Gualtiero Piccinini’s Works (Most of
Them)
Comments are always welcome.
Updated: February 2011
Dissertation
Computations and Computers in the Sciences of Mind and Brain.
On Computation in Physical
Systems
NB: in the following four papers, I used the term
“computation” for what I now call digital computation. For my most recent and general account of
computation, see Section 3 of the paper “Information Processing, Computation,
and Cognition” (listed below).
·
“Computation without
Representation,” Philosophical Studies, 137.2 (2008). This is a paper on how to individuate digital
computational states, inputs, and outputs without appealing to semantic
properties.
·
“Computing Mechanisms,” Philosophy
of Science, 74.4 (2007), pp.
501-526. An articulation and defense of the mechanistic account of
digital computing systems.
·
“Computers,” Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly, 89.1 (2008), pp. 32-73. Sequel of the above. What computers are according to the
mechanistic account of computing mechanisms. (listed below).
·
“Some Neural Networks
Compute, Others Don’t,” Neural
Networks, 21.2-3 (2008), pp. 311-321.
A detailed account of digital connectionist computation, both classical
and non-classical, plus a distinction between connectionist systems that
perform digital computations and those that don’t.
· “The Physical Church-Turing Thesis: Modest or Bold?” Forthcoming in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Discusses some traditional (bold) formulations of the physical version of the Church-Turing thesis (not to be confused with the mathematical version originally defended by Church and Turing), arguing that they are unsatisfactory because they don’t fit the epistemological notion of computation that motivates the thesis in the first place, and formulates and defends a more satisfactory (modest) formulation of the thesis. [11/10 preprint]
On Computational Theories of Cognition
·
“Computational Modeling vs. Computational
Explanation: Is Everything a Turing Machine, and Does It Matter to the
Philosophy of Mind?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85.1 (2007), pp. 93-115.
Distinguishes between computational modeling and computational explanation in
terms derived from the mechanistic account of computing mechanisms, and argues
that once that distinction is in place, the thesis that everything is
computational becomes either false or trivial.
·
“Computationalism,
the Church-Turing Thesis, and the Church-Turing Fallacy,” Synthese, 154.1 (2007), pp. 97-120. Refutes
three common arguments for computationalism from the Church-Turing Thesis.
·
“Functionalism,
Computationalism, and Mental States,” Studies in the History and
Philosophy of Science, 35.4 (2004), pp. 811-833. Argues that although
for historical reasons, philosophers have conflated functionalism and
computationalism, they are two logically independent doctrines.
·
“The Mind as Neural Software?
Revisiting Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
81.2 (2010), pp. 269-311. This is a
relatively detailed analysis of the conceptual relations between the three
notions in the title, plus a reformulation of functionalism in mechanistic
terms. [final version]
·
“Computationalism in the
Philosophy of Mind,” Philosophy
Compass, 4.3 (2009), pp. 515-532. A
review of the state of the art, drawing on some of my other papers. It is mostly superseded by the following
paper. [proofs; the published
version is here]
·
“Computationalism,” forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive
Science. Another review of the state
of the art, drawing on the previous paper but improving on it in several
ways. Section 6, which is on objections
to computationalism and is mostly drawn from the corresponding section in the
Philosophy Compass paper, will not appear in the published version to save
space. [11/10 preprint]
On the History of Computational Theories of Cognition
·
“The First Computational
Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at McCulloch and Pitts’s ‘Logical
Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity’,” Synthese, 141.2 (2004), pp.
175-215. A detailed account of the
background, assumptions, evidential basis, and historical significance of the
first computational theory of mind.
·
“Alan Turing and the
Mathematical Objection,” Minds and
Machines, 13.1 (2003), special issue on hypercomputation,
pp. 23-48. A detailed analysis of the
background to and structure of Turing’s reply to the objection that due to
Gödel incompleteness, machines cannot think.
·
“Allen Newell,” a brief biography of
Allen Newell forthcoming in New
Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Thomson Gale. [penultimate version]
·
“Review of John von Neumann,
The Computer and the Brain,” Minds and Machines, 13.2 (2003), pp.
327-332. Some comments on von Neumann’s
classic book in the occasion of its reprinting. [final version]
On Computational Theories of Cognition vs. Cognitive
Neuroscience
·
“Computational
Explanation and Mechanistic Explanation of Mind,” in Cartographies of the Mind: The Interface
between Philosophy and Cognitive Science, M. de Caro, F. Ferretti, and M. Marraffa, eds.,
Dordrecht: Springer (2007), pp. 23-36.
This is a brief summary of my views ca. 2005 on computational
explanation and the relationship between computational theories of mind and
cognitive neuroscience. [penultimate version]
·
“Computational
Explanation in Neuroscience,” introduces the topic in the title for a
special issue of Synthese,
153.3 (2006), pp. 343-353. [final version]
·
“Computation
vs. Information Processing: How They Are Different and Why It Matters”
(with Andrea Scarantino), in Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science, 41.3 (2010), pp. 237-246. Argues that computation and information
processing are distinct. Mostly this is
a preliminary version of the following paper, which is also more complete and
systematic.
[final version]
·
“Information
Processing, Computation, and Cognition” (with Andrea Scarantino), in Journal of Biological Physics, 37.1
(2011), pp. 1-38. A detailed and
systematic discussion of the relations between the three notions in the title,
with emphasis on the lack of identity between information processing and
computation. This paper contains my
latest and most general formulation of the mechanistic account of
computation. This paper supersedes the
paper just above, except for some historical remarks that did not make it into
the larger paper. [final version]
·
“The Resilience of
Computationalism,” in Philosophy of
Science, 77.5 (2010), pp. 852-861. A
review of arguments against computationalism (with emphasis on arguments from
differences between neural processes and computations, which are not discussed
in my review articles, why they don’t work as they stand, and a promissory note
on how they can be improved upon by employing the mechanistic account of
computation. [final version]
·
“Neural Computation and the Computational Theory
of Cognition” (with Sonya Bahar). Argues that neural activity is a sui generic type of computation; it is neither analog nor
digital computation. [5/11
draft]
On Explanation in Psychology and Neuroscience
·
“Integrating
Psychology and Neuroscience: Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches”
(with Carl Craver), forthcoming in Synthese. Argues that
contrary to the received view, functional analyses are mechanism sketches
(i.e., elliptical mechanistic explanations), and therefore functional analyses
are neither distinct nor autonomous from mechanistic explanations, and
therefore psychological explanations can be seamlessly integrated with neuroscientific explanations. [2/11 preprint]
On First-Person Data
·
“Epistemic
Divergence and the Publicity of Scientific Methods,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 34.3 (2003), pp.
597-612. Argues that scientific data ought
to be public. This paper is not
specifically on first-person data, but it provides a crucial premise for the
methodology of first-person data developed in the other papers in this group. [final
version]
·
“Data from
Introspective Reports: Upgrading from Commonsense to Science,” Journal of Consciousness Studies,
10.9-10 (2003), pp. 141-156. Argues that
when properly understood and handled, first-person reports are a legitimate
source of public scientific data. [penultimate version]
·
“First-Person
Data, Publicity, and Self-Measurement,” Philosophers’
Imprint, 9.9 (2009), pp. 1-16. Argues
that first-person data are public (contrary to a popular view) and that
legitimate first-person data result from a kind of self-measurement. [links
to the open-access published version]
·
“Scientific Methods Ought to Be Public, and Descriptive
Experience Sampling Is One of Them.” Forthcoming in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in a
symposium on Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic, by R. T. Hurlburt and E. Schwitzgebel. [penultimate
version]
·
“How to Improve on Heterophenomenology: The Self-Measurement Methodology of
First-Person Data.” Forthcoming in
the Journal of Consciousness Studies,
17.3-4 (2010). A comparison between my
self-measurement methodology of first-person data (developed in the papers
listed immediately above) and Dennett’s Heterophenomenology.
[penultimate version]
·
Review of Describing Inner Experience?
Proponent Meets Skeptic, by R. T. Hurlburt
and E. Schwitzgebel, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2008-04-25.
On Consciousness
·
“The Ontology of
Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy” (commentary on
“Consciousness without a Cerebral Cortex: A Challenge for Neuroscience and
Medicine,” by Björn Merker),
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30.1
(2007), pp. 103-104. [penultimate version]
·
“Access Denied to Zombies.” Argues that
even if all the usual assumptions made in the zombie conceivability argument
are granted (i.e., zombies are conceivable and conceivability entails
possibility), the argument still begs the question because it remains to be
shown that the relevant possible worlds are accessible to our world (in the
sense of ‘accessible’ used in possible world semantics). [short
version of rough draft, 1/08]
On Concepts, Language, and Intentionality
·
“Functionalism,
Computationalism, and Mental Contents,” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, 34.3 (2004), pp. 375-410. Argues that although for historical reasons,
philosophers have convinced themselves that there is no computation without
representation, in fact the notion of computation needs to be construed without
presupposing the notion of representation. [final version]
·
“Splitting Concepts” (co-authored with Sam
Scott), Philosophy of Science, 73.4
(2006), pp. 390-409. Argues that the
notion of concept should be split into different notions, each of which
explains different phenomena. [final version]
·
“Two Kinds of Concept: Implicit and Explicit,”
forthcoming in Dialogue in a
symposium on Edouard Machery’s
book Doing without Concepts. Revises, articulates, and defends the view
(originally proposed in the paper just above) that concepts split into two
kinds, which I call implicit and explicit. [penultimate version]
·
“Are Prototypes and Exemplars
Used in Distinct Cognitive Processes?” (with James
Virtel), commentary on Edouard
Machery's book Doing
without Concepts, forthcoming in Behavioral
and Brain Sciences. [penultimate version]
·
“Recovering What Is Said
with Empty Names” (co-authored with Sam Scott), forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Presents novel evidence that sentences
containing empty names are truth evaluable and thus that empty names have
meaning, contrary to what Millianism predicts. [final
version]