--cont'd--
OPERATIONAL STAGE
During the latter part of May 1952, the new Com-
manding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing,
General Jerome, was called to Fifth Air Force
Headquarters and given a directive for expanding bac-
teriological operations. The directive was given per-
sonally and verbally by the new Commanding General
of the Fifth Air Force, General Barcus.
On the following day, May 25, General Jerome out-
lined the new stage of bacteriological operations to
the Wing staff at a meeting in his office at which I was
present in my capacity as Chief of Staff.
The other staff members of the First Marine Air-
craft Wing present were: General Lamson-Scribner,
Assistant Commanding General;, Colonel Stage, Inter-
ligence Officer (G2); Colonel Wendt, Operations Officer
(G3) and Colonel Clark, Logistics Officer (G4). The
directive from General Barcus, transmitted to and
discussed by us that morning, was as follows:
A contamination bell was to be established across
Korea in an effort to make the interdiction program
effective in stopping enemy supplies from reaching the
front lines. The Marines would take the left flank of
this belt, to include the two cities of Sinanju and
Kunuri and the area between and around them. The
remainder of the belt would be handled by the Air
Force in the centre and the Navy in the east or right
flank.
Marine Squadron 513 would be diverted from its
random targets to this concentrated target, operating
from K8 (Kunsan) stiff serviced by the Third Bomb
Wing, using F7Fs (Tiger Cats) because of their twin
engine safety. The Squadron was short of these aircraft
but more were promised.
The responsibility for contaminating the left flank
and maintaining the contamination was assigned to
the Commander of Squadron 513, and the schedule of
operations left to the Squadron's discretion, subject
to the limitations that:
The initial contamination of the area was to be
completed as soon as possible and the area must then
be recontaminated or replenished at periods not to
exceed ten days.
Aircraft engaged on these missions would be given
a standard night armed reconnaissance mission, usually
in the Haeju Peninsula. On the way to the target, how-
ever, these planes would go via Sinanju or Kunuri,
drop their bacteriological bombs and then complete
their normal missions. This would add to the security
and interfere least with normal missions.
Reports on this program of maintaining the conta-
mination belt would go direct to the Fifth Air Force,
reporting normal mission numbers so-and-so had been
completed "via Sinanju" or "via Kunuri" and stating
how many "superpropaganda" bombs had been
dropped. Squadron 513 was directed to make a more
accurate "truck count" at night than had been custom-
ary in order to determine or defect any significant
change in the flow off traffic through its operating area.
General Barcus also directed that Marine Aircraft
Group 12 of the First Marine Aircraft Wing was to
prepare to enter the bacteriological program. First the
ADs (Skyraiders) and then the F4Us (Corsairs) were
to take part in the expanded program, initially, how-
ever, only as substitute for the F7Fs....
General Jerome further reported that the Fifth Air
Force required Marine Photographic Squadron I to
continue their current bacteriological operations, oper-
ating from K3 (Pohang). At the same time Marine
Aircraft Group 33 at K3 was placed on a stand-by, last
resort, basis. Owing to the distance of K3 from the
target area, - large-scale participation in the, program
by Marine Aircraft Group 33 was not desired. Because
the F9Fs (Panthers) would only be used in an emer-
gency, no special bomb supply would be established over
and above that needed to supply the photographic re-
connaissance aircraft. Bombs could be brought up
from Ulsan in a few hours- if necessary. The plans and
the ramifications thereof were discussed at General
Jerome's conference and arrangements made to trans-
mit the directive to the officers concerned with carry-
ing out the new program.
It was decided that Colonel Wendt would initially
transmit this information to the commanders concerned
and the details could be discussed by the cognizant staff
officers as soon as they were worked out.
FIRST MAW'S OPERATIONS
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513
Next day then, May 26, Colonel Wendt held a confer-
ence with the Commanding Officer of Squadron 513
and, I believe, the K8 Air Base Commander and the
Commanding Officer of the Third Bomb Wing, and
discussed the various details.
The personnel of the Fifth Air Force were already
cognizant of the plan, having been directly informed
by Fifth, Air Force Headquarters.
Since the plan constituted for Squadron 513 merely
a change of target and additional responsibility to
maintain their own schedule of contamination of their
area, there were no real problems to be solved.
During the first week of June, Squadron 513 started
operations on the concentrated contamination belt,
using cholera bombs. (The plan given to General Jerome
indicated that at a later, unspecified date-depend-
ing on the results obtained, or lack of results-yellow
fever and then typhus in that order would probably he
tried out in the contamination belt.)
Squadron 513 operated in this manner throughout
June and during the first week in July that I was with
the Wing, without any incidents of an unusual nature.
An average of five aircraft a night normally covered
the main supply routes along the western coast of
Korea up to the Chong Chon River but with emphasis
on the area from Phy6ngyang southward. They divert-
ed as necessary to Sinanju or Kunuri and the area be-
tween in order to maintain the ten-day bacteriological
replenishment cycle.
We estimated that if each airplane carried two bac-
teriological bombs, two good nights were ample to
cover both Sinanju and Kunuri and a third night would
cover the area around and between these cities.
About the middle of June, as best I remem-
ber, the Squadron received a modification to the plan
from the U.S. Fifth Air Force via the Third Bomb Wing.
This new directive included an area of about ten miles
surrounding the two principal cities in the Squadron's
schedule, with particular emphasis on towns or hamlets
on the lines of supply and any by-pass roads.
Marine Aircraft Group 12
Colonel Wendt later held a conference at K6
(Pyongtaek) at which were present the Commanding
Officer, Colonel Gaylor, the Executive Officer and the
Operations Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 12.
Colonel Wendt informed them that they were to make
preparations to take part in the bacteriological opera-
tions and to work out security problems which would
become serious if they got into daylight operations and
had to bomb up at their own base K6. They were to
inform the squadron commanders concerned but only
the absolute barest number of a additional personnel, and
were to have a list of a limited number of hand-picked
pilots ready to be used on short notice. Colonel Wendt
informed them that an Air Force team would soon be
provided to assist with logistic problems, this team
actually arriving the last week in June.
Before my capture on July 8, both the ADs (Skyraid-
ers) and the F4Us (Corsairs) of Marine Aircraft
Group 12 had participated in very small numbers, once
or twice, in daylight bacteriological operations as a
part of regular scheduled, normal day missions, bomb-
ing up at K8 (Kunsan), rendezvousing with the rest
of the formation on the way to the target. These mis- sions were directed at small towns in Western Korea
along the main road leading south from Kunuri and
were a part of the normal interdiction program.
Marine Aircraft Group 33
Colonel Wendt passed the plan for the Wing's par-
ticipation in bacteriological operations to Colonel Con-
don, Commanding Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 33,
on approximately May 27-28.
Since the Panthers (F9Fs) at the Group's base at
Pohang would only be used as 1ast resort aircraft, it
was left to Colonel Condon's discretion as to just what
personnel he would pass the information on to but it
was to be an absolute minimum.
During the time I was with the Wing, none of these
aircraft had been scheduled for bacteriological mis-
sions, though the photographic reconnaissance planes
of the Group's VMJ-1 Squadron continued their mis-
sions from that base.
SCHEDULING AND SECURITY
Security was by far the most pressing problem affect-
ing the First Marine Aircraft Wing, since the operational
phase of bacteriological warfare, as well as other types
of combat operations, is controlled by the Fifth Air
Force.
Absolutely nothing could appear in writing on the
subject. The word "bacteria" was not to be mentioned
in any circumstances in Korea, except initially to iden-
tify "superpropaganda" or "suprop."
Apart from the routine replenishment operations of
Squadron 513, which required no scheduling, bacterio-
logical missions were scheduled by separate, top-
secret, mission orders (or "FRAG" orders). These
stated only to include "superpropaganda" or "suprop"
on mission number so-and-so of the routine secret
"FRAG" order for the day's operations. -Mission
reports went back the same way by separate, top-
secret dispatch, stating the number of "suprop" bombs
dropped on a specifically numbered mission.
Other than this, Squadron 513 reported their bac-
teriological missions by adding "via Kunuri" or "via
Sinanju" to their normal mission reports.
Every means was taken to deceive the enemy and
to deny knowledge of these operations to friendly
personnel, the latter being most important since 300
to 400 men of the Wing are rotated back to the United
States each month.
Orders were issued that bacteriological bombs were
only to be dropped in conjunction with ordinary bombs
or napalm, to give the attack the appearance of a nor-
mal attack against enemy supply lines. For added
security over enemy territory, a napalm bomb was to
remain on the aircraft until after the release of the
bacteriological bombs so that if the aircraft crashed it
would almost certainly burn and destroy the evidence.
All officers were prohibited from discussing the sub-
ject except officially and behind closed doors. Every
briefing was to emphasize that this was not only a
military secret, but a matter of national policy.
I personally have never heard the subject mentioned
or even referred to outside of the office, and I ate all
of my meals in the Commanding General's small pri-
vate mess, where many classified matters were dis-
cussed.
ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS
In the Wing, our consensus of opinion was that
results of these bacteriological operations could not be
accurately assessed. Routine methods of assessment
are by (presumably) spies, by questioning prisoners of
war, by watching the nightly truck count very carefully
to observe deviations from the normal, and by ob-
serving public announcements of Korean and Chinese
authorities upon which very heavy dependence was
placed, since it was felt that no large epidemic could
occur without news leaking out to the outside world
and that these authorities would, therefore, announce it
themselves. Information from the above sources is cor-
related at the Commander-in-Chief, Far East level in
Tokyo, but the over-all assessment of results is not passed down
to the Wing level, hence the Wing was not
completely aware of the results.
When I took over from Colonel Binney I asked him
for results or reactions up to date and he specifically
said: "Not worth a damn."
No one that I know of has indicated that the results
are anywhere near commensurate with the effort, dan-
ger and dishonesty involved, although the Korean and
Chinese authorities have made quite a public report of
early bacteriological bomb efforts. The sum total of
results known to me are that they are disappointing
and no good.
PERSONAL REACTIONS
I do not say the following in defence of anyone,
myself included, I merely report as an absolutely direct
observation that every officer when first informed that
the United States is using bacteriological warfare in
Korea is both shocked and ashamed.
I believe, without exception, we come to Korea as
officers loyal to our people and government and believ-
ing what we have always been told about bacteriolog-
ical warfare-that it is being developed only for use
in retaliation in a third world war.
For these officers to come to Korea and find that
their own government has so completely deceived them
by still proclaiming to the world that it is not using
bacteriological warfare, makes them question mentally
all the other things that the government proclaims
about warfare in general and in Korea specifically.
None of us believes that bacteriological warfare has
any place in war since of all the weapons devised bac-
teriological bombs alone have as their primary objec-
tive casualties among masses of civilians-and that is
utterly wrong in anybody's conscience. The spreading
of disease is unpredictable and there may be no limits
to a fully developed epidemic. Additionally, there is the
awfully sneaky, unfair sort of feeling of dealing with a
weapon used surreptitiously against an unarmed and
unwarned people.
I remember specifically asking Colonel Wendt what
were Colonel Gaylor's reactions when he was first in-
formed and he reported to me that Colonel Gaylor was
both horrified and stupefied. Everyone felt like that
when they first heard of it, and their reactions are what
might well be expected from a fair-minded, self-respect-
ing nation of people.
Tactically, this type of weapon is totally unwar-
ranted-it is not even a Marine Corps weapon-morally
it is damnation itself; administratively and logistically
as planned for use, it is hopeless; and from the point
of view of self-respect and loyalty, it is shameful.
F. H. Schwable, 04429
Colonel, U.S.M.C.
6 December, 1952
