**Do Children Make Us Happier?**

Anna Alexandrova

Having just handed over my five-month-old to the babysitter, I am sitting at my computer wondering whether children make us happy. Before my son was born I asked many people whether having children brought them happiness. Unsurprisingly most said 'yes' without any hesitation (those who didn’t were just being humorous, I am convinced). Now that I am a parent myself, I agree completely. My son has made me a happier person overall.

But according to some psychologists this is all a grand illusion. They claim to have scientific findings that prove their point – children decrease our happiness, and all intuitions to the contrary are mere rationalizations. A committed empiricist, I take science to be the best source of knowledge about the world, but I also know that scientific data require interpretation. So let’s see on what basis psychologists draw this conclusion.

In a 2004 article in *Science*, Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues presented data about 1000 Texas women who recorded their emotions through various activities of the day. Researchers then calculated the level of positive versus negative emotions corresponding to each activity. It turns out that taking care of the children ranked below socializing, shopping, eating, praying, sex and even watching TV; it ranked just above the least pleasant activities of the day such as working, commuting and doing housework!

Harvard psychologist Dan Gilbert in his bestseller *Stumbling on Happiness* draws the seemingly inevitable conclusion – we might think that children make us happier but they don’t. And he helpfully explains why this sounds so outrageous and counterintuitive to most parents. The first reason is cognitive dissonance – when we voluntarily invest much time and effort into an activity we tend to think that it must make us happy. The second reason is our biased memory – asked to reminisce about our life with children we remember first and foremost the most intense and the least typical moments. Thus one moment of utter bliss makes us forget about the positive and negative emotions. Aristotleans among us may insist that happiness is an objective state, not a subjective feeling, and it requires doing the right things for the right reasons. Being a parent can be one of those right things, and if so, achieving happiness is partly a matter of learning how to be a good parent. On this view we don’t know enough about the subjects of Kahneman’s studies to draw conclusions about their happiness.

However, even without resorting to Aristotle, we might question whether relatively low positive emotions while taking care of children really warrant the conclusion that children do not bring happiness in a subjective sense. Granted that taking care of children is one major activity involving them, but it’s not the only one. Children also feature in their parents’ socializing, eating, shopping, exercising, resting, etc. One of the happiest moments in my life as a parent is thinking about my son while I am working or before going to sleep. So he is a source of positive emotions even when I am not currently taking care of him. More generally, any parent knows that having a child colors one of those right things, and if so, achieving happiness is partly a matter of learning how to be a good parent. On this view we don’t know enough about the subjects of Kahneman’s studies to draw conclusions about their happiness.

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everything else they do: the way they relate to their partner, the way they work, the way they see other people. Sometimes these changes are positive! So at the very least, Kahneman’s data are insufficient to measure the impact of children on happiness simply because they do not capture other ways in which parents can derive positive emotions.

Still, psychologists have a point: even if having children did not make us happy we would have much trouble admitting it. I’d better go relieve my babysitter before I think much more about it!

Anna Alexandrova is currently working on developing a contextualist theory of well-being. Her article “First-Person Reports and The Measurement of Happiness” is forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology.

Evaluating Evaluations ~Eric Wiland~

In addition to distributing syllabi, reading and commenting on student papers, grading exams, and filling out grade sheets, the process of handing out course evaluations to my students at the end of the term has become just another ritual I perform during the rhythm of the semester. I don't relish imposing them upon students, and it seems to me that most students complete them more out of a sense of obligation than out of any intrinsic desire to evaluate me or my course. But we all take it for granted that we must participate in the ritual. Don't students have the right to evaluate the quality of their teachers? They are paying customers, after all.

Still, I wonder whether students’ course evaluations are really the best way to measure the quality of the philosophical instruction they receive. It’s reported that there were 501 jurors who heard Socrates’ famous speech depicted in Plato’s Apology -- quite a large lecture course! Unfortunately for Socrates, only 221 of them found him persuasive enough to vote for acquittal, and fewer still thought that the appropriate penalty was anything less than death. I’m certainly glad that the stakes I face each semester are less consequential! But the example of Socrates makes one wonder whether students are well equipped to judge the quality of philosophical teaching. If the early Platonic dialogues are to be believed, Socrates was both the model of philosophical teaching and yet was not well loved by his interlocutors. Most of those whom he tried to instruct either left the conversation feeling dissatisfied or came to the conclusion that they knew less than what they had thought they knew. No matter how you view it, Socrates’ students’ evaluations wouldn't have looked that good.

I don't think Socrates is the odd philosopher out here either. Wittgenstein was notoriously harsh with his students. Kierkegaard was most unpopular among the public. Spinoza and Marx are two of many philosophers who fled their countries because their ideas weren’t well received. It’s almost a badge of honor among philosophers to be poorly viewed by one’s contemporaries. And while students’ evaluations don't determine whether we instructors see the hand of the executioner, they do determine whether we get hired, whether we get rehired, and how much we are paid. Course evaluations don’t affect whether we instructors live, but they do determine our livelihoods.

Of course, the task of a philosopher differs from the task of a philosophy instructor. Teachers should be clear and patient. They should be approachable and likeable. They should be nice. We could articulate more platitudes.

But it’s not obvious that students’ course evaluations measure anything other than whether instructors fulfill these platitudes, whether they measure how well instructors actually teach. Studies reveal that instructors receive better evaluations if they are physically attractive, if they are easy graders, if they share the students’ political views, or if students receive a chocolate treat before filling out the evaluation forms. (See The New York Times Magazine for more details: www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/magazine/21wwln.html )

Well-reviewed instructors are probably better than poorly reviewed ones in some way or other, but we should not take it for granted that the difference has much to do with the quality of teaching.

Students typically rate their instructor on a numerical scale; in our department, we use a five-point scale where a "1" is the best and "5" is the worst. Then these students’ ratings are averaged, letting administrators neatly associate a number with the teacher of a course; for example, in one of my courses the students’ average rating of me was a 1.8. (I've had better and worse average scores.)

There are at least three things about this way of doing things that seem suspect. First, how does one seriously go about numerically evaluating the quality of philosophical instruction? If I tentatively give Wittgenstein's Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus a “3,” and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason a “1,” I'm still not sure how to fit Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil into this scheme. In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle rightly warns us not to demand more precision in a study of some subject than the subject matter truly allows, and I think we should heed his advice here. I could (and have) said lots of things about the people who taught me philosophy, but I remain unable to assign a number to any of them. Of course, I face a similar problem when assigning grades to students, but here at least I have a much better grasp...
upon what students need to be able to do in order to do well. I feel somewhat qualified to use an admittedly crude grading system to grade my students; I don't think I was well qualified to use an equally crude system to evaluate my instructors.

Second, the number associated with the instructor is an average rating. Love-'em-or-hate-'em teachers can wind up with the same rating as a teacher who everyone thinks is just ok. Does a philosophy teacher do a sufficiently good job if she ignites a lifelong passion for philosophy in a few of her students, even if many other students are left scratching their heads? Or should a philosophy teacher, as they say, leave no student behind? What's more important, and how do average ratings measure whether teachers are making the right priorities?

Finally, the current system—I hazard to guess—also penalizes those who typically teach lots of lower-division classes. Most students in upper-division courses are majoring in philosophy, having already demonstrated some interest in the discipline. Most students in lower-division courses have little exposure to philosophy, perhaps taking a philosophy class out of curiosity or a false image of what philosophy is like. It should be no surprise that a healthy fraction of students in an introductory course will become disabused about academic philosophy by the end of the semester, realizing that it doesn't suit them, and they can take this out on their instructor when they evaluate the course. But all too often, administrators and hiring committees look merely at the instructor’s average score, taking no account of who is evaluating the instructor under consideration. Not all classes are the same.

Is there a better way for students (or others) to evaluate their instructors? If you think of one, email me at wiland@umsl.edu.

Eric Wiland probably has his hands in too many pots. He is working on papers and projects concerning the existence of God, reasons for action, the taxonomy of moral theories, and the ethics of names. He is also teaching a course on humor and laughter. Forthcoming publications include "On Indirectly Self-Defeating Moral Theories," Journal of Moral Philosophy, and "The Ethics of Terror and Torture," Review Journal of Political Philosophy.
What Makes Bad Art Bad?
Stephanie Ross

We often argue about art. And when we challenge, say, a companion’s view of a movie we’ve just seen together, we aren’t just voicing a brute preference. We offer reasons to support our account and attempt to bring our friend around to share our view. Thus discussions of art seem different from disputes about gustatory taste (“I love broccoli.” “I hate it.”) because both right and wrong things can be said about a work’s properties, meaning, and value. Overall, we seek art in order to generate rewarding aesthetic experiences, and at times we seek the counsel of others in deciding what art to sample. In particular, we seek the advice of critics. They tell us what works of art to pursue and what to make of them.

In his 1757 essay “Of the Standard of Taste,” David Hume argued that there is a standard that helps us sort masterpieces from less worthy works, and that it is constituted by the converging verdicts of ideal critics. The relevant critics are identified by an independent set of traits that Hume sets out (delicacy of taste, practice, comparison, freedom from prejudice, and good sense). While I think that Hume’s list needs to be updated to fit the twenty-first-century art world (I’d add in imaginative fluency and emotional responsiveness), I endorse his overall approach. In what follows, I’d like to explore a particular problem that follows from his theory: why should the critics’ verdicts turn us away from the bad works of art that we currently enjoy? Why should we ‘train up’ and grapple with more difficult artists and pieces? (The philosopher Jerrold Levinson asks this important question in his paper “Hume: The Real Problem.”)

Posing the question this way invites us to grapple with an interesting issue: what’s wrong with bad art, and how can it be identified? Connoisseurs might simply claim “I know it when I see it.” But that doesn’t help less gifted appreciators. There are various sites where bad art is on offer. The Museum of Bad Art, aptly housed in the basement of a Boston cinema multiplex, displays a permanent collection amassed according to an arch and amusing set of principles – e.g., “no works on velvet,” “no deliberately made bad art.” The entire collection can be viewed at: http://www.museumofbadart.org/collection/portraiture.php. Many of the works do seem garish and inept. Consider this dual portrait:

It seems pretty awful. Though a doubt does surface: if the piece were re-contextualized, hung in New York’s Museum of Modern Art, would we still be confident that it lacked all value?

There are literary counterparts to MOBA. The Stuffed Owl is an anthology of bad verse, much of it overly sentimental Victorian poetry. The Bulwer-Lytton Contest, inspired by the author’s 1830 novel Paul Clifford, asks entrants to come up with the worst possible opening sentence for a novel. Here is the 2008 winner: “Theirs was a New York love, a checkered taxi ride burning rubber, and like the city their passion was open 24/7, steam rising from their bodies like slick streets exhaling warm, moist, white breath through manhole covers stamped ‘Forged by DeLaney Bros., Piscataway, N.J.’”

Finally, many cinemaphiles agree that the worst movie in all time is Ed Wood’s “Plan 9 from Outer Space.” The production values are laughable – what looks like a tin foil-covered paper plate careens across the screen to indicate a flying saucer, and when Boris Karloff died in the middle of filming, Wood simply had a stand-in play the rest of the role with a large cape raised up and held to cover his face!

Can we extract from this brief survey any principles that would help us identify bad art? Unfortunately not. Consider some possible criteria:

1. It’s ugly!

Not all great art is beautiful. Many powerful and important subject matters don’t lend themselves to beauty. Think of Goya’s works on the horrors of war, or Shakespeare’s portraits of villains and villainy. The philosopher Timothy Binkley has coined the category “anti-aesthetic art” to characterize some very important twentieth-century works which are entirely without sensory appeal, e.g., Duchamp’s “LHOOQ,” in which the artist Marcel Duchamp scrawled a mustache on a print of the Mona Lisa, or Robert Rauschenberg’s “Erased DeKooning” in which he did just that – purchased, entirely erased, and then exhibited a drawing by his contemporary.

2. There’s no apparent artistry

The complaints “I could do that,” “My child could do that,” “A monkey could do that” capture people’s frustration with much modern art. Some ‘seminal’ works are indeed simple – consider the first-ever monochromatic paintings, attributed to the Russian Constructivist Kasimir Malevich – but not simple minded. A famous example is Marcel Duchamp’s “Fountain,” a white porcelain urinal submitted to the Society of Independent Artists Exhibit in 1917. It may be the most discussed of all modern works.

3. It’s sentimental

This criticism is hard to pin down, but some people feel that excessive sentimentality is a flaw in art, in part because it ensures that the works are not true to life. Examples here might include children’s deathbed scenes in Dickens, Thomas Kinkade’s many images of warm light streaming from snow-covered stone cottages beside meandering streams, Norman Rockwell’s endless variations on a bygone and innocent America in his Saturday Evening Post covers. While some of these examples may fail to be high art, or great art (Kinkade’s website declares him

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“America’s most collected living artist”[1], being true to life does not seem a plausible requirement here. We often look to art to take us to alternative realms. And why should we insist that great art always take us to darker, rather than to cheerier, places?

4. Flawed content

This is perhaps an extension of the previous complaint. While some works of art are all about pattern or sensory surface, other works convey ideas. We are rightly critical of that presents vapid or puerile content. Works that not only present but also endorse morally vicious ideas are also criticized. But shouldn’t we accept any art that plugs into enduring and universal human concerns? There are so many ways to make this connection. Some artists do it by purposefully focusing on the mundane and the quotidian.

5. Lack of creativity

Our complaint about forgeries, even when they’re created with great skill, is that they involve the theft of someone else’s creativity. So perhaps work that is derivative or unoriginal is, other things equal, always going to be of lesser value. Unfortunately, there are counterexamples ready at hand even to this seemingly plausible principle. Some twentieth-century artists practiced what was called appropriation art. It was about originality, and they used lack of originality to make their point – e.g., Sherry Levine took photos of famous photos (like Dorothea Lange’s WPA studies of gaunt migrant workers) and exhibited them as her own.

Despite the failure of any of these simple answers to the question “What’s wrong with bad art?” I don’t think we remain at a total loss. Though there is no simple criterion that can sort art into the good and the bad, the worthy and the less worthy, we can make considerable progress by judging each work in the context of its originating time and place. Return to that monochromatic canvas. Such an object presented in the sixteenth century would have had no chance of becoming art; the art world wasn’t ready for abstraction, let alone minimalism, at that time. Yet one presented today would be old hat, too unoriginal to merit our attention. So works of art must be judged against the background of what other artists were doing at the time and of what were considered important works from the past. Most artists consciously create their works in response to their knowledge of the history of their art.

4. Flawed content

This lets them knowingly reinforce, or extend, or subvert, or undermine what their predecessors have done. (I’m here alluding to the work of Jerrold Levinson and Noel Carroll, two contemporary philosophers who advocate defining art historically.) To return, finally, to Hume – what the Humean ideal critics possess, above all, is a wide-ranging knowledge of the history of art, coupled with an extreme degree of sensitivity. Works of art can perform many varied functions. They can present delightful sensory patterns, imitate the real world, create alternative worlds, express emotion, convey ideas. Thus there is no one way that works can go wrong. But any individual work is properly assessed against the background of what artists in that realm had done before, and the critic is particularly well positioned to inform us about such matters.

Devin Peipert (M.A. 2007) has been pursuing a second master’s degree at Washington University’s George Brown School of Social Work. Devin has long been interested in both politics and environmental issues. He writes “I was able to spend last summer in India doing a study on people’s dependence on forests for food and firewood. It was a lot of fun and quite interesting; a nice way to merge interests in environmental conservation and poverty. The goal will be to advise policy makers and organizations on ways to manage forests such that traditionally forest-dependent people can subsist while maintaining a desirable level of ecosystem conservation. As I develop skills in this field, I’m really seeing the benefits of my experience in philosophy.”

Adam (Patrick) Taylor (M.A. 2006) continues in the Ph.D. program at SUNY-Buffalo. He recently sent us this picture of himself holding a recent creation, “Yellow Spirits Ascending,” that he will be presenting to fellow UMSL grad and SUNY-Buffalo Ph.D. candidate Robert Earle (B.A. 2006).

Tyler Paytas (M.A. expected 2008) will present his paper “The Evolution of an Illusion: How Darwinism Supports Moral Skepticism” to a Society for Student Philosophers Panel at the APA Pacific Division Meeting in April. He presented this same paper at the St. Louis University Graduate Philosophy Conference on September 19th.

Are you an alum or current student with news to share? Please keep in touch and let us know what you’re up to! Send an email to philosophy@umsl.edu.

John Brunero’s paper “Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality” is forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*. He will be presenting an excerpt called “Consistency in Belief and Intention” at both the Central States Philosophical Association and the Central APA.


Jon McGinnis has one book out with David Reisman, *Classical Arabic Philosophy, An Anthology of Sources*, which is one of the first anthologies of Arabic philosophical texts in translation. Another book, *Avicenna, The Physics of the Healing, Islamic Translation Series*, is forthcoming, and a third book, *Avicenna, Great Medieval Thinkers series*, that will be completed by the end of the spring semester. Jon has also been active on the international conference scene. Here, respectively, are talks recently delivered in Mexico City, Istanbul, and Brazil: “New Light on Avicenna: Optics and Its Role in Avicennan theories of Vision, Cognition and Emanation,” “Time to Change: Time, Motion and Possibility in Ibn Sina,” and “What underlies the change from potentiality to possibility? A select history of the theory matter from Aristotle to Avicenna.”

Ronald Munson’s book *The Woman Who Decided to Die: Challenges and Choices at the Edges of Medicine* is forthcoming from Oxford University Press: “Advances in medical technology force us to struggle with new and often gut-wrenching decisions. How do we know when someone is dead and not just in a coma? Should a convicted felon qualify for a new heart? In *The Woman Who Decided to Die*, novelist and medical ethicist Ronald Munson takes readers to the very edges of medicine, where treatments fail and where people must cope with helplessness, mortality, and doubt. Using personal narratives that place us right next to doctors, patients, and care givers as they make decisions, Munson explores ten riveting case-based stories, told with a writer's eye for illuminating detail. These include a young woman with terminal leukemia more worried about her family than herself, a stepfather asked to donate a liver segment to his stepson, a student who believes she is being controlled by invisible Agents, and a psychiatrist-patient who prizes his autonomy until the end. Raising fundamental questions about human relationships, this is an essential book about the very nature of life and death.”

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Robert Northcott has recently given talks on both sides of the Atlantic: “Apportioning explanatory responsibility, and an application to genetic drift,” University of Bristol, UK, December 2008; “Genetic causation and actual difference makers,” Philosophy of Science Association, Pittsburgh, November 2008 (the leading philosophy of science conference in the world); and “Experimental philosophy and metaphysics – two cases from the literature on causation,” Saint Louis University, October 2008.

Gualtiero Piccinini can boast of five forthcoming or recently published articles: Computation vs. Information Processing: How They Are Different and Why It Matters” (with Andrea Scarantino), forthcoming in a special issue of Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science; “The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism,” forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; “Some Neural Networks Compute, Others Don’t,” Neural Networks, invited submission to a special issue on “Advances in Neural Networks Research: IJCNN ’07, 2007 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks”; “Computation without Representation,” Philosophical Studies; and “Computers,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Piccinini has also been busy presenting papers at such far-flung venues as Cambridge, England, and Aberdeen, Scotland. More talks and publications are listed on his curriculum vitae.


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