The Making of the Atomic Bomb

Richard Rhodes

A Summary by Tom East

In August 1945 the United States dropped the first two combat atomic bombs in history. Upon hearing of their successful detonation, President Harry Truman declared, "This is the greatest thing in history." This action by the US brought an almost immediate end to the war between the United States and Japan.

Taking as his subject the history of the development and deployment of these first atomic weapons, Richard Rhodes explores the events of the preceding years that led to the beginning of the atomic age. The silent question that underlies his work and that of hundreds of others is, Could history have taken an alternative course?

Through some of the details presented by the author we will see how laymen groped for ways to use the technical miracle of the atomic bomb in the non-technical world of foreign relations and human affairs.

Into The Fire

Within twenty four hours of the death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, two men briefed Harry S. Truman on the atomic bomb. The Manhattan project, a project so secret even as Vice President he had been kept in the dark. He had known of the project before but details were strictly guarded. The first to discuss the project with him was Henry Stimson. One of the greatest lessons I learned in life is that the only way to make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust. He applied this philosophy equally to men and to nations. In the spring of 1945 he was greatly worried about the use and consequences of the atomic bomb. The other man was "Jimmy" Byrnes. During the previous 3 years tenure of FDR he was the "assistant president"; while FDR ran the war effort, he "ran" the country. "Jimmy Byrnes visited me" wrote President Truman "and even he told me few details, though with great solemnity said we were perfecting a weapon great enough to destroy the whole world." Later he added, "that in his belief the bomb might well put us in the position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war."

The Soviet Complications

There were two different attitudes concerning the release of information about the atomic device to the Russians. One was to share the information with the scientists of the world. The belief was that the only way to forestall the nuclear arms race with the Russians was to convince them of the dangers to all people in the event of such a dangerous situation. The other was to garner a quid-pro-quo for the knowledge of the device. The exchange of information for the democratization of the Soviet Police State was considered a reasonable trade.. The US ambassador to the USSR however thought this was a ridiculous idea.

There was considerable tension with the USSR at this time over the post-war government of Poland. According to the terms agreed upon at the Yalta Conference, there was to be erected a democratic government in Poland, as well as Greece and Belgium. The Russians however were in the process of setting up a police state similar to the one operating in the Soviet Union. The United Nations was also very near to opening its doors in San Francisco. Truman's advisors felt that opening the UN while the bomb was still a secret was a sham.

With the war in full swing in the Far East, the Americans were hoping for the Soviets to come in and help finish the war with Japan. The Soviets however had it in their power to hold out until the Americans had done most of the dirty work. Truman decided to take a hard line with the Soviets concerning Poland. When he spoke with the Soviet Ambassador the president went from diplomatic discussion at the first meeting to attack at the second. He demanded the free elections agreed to at Yalta. When word got back to Stalin, his response was tepid at best. ---"The question of Poland has the same meaning for security of USSR as Greece and Belgium have for Great Britain. We were not consulted as these governments were set up...The blood of the Soviet people in the name of the liberation of Poland demands a government friendly to the USSR...I am ready to fulfill your request and do everything possible to reach a harmonious solution. But you demand too much of me. In other words, you demand that I renounce the interests of security of the Soviet Union, but I cannot turn against my country." With this blunt challenge on his mind Truman received his Secretary of War.

He was told..."Within four months we will in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city." We had shared the development with the British, but controlled all the factories that made the explosive material, and no nation could reach this position for several years. We could not hold this monopoly forever, and the only country that could reach this position in the next few years is Russia. The world in its present state of moral advancement compared to its technical development would eventually be at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words, modern civilization might be completely destroyed.

Further Complications

Truman's Chief of Staff Stimson continued; No system of control ever before considered would be adequate to control this menace. Both inside any particular country and between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thorough-going rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never before contemplated.

To Share; Or Not To Share?

Furthermore, in the light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and, if so shared, upon what terms, becomes a primary question of our foreign relations.

Secretary of War Bohr had proposed to inform other nations of the common dangers of a nuclear arms race. At the hands of Stimson and his advisors that sensible proposal had drifted to the notion that the issue was sharing the weapon itself.

Was the United States morally obliged to give away such a devastating new weapon of war?

The United Nations

Now Stimson brought in General Groves. The general had brought with him a report on the status of the Manhattan Project. Both Stimson and Groves insisted Truman read the document while they waited. The President was impatient. He had a threatening note from Stalin to deal with. He had to prepare to open the United Nations conference even though Stimson had just informed him that allowing the conference to proceed in ignorance of the bomb was a sham.

The final point in Stimsons address was the proposal two others had initiated to establish a select committee for recommending action to the executive and legislative branches of the government. Truman approved.

The Discussion Broadens

So discussion between Truman and his various advisors was one level of discourse in the spring of 1945 on the uses of the atomic bomb. Another was joined two days later when a target committee under General Groves authority met for the first time at the Pentagon.

The Target Committee

The target committee consisted of three military representatives, and five physicists/scientists. After the obligatory lecture on the need for utmost secrecy, they got straight to work. Their first decision was to limit the number of possible targets to four, The basics were established. Effective range of the B-29 bomber for such important missions 1500 miles. Visual bombing essential ao these untried and valuable bombs could be aimed with certainty and their effects could be photographed. Probable targets should be "urban or industrial Japanese areas" in July, August, or September. Each mission to be assigned one primary and two secondary targest with spotter planes sent ahead to confirm visibility.

Most of the first meetings were devoted to Japanese weather. The Air Force's top meteorologist stated the weather during those months was generally bad, with January being the best weather month; however nobody was willing to wait that long. He also said he could forecast good weather only twenty-four hours in advance,bad weather forty-eight hours. His suggestion was to station submarines in the area to radio back weather conditions.

They wanted to hit something that would most adversely affect the Japanese will to continue the war. Beyond that, the target should be military in nature,ie important headquarters or troop concentrations, or centers of production of military equipment and supplies. Later they began to consider targets. Also the target should be of large enough size for the damage to be confined within it, and pristine enough to determine the power of the bomb. Tokyo was a possibility but it was already bombed out pretty hard. Practically the only thing left standing is the palace grounds.

There was a misunderstanding within the target committee. They had no idea at first, of the power they held. They thought they were prioritized behind Curtis Lemay, not ahead of him. With a few words to Curtis Lemay the commander of the Air Force, they could spare a city from relentless firebombing, preserving it through spring cherry blossoms and wild summer monsoons for a more historic fate. Lemay's plan was to lay waste to all aircraft manufacturing facilities and support facilities so as to take the heat off the 20th Air Force. Basically, he intended to not leave one stone upon another. If they were prepared to eat stones, the Air Force was ready to supply them. After a few months of discussion,the Air Force agreed to reserve five cities for atomic bombing.

These five were:

1). Kyoto An urban industrial area with a population of 1,000,000. The former capital of Japan, many people and industries were moving thereas other areas were destroyed. From the psychological perspective, the advantage of this site lied in its being an intellectual center and the people there are more apt to appreciate the significance of such a device as the gadget... 2). Hiroshima This is an important army depot and point of embarkation in the middle of an urban industrial area. Its size is such that a large part of the city would be extensively damaged and being in a valley, the hills would have a focusing effect considerably increasing the blast damage. The other three targets proposed were Yokohama, Kokura Arsenal, and Niigata. One enthusiastic member of the committee proposed to bomb the emperors palace, but the consensus was that targets should be selected by military professionals and then whittled down by the committees.

The Interim Committee

This group was to take into account several factors not otherwise considered and pull together the operation into a cohesive strategy. They devised a thorough agenda:

A] Height of Detonation B] Report on Weather and Operations C] Gadget Jettisoning and Landing D] Status of Targets E] Psychological Factors in Target Selection F] Use Against Military Targets G] Radiological Effects H] Coordinated Air Operations I] Rehearsals J] Operating Requirements for Safety of Airplanes K] Coordination with 21st [Bomber Command] Program

Summary

The overall picture is one of a very complex network moving forward as if no other option was possible. The tenor of the war and the possibility of the imminent collapse of Japan were just secondary factors not given much weight at this point. It was basically a foregone conclusion that there was going to be an atomic bombing of Japan. Therefore the decision was not whether or not to use the device, but where, and how soon could it be ready. As the wheels of science ground unceasingly forward, the diplomats and politicians were already deciding how to use the newfound power at their disposal. Not just as the brute force of the power of the device, but the inherent political power that possessing such a device gave them on the world stage. Foreign policy was already being rearranged with this in mind, well prior to the demonstration of the bomb. For example, the question of how to handle the developments with Russia would be handled quite differently with the availability of the device, their assistance not neccessary in the Far East now. Also the manner of dealing with other nations of considerable strength was now an entirely different matter. We had a certain leverage, holding the trump of this new device and the secrets that came with it. We could extract a hefty price for the sharing of this technology, for without it, most other nations would be unable to duplicate the Americans achievement for several years yet. A pretty heady position indeed.

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