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Eric Wiland (University of Chicago, 1997) works primarily on topics
in ethics and practical reason. He investigates problems in practical
philosophy by thinking about people who have various cognitive and
motivational flaws, especially those who recognize that they have
such flaws.
Publications:
- “Monkeys, Typewriters, and Consequentialism,” Ratio
(forthcoming).
- “Trusting Advice and Weakness of Will,” Social
Theory and Practice 80 (2004), 371-89.
- “Some Advice for Moral Psychologists,” Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 84 (2003), 299-310.
- “Psychologism, Practical Reason, and the Possibility
of Error,” Philosophical Quarterly 53:210 (2003), 68-78.
- “Stories, Autobiographies, and Moral Inquiry,”
Journal of Social Philosophy 34:2 (2003), 188-98.
- “On the Rationality of Desiring the Forbidden,”Analysis
62:4 (2002), 296-9.
- “Theories of Practical Reason,” Metaphilosophy
33:4 (2002), 450-67.
- “Advice and Moral Objectivity,” Philosophical Papers
29:1 (2000), 1-19.
- “Unconscious Violinists and the Use of Analogies in Moral
Argument,” Journal of Medical Ethics 26:6 (2000), 466-8.
- “Good Advice and Rational Action,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 60:3, (2000), 561-9.
- “A Fallacy in Korsgaard’s Argument for Moral Obligation,”
The Journal of Value Inquiry 34:1 (2000), 103-4.
- “Personal Identity and Quasi-Responsibility,” in
Moral Responsibility and Ontology, ed. Ton van den Beld, Kluwer
Academic Publishers (2000), 77-87.
- “Is there Ethical Knowledge?” Southwestern Philosophical
Review 14:1 (1998), 63-8.
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