

Notes and References

In the last few years, I've read at least ten or twelve pounds of books on informal logic. I've learned something from them all, and I'm grateful to their authors. Informal logic is one of the few remaining traditions of unselfishly shared knowledge, and I know the authors will forgive me if I don't name every book I've consulted.

The tradition that I've drawn from, modified, and added to is embodied in Richard Whately's *Elements of Logic* (Boston: James Monroe, 1838) and John Stuart Mill's *A System of Logic*, 8th ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1879). Somewhat more recent embodiments are Irving M. Copi's *Introduction to Logic*, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1972) and Robert G. Olson's *Meaning and Argument* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969).

I would like to say, though, that I found particularly helpful Nicholas Rescher's brief treatment of informal logic in his *Introduction to Logic* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964). Rescher presents the standard criteria and distinctions, and I often relied on his statement and discussion of them to help me make my own beginnings. Where my indebtedness to Rescher or others has been special or substantial, I'll indicate in the notes below.

Also, I hope it's clear to every reader how much I owe the writers of pulp science fiction, fantasy, and detective stories. Though I quoted the work of none of them, they created the kind of style, settings, and characters that I used so freely.

Chapter 1

The method of illustrating the use-mention distinction by using the name of an author was suggested to me by the discussion of that topic in Samuel Gorowitz and Ron Williams's *Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* (New York: Random House, 1965). The book is generally useful for anyone who needs to know about terms and distinctions involved in contemporary philosophy.

Chapter 2

The discussion of the Reference and Idea theories is substantially indebted to William P. Alston's *Philosophy of Language* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964). See, in particular, pp. 10-16, but read the whole book. It's very good. See Alston also for a guide to the more sophisticated versions of all three theories.

The now-classic presentation of the Use theory is Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).

Chapter 3

The standard treatment of ambiguity and vagueness is found in Rescher. I've departed substantially from the standard view on both topics by tying ambiguity to use and vagueness to a certain kind of situation. "Chameleon words" is a label of my own invention, and what I've said about them resembles what most writers say about vague words in general.

I learned about the "red heifer" case and the rabbinical schools of thought from Herbert L. Searles, *Logic and Scientific Method*, 3rd ed. (New York: Ronald Press, 1968), p. 39.

The classical versions of the sophistries of the Sophist in conversations 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9 are given in Ralph L. Woods, *How to Torture Your Mind* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), pp. 123, 104, 123, 126, and 126 respectively. (The originals, of course, are from the Cynics, the Stoics, and the Sophists and are scattered through many volumes of the Loeb Classical Library.)

I am indebted to *Time Magazine* (August 26, 1972) for the report on the U.S. Army's list of "incorrect" and "correct" expressions.

Chapter 4

Mill (chap. 8) is particularly good on definition, though his general position differs from the one I presented. Both Copi and Rescher have good discussions, though neither of them adequately connects definition with a theory of meaning. A very informative treatment is found in Chapters 6 and 7 of Olson.

Chapter 5

Rescher distinguishes the uses of language in a brief (too brief) way and so does Copi. Copi leaves out the evaluative class, and Rescher omits the expressive. An informative discussion of confusions connected with the uses of language is in James D. Carney and Richard K. Scheer's *Fundamentals of Logic* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), chap. 4.

Chapter 6

Both Rescher and Copi have a brief discussion of disagreements, though neither includes disagreement about interpretation. I know of no other discussion of challenging arguments.

Chapter 7

A concise and readable introduction to formal logic for those who want to know more about it is Richard C. Jeffrey's *Formal Logic: Its Scope and Limits* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

Also see Howard Kahane's *Logic and Philosophy* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1969). I found the sections on argument forms (pp. 5-7) and on truth and validity (pp. 8-12) particularly helpful in guiding my own presentation. The treatment of sentential logic in Part One provides a clear and sharp introduction to the topic.

Chapter 8

Every informal logic book deals with more or less the same informal fallacies, though they aren't always classified in the same way. A useful little book devoted almost wholly to various kinds of mistakes in reasoning is Alex C. Michalos's *Improving Your Reasoning* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

The standard versions of the sophistries of the Sophist in conversations 1 and 4 are presented by Ralph L. Woods in *How to Torture Your Mind* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), pp. 130 and 113 respectively.

Chapter 9

Copi, Rescher, and Carney and Scheer all have nice discussions of analogical arguments, though none discusses the use of analogy in moral arguments. Only Carney and Scheer discuss analogies as illustrations. Other than the one in this chapter, I know of no other discussion of criteria for appraising examples or of the use of fables and parables as illustrative devices.

The quotation from Charles Lyell is from his *Principles of Geology* (New York: Appleton, 1854), p. 64.

The New Testament parable is from Matthew 18: 23-35 of the New English Bible.

For a statement and critical discussion of the extinction theory based on the analogy of "racial youth," etc., see George G. Simpson's readable *The Meaning of Evolution* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 187-189.

The Mill analogy is from Mill's *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 6th ed. (London: Longmans, 1867), p. 243.

Chapter 10

The way of beginning the first section by discussing the need for structure I borrowed from Sheridan Baker's *The Practical Stylist* (New

York: Crowell, 1962), p. 8. Baker's book is filled with good advice, and anyone interested in improving his writing can learn from it. It's also short.

Russell discusses Smith's rules and his own views about writing in "How I Write," which is reprinted in *Portrait from Memory and Other Essays* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951).

The quotation from Brand Blanshard is from his marvelous essay *On Philosophical Style* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 31.

Darwin describes his writing troubles in his *Autobiography*, ed. by Nora Barlow (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959), pp. 137 ff.

The remark by James is quoted by Blanshard, p. 42.

The remark about incoherence is Nicholas Rescher's in his *Introduction to Logic*, p. 100. I am indebted to Rescher for the idea of including a chapter on writing and for guidelines about what might profitably be discussed in it.

Chapter 11

The original S-J-R puzzle is found in Henry E. Dudeney's *536 Puzzles and Curious Problems*, ed. with introduction by Martin Gardner (New York: Scribner's, 1967), p. 214. The version discussed is virtually the same as the one in Rescher's *Introduction to Logic*, p. 11, and it is virtually the same as the one given by Martin Gardner in *Mathematical Puzzles and Diversions* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), p. 120.

Gardner's book contains other S-J-R puzzles and also puzzles of the other sorts we discussed. Anyone interested in more should also look at C. R. Wylie, Jr., *101 Puzzles in Thought and Logic* (New York: Dover, 1957). Also see George J. Summers, *New Puzzles in Logical Deduction* (New York: Dover, 1968). My explanations of how to solve the three types of puzzles owe something to the first six pages—unnumbered—of Wylie's book.

Index

- Addition, rule of, 255
- Aesthetic evaluation, 148–149
- Against the person sophistry, 286–288
- Ambiguity
 - definition and, 126–127
 - fallacy and, 261
 - grammatical, 76–78
 - linguistic, 61–62
 - referential, 75–76
 - vagueness and, 78–79
 - of words, 72–75
- Analogical principle, 341–343
- Analogue, 318–326
- Analogy
 - as argument, 339–349
 - degree of, 344–346
 - evaluation of, 319–327
 - as illustration, 316–326
 - as moral argument, 349–355
 - negative, 345–346
 - positive, 344–346
- Appeal
 - to authority, 265–268
 - to force, 270–271
 - to ignorance, 263–264
 - to pity, 268–270
 - to popular attitudes, 271–273
- Argument
 - by analogy, 339–349, 349–355
 - circular, 281–282
 - conclusion of, 176–179, 181–183, 215–216, 232, 346–347
 - counterarguments, 285–286
 - definition of, 176
 - in essays, 374–377
 - form, 227–231
 - how to identify, 175–182
 - incomplete, 179–181
 - logic and, 175–176, 182–184
 - sound, 176, 186, 224–225, 230–231
 - see also* Deductive argument; Inductive argument
- Argumentum*
 - ad baculum*, 270–271
 - ad hominem*, 286–288
 - ad ignorantiam*, 263–264, 300
 - ad misericordiam*, 268–270
 - ad populum*, 271–273
 - ad verecundiam*, 265–268
- Aristotle, 6
- Association, rule of, 252
- Authority, appeal to, 265–268
- Barbarism, 391–392
- Begging the question, 280–283
- Borderline cases, 267
- Case errors, 394
- Challenging arguments
 - adequacy of premises, 189–194
 - fairness of the premises, 194–196
 - relevance of the premises, 187–189, 195
 - truth of the premises, 185–187
- Chameleon words, 70–72
- Circular argument, 281–282
- Circularity, and definition, 124–125
- Communication, 34–35, 143–144, 155, 391
- Commutation, rule of, 251
- Complex disagreement, 174
- Composition, *see* Writing
- Compound sentences, 248–250
- Conclusion of an argument, 176–179, 181–183, 215–216, 232
 - strength of, 346–347
- Conclusion words, 177–178
- Conditions for use, *see* Use theory
- Confirmation, 190–194, 239–240, 245–247
- Conjunction
 - as connective, 250
 - as inference rule, 236, 255
- Connectives, 249–250
 - implication as, 250
 - sentence, 248, 250
- Connotation, 79–81, 83

434 INDEX

- Connotation (*cont.*)
 - morality and, 83–84
- Constructive dilemma, rule of, 255
- Contradiction
 - definition of, 219–221
 - in puzzle solving, 414, 417
 - in writing, 387–389
- Contradiction in terms, 338
- Counterarguments, 285–286

- Dangling participle, 394–395
- Darwin, Charles, 25
- DeMorgan's rules, 251–252
- Deductive argument
 - definition of, 215
 - distinguished from inductive, 214–219, 242
 - enthymemes and, 179–181, 225–226
 - formal, 226–238, 247–257
 - soundness and, 224–225
 - validity and, 219
- Deductive proof, 231–238
- Definition
 - ambiguity and, 126–127
 - circularity and, 124–125
 - definition of, 99–100
 - loaded, 132–134
 - metaphorical language and, 127
 - morality and, 130–133
 - obscure language and, 125–126
 - ostensive, 116–118
 - paradigm cases and, 115–116
 - persuasive, 131–132, 134
 - relevance in, 129–130
 - scope of, 128–129
 - stipulative, 101–106, 108–109
 - verbal disagreement and, 164
 - see also* Reportive definition
- Definition, methods of
 - by enumeration, 113–115
 - by example, 115–121
 - by synonym, 112–113
 - by example, 115–121
- Definition, standards for, 123–134
- Definitional sulk sophistry, 296–297
- Degree of analogy, 344–346
- Denotation, 80–83
- Directive use of language, 144–145, 156
- Disagreement
 - complex, 174
 - definition of, 160–161
 - evaluative, 166–169, 174–175
 - factual, 161–163, 172, 174–175
 - interpretative, 169–175
 - verbal, 163–166, 174–175

- Disjunction, 250
- Disjunctive syllogism, 235, 255
- Distribution, rule of, 253
- Double negation, rule of, 250

- Enthymemes, 179–181, 225–226
- Enumeration, definition method, 113–115
- Equivalence rules, 250–254
- Essay
 - body, 374–376
 - conclusion, 376–377
 - example in, 382–383
 - introduction, 371–374
- Ethical evaluation, 147–148
- Evaluative disagreement, 166–169, 174–175
- Evaluative use of language, 145–149, 150, 156
- Evidence, fallacies of, 275–285
- Example
 - definition and, 118–121
 - definition of, 329–330
 - in essays, 382–383
 - evaluation of, 331–334
- Exception that proves the rule sophistry, 300–301
- Exportation, rule of, 252
- Expository writing, *see* Writing, expository
- Expressive use of language, 150–151, 156

- Fable, 326–329
- Factual disagreement, 161–163, 172, 174–175
- Fallacies
 - classification of, 261–262
 - definition of, 260
 - of evidence, 275–285
 - of irrelevance, 263–275, 288–289
 - see also* Sophistical defenses; Sophistical refutations
- Fallacies of evidence
 - begging the question, 280–282
 - false cause, 276–278
 - gambler's fallacy, 278–280
 - loaded phrases, 283
 - loaded questions, 283–285
- Fallacies of irrelevance
 - appeal to authority, 265–268
 - appeal to force, 270–271
 - appeal to ignorance, 263–264
 - appeal to pity, 268–270
 - appeal to popular attitudes, 271–273
 - stress fallacy, 273–275
- Fallacy of stress, 273–275
- False cause fallacy, 276–278

- Faulty reference, 395
 Force, appeal to, 270–271
 Formal fallacies, 262
 Formal logic, 226–238, 247–257
- Gambler's fallacy, 278–280
 Gerund error, 395
 Gosse, Philip H., 397–401
 Grammar
 ambiguity and, 76–78
 use and, 152–153
 writing and, 393–395
- Hedging sophistry, 298–299
 Hypothetical syllogism, 255
- Idea theory of meaning, 31, 34–36, 52–53
 Ignorance, appeal to, 263–264
 Illustration
 as analogy, 316–326
 as example, 329–334
 in essays, 382–383
 as parable and fable, 326–329
- Implication
 as connective, 250
 as equivalence rule, 251
 Inconsistency, 387–389
 Inductive argument
 confirmation and, 239–240, 245–247
 definition of, 215
 distinguished from deductive, 214–219, 242
 evaluation of, 240–242
 nonfactual conclusions and, 242–247
 validity and, 238–239
 Inference rules, 235–238, 254–257
 Informal fallacies, 260–289
 Informal logic
 basic character of, 4–6, 27, 80–81
 definition of, 3–4
 history of, 6
 uses of language and, 143–144, 155–156
 Informative use of language, 151–152, 156
 Interpretative disagreement, 169–175
 Irrelevance
 fallacies of, 263–275, 288–289
 in writing, 389–390
- Language
 change and, 25–27, 39, 390–391
 conventions and, 38, 39
 obscure, 125–126
 use and, 34, 37–39
 Language improprieties
 barbarisms, 391–392
 grammar, 393–396
 Language, uses of, 142–156
 directive, 144–145, 156
 evaluative, 145–149, 156
 expressive, 150–151, 156
 informative, 151–152, 156
 multiple, 153–154
 Linguistic ambiguity, 76–78
 Linguistic vagueness, 61–62
 Loaded definition, 132–134
 Loaded phrase, 283
 Loaded question, 283–285
 Logic
 argument and, 175–176, 182–184
 deductive, definition of, 215
 formal, 226–238, 247–257
 inductive, definition of, 215
 informal, 3–6, 27, 80–81
 predicate, 237–238
 sentential, 227, 237–238
 writing and, 369
- Meaning
 as arbitrary, 38–39
 changes in, 25–27, 390–391
 character of, 27–30
 as conventional, 38–39
 idea theory, 31, 34–36, 52–53
 reference theory, 31–34, 52–53
 summary of theories, 54–55
 use theory, 36–55, 121–123
- Measurement, 62–64
 Metaethics, 148
 Metaphor, 156
 Mill, John Stuart, 340–341
 Misplaced modifier, 395
Modus ponens, 235, 254
Modus tollens, 254
 Moral argument, 349–355
 Morality
 and connotation, 83–84
 and definition, 130–133
- Necessary and sufficient condition, 40–41, 45
 Necessary condition, 43–44
 Negation, 250
 Negative analogy, 345–346
 Nondeductive argument, *see* Inductive argument
 Normative ethics, 148
 Normative use of language, *see* Evaluative use of language

436 INDEX

- Number errors, 394
- Obscure language, 125–126
- Parable, 326–329
- Paradigm cases, 50–53, 71, 107
 - definition and, 115–116
- Parallel structure, 395
- Persuasion, rational, 4, 80–81, 142, 155–156, 196
 - in writing, 375–377, 383
- Persuasive definition, 131–132, 134
- Petitio principii*, 280–283
- Phrase, loaded, 283
- Pity, appeal to, 268–270
- Pleasure, intellectual, 403–404, *passim*
- Pleonasm, 386–387
- Popular attitudes, appeal to, 271–273
- Pooh-poohing sophistry, 289
- Positive analogy, 344–346
- Post hoc*, 276–278
- Pragmatic evaluation, 149
- Predicate logic, 237–238
- Premises, 176, 181–183, 215–216, 232
 - adequacy of, 189–194
 - fairness of, 194–196
 - relevance of, 187–189, 195
 - truth of, 185–187
- Probability theories
 - mathematical, 279–280
 - relative frequency, 279–280
- Protagoras, 11
- Puzzles
 - use of contradiction, 414, 417
 - logic and, 403–407
 - use of matrices, 407–411
- Questions
 - loaded, 283–285
 - and use, 154–155
- Quotation-mark names, 13–15
- Quotation marks, 12–17
- Rational persuasion, 4, 80–81, 142, 155–156, 196
- Red herring sophistry, 295–296
- Redundancy, 386–387
- Reference theory of meaning, 31–34, 52–53
- Referential ambiguity, 75–76
- Refuting examples sophistry, 294–295
- Relevance, and definition, 129–130
- Reportive definition
 - evaluation of, 107–108
 - historical, 110–111
 - lexical, 109, 111
 - ordinary words and, 106–109
 - technical, 110, 111
- Revision, in writing, 385
- Scare quotes, 16–17
- Scenario
 - battle plan, 336–337
 - definition of, 334–335
 - quasipredictive, 337–338
 - science fiction, 335–336
- Sentence connectives, 248, 250
- Sentential form, *see* Argument form
- Sentential logic, 227, 237–238
- Shifting ground sophistry, 298
- Shifting burden of proof sophistry, 299–300
- Simplification, rule of, 255
- Sophistical defenses
 - definitional sulk, 296–297
 - exception that proves rule, 300–301
 - hedging, 298–299
 - red herring, 295–296
 - shifting burden of proof, 299–300
 - shifting ground, 298
- Sophistical refutations
 - against the person, 286–288
 - pooh-poohing, 289
 - refuting examples, 294–295
 - straw man, 289–292
 - trivial objections, 293–294
 - what about you?, 288–289
- Sophistries
 - definition of, 262
 - morality and, 286
- Sound argument, 176, 186, 224–225, 230–231
- Stipulative definition
 - arbitrary, 101–104, 106
 - evaluation of, 102–104
 - restricting, 104–106
 - role of, 108–109
- Straw man sophistry, 289–292
- Strength of conclusion, 346–347
- Stress fallacy, 273–275
- Substitution instance, 229–230
- Sufficient condition, 40–41
- Syllogism
 - disjunctive, 235, 255
 - hypothetical, 255
- Synonym, definition by, 112–113
- Talmud, 64, 68
- Tautology, rule of, 251
- Trivial objections, 293–294
- Truth, validity and, 221–225, 230–231
- Tu quoque* sophistry, 288–289

- Use-mention distinction, 11–17
- Use theory of meaning, 36–54
 - definition and, 121–123
- Vagueness
 - ambiguity and, 78–79
 - chameleon words and, 70–72
 - comparative, 62–64
 - criteria for resolving, 67–70
 - linguistic, 61–62
 - in use of words, 64–67
- Validity
 - argument forms and, 228–231
 - contradiction and, 219–221
 - deductive proofs and, 231–238
 - inductive argument and, 238–239
 - truth and, 221–225, 230–231
- Value disagreements, 166–169, 174–175
- Value judgment, 146
- Verbal disagreement, 163–166, 174–175
 - and definition, 164
- “What about you?” sophistry, 288–289
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 28
- Word ambiguity, 72–75
 - conclusion, 177–178
- Writing, expository
 - for an audience, 375, 383–384, 391
 - definition of, 369–370
 - persuasion in, 375–377, 383
 - revision and, 385
 - structure in, 371–378
 - style and use, 378–395
- Writing, incoherence in
 - inconsistency, 387–389
 - irrelevancy, 389–390
 - redundancy, 386–387