IS 7893: Special Topics in Information Systems:

Economic, Strategic, and Social Theories Used in I.S. Sourcing Research

 

Winter 2010

 

Dr. Mary C. Lacity

233 Computer Center Building

(314) 516-6127 (work)

(314) 516-6827 (fax)

Email: Mary.Lacity@umsl.edu

Homepage:  http:/www.umsl.edu/~lacitym

 

 

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

 

This course explores the theoretical and empirical foundations of IS research in the IS sourcing context.  The primary objective is to prepare students to be IS researchers by demonstrating the variety of theories and methodological approaches used to study IS. Students will learn major reference theories adopted from other disciplines and applied to IS research, including transaction cost economics, resource based view, resource dependency theory, agency theory, social exchange theory, social capital theory, institutionalism, power theory, and others. These theories are applied to the IS sourcing context to identify the determinants of IS sourcing, critical success factors, ideal contracts, relationship management, and governance forms.  Students will gain an in-depth knowledge of the theories and empirical results of many IS sourcing empirical studies.

 

GRADING:

10%  Active class participation

20%  Weekly paper critiques (at most 1 paper per student per week)

50%  Weekly quizzes

20%  Final Exam last day of class

 

WEEKLY QUIZZES:

At the start of class each week, I will administer a brief quiz on the assigned readings.  The purpose of the quiz is to give you that extra incentive to read all assignments prior to class.  The quizzes will assess basic understanding of the material, while the subsequent class discussion will provide more erudite analysis.  The lowest quiz grade will be dropped.

 

WEEKLY PAPER SUMMARY/ CRITIQUES:

 

One of our goals is to also prepare you for your comprehensive exams.  One of the best ways to do this is to summarize each book/article you read and file it into meaningful categories so that you only have to study your summaries rather than revisiting the 1,000 plus articles/books you will read during your doctoral studies.  For class, I am only asking that you each prepare one or two summaries each week, then share your summaries with your classmates.   Each student will also be asked to present/lead the class discussion for the article/book.

 

Summary/Critiques Format:

 

§         Ph.D. Student Name

§         Research Method (Data Collection Method, Date, Variable Definitions & Measures, Number of Participants)

§         Theoretical Foundation (hypotheses)

§         Findings

§         Limitations

§         Please add some of your own insights to the summary by incorporating knowledge gained from other readings, classes, etc.

§         Pictures help!  If there is a tested model, it helps to depict the model and outcomes such as:

 

 

 

 

WEEKLY CLASS PARTICIPATION:

 

It is vital that students attend all sessions. Please make attendance your number one priority. This class will only be valuable if each and every one of us makes a commitment to be prepared.  That means that each student must have carefully read all the reading assignments prior to class.  I will assess the class participation grade based on my impression of your weekly preparation, meaningful insights, plentiful comments, intellectual curiosity, and enthusiasm.

 

In a rare circumstance that a student has to miss class (such as the birth of a child or severe illness), please contact me immediately. 

 

FINAL EXAM:

 

One of my goals is to help students prepare for comprehensive exams.  The final exam will be in the same format as the comprehensive exam.  The final exam in the class will comprise two questions.  You have two hours to answer the exam using only a CLEAN copy of the syllabus, no notes, and no outside resources.  I will find a computerized classroom so that you may use a computer.

STUDENTS: Shaji, Daniel, Fon, Prasad, Jessie, Yejing, Aihua

Week 1: COURSE OVERVIEW:

 

In 1945, Kurt Lewin—father of modern social psychology—wrote, “nothing is so practical as a good theory.”  We further believe that the dual roles of theorist and practitioner are elemental to human nature.  Any agent (whether she is manager or academic) is a theorist when creating abstractions and postulating relationships among the abstractions to make sense of reality.   Searle (1997) calls this “world-to-mind” direction of fit.   Any agent is a practitioner when applying abstractions to solve a problem, make a decision, or engage in any reasoned action. Searle call this “mind-to-world” direction of fit.  Thus, we are all theorists and practitioners.

 

Good theories are good for practice and good practices are good for theory.  In the context of IT outsourcing, there is no shortage of good theories.  Nearly twenty years of empirical work on IT outsourcing (ITO) has been guided by a number of theoretical perspectives from economics, strategy, sociology, and systems science (see table 1).  Theories from economics include Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory, and various theories on contracting.  The main assumption across economic theories is that agents base outsourcing decisions and engage in contracts to minimize total costs and to mitigate risks, such as the risk that an agent or supplier will behave opportunistically. Theories from strategy include the Resource-based view, Resource Dependency Theory, Game Theory, Auction Theory, and various theories of firm strategy. The main assumption across strategic theories is that agents build or acquire resources to execute strategies that lead to “winning”. Theories from sociology include Social/Relational Exchange Theory, Social Capital Theory, Institutionalism, Power Theories, Innovation Diffusion, and Social Cognition.  A common focus among these theories is the relationships among agents, including levels of trust and power, feelings of mutual obligation, and social norms.  Systems sciences view organizations as organisms that exchange resources across organizational boundaries and learn through feedback. When applied to IT outsourcing, systems approaches are used for modeling outsourcing and examining systems properties that facilitate outsourcing.

 

 

Category

Theory

Brief Summary

Relevant Literature

Economic

Transaction Cost Theory

TCT generally addresses the question: why do firms exist? TCT specifically addresses the question: should companies make or buy resources?  Make-or-buy decisions are presumed to be made on an economic basis, considering production and transaction costs.  Agents match the attributes of the transaction (asset specificity, uncertainty, measurement, and frequency) to the most efficient governance form (market, hybrid, or hierarchy). The attributes indicate the extent to which opportunities exist for agents to behave opportunistically, which increases transaction costs due to increased needs for detailed contracts and monitoring. 

 

Major Constructs:

Production Costs; Transaction Costs; Asset Specificity;

Frequency of Transaction; Uncertainty; Measurability;

Opportunism; Contract Types; Number of suppliers;

Property Rights

Foundational Reading:

 

Coase (1937)

Williamson (1975, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1991)

 

IS sourcing literature:

 

Ang & Straub (1998) Aubert et al. (1996)

Bahli & Rivard (2003)

Barthélemy & Geyer (2005)

Dibbern & Heinzl (2002)

Grover et al. (1996)

Heiskanen et al. (1996)

Kishore et al. (2004)

Knolmayer (2002)

Lacity & Willcocks (1995)

Loebbecke & Huyskens (2006)

Loh & Venkatraman (1995)

Miranda & Kim (2006)

Nam et al. (1996)

Ngwenyama & Bryson (1999)

Oh et al. (2006)

Poppo & Lacity (2002)

Poppo & Zenger (1998)

Qu & Brocklehurst (2003)

Shelanski (1991)

Tanriverdi et al. (2007)

Tsang, E., (2000)

Walden (2005)

Agency Theory

 

AT purports that principal-agent relationships--characterized by different goals and risk preferences--should be efficiently managed, particularly with appropriate contracts.  Behavior-based contracts (such as time and materials) is appropriate when outcome uncertainty is high, the agent’s risk aversion is high, outcomes are not easily measured. Outcome-based contracts (such as fixed price) are appropriate when the principal’s risk aversion is high, outcomes are measurable, and tasks are programmable.

 

Major Constructs: Contracts; Monitoring, Bonding;

Residual Loss Costs, Task Programmability; Risk Preference

 

Foundational Reading:

Eisenhardt (1985, 1989)

Sharma (1997)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Bahli & Rivard (2003)

Chalos & Sung (1998)

Choudhury & Sabherwal (2003)

Gopal et al. (2003)

Hall & Liedtka (2005)

Hancox & Hackney (1999)

Iyer et al. (2005)*

Logan (2000)*

Nelson et. al. (1996)

Oh et al. (2006)

Contracting Theories

 

Several theories address contracting. Domberger basically argues that outsourcing is a sound decision if the net cost to the outsourcer drops as a result of outsourcing, provided there is no drop in service quality.

 

Major Constructs: Specialization; Market Discipline; Flexibility; Cost Savings; Contract Type ;

 

Foundational Reading:

Domberger (1998)

MacNeil (1980)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Gopal et al. (2003)

Seddon et al. (2007)

 

Strategic

Resource-Based View

 

RBV purports that competitive advantage of a firm arises from developing and deploying unique, valuable, and costly-to-copy capabilities. RBV implies that companies should retain core capabilities, but that non-core capabilities do not have to be owned or controlled. Recent thinking focuses on complementary resources.

 

Major Constructs: Resource Value; Resource Rareness;

Resource Non-imitablity; Resource Non-substitutability

 

Foundational Reading:

Barney (1991, 1999)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Alvarez-Suescun (2007)

Barthélemy & Geyer (2004)

Duncan (1998)

Levina & Ross (2003)

Roy & Aubert (2002)

Straub et al. (2002)

Tsang, E., (2000)

Wade & Hulland (2004)*

Resource Dependency Theory

 

RDT argues that an organization’s dependence on external resources (outsourcing) is determined by the importance of the resource to the organization, the number of potential suppliers, and the cost of switching suppliers. Organizations try to minimize dependence when possible.

 

Major Constructs: External Environment; Concentration;

Munificence; Interconnectedness

 

 

Foundational Reading:

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)

Pfeffer (1982, 1994)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Grover et al. (1996)

Grover et al. (1997)

Oh et al. (2006)

Teng et al. (1995)

Firm Strategy

Firms enact strategies to achieve a competitive advantage.  Porter views that a firm’s competitive advantage is either low cost producer (more efficient than rivals) or differentiator (firm differentiates itself from rivals).  Miles and Snow proposed that organizations may be prospectors (seeking to innovate), defenders (seeking stability), analyzers (seeking stability in operations but innovation at the margins), or reactors (reacting to the environment). Pralahad and Hamel argue that the best strategy is to focus on core capabilities and outsource the rest. 

 

Major Constructs: Differentiation; Low Cost Producer; Prospector; Defender; Analyzer; Reactor

Foundational Reading:

Chandler (1962)

Miles & Snow (1978)

Porter (1980, 1985)

Pralahad & Hamel (1990)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Apte and Mason (1995)

Bardhan et al. (2006)

DiRomualdo & Gurbaxani (1998)

Grover et al. (1994)

Hall & Liedtka (2005)

Loebbecke & Huyskens (2006)

McLellan et al. (1995)

Michell & Fitzgerald (1997)

Slaughter & Ang (1996)

Game Theory/

Auction Theory

 

Game Theory posits that an agent considers other agents’ strategies before choosing a strategy to maximize his/her own return. Auction theory is a subset of game theory that examines how agents act in auction markets. These theories are applied to customer-supplier bidding and negotiations.

 

Major Constructs: Payoff Calculation; Opponent Assessment; Information Asymmetry; Winner’s Curse;

Nash Equilibrium

Foundational Reading:

Nash (1951, 1953)

Milgrom  & Weber (1982)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Bhargava & Sundaresan (2004)

Chaudhury et al.  (1995)

Elitzur & Wensley (1997)

Kern et al. (2002)

Klotz & Chatterjee (1995)

Wang et al. (1997)

Whang (1992)

Social

Social/

Relational Exchange Theory

 

Relationships between customers and suppliers are based on trust developed over time (partnership advantage). Rousseau views a contract as mental beliefs and expectations parties have about their mutual obligations based on perceived promises of a reciprocal exchange.

 

Major Constructs: Trust; Culture; Personal Satisfaction;

Gain; Psychological obligations; Social Exchange

 

Foundational Reading:

Blau (1964) ;

Ekeh (1974)

Emerson (1972) ;

Homans (1961,1974) ;

Rousseau (1990)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Adler (2003/2004)

Ang & Slaughter (2001)

Goles (2001)

Goles and Chin (2002)

Grover et al. (1996)

Klepper (1995)

Koh et al. (2004)

Lee & Kim (1999)

Oza et al. (2006)

Sabherwal (1999)

 

Social Capital Theory

In general, the theory posits that social capital facilitates the exchange and recombination of existing intellectual capital to form new intellectual capital, and that an organization has an advantage over markets in this regard.

 

Major Constructs: Structural, Cognitive, and

Relational Dimensions of Social Capital

 

Foundational Reading:

Nahapiet, J., and Ghosal (1998)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Chou et al. (2006)

George (2006)

Miranda and Kavan (2005)

Institution-alism

The subset of this theory, institutional isomorphism studies how organizations eventually adopt similar practices through three mechanisms of influence: force, mimicking, and norms.

 

Major Constructs: Mechanisms of Isomorphic Change: Coercive, Mimetic, Normative

 

Foundational Reading:

DiMaggio & Powell (1991)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Ang & Cummings (1997)

Barthélemy & Geyer (2004)

Jayatilaka (2001)

Jayatilaka (2002)

Miranda & Kim (2006)

Power Theories

Organizational decision-making processes are characterized by the power and political tactics of stakeholders involved. Political tactics include the selective use of decision criteria, selective use of information, use of outside experts, building coalitions, and cooptation (swaying opposition by making them participants), framing, using interpersonal Influence, and timing. Sources of power include position of authority, ability to acquire or control resources that others value but few possess, location in the communication network, being in the right sub-unit, the ability to absorb uncertainty and personal characteristics. 

 

Major Constructs: Sources of Power; Political Tactics

 

Foundational Reading:

Pfeffer (1981, 1994)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Allen et al. (2002)

Dibbern & Heinzl (2002)

Lacity and Hirschheim (1993)

Lee & Kim (1999)

Peled (2001)

Innovation Diffusion

 

ID posits that the rate at which individuals adopt innovations depends on attributes of the innovation, communication channels, and social norms. The rate at which organizations adopt innovations depends on leadership, characteristics of the organization, and system openness.

 

Major Constructs: Innovation, Individual, Organizational and Environmental Characteristics; S-shaped adoption curve; Social Norms;

Foundational Reading:

Rogers (1983)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Hu et al. (1997)

Loh and Venkatraman (1992b)

 

Social Cognition

Social cognition theory studies how ordinary people think about other people (phenomenology) and how people think they think about people (naïve scientists)

 

Major Constructs: Persistent Expectations;

Schemas, Scripts, & Frames; Decision-making & Causal Analysis

Foundational Reading:

Fiske & Taylor (1991)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Ho et al. (2003)

Systems

Theories

General Systems Theory

Many behavioral researchers believe social systems are like living organisms in the sense that both display wholeness, interact with their environment, exhibit strategies of self-maintenance, and experience cycles of birth, growth, maturity and death.

 

Major Constructs: Equifinality; Control; Feedback

Foundational Reading:

von Bertalanffy (1968)

 

IS sourcing literature:

Marcolin & Ross (2005)

Systems Dynamics

SD models are mathematical representations of the causal structure of systems.  SD assumes that structure causes behavior

 

Major Constructs: Causal links; Causal loops

Foundational Reading:

Forrester (1996);

Richardson (1996)

IS sourcing literature:

Dutta and Roy (2005)

Modular Systems Theory

The extent to which a business process is loosely coupled, mature, and standardized enough to be separated from a firm’s other business processes for outsourcing.

 

Major Constructs: Modularity

Foundational Reading:

Sanchez & Mahoney (1996)

IS sourcing literature:

Tanriverdi et al. (2007)

Miscellaneous

Global Disaggregation: Apte & Mason (1995)

Residual Rights Theory:  Lee et al. (2004)

 

 

Week 2: UNDERSTANDING PRACTICE:

 

Lacity, M., Willcocks, L., and Rottman, J. (2008), “Global Outsourcing of Back Office Services: Lessons, Trends and Enduring Challenges,” Strategic Outsourcing: An International Journal, Vol. 1, 1, 2008.

 

Quinn, J. (2000), "Outsourcing Innovation: The New Engine of Growth," Sloan Management Review, Vol. 41, 4, pp. 13-28.

 

DiRomualdo, A., and Gurbaxani, V. (1998), “Strategic Intent for IT Outsourcing,” Sloan Management Review, Vol. 39, 4, p. 67-80.

 

 

Week 3: UNDERSTANDING PRACTICE:

 

Lacity, M., and Willcocks, L. (1998), "An empirical investigation of information technology sourcing practices: Lessons from experience," MIS Quarterly, Vol. 22, 3, pp. 363-408. (updated data is in chapter 6 Lacity and Willcocks 2001).  

 

Hirschheim, R., and Lacity, M (2000), "Information Technology Insourcing: Myths and Realities", Communications of the ACM, Vol. 43, 2, pp. 99-108.

 

Levina, N., and Ross, J. (2003), “From the Vendor’s Perspective: Exploring the Value Proposition in Information Technology Outsourcing,” MIS Quarterly, Vol. 27, 3, pp. 331-364. 

 

 

Week 4: Overview of entire academic literature:

 

Dibbern, J., Goles, T., Hirschheim, R., and  Bandula, J. (2004), "Information Systems Outsourcing: A Survey and Analysis of the Literature," Database for Advances in Information Systems, Vol 34, 4, Fall 2004, pp. 6-102.

 

Pick another meta analysis

Week 5: TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS:

 

Williamson, O. (1991), “Comparative Economic Organization:  The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, 2, pp. 269-296. 

 

Williamson, O. (2005), “The Economics of Governance,” The American Economic Review,  Vol. 95, 2; pp. 1-18.  

 

Ghosal, S., and Morgan, P. (1996), “Bad for Practice: A Critique of Transaction Cost Theory,” Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, pp. 13-47.

 

Barney, J. (1999), “How a Firm’s Capabilities Affect Boundary Decisions,” Sloan Management Review, Vol 40, 3, pp. 137-145.

 

Week 6: TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS:

 

Ang, S. and Straub, D. (1998), "Production and Transaction Economies and IS Outsourcing: A Study of the U.S. Banking Industry," MIS Quarterly, Vol. 22, 4, pp. 535-552. 

 

Nam, K., Rajagopalan, S., Rao, H. R. and Chaudhury, A. (1996), "A Two-Level Investigation of Information Systems Outsourcing," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 39, No. 7, pp. 36-44. 

 

Lacity, M. and Willcocks, L. (1995).  Interpreting Information Technology Sourcing Decisions From A Transaction Cost Perspective: Findings and Critique. Accounting, Management and Information Technology, 5, 3/4, 203-244. 

 

Poppo, L. and Zenger, T. (1998), "Testing Alternative Theories of the Firm: Transaction Cost, Knowledge-Based, and Measurement Explanations for Make-or-Buy Decisions in Information Services," Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, pp. 853-877. 

 

 

Week 7:   AGENCY THEORY:

 

Eisenhardt, K. (1989), "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review," The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, 1, pp. 57-76.

 

Sharma, A. (1997), "Professional as agent: Knowledge asymmetry in agency exchange," Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, 3, pp. 758-798.

 

Oh, W., Gallivan, M., and Kim, J., (2006), “The Market's Perception of the Transactional Risks of Information Technology Outsourcing Announcements,” Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 22, 4, pp. 271-303.

 

Hall, J., and Liedtka, S. (2005), "Financial Performance, CEO Compensation, and Large-Scale Information Technology Outsourcing Decisions," Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 22, 1, pp. 193 – 222. 

 

Gopal, A., Sivaramakrishnan, K., Krishnan, M., and Mukhopadhyay, T. (2003), "Contracts in Offshore Software Development: An Empirical Analysis," Management Science, Vol. 49, 12, pp. 1671-1683.

 

Week 8: RESOURCE BASED VIEW:

 

Michalisin, Michael, "In search of strategic assets",  International Journal of Organizational Analysis,  Bowling Green; Oct 1997; Vol. 5, Iss. 4; pg. 360, 28 pgs 

 

Barney, J. (1991), "Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage," Journal of Management, Vol. 17, 1, pp. 99-120.

 

Tsang, E., (2000), "Transaction cost and resource-bases explanations of joint ventures: A comparison and synthesis," Organization Studies, Vol. 21, 1, pp. 215-242.

 

Alvarez-Suescun, A. (2007), “Testing resource-based propositions about IS sourcing decisions,” Industrial Management & Data Systems, Vol. 107, 6, pp. 762-229.

 

Teng, J., Cheon, M., and Grover, V. (1995), "Decisions to Outsource Information Systems Functions: Testing a Strategy-Theoretic Discrepancy Model," Decision Sciences, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 75-103. 

 

Week 9: RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY & POWER THEORY:

Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. (1978), The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective, New York: Harper & Row; reprinted by Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2003.

 

Straub, D., Weill, P., and Schwaig, "Strategic Dependence on the IT Resource and Outsourcing: A Test of Strategic Control Model,” Information Systems Frontiers, Vol. 10, 1.

            Pfeffer, J. (1994), Managing With Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1994.

Lacity, M., and Hirschheim, R. (1993), "Theoretical Foundations of Outsourcing Decisions: The Political Model", from Information Systems Outsourcing: Myths, Metaphors, and Realities, Wiley, Chichester,  pp. 37-47; 197-229; 

 

 

Week 10: SOCIAL/RELATIONAL  EXCHANGE THEORY

 

Ekeh, Peter, Social Exchange Theory: The Two Traditions,  Harvard   University Press, 1974. pp. 1-186; particular attention to chapter 7.  NO QUIZ ON THIS, BUT YOU SHOULD BE FAMILIAR WITH THIS READING.

 

Ang, S., and Slaughter, S., (2001), “Work Outcomes and Job Design for Contract Versus Permanent Information Systems Professionals on Software Development Teams,” MIS Quarterly, Vol. 25, 3, pp. 321-350. 

 

Lee, J., and Kim, Y. (1999), "Effect of Partnership Quality on IS Outsourcing Success: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Validation," Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 29-61.

 

Sabherwal, R. (1999), "The Role of Trust in Outsourced IS Development Projects," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 42, 2, pp. 80-86.

 

Grover, V., Cheon, M., and Teng, J. (1996), "The Effect of Service Quality and Partnership on the Outsourcing of Information Systems Functions," Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 12, 4, pp. 89-116.

 

Poppo, L. and Zenger, T., “Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements?” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 23, pp. 707-725.

 

Week 11: INSTITUTIONALISM

 

DiMaggio, P., and Powell, W. (1991), "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, (Powell & DiMaggio eds), The University of Chicago Press, pp. 63-82.

 

Ang, S. and Cummings, L. (1997), "Strategic Response to Institutional Influences on Information Systems Outsourcing," Organization Science, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 235-256.

 

Miranda, S, and Kim, Y. (2006), “Professionalism Versus Political Contexts: Institutional Mitigation and the Transaction Cost Heuristic in Information Systems Outsourcing,” MIS Quarterly. Vol. 30, 3, p. 725-753.

 

 

Week 12:  SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY

 

Lin,N., Cook, K.,  Burt, R., Social Capital: Theory and Research, Aldine De Gruyter, (2001)

 

Nahapiet, J., and Ghosal, S. (1998), “Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage,” Academy of Management Review, Vol. 23, 2, pp. 242-265.

 

Chou, T., Chen, J., and Pan, S. (2006), “The Impacts of Social Capital on Information Technology Outsourcing Decisions: A Case Study of Taiwanese High-Tech Firms,” International Journal of Information Management, Vol. 26, pp. 249-256.

 

Okoli, C., and Oh, Wonseok, “Investigating Recognition-based Performance in an Open Community: A Social Capital Perspective,” Information and Management, Vol. 44, 2007, pp. 240-252.

 

Week 13: MISCELANEOUS THEORIES APPLIED TO I.S. SOURCING

 

Ho, V. Ang, S., and Straub, D. (2003), “When subordinates become IT contractors: Persistent managerial expectations in IT outsourcing,” Information Systems Research, Vol. 14, 1, pp.66-86.  

 

Lee, J., Miranda, S., and Kim, Y. (2004), "IT Outsourcing Strategies: Universalistic, Contingency, and Configurational Explanations of Success," Information Systems Research, Vol. 15, 2, pp. 110-131.

 

 

Week 14: SPECIAL ISSUE IN MIS QUARTERLY ON OFFSHORE OUTSOURCING 2008

 

Is the World Really Flat? A Look at Offshoring at an Online Programming Marketplace
David Gefen and Erran Carmel  

 

Cocreating Understanding and Value in Distributed Work: How Members of Onsite and Offshore Information Systems Development Vendor Teams Give, Make, Demand and Break Sense
Paul W. L. Vlaar, Paul C. van Fenema, and Vinay Tiwari  

 

Innovating or Doing as Told?  Status Differences and Overlapping Boundaries in Offshore Collaboration
Natalia Levina and Emmanuelle Vaast

 

Explaining Variations in Client Extra Costs Between Software Projects Offshored to India
Jens Dibbern, Jessica Winkler, and Armin Heinzl

 

Week 15:  IN CLASS FINAL EXAM