Table 4 presents the decomposition of the forecast error variance of inflation and output for forecast horizons up to 6 years, and in the long-run where the forecast horizon tends to infinity. It is evident from Table 4 that terms of trade, balance of payments, and monetary shocks figure prominently in the inflationary process in Turkey. Note that fiscal deficit shocks play a somewhat limited role. This may be due to data limitations which preclude us from using a comprehensive measure of the public sector deficit such as the “public sector borrowing requirement” which is not available on a quarterly basis. While in the short-run terms of trade shocks are important, in the long-run balance of payments and monetary shocks dominate. This conforms to evidence presented by Atesoglu and Dutkowsky (1995) in that monetary policy in Turkey is neutral with unitary elasticity between money and prices. Our work differs from Onis and Ozmucur (1990) in that supply shocks seem to have negligible effects on inflation. The effect of terms of trade shocks is understandable for a country which imports a substantial part of raw materials, oil, machinery, and equipment. On the other hand, balance of payments shocks necessitate revaluations of domestic currency which translate into increases in aggregate demand for domestic output. Moreover, devaluations affect domestic prices directly depending on the degree of exchange rate pass-through. Recent evidence by Leigh and Rossi (2002) suggests that exchange rate pass-through in Turkey is pronounced in the short-run particularly for wholesale prices as compared to other key emerging markets.

The right hand side of Table 4 gives the variance decomposition of output. For forecast horizons up to 1 year, output is influenced by supply shocks, followed by terms of trade, balance of payments, and monetary disturbances. At medium to long term forecasting horizons, output is mainly driven by terms of trade and supply shocks. The effect of terms of trade shocks on output can be explained by the relative openness of the Turkish economy in the last two decades. Indeed, if we use the ratio of imports and exports to GDP as a crude measure of the openness, the Turkish economy was virtually closed prior to 1980 as the
Monetary shocks do have an expansionary output effect albeit a limited one. Except for the impact effect, monetary shocks are not significant in influencing output. In a sustained inflationary environment short of hyperinflation, the element of surprise associated with efficacious aggregate demand policies is absent. Moreover, inflation and inflationary expectations limit rigidities that normally are credited with expansionary aggregate demand. This is in line with Atesoglu and Dutkowsky (1995) who found that none of the aggregate demand variables significantly affect output in Turkey. The lack of pronounced effects of aggregate demand shocks on output provides preliminary evidence that a disinflationary program may not involve significant output losses.

5.3. Core inflation

Following Quah and Vahey (1995), we construct “core inflation” by eliminating supply-side influences (terms of trade shocks and supply shocks). The remaining “aggregate demand-driven inflation” based on historical realizations of balance-of-payments shocks, fiscal shocks, and monetary shocks gives an idea about the extent of policy-induced inflation. The simulations of core inflation include the base projection. If a substantial portion of actual

5 Based on data from the State Institute of Statistics and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.

6 Demand-driven inflation is only an approximation to policy induced inflation as not all broadly defined demand shocks are policy related.
inflation is demand-driven or “core inflation,” there is room for a successful stabilization program to bring down inflation. This assumes authorities have some discretion on demand side shocks compared to supply-side shocks where the latter can be thought of as exogenous.

A decomposition of inflation based on historical realizations of the shocks is given in Fig. 4. This figure reveals several interesting features of the high inflation period in Turkey. First, there is a moderating effect of favorable supply-side shocks on total inflation between 1985–1988 and 1994–1997. These can partially be attributed to favorable oil-price shocks. Second, and most important, core inflation was never far below total inflation during the entire sample period. Finally, the spike in the inflation rate in 1994 seems to have been mostly driven by a “core” impulse.

Given the negligible noncore inflation and oftentimes moderating supply-side influences on inflation, the historical decomposition of inflation has some policy implications. If we assume that core inflation is mostly induced by demand policies, then stabilizing aggregate demand has a good chance of stabilizing the economy.

6. Conclusions

Using a dynamic aggregate supply and aggregate demand model with imperfect capital mobility and structural VARs, we decompose inflation and output movements into those attributable to terms of trade, supply, balance-of-payments, fiscal, and monetary shocks. Empirical results show that terms of trade shocks have a significant effect on inflation in the short-run. In the long-run, monetary, and balance of payments shocks dominate. Budget deficits play a limited role in the inflationary process. Moreover, demand shocks have limited effects on output movements; output is mostly driven by terms of trade and supply shocks.

When inflation runs high for a sustained period of time, inflationary expectations and inflation inertia play a significant role in inflation dynamics. Recently, Dibooglu (2002) showed that inflationary expectations have forward- and backward-looking elements in Turkey. A key result of the study is that forward expectations dominate; as such the output costs of a credible disinflation program are likely to be limited. Indeed the limited effects of aggregate demand shocks on output in this paper also provide evidence that a credible disinflation program may not have significant output costs. It can be said that Turkish macroeconomic policies in the 1980s and 1990s reflected a preference toward expansionary policies at the expense of price stability. When governments in Turkey faced a choice between responding to the immediate needs of their constituents and reforms necessary for sustainable long-run growth, they opted for the first, and quite predictably, Turkey became one of few countries in history to have a high sustained inflation short of hyperinflation for more than two decades.

The fact that a major component of inflation is demand-driven core inflation highlights the importance of structural reforms and credible commitment mechanisms that restrain discretionary aggregate demand policies. To the extent that recent government programs resolve the credible commitment problem and are accompanied by structural reforms, they can bring the high inflation era to an end, and stabilize the economy.
Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments without implicating them for any remaining errors. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Department of Economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign where the authors were visiting when the paper was written.

Appendix A


(2) Real GDP: State Institute of Statistics (SIS), Ankara, in 1987 prices, expenditure based, millions of Turkish lira. The data for 1987:1 to 2002:3 is retrieved from the Electronic Data Distribution System of the Turkish Central Bank at: http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html. The data for 1980.1 to 1986:4 is provided by the officials of the SIS upon authors’ request.


(4) SDR exchange rate: IMF’s International Financial Statistics, CD-ROM Version, IFS line aa, Turkish lira per SDR.


References


