Gualtiero Piccinini’s Main
Works
Comments are always welcome, especially on the
unpublished stuff.
Updated: September 2008
Dissertation
Computations and Computers in the Sciences of Mind and Brain.
On the Church-Turing Thesis
“The Physical Church-Turing Thesis: Modest or Bold?” Discusses traditional formulations of the Physical Church-Turing thesis (not to be confused with the original thesis defended by Church and Turing), arguing that they are unsatisfactory because they don’t fit the epistemological notion of computation that motivates the thesis in the first place, and offers a satisfactory formulation of the thesis.
On Computing Mechanisms
“Computation
without Representation,” Philosophical Studies, 137.2 (2008). This is a paper on how to individuate
computational states, inputs, and outputs without appealing to semantic
properties.
“Computing Mechanisms,” Philosophy
of Science, 74.4 (2007), pp.
501-526. An articulation and defense of the
mechanistic account of computing mechanisms.
“Computers,” Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly, 89.1 (2008), pp. 32-73. Sequel of the above. What computers are according to the mechanistic
account of computing mechanisms.
“Some Neural Networks
Compute, Others Don’t,” Neural
Networks, 21.2-3 (2008), pp. 311-321.
A detailed account of connectionist computation,
both classical and non-classical, plus a distinction between connectionist
systems that compute and those that don’t.
On Computational Theories of Mind
“Computational Modeling vs. Computational
Explanation: Is Everything a Turing Machine, and Does It Matter to the
Philosophy of Mind?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85.1 (2007), pp. 93-115.
Distinguishes between computational modeling and computational explanation in
terms derived from the mechanistic account of computing mechanisms, and argues
that once that distinction is in place, the thesis that everything is
computational becomes either false or trivial.
“Computationalism,
the Church-Turing Thesis, and the Church-Turing Fallacy,” Synthese, 154.1 (2007), pp. 97-120. Refutes three common arguments for computationalism from the
Church-Turing Thesis.
“Functionalism,
Computationalism, and Mental States,” Studies in the History and
Philosophy of Science, 35.4 (2004), pp. 811-833. Argues that although
for historical reasons, philosophers have conflated functionalism and
computationalism, they are two logically independent doctrines.
“The Mind as
Neural Software? Revisiting Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational
Functionalism,” forthcoming in Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research.
This is a relatively detailed analysis of the conceptual relations
between the three notions in the title, plus a reformulation of functionalism
in mechanistic terms. [1/08 draft]
“Computationalism in the
Philosophy of Mind.” My
attempt at review the current state of the art, drawing on some of my other
papers. [9/08 draft]
On the History of Computational Theories of Mind
“The First Computational
Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at McCulloch and Pitts’s ‘Logical
Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity’,” Synthese, 141.2 (2004), pp.
175-215. A detailed
account of the background, assumptions, evidential basis, and historical
significance of the first computational theory of mind.
“Alan
Turing and the Mathematical Objection,” Minds
and Machines, 13.1 (2003), special issue on hypercomputation,
pp. 23-48. A detailed analysis of the background to and
structure of Turing’s reply to the objection that due to Gödel incompleteness,
machines cannot think.
“Allen Newell,” a brief biography of
Allen Newell forthcoming in New
Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Thomson Gale.
“Review
of John von Neumann, The Computer and the Brain,” Minds and Machines, 13.2 (2003), pp.
327-332. Some comments on von Neumann’s
classic in the occasion of its reprinting.
On Computational Theories of Mind vs. Cognitive
Neuroscience
“Computational
Explanation and Mechanistic Explanation of Mind,” in Cartographies of the Mind: The Interface
between Philosophy and Cognitive Science, M. de Caro, F. Ferretti, and M. Marraffa, eds.,
“Computational
Explanation in Neuroscience,” introduces the topic in the title for a
special issue of Synthese,
153.3 (2006), pp. 343-353. [final version]
“Computation
vs. Information Processing: How They Are Different and Why It Matters”
(co-authored with Andrea Scarantino), forthcoming in Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science, argues that computation and information processing
should be distinct. [8/08 draft]
“The
Resilience of Computationalism.” A
review of arguments against computationalism (with emphasis on arguments from
differences between neural processes and computations, which are not discussed
in “Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind”), why they don’t work as they
stand, and a promissory note on how they can be improved upon by employing the
mechanistic account of computation. (This
paper is an expansion of a section of “Symbols, Strings, and Spikes”.) [10/08
draft]
“Symbols,
Strings, and Spikes.” An argument that in the
sense relevant to computational theories of mind, minds (or brains) are not
computing mechanisms. [2/05 draft]
On Consciousness and Introspection
“Data from
Introspective Reports: Upgrading from Commonsense to Science,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10.9-10
(2003), pp. 141-156. Argues that when
properly understood and handled, introspective reports are a legitimate source
of public scientific data.
“First-Person
Data, Publicity, and Self-Measurement.” Argues that first-person data are public (contrary to a popular
view) and that legitimate first-person data result from a kind of
self-measurement. [8/08 draft]
“The Ontology of
Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy” (commentary on
“Consciousness without a Cerebral Cortex: A Challenge for Neuroscience and
Medicine,” by Björn Merker),
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30.1
(2007), pp. 103-104.
“Access Denied
to Zombies.” Argues that even if all the usual assumptions made in the
zombie conceivability argument are granted (i.e., zombies are conceivable and
conceivability entails possibility), the argument still begs the question
because it remains to be shown that the relevant possible worlds are accessible
to our world (in the sense of ‘accessible’ used in possible world semantics). [short version of rough draft, 1/08]
Review of Describing Inner Experience? Proponent
Meets Skeptic, by R. T. Hurlburt and E.
Schwitzgebel, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2008-04-25.
On Intersubjectivity in
Science
“Epistemic
Divergence and the Publicity of Scientific Methods,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 34.3 (2003), pp.
597-612. [final version]
On Concepts, Language, and Intentionality
“Functionalism,
Computationalism, and Mental Contents,” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, 34.3 (2004), pp. 375-410. Argues that although for historical reasons,
philosophers have convinced themselves that there is no computation without
representation, in fact the notion of computation needs to be construed without
presupposing the notion of representation.
“Splitting Concepts”
(co-authored with Sam Scott), Philosophy
of Science, 73.4 (2006), pp. 390-409. Argues that
the notion of concept should be split into different notions, each of which
explains different phenomena.
“Recovering
What Is Said with Empty Names” (co-authored with Sam Scott). [7/08
draft]