

Immigrant Resentment and Voter Fraud Beliefs in the U.S. Electorate

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Abstract

Public beliefs about the frequency of voter fraud are frequently cited to support restrictive voting laws in the United States. However, some sources of public beliefs about voter fraud have received little attention. We identify two conditions that combine to make anti-immigrant attitudes a strong predictor of voter fraud beliefs. First, the recent growth and dispersion of the immigrant population makes immigration a salient consideration for many Americans. Second, an immigrant threat narrative in political discourse linking immigration to crime and political dysfunction has been extended to the voting domain. Using new data from a survey module in the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study and the 2012 American National Election Study, we show that immigrant resentment is strongly associated with voter fraud beliefs. Widespread hostility toward immigrants helps nourish public beliefs about voter fraud and support for voting restrictions in the United States. The conditions generating this relationship in public opinion likely exist in other nations roiled by immigration politics. The topic of fraudulent electoral practices will likely continue to provoke voters to call to mind groups that are politically constructed as “un-American.”

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INTRODUCTION

Public concerns about voting integrity are more than an academic curiosity, since they are frequently cited to support particular election reforms. In two recent Supreme Court cases, *Purcell v. Gonzalez* (2006) and *Cranford v. Marion County* (2008), the majority decision accepted state arguments that voting restrictions, such as photo identification and proof of citizenship requirements, are needed to maintain public confidence in elections. Similarly, lawmakers frequently invoke public concerns about voter fraud as the basis for new voting restrictions (Minnite 2010; Hasen 2012). Indeed, people who believe that voter fraud is common are more likely to favor laws requiring voters to show a photo ID before being allowed to cast a ballot (Wilson and Brewer 2013). Beliefs about widespread voter fraud have filtered across the American mass public, despite evidence that voter fraud occurs very rarely (Ansolabehere, Luks and Schaffner 2015; Minnite 2010; Ahlquist, Mayer, and Jackman 2014; Christensen and Schultz 2014; Levitt 2014).

Given that beliefs about widespread voter fraud are influential in driving public support for voter restrictions, it is important to understand the sources of these beliefs. While the literature on voter fraud beliefs is emerging, we argue that attitudes toward immigrants are an understudied source of public beliefs about how much voter fraud occurs. Two conditions in the United States are expected to produce a strong association between anti-immigrant attitudes and public beliefs about voter fraud: (1) relatively high levels of immigration in recent years that make immigration a salient national issue; and (2) an immigrant threat narrative in political rhetoric that frames immigrants as criminals and undeserving of the rights of citizenship. Elite claims about voter fraud frequently incorporate elements of immigrant threat language. For example, upon taking office in 2017, President Donald Trump called for a major investigation into voter fraud after alleging that millions of undocumented immigrants cast illegal votes to deliver the nationwide popular vote to

Hillary Clinton (House and Dennis 2017). Trump also centered his campaign for president around anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy proposals, though he is certainly not the first politician to frame immigrants as criminals or fraudulent voters. While we test this theory on the United States we believe that anti-immigrant attitudes will be a potent predictor of voter fraud beliefs in other countries where these conditions also exist.

We argue that a person's animosity toward immigrants – particularly, immigrant resentment – is a highly influential predisposition since its components reflect attitudes toward crime, deserving membership in the polity, perceived threats to American traditions, and fears about losing political influence. Recent political rhetoric frequently combines these elements by linking immigration with crime and voter fraud in particular. We posit that similar attitudes are called to mind when people attempt to enumerate instances of voter fraud in U.S. elections. By bridging the literatures on immigrant threat and voter fraud, our study is the first to theorize and test a link between public attitudes toward election integrity and anti-immigrant attitudes.

We report the results of two studies to examine the relationship between attitudes toward immigrants and voter fraud beliefs. Our first study reports results from a survey module in the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). We test an immigrant resentment hypothesis along with dominant frameworks in political science. Our second study examines public perceptions of election integrity in the United States using data from the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES). In each study, we find that anti-immigrant attitudes strongly predict beliefs about voter fraud, often outperforming conventional political predispositions and contextual measures.

We organize the paper as follows. First, we explain the reasons for which anti-immigrant attitudes should be associated with voter fraud beliefs. We then provide an overview of scholarship on public beliefs about voter fraud. Next, we present our data, methods, and evidence from our two studies. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks about our results.

ANTI-IMMIGRANT ATTITUDES AND VOTER FRAUD PERCEPTIONS

Existing scholarship indicates that political predispositions, general orientations toward the political system, and racial attitudes are the most reliable predictors of public beliefs about voter fraud. Reflecting the nature of political debate about proposed voting restrictions, Republicans and conservatives tend to believe that voter fraud occurs more frequently than Democrats and liberals (Wilson and Brewer 2013; Bowler et al. 2015; Wilson and King-Meadows 2016). Furthermore, there is clear evidence of a sore loser effect in voter fraud beliefs, as supporters of winning candidates hold more positive assessments of election integrity than supporters of losing candidates (Sances and Stewart 2015; Wolak 2014; Beaulieu 2014).

Certain predispositions and acts that signal closer connections to the political system also shape beliefs about voter fraud. Voters and people with higher levels of political efficacy and trust in government tend to hold more positive beliefs about election integrity (Wolak 2014). In addition, people with higher levels of education and political knowledge tend to be more sanguine about voter fraud in the United States (Bowler et al. 2015; Wolak 2014). Similarly, messages from political elites, particularly trusted leaders, can influence public beliefs about voter fraud (Vonnahme and Miller 2013; Wilson and Brewer 2013; Beaulieu 2014).

Finally, there is some evidence that the issue of voter fraud has become racialized. Political debates about restrictive voting laws often feature arguments about how those laws will affect people of color, who are less likely to possess a government-issued photo ID or the documents needed to obtain one (Barreto, Nuño and Sanchez 2009; Hershey 2009). In some instances political rhetoric includes pointed allegations of voter fraud by people of color (Dreier and Martin 2010; Minnite 2010; Hasen 2012: 44, 65-67; Wilson and Brewer 2013; Ellis 2014; Appleby and Federico 2017). As a result, some have found a positive relationship between racial resentment and public beliefs about voter fraud (Wilson and Brewer 2013; Appleby and Federico 2017). Current

scholarship on voter fraud builds upon a racial spillover effect of President Obama's historic status as the nation's first African American president (Appleby and Federico 2017). In turn, they find that perceptions of the fairness of the presidential election and integrity of the vote became racialized in 2008 and 2012. Nevertheless, existing research has largely ignored public attitudes toward immigrants as a source of beliefs about voter fraud.

Why should attitudes toward immigrants influence public beliefs about voter fraud? One mechanism linking the two sets of attitudes would be empirical evidence of higher rates of voter fraud among immigrants. Available evidence suggests that voter fraud is extremely rare and that non-citizen voting is even less common than other forms of election fraud, such as absentee fraud and ballot tampering by officials (Ansolabehere, Luks, and Schaffner 2015; Kahn and Carson 2012).¹ One study found 33 complaints of non-citizen voting during a decade of elections in California and Oregon, but only four cases that led to convictions (Minnite 2010). A nationwide investigation of all reported instances of voter fraud from 2000 to 2012 found just 56 cases of alleged non-citizen voting (Kahn and Carson 2012). Most voter fraud allegations are made leading up to a major election, particularly in electorally competitive states, suggesting that voter fraud allegations are used as a voter mobilization strategy (Fogarty et al. 2015; Hasen 2012).

Some elite rhetoric tends to exaggerate the frequency of non-citizen voting in the United States. For example, in 2011 Colorado Secretary of State Scott Gessler (R) claimed that 12,000 registered voters were not citizens out of more than 3 million registered voters in the state (Siegelbaum 2011). Gessler further claimed that 5,000 non-citizens voted in the 2010 general election in Colorado (Siegelbaum 2011). Upon further investigation, most of the people on the list were

¹ One study concludes that approximately 2% to 6% of non-citizens vote illegally in American elections (Richman, Chattha, and Earnest 2014). However, this study has major flaws. The estimate is based on a sample survey yet does not report confidence intervals for any estimates of illegal voting. More importantly, large sample surveys are inferior for making inferences about low probability events when there are even small amounts of measurement error in key variables (in this case there is some error in the question identifying non-citizens). Another study of the same data concludes that the non-citizen voting rate in the United States is likely 0 (Ansolabehere, Luks, and Schaffner 2015).

American citizens and the state ultimately identified only 35 alleged non-citizens who voted in Colorado (Hoover 2012). In Florida, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles estimated a potential 180,000 non-citizens registered among the state's 12 million registered voters in 2011 (Dixon 2012). Florida Governor Rick Scott (R-FL) ordered a statewide effort to remove immigrants from the state's voting rolls. However, the initial estimate included extensive errors and a subsequent investigation found just 38 alleged non-citizens voted in Florida (Powers, Haughney and Williams 2012) and only one person was convicted of non-citizen voting in Florida.

A more likely mechanism linking attitudes toward immigrants and beliefs about voter fraud relies on two conditions: (1) the growth of foreign-born groups in historically newer U.S. destinations, increasing the salience of immigration attitudes in the mass public; and, (2) political rhetoric that often paints immigrants as lawbreakers, thus priming attitudes toward immigrants when people think about criminal behavior, including voter fraud. These conditions are similar to Kinder and Kam's (2009) theory about the conditions that "activate" ethnocentrism as a powerful force in public opinion.

On the first condition, the United States has experienced relatively high levels of immigration over the past twenty years, with most of the recent wave of immigrants coming from Latin America and Asia (Hajnal and Lee 2011, 10; Garand, Xu, and Davis 2015). Currently, the foreign-born share of the total population in the United States is higher than it has been in almost one hundred years. Between 1990 and 2000, the total U.S. foreign-born population grew by 57 percent from 19.8 million to 31.1 million. Between 2000 and 2009, the number of immigrants grew by 24 percent from 31.1 million to 38.5 million. In addition, the number of unauthorized immigrants peaked at 12.2 million in 2007 and has remained relatively stable since 2009 after rising for nearly two decades (Passel and Cohn 2016).

Furthermore, the foreign-born population is now more dispersed across the United States, with recent immigrants settling in racially and ethnically homogenous areas where immigrants have historically been absent (Marrow 2011; Massey 2008; Singer 2004). Scholars have found an increase in “new destination” states, cities and rural areas that had not experienced much immigration since the 1960s (Marrow, 2011; Cisneros 2009; Wilson and Singer, 2011). While traditional destination states – such as New York, Illinois, California, Texas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Florida – continue to receive large numbers of immigrants, the foreign born population grew by 49 percent or more, twice the national rate between 2000 and 2009, in mostly southern and Midwestern regions of the United States (Terrazas 2011; Passel and Cohn 2011).²

Scholarship on racial and ethnic group threat suggests that the growth and dispersion of immigrant groups across the U.S. is related to the second condition. That is, demographic changes in one’s community fosters a sense of perceived threat among native-born U.S. citizens (Hopkins 2010; Newman 2013). Others show that a considerable portion of American voters feel that increased growth rates of immigrants lead to reductions in employment prospects, safety, and “American” values (Branton et al. 2011; Schildkraut 2011). Large proportionate changes in state immigrant populations produce intensive sociocultural changes that represent a challenge to a state’s ethnic and cultural status quo while generating a higher degree of anti-immigrant sentiment (Newman et al. 2012). In some quarters there is also a longstanding strain of anxiety about demographic change in the United States, a fear that the country as they know it is slipping away (Albertson and Gadarian 2015).

On the second condition, the extent to which a person’s anti-immigrant attitudes structure perceptions of how much voter fraud occurs in U.S. election will depend on an “immigrant threat” narrative commonly found in political and policy discourse (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Albertson

² These states are: South Carolina, Alabama, Tennessee, Delaware, Arkansas, South Dakota, Nevada, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Wyoming, Idaho, Indiana, and Mississippi.

and Gadarian 2015). Sudden increases in ethnic diversity, complimented by mainstream political discourse that arouses public anxiety about an increasingly diverse country, are associated with increases in anti-immigrant attitudes (Hopkins 2010). The threat narrative broadly links concerns over immigration to crime, job loss, and several other social and political maladies (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Albertson and Gadarian 2015).³ Some argue that perceived threat manifests as resentment toward immigrants generally (Schildkraudt 2011). Resentment takes the form of negative stereotypes about immigrants as a monolithic group, fears about cultural and political decline, beliefs that immigrants are not equally deserving of political rights, and that immigrants engage in criminal activity.

Voter fraud is another type of crime and rhetoric about voter fraud from prominent politicians often extends this connection between immigration and criminal behavior to the voting domain. Elite rhetoric about voter fraud is often vague, but when a specific mechanism is provided it tends to focus on allegations of non-citizens voting in elections (Fogarty et al. 2015). For example, President Trump has made the unsupported claim that he lost the popular vote in the 2016 election because millions of undocumented immigrants participated illegally in the election (House and Dennis 2017). In congressional testimony, Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach alleged that “the problem of aliens registering to vote is a massive one, nationwide” (Kobach 2015). The recent increase in immigration, combined with elite rhetoric and media coverage that stereotype non-citizens as criminals, may prime attitudes toward immigrants when Americans think about voter fraud. This suggests that higher levels of immigrant resentment are associated with the perception that voter fraud occurs more frequently in U.S. elections (H₁).

Others argue that the perceived threat arises specifically from Mexicans, who pundits and political elites have constructed as the stereotypical immigrant (Brader, Valentino and Suhay 2008).

³ A recent review of criminology research finds that immigration generally has not increased crime rates in the United States (Ousey and Kubrin 2017).

When Americans imagine a stereotypical immigrant, studies suggest that they tend to envision a Latino (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Dunaway, Branton and Abrajano 2010; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Haynes, Merolla and Ramakrishnan 2013) while visual cues of “Latino-looking” people elicit restrictive immigration attitudes among U.S. voters (Brader, Valentino and Suhay 2008). As such, these findings indicate that more negative attitudes toward Latinos, particularly Mexican immigrants, are associated with the perception that voter fraud occurs more frequently (H₂).

Finally, studies also suggest that threatened sentiments mainly come from an animosity toward undocumented immigrants. Paul Broun, a Republican running for a U.S. Senate seat in Georgia in 2014, stated that Democrats can only win elections in the state with the votes of “illegal aliens” (Galloway 2014). Haynes, Merolla and Ramakrishnan (2016) show that mainstream political rhetoric continues to construct immigration as a problem of social deviance (i.e. immigrants illegally crossing the border). Undocumented immigrants are often portrayed as being deceptive in trying to acquire welfare benefits and legal residence at the cost of law-abiding and deserving Americans (Garand, Xu, and Davis 2015; Hussey and Pearson-Merkowitz 2013). Xia Wang (2012) finds that perceptions of undocumented immigrants as a criminal threat is positively associated with the perceived size of the undocumented immigrant population. These findings suggest that more negative attitudes toward undocumented immigrants are associated with the perception that voter fraud occurs more frequently in U.S. elections (H₃).

STUDY 1: USING RACIAL AND ETHNIC ATTITUDES IN THE 2014 CCES

In this study, our main objective is to test whether voter fraud beliefs are associated specifically with anti-immigrant attitudes while controlling for relevant political dispositions. We use survey data from a module of 1,000 respondents to the 2014 CCES. The survey was conducted online by YouGov and included a pre-election wave conducted before the November elections and a post-election wave fielded after the elections. To understand the determinants of voter fraud

beliefs, we collect data on respondents' political attitudes and social characteristics before the election, and then measure their voter fraud beliefs after the election. A detailed description of our variables is provided in the online appendix.

Public perceptions about election fraud can be measured on several dimensions: (1) who is committing fraud – individual voters or election officials; (2) the frequency of fraudulent acts; and (3) the significance of fraudulent acts. Our main dependent variable measures beliefs about the frequency of voter fraud, focusing primarily on fraud committed by voters. These frequency measures were previously used in the Survey of the Performance of American Elections and another peer-reviewed study (Stewart 2013; Bowler and Donovan 2016). In addition, beliefs about the frequency of voter fraud are more strongly correlated with election policy preferences than other common measures of voter confidence and election integrity perceptions (Udani and Kimball 2017). In the CCES post-election module, respondents are asked how frequently four different types of voter fraud occur in the United States: non-citizen voting, voter impersonation, double voting, and ballot tampering. We randomize the order of fraudulent activities that participants view. There is considerable variation across individuals in voter fraud beliefs, and roughly 20 percent of respondents in the CCES module believe that acts of voter fraud are “very common.” Our sample is similar to prior surveys in terms of baseline beliefs about voter fraud and support for photo ID laws (see Table A-1 in online appendix). Responses to the voter fraud items are coded from 1 to 4 with the most frequent category at the high end of the scale. An exploratory factor analysis of the four items reveals just one factor, with the item dealing with official vote tampering producing the weakest factor loading. Excluding vote tampering, the other three items form a reliable scale ($\alpha = 0.92$). There is also relatively little variation in aggregate beliefs across the different types of voter fraud, although respondents tend to believe that non-citizen voting occurs more frequently than other acts of fraudulent voting (see Table A-2 in online appendix). This suggests that people hold

general beliefs about voter fraud and do not distinguish between different sources of voter fraud. Our voter fraud index is created by averaging the responses to each of the three items.⁴ Higher scores on the scale indicate beliefs that voter fraud occurs more frequently.

To investigate whether animosity toward immigrants predicts beliefs about voter fraud, we create several measures of attitudes toward immigrants based on questions in the pre-election wave of the survey. We create a measure of immigrant resentment based on six randomly ordered questions that ask how much respondents agree or disagree with statements about the impact of immigration. These items, which tap into dimensions involving cultural beliefs, group conflict, political influence, and different forms of resentment, form a reliable scale ($\alpha = 0.84$), with higher scores indicating greater resentment of immigrants. A majority of respondents fall on the resentful side of the scale. Respondents in the bottom third of the immigrant resentment scale tend to believe that voter fraud occurs infrequently, with a mean score of 1.9 on the voter fraud index (which ranges from 1 to 4). Mean voter fraud beliefs are higher for respondents in the middle third (2.5) and highest third (3.0) of the immigrant resentment scale. This provides preliminary support for H₁.

To account for animosity toward illegal immigrants, we measure affect towards illegal immigrants with a feeling thermometer, with larger (smaller) values reflecting more warmth (coldness). To account for anti-Latino sentiments that often are associated with attitudes toward U.S. immigration, we use a two batteries of stereotype questions that ask respondents whether Latinos are lazier and less intelligent than whites, African Americans, and Asian Americans ($\alpha = 0.70$). Our immigrant resentment scale generates a solid correlation with the thermometer rating of illegal immigrants ($r = 0.44$) and a weaker correlation with the Latino stereotype scale ($r = 0.30$).

We try to control for as many alternative sources of voter fraud beliefs as possible with CCES data. For example, one's identity as an American may influence optimism toward election

⁴ Bowler and Donovan (2016) use the same three items to construct a voter fraud scale.

administration. Studies suggest that those with high levels of national pride tend to offer more positive assessments of electoral integrity (Schildkraut 2011; Wolak 2014). To this end, we suspect that voter fraud beliefs will be lower among not only voters who are highly patriotic, but also are native-born residents whose family members were all born in the United States. The CCES allowed respondents to choose which of the following categories best describes them: immigrant citizens, immigrant non-citizens, first generation, second generation, and third generation. We use dichotomous indicators for each category, but exclude third generation. Second, we create a patriotism scale using two questions on the importance of being an American and how good a person feels seeing the American flag ($\alpha = 0.86$).

Most of what we know about voter fraud beliefs is informed by broader attitudes about American government institutions and electoral outcomes. In predicting beliefs about voter fraud, we measure relevant social and political dispositions from the pre-election module of the 2014 CCES. First, partisanship should also be a strong predictor of public opinion about electoral integrity. Voter fraud debates are largely understood in partisan and polarized terms (Bowler and Donovan 2016; Wolak 2012). Studies show that voter fraud concerns are advanced primarily by conservatives and Republican elites (Dreier and Martin 2010; Hasen 2012; Ellis 2014) while liberal groups and Democratic Party elites tend to spread fears that voting restrictions may disenfranchise some voters (Atkeson, Adams and Alvarez 2014; Bowler and Donovan 2016; Hasen 2012). In addition, most voter restrictions are either enacted or introduced by predominantly Republican-dominated state legislatures (Hicks et al. 2015). If partisans in the mass public internalize messages coming from respective party elites (Zaller 1992), we expect that Republicans are more likely than

Democrats and Independents to believe that voter fraud occurs frequently in U.S. elections. We use three dichotomous variables to delineate between Democrats, Independents, and Republicans.⁵

Prior studies point to other subgroups that may hold unique voter fraud beliefs. There is variation in information from different news sources on this issue, as conservative sources tend to emphasize concerns about voter fraud while liberal sources tend to focus more on voter suppression fears (Hasen 2012; Henderson 2015). Unlike the ANES data in Study 2, the CCES data include relatively few questions about specific sources of political information. We create a conservative news exposure index based on three questions ($\alpha = 0.75$), two of which ask how frequently respondents watch Fox News and visit its web site. Uncritical reports of voter fraud are more common on Fox News than other news sources (Dreier and Martin 2010), including allegations of non-citizen voting (Henderson 2015). For example, in 2017 *Fox & Friends* co-host Ainsley Earhardt alleged that 5.7 million non-citizens may have voted in the 2008 election (Sherman 2017). We are not aware of other major news organizations reporting the same allegation. There is some evidence that Fox News influences public opinion, particularly support for presidential candidates (Della Vigna and Kaplan 2007; Smith 2016). More relevant to our study, people who trust Fox News are much more likely to believe that voter fraud is a big problem than viewers of other news networks (Jones et al. 2014). Furthermore, exposure to Fox News is associated with negative views of Mexican immigrants and more support for restrictive immigration policies (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012). For these reasons, we include a measure of conservative media exposure as a control variable. We create a similar measure of exposure to liberal media based on six questions that ask how often respondents watch particular TV networks or visit certain web sites ($\alpha = 0.82$). Few people report

⁵ Due to much of the voter fraud and election integrity rhetoric expressed in polarized terms (Wolak 2014), we anticipate that partisan cues will have minimal effect on independents and those who are unsure of their party identification. To this end, we group these two groups of respondents (163 and 46, respectively) together in order to avoid dropping more observations when analyzing the dependent variable, which is measured in the post-election wave.

consuming partisan news sources at least several days a week (6 percent for conservative sources, 5 percent for liberal sources). We expect that conservative media exposure is positively associated with beliefs about the frequency of voter fraud while liberal media exposure is negatively associated with voter fraud beliefs.

Along the same lines, it may be that general exposure to news influences beliefs about voter fraud, as fraud allegations tend to be regular news items, particularly as a major election approaches (Fogarty et al. 2015; Dreier and Martin 2010). Thus, we also use five questions on type of media usage to gauge overall media consumption. Furthermore, others find that higher levels of education and political knowledge tend to reduce public concerns about election fraud (Wolak 2014; Gronke 2014). We include controls for both factors. Education is measured with 6 categories of educational attainment ranging from having no high school degree to having a post-graduate degree. Political knowledge is measured with two questions asking participants whether they know which political party controls the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate ($\alpha = 0.80$).

Lastly, other scholars have noted that the issue of voter fraud has become racialized, with some political rhetoric describing voter fraud as an urban problem specifically implicating African Americans (Dreier and Martin 2010; Minnite 2010; Wilson and Brewer 2013; Ellis 2014). This rhetoric encourages the public to bring to mind racial attitudes when considering the issue of voter fraud. As a result, some have found a positive relationship between racial resentment and public beliefs about voter fraud (Wilson and Brewer 2013; Wilson and King-Meadows 2016; Appleby and Federico 2017). Racial resentment seems to be a strong predictor of public support for voting restrictions as well (Wilson and Brewer 2013; Gronke et al. 2015). We create a black resentment scale based on items in the CCES common content survey ($\alpha = 0.75$), and expect that people with higher racial resentment tend to believe that voter fraud occurs more frequently.

We also control for age, sex, and race. We use a set of dichotomous indicators to designate respondents who identify as female, black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, Mixed, and Other. Because of a history of resisting the Voting Rights Act, we control for whether a respondent lives in the South as defined by the U.S. Census. The base category in our statistical models of voter fraud beliefs consist of respondents who identify as white, male, Republican, and third generation Americans with mean levels of political knowledge, media exposure, education, racial resentment, immigrant resentment, and who does not live in the south.

Results

Table A-3 in the online appendix displays the OLS coefficients and robust standard errors from the separate models of voter fraud beliefs.⁶ For comparison, we standardize all scales (i.e. immigrant resentment, nationalism, negative Latino stereotypes, ratings of undocumented immigrants, black resentment, and political knowledge), media consumption measures, education, and age. Our results provide strong evidence that a general measure of immigrant resentment is a robust predictor of voter fraud perceptions. In Models 1 and 2 of Table A-3, a one standard deviation change in immigrant resentment scale is associated with a 0.29 increase (s.e. = 0.04, $p < 0.001$) in the voter fraud perception scale. The results also show a significant negative association between voter fraud perceptions and receptivity toward undocumented immigrants ($b = -0.09$, s.e. = 0.05, $p < 0.05$), but not with negative stereotypes toward Latinos. The size and significance of the

⁶ While 1,000 respondents participated in our pre-election module, 873 respondents participated in our post-election module. Since we measure voter fraud perceptions in the post-election module, the most observations that we could have in a statistical model is 873. Additional missing observations arise from participants who did not answer questions on watching Fox News (16), the political knowledge battery (1), immigrant resentment battery (1), and voter fraud battery (2). The number of observations in Models 3 and 4 of Table A-3 is lower, due to 116 participants preferring not to answer the undocumented immigrant thermometer question. We also tested models that include household income as a predictor. Ultimately, we left income out of the reported results because over 100 respondents did not answer the income question. Income is not a statistically significant predictor of voter fraud beliefs in the CCES study, and the substantive findings do not change when income is included in the model. These results are available from the authors.

immigrant resentment indicator does not change after accounting for holding negative stereotypes of Latinos; however, its size does decrease by 24 percent after controlling for attitudes toward undocumented immigrants. The findings suggest that voter fraud perceptions tap an underlying dimension of attitudes involving undocumented immigrants, a group of immigrants that are dominant constructed as criminals.

The effect of immigrant resentment is nearly cut in half (-45%) after adding the control for black resentment. The results from the last model in Table A-3 show that the resentment scales nearly produce the same change in voter fraud perceptions. Comparing the black resentment and immigrant resentment indicators, a one standard deviation change in each is associated with a 0.18 (s.e. = 0.05, $p < 0.001$) and 0.16 (s.e. = 0.05, $p < 0.001$) increase in the voter fraud scale, respectively.⁷ Moving from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile in immigrant resentment is associated with a .43 increase in the voter fraud scale, holding other factors constant. A similar change in racial resentment is associated with a .50 increase in voter fraud perceptions. These relationships are substantial given that the voter fraud scale has a range of 3. We interpret our results to indicate that the dominant racial attitudinal frameworks that center on black antipathy cannot easily wash away the effect of other dimensions of racial and ethnic animus directed at immigrants in particular.

In addition, immigrant resentment serves as a significant predictor of voter fraud perceptions above and beyond other relevant dispositions toward politics. Our models provide evidence that political sophistication matters. Even after controlling for racial and ethnic indicators

⁷ Black resentment and immigrant resentment are positively related measures ($r = .6$) but they are conceptually distinct. Immigrants comprise less than ten percent of Black Americans (Anderson 2015), so immigrant resentment is largely directed at a different group than racial resentment. Given the prior research findings on racial resentment noted above, it is important to control for racial resentment when examining the association between attitudes toward immigrants and voter fraud beliefs. If we remove black resentment from the analysis then the coefficients for immigrant resentment and partisanship increase in size (see Tables A-5 and A-13).

in Model 4, a one standard deviation increase in education is associated with a decrease in voter fraud perceptions ($b = -0.10$, $s.e. = 0.03$, $p < 0.01$). Increasing education levels from the 10th to the 90th percentile is associated with a .29 drop in voter fraud perceptions, holding other variables constant. Meanwhile, some model results show that political knowledge ($b = -0.09$, $s.e. = 0.04$, $p < 0.05$) is significantly associated with lower voter fraud perceptions (see Models 1 and 2 in Table A-3).

Our results also provide stronger evidence for partisan effects and the influence of conservative media outlets. As Models 1 through 3 in Table A-3 indicate, Democrats on average score 0.25 lower than Republicans in voter fraud perceptions ($s.e. = 0.09$, $p < 0.001$). That partisan coefficient does not change after controlling for attitudes toward undocumented immigrants, but becomes statistically insignificant when models account for black resentment ($b = -.15$, $s.e.=0.15$ in Model 4).⁸ In Model 1, a one standard deviation change in watching conservative media outlets is associated with a 0.32 increase on average ($s.e. = 0.05$, $p < 0.001$) in voter fraud perceptions.⁹ In contrast, a one standard deviation change in watching liberal media outlets is associated with a 0.17 drop on average in voter fraud perceptions ($s.e. = 0.04$, $p < 0.001$). These effect sizes, standard errors, and significance levels change minimally in different model specifications. Lastly, our results suggest that elite rhetoric on voter fraud is more impressionable on newer than older generations of voters. Compared to third generation participants, first-generation respondents believe voter fraud occurs more frequently ($b = 0.24$, $s.e. = 0.10$, $p < 0.05$). The estimated effect of this generational

⁸ Other statistical models in the online appendix (Tables A-9 and A-10) indicate that black resentment has similar effects for Republicans, Independents, and Democrats. Models interacting black resentment with race also suggest that black resentment has a larger effect on whites than Hispanic ($b=-0.87$, $s.e. = 0.50$, $p<0.10$), Asian ($b=-0.87$, $s.e.= 0.72$, $p<0.10$) or mixed-race ($b=-0.84$, $s.e. = 0.49$, $p<0.05$) identifiers.

⁹ Conservative media exposure is positively associated with immigrant resentment ($r = .33$), racial resentment ($r = .32$) and Republican partisanship ($r = .29$), and negatively correlated with liberal media exposure ($r = .28$). If we remove the conservative and liberal media variables from Model 4 then the coefficients for immigrant resentment, racial resentment, partisanship, and general news consumption increase in size (see Table A-7).

difference is less certain, though, once our models account for all racial and ethnic indicators. Other demographic measures, including age, sex, race and ethnicity are largely unrelated to public beliefs about voter fraud.

Some may wonder whether immigrant resentment is only associated with beliefs about the frequency of non-citizen voting, rather than other types of voter fraud. When we examine the individual questions that comprise the voter fraud scale, we find that immigrant resentment is a strong predictor of beliefs about each type of fraudulent activity (see Table A-4 in online appendix). We use an ordinal logit estimation to model the responses to individual voter fraud questions. We find that a one standard deviation increase in immigrant resentment has the strongest association with believing that noncitizen voting occurs very frequently in U.S. elections ($b = 0.49$, $s.e. = 0.14$, $p < 0.001$), and is slightly stronger than black resentment ($b = 0.44$, $s.e. = 0.14$, $p < 0.001$). In Figure 1 we compare the relative impact of significant racial and ethnic attitudes on each item of the voter fraud perception scale.¹⁰ As the first two panels of Figure 1 further illustrate, immigrant resentment has a marginally larger effect than black resentment on the probability of believing that double voting and voter impersonation are “very common” in American elections. As immigrant resentment increases from lowest to highest values, the predicted probability of believing that either form of fraud is very common increases by roughly .14 and .12, respectively.¹¹ The third panel of Figure 1 indicates that the estimated impact of immigrant resentment on beliefs about non-citizen voting is even bigger, and substantially larger than the impact of racial resentment. As immigrant resentment increases from lowest to highest values, the probability of believing that non-citizen voting is very common increases by approximately 27 percentage points. A comparable rise in black

¹⁰ For each figure we recode the independent variables on a 0-1 scale so that different variables have comparable minimum and maximum values.

¹¹ The predicted probabilities reported in the text are “as observed” – calculated while leaving other independent variables at observed values and then averaging over all cases in the sample (see Hanmer and Kalkan 2013).

resentment increases the probability of believing the non-citizen voting is very common by almost 17 percentage points. It is not surprising that immigrant resentment is more closely related to beliefs about the type of voter fraud directly implicating non-citizens. The results are also consistent with our main hypothesis: even when asked about forms of voter fraud that do not necessarily involve non-citizens, people with more resentment toward immigrants are still more likely to believe that those fraudulent acts occur frequently.

[Insert Figure 1 About Here]

We are also interested in whether voter fraud beliefs are associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants from a particular part of the world. To answer this question, we leverage a question wording experiment that we conducted in the pre-election module. All respondents were asked to use a thermometer rating to indicate how cold (0) or warm (100) they feel about Irish immigrants. Then, respondents were randomly assigned one of three group thermometer rating questions on African, Chinese, and Mexican immigrants. Measuring attitudes toward Irish immigrants creates a baseline against which to compare the effects of the other immigrant groups. We then examine the association between the different immigrant group ratings and voter fraud beliefs while controlling for other competing explanatory variables proposed in this study.¹² We provide the results of our regression models with immigrant group thermometer ratings as predictors in our online appendix (see Table A-11).

[Insert Figure 2 About Here]

In Figure 2, we compare the relative impact of each thermometer scale on the voter fraud perceptions scale. We find that feelings toward Irish immigrants are unrelated to beliefs about voter fraud. In contrast, when asked about the other immigrant groups, people with colder feelings toward those groups are more inclined to think that voter fraud occurs very frequently. Our findings show

¹² These tests have weaker statistical power since a different subsample evaluated each non-Irish immigrant group.

that a one standard deviation change in warmth towards Mexican immigrants is associated with a decrease in voter fraud perceptions ($b = -0.12$, $s.e. = 0.05$, $p < 0.05$). Moving from extremely low to extremely positive ratings of Mexican immigrants is associated with a roughly 1 point drop in the expected voter fraud scale. However, there is no statistically significant relationship between views towards Irish, African, or Chinese immigrants and beliefs about voter fraud. Additional tests of the treatment effects indicate that the Mexican immigrant treatment group had significantly higher voter fraud beliefs than the Chinese immigrant treatment group ($b = 0.19$, $s.e. = 0.09$, $p < 0.05$). No significant differences were found between Mexican and African immigrant groups or Chinese and African immigrant groups. This suggests that voter restrictions, which may depress turnout among voters of color (Hajnal et al. 2015), are being mobilized by tapping into public animosity toward Mexican immigrants. Overall, the CCES study shows a strong relationship between immigrant resentment and voter fraud beliefs.

STUDY 2: ELECTION INTEGRITY MEASURES IN THE 2012 ANES

We have two main objectives in our second study. First, we build upon our first study showing that voter fraud beliefs extend beyond racial animus to immigration concerns, using different measures of election fraud beliefs and immigration attitudes. Second, we aim to further show that immigrant animosity biases a person's perception of election integrity even after controlling for many covariates, including general orientations toward the political system. When registration and voting procedures operate smoothly the public is more likely to believe in the integrity of elections. Prior studies provide some evidence that public confidence in elections is shaped by the performance of election administrators at the state level (Bowler et al. 2015) and at the local level (Hall, Monson, and Patterson 2009; Gronke 2014). There is less evidence that state election laws influence public concerns about election integrity. For example, the adoption of photo ID requirements in several states does not appear to alleviate public concerns about voter fraud

(Ansolabehere and Persily 2008; Bowler et al. 2015). These findings still suggest that public confidence in election administration should improve perceptions about the frequency of voter fraud. Lastly, voters with higher levels of political efficacy and trust in government tend to be more sanguine about election fraud in the United States (Gronke 2014; Wolak 2014; Uscinski and Parent 2014). This suggests that such dispositions should lower voter fraud beliefs.

To this end, we further test our hypotheses using the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES) data. We provide a more detailed explanation of our measures in the online appendix. We again use dependent variables that ask respondents about the frequency of election integrity outcomes. The 2012 ANES Time Series Study includes questions in the post-election wave that ask how often in our country “votes are counted fairly” and “election officials are fair.” Thus, respondents knew the outcome of the 2012 election when answering the questions. We focus on these two items as dependent variables because they come closest to the election fraud allegations that frequently appear in election reform debates in the United States. We code both variables so that higher scores indicate a stronger belief that elections are fraudulent. Less than one-third of respondents believe that votes are counted fairly “very often,” and less than one-quarter believe that election officials are fair “very often.”

We examine two measures of hostility to immigrants as our primary independent variable of interest. One is an anti-immigration scale based on responses to six ANES questions on immigration. Each item was recoded to a 0-1 scale, with higher values indicating greater antipathy toward immigrants, and the six variables were averaged together to form an anti-immigration scale ($\alpha = 0.75$). We also create an ethnocentrism scale based on stereotype questions that ask the degree to which particular groups (Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians) are “hard working” and “intelligent.” Following the method used by Kam and Kinder (2012, 328), the average rating for out-group members is subtracted from the in-group rating on each trait. Then the two trait comparison

measures are averaged together to create an ethnocentrism scale ($\alpha = 0.69$). Higher scores indicate greater hostility to racial and ethnic out-groups. We expect ethnocentrism and anti-immigration attitudes to be positively associated with the election integrity variables.

We also control for similar partisan and ideological predispositions that we use in the 2014 CCES analysis. Both variables are coded so that we expect them to be positively associated with the electoral integrity measures. In addition, we control for racial resentment by developing a scale with four questions that ask about the status of blacks in American society ($\alpha = 0.80$).¹³ Higher values indicate higher levels of racial resentment, so we expect it to be positively associated with beliefs about election fraud.

We also utilize the richness of ANES surveys to control for other dispositions that we were unable to include in our CCES module. First, we control for electoral surprise, the inclination of election losers, particularly unexpected losers, to grasp at poorly sourced claims of voter fraud (Beaulieu 2014; Wolak 2014). To test this hypothesis, we create a dummy variable for respondents in the pre-election wave of the survey who correctly predicted that President Obama would win re-election in 2012. This measure should be negatively associated with beliefs about voter fraud. Second, those with higher levels of patriotism and confidence in government should also be more confident in the fairness of elections (Wolak 2014). We combine four questions about government corruption and waste to measure trust in government ($\alpha = 0.63$). Higher values indicate more trust in government. We measure patriotism with three items ($\alpha = 0.80$). We expect patriotism and trust to be negatively associated with beliefs about election fraud.

The ANES data include a bevy of media exposure measures as well. Many ask which newspapers, web sites, and radio and television programs respondents follow regularly. We compute

¹³ Racial resentment is positively correlated with ethnocentrism ($r = .35$) and the anti-immigration scale ($r = .46$). Removing racial resentment from the models does not appreciably change the coefficient estimates for the other independent variables (compare Tables A-13 and A-14).

the average of 19 of these questions measuring exposure to conservative media sources to create a conservative media consumption scale ($\alpha = 0.86$). Similarly, we combined 19 items for liberal sources into a liberal media consumption scale ($\alpha = 0.77$). We control for general media consumption with a separate set of questions that ask respondents how frequently they read a newspaper, watch TV news, or get news from radio shows or web sites.

Additionally, we include external efficacy and voter turnout as additional independent variables, since actual participation and efficacy should predict more positive assessments of election integrity. Turnout is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent reported voting in the 2012 election. We measure external efficacy by combining two items that ask respondents whether government officials care about their interests and whether they have a say over what government does ($\alpha = 0.65$). Both variables are coded in a way that we expect them to be negatively associated with beliefs about election fraud. Fourth, we include a dummy variable for battleground states to test whether exposure to the heaviest competition in the presidential campaign produces more positive assessments of electoral fairness (Wolak 2014). Lastly, we test the election administration hypothesis using data from a recent initiative that rates each state's administration of elections based on several indicators (Pew Charitable Trusts 2016). We use the summary rating, the Election Performance Index (EPI), as a measure of state election administration in 2012. Higher scores indicate better performance, so we expect EPI to be negatively associated with our election integrity measures.

The 2012 ANES is a mixed-mode survey, with some respondents carrying out the survey via traditional face-to-face interviews and others completing the survey online. There is some indication that interviewer-administered surveys are more prone to social desirability effects, producing more positive assessments of government and elections (Atkeson, Adams, and Alvarez 2014). Internet surveys tend to generate more negative assessments and may also yield more pessimistic evaluations

of electoral integrity. We include a dummy variable for the Internet mode to test this hypothesis. Finally, we include controls for political knowledge, education, income, race, and ethnicity.

Since our dependent variables are ordinal measures we estimate an ordered logit model to examine the predictors of beliefs about electoral integrity. Each of the independent variables are scored on a 0-1 interval. For each dependent variable we estimate one model with anti-immigration attitudes as our main predictor of interest and a second model with ethnocentrism as the chief independent variable.

Results

Table A-13 in the appendix provides the results from models of election integrity ratings in the United States. Our results provide additional evidence of a strong relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and measures of electoral fraud beliefs. Anti-immigration attitudes and ethnocentrism are potent predictors of electoral integrity beliefs, even after controlling for a host of other factors. A one-standard deviation increase in the anti-immigration scale increases the odds of negative evaluations by 22 percent on the “votes counted fairly” measure and by 21 percent on the “election officials are fair” measure. A one-standard increase in the ethnocentrism scale yields a somewhat weaker but statistically significant relationship with election integrity evaluations (14 percent and 20 percent, respectively). Moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile on the anti-immigration scale is associated with a .10 decline in the predicted probability of believing that votes are counted fairly very often and a .08 decline in the predicted probability of believing that election officials are very often fair. A similar change in ethnocentrism is associated with a 6 percentage point drop in the “very often” response on both election integrity items. Additionally, we find a stronger impact of ethnocentrism and anti-immigration attitudes on voter fraud beliefs when the sample is restricted to non-Hispanic Whites. All of these estimated impacts are statistically significant at

$p < .001$. Among the other independent variables, only political knowledge and trust in government consistently produce stronger associations with beliefs about electoral integrity.

Consistent with previous studies, we find that perceptions of election integrity are influenced by broader pessimism toward government, mainstream politics, and election administration. Individuals with less patriotism and trust in government are less likely to believe that votes are counted fairly and election officials act fairly. A one-standard deviation increase in trust in government reduces the odds of negative evaluations on the “votes counted fairly” measure by 23 percent and by 29 percent on the “election officials are fair” measure. Moving from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile on trust in government increases the predicted probability of believing that elections are fair very often by approximately 14 percentage points. A one-standard deviation increase in patriotism reduces the odds of believing that votes are not counted fairly (20 percent) more than believing that election officials are not fair (9 percent). Increasing patriotism from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile increases the predicted probability of believing that votes are very often counted fairly by approximately 9 percentage points. These estimated effects are statistically significant at $p < .001$. Patriotism is a somewhat rare disposition that is positively associated with evaluations of election fairness but appears unrelated to beliefs about the frequency of voter fraud in the CCES study.

Other indicators of positive connections to the political system tend to produce favorable assessments of election integrity. People who did not vote in the 2012 elections and have lower levels of political efficacy are more likely to hold negative evaluations of election fairness. Voters are 6 percentage points more likely than non-voters to believe that votes are very often counted fairly and 9 points more likely to believe that election officials are very often fair ($p < .001$). A one-standard deviation increase in external efficacy reduces the odds of negative election assessments by roughly 14 percent ($p < .001$). Similarly, education and political knowledge are associated with more positive

evaluations of election integrity. One-standard deviation increases in political knowledge and education lower the odds of unfavorable election fairness beliefs by roughly 24 percent and 16 percent, respectively ($p < .001$).

As in the CCES study, we again find that exposure to conservative media outlets is associated with more negative assessments of election integrity. Increasing conservative media exposure from the 10th to the 90th percentile reduces the predicted probability of believing that vote counts and election officials are very often fair by 7 percentage points and 4 percentage points, respectively ($p < .001$). Liberal media exposure and overall news consumption are substantively and statistically unreliable predictors of election fairness evaluations.

The ANES results also provide evidence of a mode effect in public evaluations of election integrity. Face-to-face respondents are 8 percentage points more likely than Internet respondents to believe that votes are very often counted fairly and 5 points more likely to believe that election officials are very often fair ($p < .001$). These findings are consistent with prior research suggesting that Internet surveys yield somewhat more negative assessments of political institutions and processes. The results also indicate that negative assessments of election fairness are slightly more prominent among people who live in battleground states than those living in non-battleground states. These findings are telling, since the one objective measure of election performance (EPI) is not significantly related to beliefs about election fairness.¹⁴

Leveraging the oversampling of racial minorities in the 2012 ANES, we are able to examine the election integrity ratings of non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics. We find that African Americans, Hispanics and Americans of another race tend to report less positive evaluations of election fairness than white Americans ($p < .001$). However, when we estimate a simplified model that interacts the

¹⁴ When we control for other state performance measures, such as the frequency of registration and absentee voting problems, we also find little to no relationship with public beliefs about election integrity.

immigrant resentment measures with race we find that any effect of anti-immigration attitudes on voter fraud beliefs seems to be located primarily among non-Hispanic white respondents. In Figures 3 and 4, we plot the predicted probability of believing that fair outcomes occur “very often” across group-based attitudes segmented by race. Generally, an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes decreases the probability of holding positive evaluations of election fairness. Among individuals with lower anti-immigration attitudes, white respondents tend to be substantially more optimistic about election integrity than black and Hispanic respondents. Yet, an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes has a larger effect in diminishing optimism among whites than racial and ethnic minorities. Thus, white Americans with strong anti-immigrant attitudes tend to hold negative assessments of election integrity on par with black and Hispanic Americans. Ethnocentrism has an even larger negative effect on the election fraud beliefs of whites, shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 also illustrates that blacks and Hispanics who believe that whites are less intelligent and lazier than racial minorities are less likely to hold positive assessments of election integrity. However, as they subscribe to the stereotype of white superiority, blacks tend to give generally more positive evaluations of elections while Hispanics tend to believe that votes are counted fairly very often.

[Insert Figure 3 About Here]

[Insert Figure 4 About Here]

As with our CCES study, controlling for group-based attitudes and other political orientations seems to leave little room for partisanship and ideology to explain variation in voter fraud beliefs. Changing the coding of party identification to nominal categories, or removing ideology from the equation, does not improve partisanship’s explanatory power. Part of the reason for the weak performance of partisanship is its correlation with the sore loser measure. Those who correctly expected Obama to be reelected in 2012 were approximately 6 percentage points more likely than other respondents to believe that ballot counts and election officials are very often fair

($p < .001$). However, our evidence also suggests that group-based attitudes toward immigrants account for some of the partisan differences in public beliefs about election integrity.

Meanwhile, after controlling for immigration attitudes we fail to find evidence that racial resentment is associated with beliefs about election integrity. It appears that broader indicators of out-group hostility (i.e. ethnocentrism) more reliably predict electoral integrity evaluations than the more narrowly tailored racial resentment measure. In comparing our two studies, we find that anti-immigrant attitudes are strongly associated with beliefs about voter fraud and election fairness but racial resentment only helps explain voter fraud beliefs. This disparity in our findings may be due to the nature of voter fraud rhetoric in the United States. While there are examples noted above of rhetoric framing voter fraud as an urban problem, these examples tend to focus on voter registration and the language tends to stop short of implicating election officials and the fairness of the vote count. In contrast, voter fraud rhetoric targeting immigrants tends to include claims that non-citizens change the vote count and swing election outcomes, as in the statements by President Trump and Rep. Broun noted above, thus “diluting” the votes of American citizens (e.g., von Spakovsky 2008). Overall, the language of voting integrity may be “immigrationalized” (Garand, Xu and Davis 2015) more than it is racialized. In any case, this puzzle deserves attention in future research.

CONCLUSION

Across two studies, we present strong evidence that group-centric attitudes toward immigrants are associated with public beliefs about voter fraud. Using data from the 2014 CCES, we show that immigrant resentment is a strong predictor of voter fraud beliefs. Using the 2012 ANES data, we find that the effects of anti-immigration and ethnocentric attitudes remain robust across different measures of election fairness. Both studies indicate immigration concerns are associated

with election integrity beliefs above and beyond the impact of traditional political dispositions involving party, ideology, election administration, and racial animus.

We believe these findings are due to two contemporary conditions in American politics. First, the foreign-born population has increased sharply in recent years, particularly in historically newer American destinations. This makes immigration a more salient consideration for many Americans when thinking about politics. Second, political rhetoric often paints immigrants as lawbreakers, particularly in the voting domain, thus priming attitudes toward immigrants when people think about criminal behavior. While we test these ideas in the United States, we believe that immigration attitudes may shape voter fraud beliefs in other countries where politics are roiled by immigration anxieties.

The results of our studies are consistent with studies that show that racial animus structures voter fraud beliefs (Appleby and Federico 2017; Wilson and Brewer 2013). Yet, our findings from the CCES also suggest that such conclusions about racial attitudes are incomplete. In response to calls to use attitudes toward immigrants as explanatory variables (e.g., Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), we find that immigrant resentment is a robust predictor of voter fraud beliefs. In addition, this relationship is mediated in part by attitudes toward undocumented immigrants and Mexican immigrants. We argue that these findings are largely attributed to the immigrant resentment scale capturing various attitudes on whether immigrants increase crime, disrupt social and political norms, are undeserving American members, and decrease the political influence of white Americans. These attitudes are not measured in other racial attitude scales, but are likely called to mind when respondents are asked about how often people commit voter fraud.

Our findings suggest that immigrant resentment is a strong and reliable predictor of other attitudes concerning American political membership. While immigrant anxiety increases trust in certain political actors, primarily Republican leaders (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), we find that

immigrant resentment is associated with lower levels of trust in the integrity of American elections. We also find significant relationships between measures of conservative media exposure and beliefs that voter fraud occurs frequently. Overall, these findings suggest that elite rhetoric might provoke Americans' pessimistic beliefs about election fraud.

We are aware that two cross-sectional surveys are not ideal for making causal inferences and do not provide the last word on this topic. Nevertheless, this study establishes a clear relationship between immigrant resentment and beliefs about voting integrity that merits further examination. In particular, we suggest survey experiments that test the impact of elite messages linking immigration and voter fraud. Furthermore, we examine public opinion measures that focus on estimates of the frequency of fraudulent and fair election activities. Additional research should examine the relationship between immigrant resentment and other dimensions of voter fraud beliefs (such as voter confidence, the significance of fraudulent acts, and misbehavior by other actors in the election process). The gap in political science scholarship on voter fraud beliefs is due in part to a dearth of survey instruments that include questions about perceptions of voter fraud and attitudes toward immigrants all in the same survey. As such, prior studies produced indirect analyses by using less reliable and valid demographic indicators of Latino or foreign-born population growth as approximations of the threat or animosity that native-born feel toward immigrants.

Hostility toward immigrants is a reliable predictor of concerns about voter fraud and thus a likely source of public support for restrictive laws such as photo ID and proof of citizenship requirements for voters. Voter fraud perceptions are associated with public support for restrictive voter identification laws (Wilson and Brewer 2013). Relatedly, states with a higher share of minority residents or voters are more likely to introduce legislation with restrictive voting policies, like photo ID requirements (Bentele and O'Brien 2013; Hicks et al. 2014). The policymaking process may be shaped by political rhetoric that frequently links immigration, race and voter fraud, sometimes in a

hyperbolic manner. Furthermore, debates about proposed voting restrictions often focus on the anticipated impact of those policies on minority groups. Thus, in a “group-centric” polity we expect that public support for proposed voting restrictions will be associated with attitudes toward immigrants.

In sum, the role of animosity toward racial and ethnic minorities is underappreciated in scholarship on public opinion about election fraud and voting reforms. Much of the existing literature emphasizes partisan and ideological divisions among the electorate on photo ID laws, for example, largely reflecting clear partisan divisions among elites on these issues. The partisan and ideological differences are real, but photo ID and proof of citizenship requirements enjoy majority support among people of all political stripes in the United States. Widespread support for these policies, and heightened concerns about voter fraud, appear to be nourished by a reservoir of hostility toward racial and ethnic minorities. Animosity toward immigrants may solidify public support for measures to restrict participation of eligible voters in democratic elections. This is troubling, given that legislators and courts lean heavily on public concerns about voter fraud as justification for new election laws. These prejudices may extend to election officials themselves. A recent study (White, Nathan and Faller 2015) finds that Latino voters receive less assistance from local election officials than white voters. In any case, the topic of fraudulent voting practices will likely continue to provoke voters to call to mind groups that are politically constructed as “un-American.”

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
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
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Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Believing Voter Fraud is Very Common Across Racial and Ethnic Indicators




Source: Udani, Adriano and David Kimball, Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2014: University of Missouri, St. Louis Content. Release: January 2014. St. Louis, MO. Note: Values for each indicator (represented by lines) are rescaled from 0 to 1, with positive numbers indicating more negative attitudes toward group and negative numbers indicating positive attitudes toward group. All other variables held at mean and median values. Figures based on Table A-4.

Figure 2. Impact of Immigrant Thermometer Indicators on Voter Fraud Perceptions




Source: Udani, Adriano and David Kimball, Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2014: University of Missouri, St. Louis Content. Release: January 2014, St. Louis, MO. Note: Thermometer measures rescaled from 0-1, where larger number indicate warmth toward group. Estimates based on CCES survey weights. Larger and positive scores on y axis indicate beliefs that fraud occurs frequently.

Figure 3. Election Integrity Evaluations Across Anti-Immigration Attitudes by Race



Source: 2012 ANES. Note: Anti-immigration attitudes are rescaled using values from zero to 1. Larger values indicate more anti-immigration attitudes.

Figure 4. Election Integrity Evaluations Across Ethnocentrism by Race



Source: 2012 ANES. Note: Ethnocentrism values recoded to range from 0 to 1. Larger numbers indicate higher ethnocentrism.

ONLINE APPENDIX for “Immigrant Resentment and Voter Fraud Beliefs in the U.S. Electorate”

Variables and Question Wording for 2014 CCES Study

Voter fraud ($\alpha = .92$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions. Responses recoded to indicate higher values reflect beliefs that voter fraud occurs more frequently.

How often do the following illegal practices occur in U.S. elections?

1. Voting more than once in an election.
2. Pretending to be someone else when voting.
3. People voting who are not U.S. citizens.

Immigrant Resentment ($\alpha = .84$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

In your view, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

(Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree)

1. The more influence that immigrant have in politics the less influence people like me will have in politics.
2. English will be threatened if other languages are frequently used in large immigrant communities in the U.S.
3. New immigrants have increased the level of crime in the United States.
4. The Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Today's immigrants should do the same without any special favors.
5. Immigrants are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
6. Legal immigrants should have same rights as an American.

Social dominance orientation ($\alpha = .79$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

In your view, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

(Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree)

1. Certain groups should stay in their place.
2. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
3. Other groups should stay in their place.
4. Society should equalize conditions for groups.
5. Group equality is ideal.
6. Society should increase social equality.

Black resentment ($\alpha = .75$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

(Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree)

1. The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

American patriotism ($\alpha = .86$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

1. When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel: (Extremely good; Very good; Moderately good; Slightly good; Not good at all)
2. How important is being an American to you personally? (Extremely important; Very important; Somewhat important; A little important; Not at all important)

Fox News Exposure

How often do you watch news on Fox News?

(1 = Rarely; 2 = Several days a month; 3 = several days a week; 4 = Every day)

Media Consumption ($\alpha = .54$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

In the past 24 hours have you ... (check all that apply) [order randomized]

(No = 0; Yes = 1)

1. Read a Blog
2. Watched TV
3. Read a newspaper in print or online
4. Listened to a radio news program or talk radio
5. None of These (Yes = 0; No = 1)

Political knowledge ($\alpha = .80$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

1. Which political party controls the U.S. House of Representatives? (Democrats; Republicans; Not Sure)
2. Which political party controls the U.S. Senate? (Democrats; Republicans; Not Sure)

Party Identification

1 = Democrat; 2 = Independent; 3 = Republican ("Not sure" coded as Independent)

Sex

0 = Male; 1 = Female

Race

0 = White; 1 = Non-white

Family Income

Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

1 = Less than \$10,000; 2 = \$10,000 - \$19,999; 3 = \$20,000 - \$29,999; 4 = \$30,000 - \$39,999; 5 = \$40,000 - \$49,999; 6 = \$50,000 - \$59,999; 7 = \$60,000 - \$69,999; 8 = \$70,000 - \$79,999; 9 = \$80,000 - \$99,999; 10 = \$100,000 - \$119,999; 11 = \$120,000 - \$149,999; 12 = \$150,000 - \$199,999; 13 = \$200,000 - \$249,999; 14 = \$250,000 - \$349,999; 15 = \$350,000 - \$499,999; 16 = \$500,000 or more

Education

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1 = No High School; 2 = High School Graduate; 3 = Some College; 4 = 2- year; 5 = 4-year; 6 = Post-grad

Variables and Question Wording for 2012 ANES Study

Votes Counted Fairly

In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Votes are counted fairly: (1 = Very often; 2 = Fairly often; 3 = Not often; 4 = Not at all often)

Election Officials Fair

In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Election officials are fair: (1 = Very often; 2 = Fairly often; 3 = Not often; 4 = Not at all often)

Anti-Immigration Scale ($\alpha = .75$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

1. Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States?
 - a. Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country.
 - b. Have a guest worker program that allows unauthorized immigrants to remain
 - c. allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the united states ...certain requirements
 - d. allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the united states ...without penalties
2. There is a proposal to allow people who were illegally brought into the U.S. as children to become permanent U.S. residents under some circumstances. Specifically, citizens of other countries who illegally entered the U.S. before age 16, who have lived in the U.S. 5 years or longer, and who graduated high school would be allowed to stay in the U.S. as permanent residents if they attend college or serve in the military. From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose this proposal? (Favor; Neither favor nor oppose; Oppose)
3. Some states have passed a law that will require state and local police to determine the immigration status of a person if they find that there is a reasonable suspicion he or she is an undocumented immigrant. Those found to be in the U.S. without permission will have broken state law. From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose these immigration laws? (Favor; Neither favor nor oppose; Oppose)
4. Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be: (Increased a lot; Increased a little; Left the same as it is now; Decreased a little; Decreased a lot)
5. How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here? (Extremely; Very; Somewhat; Not at all)
6. Feeling thermometer rating for illegal immigrants

Ethnocentrism ($\alpha = .69$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

Where would you rate [Whites/Blacks/Hispanic-Americans/Asian-Americans] in general on this scale? (1. Hardworking ... 7. Lazy)

Where would you rate [Whites/Blacks/Hispanic-Americans/Asian-Americans] in general on this scale? (1. Intelligent ... 7. Unintelligent)

Racial Resentment ($\alpha = .80$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

(Strongly agree; Agree somewhat; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree somewhat; Strongly disagree)

1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
4. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

Party Identification

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party? (Strong Democrat; Not very strong Democrat; Lean Democrat; Independent; Lean Republican; Not very strong Republican; Strong Republican)

Expected Obama to Win

Who do you think will be elected President in November? (Barack Obama; Mitt Romney; Don't know)

Ideology

Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

(Extremely liberal; Liberal; Slightly liberal; Moderate; middle of the road; Slightly conservative; Conservative; Extremely conservative)

Patriotism ($\alpha = .80$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

1. When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel? (Extremely good; Very good; Moderately good; Not good at all)
2. How do you feel about this country? Do you (hate it; dislike it; neither like nor dislike it; like it; or love it)?
3. How important is being an American to you personally? (Extremely important; Very important; Somewhat important; A little important; Not at all important)

Political Knowledge ($\alpha = .63$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

1. Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington BEFORE the election [this/last] month? (Democrats; Republicans – correct)
2. Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the U.S. Senate BEFORE the election [this/last] month? (Democrats – correct; Republicans)
3. Would you say that Barack Obama is Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Mormon, some other religion, or is he not religious?
4. Would you say that Mitt Romney is Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Mormon, some other religion, or is he not religious?
5. Would you say that one of the parties is more conservative than the other at the national level? Which party is more conservative? (Democrats; Republicans)

Trust in Government ($\alpha = .63$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

1. How often can you trust the federal government in Washington to do what is right? (Always; Most of the time; About half the time; Some of the time; Never) OR How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right? (Just about always; Most of the time; Only some of the time)
2. Would you say the government is pretty much RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS looking out for themselves or that it is run FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE?
3. Do you think that people in government WASTE A LOT of the money we pay in taxes, WASTE SOME of it, or DON'T WASTE VERY MUCH of it?
4. How many of the people running the government are corrupt? (All; Most; About half; A few; None)

External Efficacy ($\alpha = .65$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

1. Public officials don't care much what people like me think. Do you (Agree strongly; Agree somewhat; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree somewhat; Disagree strongly)? OR How much do public officials care what people like you think? (A great deal; A lot; A moderate amount; A little; Not at all)
2. People like me don't have any say about what the government does. Do you (Agree strongly; Agree somewhat; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree somewhat; Disagree strongly)? OR How much can people like you affect what the government does? (A great deal; A lot; A moderate amount; A little; Not at all)

Voted in 2012

Which of the following statements best describes you: One, I did not vote (in the election this November); Two, I thought about voting this time, but didn't; Three, I usually vote, but didn't this time; or Four, I am sure I voted? (recoded into a dummy variable)

Conservative Media ($\alpha = .86$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

1. Which TV programs do you watch regularly? (Respondents could select any of the following: America Live; America's Newsroom; The Five; Fox Report; Hannity; Huckabee; O'Reilly Factor; Greta Van Susteren; Bret Baier)
2. Which radio programs do you listen to regularly? (Respondents could select any of the following: The Dave Ramsey Show; Glenn Beck Program; The Laura Ingraham Show; The Mark Levin Show; The Neal Boortz Show; The Rush Limbaugh Show; The Savage Nation (Michael Savage); The Sean Hannity Show)
3. Which web sites do you visit regularly? (Respondents could select any of the following: Drudge Report; Forbes (forbes.com); Fox News (foxnews.com))

Liberal Media ($\alpha = .86$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

1. Which TV programs do you watch regularly? (Respondents could select any of the following: Christ Matthews Show; Colbert Report; Daily Show with Jon Stewart; Key and Peele)

2. Which radio programs do you listen to regularly? (Respondents could select any of the following: All Things Considered (NPR); The Ed Schultz Show; Fresh Air (NPR); Morning Edition (NPR); The Power (Joe Madison); Talk of the Nation (NPR); The Thom Hartmann Program)
3. Which web sites do you visit regularly? (Respondents could select any of the following: Huffington Post; MSNBC; New York Times; Washington Post)
4. Which print newspapers do you read regularly? (Respondents could select any of the following: New York Times; Washington Post)
5. Which online papers do you read regularly? (Respondents could select any of the following: New York Times; Washington Post)

News Consumption ($\alpha = .43$)

We create an index by averaging responses to the following questions.

1. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news on the Internet, not including sports? (Respondents could select an integer from 0 to 7)
2. During a typical week, how many days do you watch national news on TV, not including sports? (Respondents could select an integer from 0 to 7)
3. During a typical week, how many days do you read news in a printed newspaper, not including sports? (Respondents could select an integer from 0 to 7)
4. During a typical week, how many days do you listen to news on the radio, not including sports? (Respondents could select an integer from 0 to 7)

Battleground State

A dummy variable coded: 1 for respondents residing in Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, or Wisconsin; 0 otherwise

State EPI

State election performance index for 2012 reported by Pew Charitable Trusts (2014).

Internet Survey Mode

Coded 1 for Internet respondents and 0 for face-to-face respondents

Hispanic

Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino?

Non-Hispanic Black and Non-Hispanic Other Race

Coded from demographic profile variables.

**Table A-1. Comparing 2014 CCES Voter Fraud Beliefs
to other Surveys with the Same Question**

Survey Question (Source)	Quantity in Other Survey	Quantity in 2014 CCES
Voter fraud is a major problem (<i>Washington Post</i> 2012)	48%	43%
Votes are counted fairly very often (ANES 2012)	29%	25%
Election officials are fair very often (ANES 2012)	18%	22%
People voting more than once is very common (SPAE 2012)	11%	17%
Voter impersonation is very common (SPAE 2012)	11%	18%
Non-citizen voting is very common (SPAE 2012)	22%	25%
Strongly support photo ID law (SPAE 2012)	53%	56%

Table A-2. Beliefs about the Frequency of Voter Fraud

How often do these activities occur?	Very common	Occurs occasionally	Occurs infrequently	Almost never
Voting more than once in an election (n=869)	17%	33%	27%	24%
Pretending to be someone else when voting (N=868)	18%	36%	26%	20%
People voting who are not U.S. citizens (N=866)	25%	32%	22%	20%

Source: 2014 CCES post-election wave. Sampling weights applied.

Table A-3. Results from Models of Voter Fraud Perceptions

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>
Immigrant Resentment	0.29 (0.04) ^{***}	0.29 (0.04) ^{***}	0.22 (0.05) ^{***}	0.16 (0.05) ^{***}
Negative Latino Stereotype		-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Undocumented Imm. Warmth			-0.09 (0.05) [*]	-0.07 (0.05)
Black Resentment				0.18 (0.05) ^{***}
Nationalism	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Democrat	-0.26 (0.09) ^{**}	-0.26 (0.09) ^{**}	-0.23 (0.10) [*]	-0.15 (0.10)
Indepedent	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.11)
Political Knowledge	-0.09 (0.04) [*]	-0.09 (0.04) [*]	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
Conservative Media	0.31 (0.05) ^{***}	0.31 (0.05) ^{***}	0.34 (0.05) ^{***}	0.32 (0.05) ^{***}
Liberal Media	-0.17 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.17 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.18 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.16 (0.04) ^{***}
Media Consumption	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Education	-0.10 (0.03) ^{**}	-0.10 (0.03) ^{**}	-0.11 (0.04) ^{**}	-0.10 (0.03) ^{**}
Age	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)
Female	0.14 (0.07) [*]	0.14 (0.07)	0.19 (0.07) [*]	0.17 (0.07) [*]
Black	0.10 (0.14)	0.10 (0.14)	0.07 (0.15)	0.14 (0.15)
Hispanic	-0.08 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.16)
Asian	-0.31 (0.20)	-0.31 (0.20)	-0.29 (0.21)	-0.28 (0.22)
Native-American	0.39 (0.26)	0.38 (0.26)	0.22 (0.22)	0.15 (0.23)
Mixed	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.05 (0.19)
Other	-0.07 (0.33)	-0.08 (0.33)	0.20 (0.23)	0.16 (0.22)
Immigrant Citizen	-0.04 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.16)	0.03 (0.17)	0.03 (0.17)
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.12 (0.18)	0.12 (0.17)	0.16 (0.20)	0.13 (0.23)
First Generation	0.24 (0.10) [*]	0.24 (0.10) [*]	0.26 (0.11) [*]	0.24 (0.11) [*]
Second Generation	0.12 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)
Living in South	0.08 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	0.10 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)
_cons	2.48 (0.09) ^{***}	2.48 (0.09) ^{***}	2.41 (0.09) ^{***}	2.38 (0.09) ^{***}
R^2	0.41	0.41	0.43	0.45
adj. R^2	0.40	0.40	0.42	0.43
N	858	855	757	757

Source: 2014 CCES. Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients obtained using OLS Regression with CCES survey weights. Interval and ordinal-level variables are standardized. Two-tailed: ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$.

Table A-4. Results from Full Model of Voter Fraud Perceptions Scale Components

	More Than Once	Somone Else	Noncitizen Voting
	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>
Immigrant Resentment	0.34 (0.14)*	0.29 (0.11)*	0.49 (0.14)***
Undocumented Immigrant Warmth	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.24 (0.12)
Negative Latino Stereotype	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.10)
Black Resentment	0.38 (0.15)**	0.39 (0.13)**	0.44 (0.14)**
Nationalism	0.01 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.12)
Democrat	-0.19 (0.28)	-0.38 (0.26)	-0.34 (0.28)
Indepedent	-0.04 (0.30)	-0.11 (0.29)	-0.18 (0.30)
Political Knowledge	-0.23 (0.12)*	-0.25 (0.11)*	-0.08 (0.12)
Conservative Media	0.72 (0.14)***	0.68 (0.13)***	0.77 (0.14)***
Liberal Media	-0.44 (0.12)***	-0.32 (0.12)**	-0.44 (0.12)***
Media Consumption	0.15 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)	0.09 (0.11)
Education	-0.23 (0.10)*	-0.27 (0.10)**	-0.31 (0.10)**
Age	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.11)
Female	0.24 (0.20)	0.43 (0.19)*	0.48 (0.20)*
Black	0.11 (0.36)	0.66 (0.43)	0.49 (0.45)
Hispanic	0.09 (0.45)	0.05 (0.44)	-0.53 (0.39)
Asian	-1.01 (0.56)	-0.11 (0.62)	-0.47 (0.72)
Native-American	0.70 (0.52)	-0.03 (1.20)	0.59 (0.53)
Mixed	0.02 (0.72)	0.11 (0.38)	-0.32 (0.61)
Other	-0.10 (0.85)	0.72 (0.70)	0.68 (0.72)
Immigrant Citizen	0.16 (0.41)	0.05 (0.53)	0.06 (0.43)
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.49 (1.34)	0.51 (0.33)	-0.13 (0.36)
First Generation	0.17 (0.37)	0.88 (0.37)*	0.62 (0.34)
Second Generation	0.20 (0.23)	0.47 (0.21)*	0.25 (0.24)
Living in South	0.41 (0.20)*	0.09 (0.20)	0.24 (0.22)
_cut1	-1.24 (0.24)***	-1.42 (0.25)***	-1.68 (0.29)***
_cuts2	0.47 (0.25)	0.33 (0.24)	-0.06 (0.27)
_cut3	2.48 (0.28)***	2.45 (0.27)***	1.96 (0.28)***
Wald X ²	209.51 ***	215.18 ***	219.28 ***
Pseudo R ²	0.16	0.16	0.15
N	757	756	754

Source: 2014 CCES. Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients obtained using ordinal logistic regression with CCES survey weights. Positive coefficients indicate higher likelihood of believing voter fraud is very common. Interval and ordinal-level variables are standardized.

Two-tailed: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

**Table A-5. Results from Full Model of Voter Fraud Perceptions Scale
Components Without Black Resentment**

	More Than Once	Somone Else	Noncitizen Voting
	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>
Immigrant Resentment	0.46 (0.14) ^{***}	0.41 (0.11) ^{***}	0.63 (0.13) ^{***}
Undocumented Immigrant Warmth	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.22 (0.11) [*]	-0.30 (0.12) [*]
Negative Latino Stereotype	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.11)
Nationalism	0.09 (0.12)	0.02 (0.09)	0.01 (0.12)
Democrat	-0.34 (0.27)	-0.53 (0.26) [*]	-0.54 (0.26) [*]
Indepedent	-0.04 (0.30)	-0.12 (0.30)	-0.21 (0.30)
Political Knowledge	-0.24 (0.12) [*]	-0.25 (0.11) [*]	-0.09 (0.12)
Conservative Media	0.77 (0.14) ^{***}	0.72 (0.13) ^{***}	0.81 (0.14) ^{***}
Liberal Media	-0.48 (0.12) ^{***}	-0.36 (0.11) ^{**}	-0.48 (0.11) ^{***}
Media Consumption	0.16 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)	0.10 (0.11)
Education	-0.24 (0.10) [*]	-0.29 (0.10) ^{**}	-0.33 (0.10) ^{**}
Age	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.10)
Female	0.28 (0.20)	0.49 (0.20) [*]	0.54 (0.20) ^{**}
Black	-0.07 (0.33)	0.47 (0.43)	0.29 (0.44)
Hispanic	-0.01 (0.41)	-0.04 (0.41)	-0.65 (0.37)
Asian	-1.01 (0.54)	-0.16 (0.60)	-0.55 (0.63)
Native-American	0.87 (0.50)	0.17 (1.15)	0.77 (0.52)
Mixed	0.04 (0.68)	0.20 (0.32)	-0.23 (0.58)
Other	0.01 (0.83)	0.81 (0.75)	0.77 (0.78)
Immigrant Citizen	0.14 (0.40)	0.07 (0.52)	0.07 (0.42)
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.56 (1.18)	0.58 (0.30)	-0.06 (0.34)
First Generation	0.20 (0.34)	0.91 (0.36) [*]	0.67 (0.31) [*]
Second Generation	0.20 (0.24)	0.44 (0.21) [*]	0.22 (0.24)
Living in South	0.39 (0.21)	0.08 (0.20)	0.22 (0.22)
_cut1	-1.28 (0.24) ^{***}	-1.44 (0.25) ^{***}	-1.73 (0.29) ^{***}
_cut2	0.41 (0.25)	0.28 (0.25)	-0.14 (0.28)
_cut3	2.41 (0.29) ^{***}	2.38 (0.28) ^{***}	1.85 (0.28) ^{***}
Wald X ²	219.11 ^{***}	208.98 ^{***}	294.04 ^{***}
Pseudo R ²	0.16	0.15	0.20
N	757	756	754

Source: 2014 CCES. Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients obtained using ordinal logistic regression with CCES survey weights. Positive coefficients indicate higher likelihood of believing voter fraud is very common. Interval and ordinal-level variables are standardized.

Two-tailed: ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$.

**Table A-6. Results from Models of Voter Fraud Perceptions
with Predictors Rescaled from Zero to One**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>
Immigrant Resentment	1.27 (0.18) ^{***}	1.27 (0.19) ^{***}	0.97 (0.20) ^{***}	0.69 (0.20) ^{***}
Negative Latino Stereotype		-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Undocumented Imm. Warmth			-0.28 (0.14) [*]	-0.20 (0.14)
Black Resentment				0.57 (0.17) ^{***}
Nationalism	0.06 (0.15)	0.06 (0.15)	0.08 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.16)
Democrat	-0.26 (0.09) ^{**}	-0.26 (0.09) ^{**}	-0.23 (0.10) [*]	-0.15 (0.10)
Indepedent	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.11)
Political Knowledge	-0.20 (0.10) [*]	-0.20 (0.10) [*]	-0.19 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.10)
Conservative Media	1.12 (0.16) ^{***}	1.12 (0.16) ^{***}	1.23 (0.17) ^{***}	1.14 (0.18) ^{***}
Liberal Media	-0.72 (0.16) ^{***}	-0.72 (0.17) ^{***}	-0.76 (0.18) ^{***}	-0.67 (0.18) ^{***}
Media Consumption	0.10 (0.14)	0.10 (0.14)	0.17 (0.15)	0.15 (0.15)
Education	-0.33 (0.12) ^{**}	-0.33 (0.12) ^{**}	-0.38 (0.12) ^{**}	-0.36 (0.12) ^{**}
Age	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.15)
Female	0.14 (0.07) [*]	0.14 (0.07)	0.19 (0.07) [*]	0.17 (0.07) [*]
Black	0.10 (0.14)	0.10 (0.14)	0.07 (0.15)	0.14 (0.15)
Hispanic	-0.08 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.16)
Asian	-0.31 (0.20)	-0.31 (0.20)	-0.29 (0.21)	-0.28 (0.22)
Native-American	0.39 (0.26)	0.39 (0.26)	0.22 (0.22)	0.15 (0.22)
Mixed	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.05 (0.19)
Other	-0.07 (0.33)	-0.07 (0.34)	0.20 (0.23)	0.16 (0.22)
Immigrant Citizen	-0.04 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.16)	0.03 (0.17)	0.03 (0.17)
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.12 (0.17)	0.12 (0.17)	0.16 (0.20)	0.13 (0.23)
First Generation	0.24 (0.10) [*]	0.24 (0.10) [*]	0.25 (0.11) [*]	0.24 (0.11) [*]
Second Generation	0.12 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)
Living in South	0.08 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	0.10 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)
_cons	1.94 (0.20) ^{***}	1.94 (0.20) ^{***}	2.10 (0.21) ^{***}	1.88 (0.22) ^{***}
R ²	0.41	0.41	0.43	0.45
adj. R ²	0.40	0.40	0.42	0.43
N	858	855	757	757

Source: 2014 CCES. Note. Standard errors in parentheses. All indicators rescaled 0 to 1. Coefficients obtained using OLS Regression.

Two-tailed: ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

Table A-7. Results from Model 4 of Voter Fraud Perceptions with Liberal/Conservative Media Variables Removed

	Model 4	With Conservative Media and Media Consumption	With Liberal Media and Media Consumption	All
	coef. (s.e.)	coef. (s.e.)	coef. (s.e.)	coef. (s.e.)
Immigrant Resentment	0.94 (0.22) ^{***}	0.74 (0.21) ^{***}	0.97 (0.22) ^{***}	0.69 (0.20) ^{***}
Undocumented imm. warmth	0.22 (0.14)	0.25 (0.14)	0.18 (0.15)	0.20 (0.14)
Negative Latino Stereotype	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Black Resentment	0.79 (0.18) ^{***}	0.66 (0.17) ^{***}	0.73 (0.18) ^{***}	0.57 (0.17) ^{***}
Nationalism	-0.01 (0.17)	-0.16 (0.17)	0.04 (0.17)	-0.04 (0.16)
Democrat	-0.37 (0.10) ^{***}	-0.27 (0.09) ^{**}	-0.34 (0.10) ^{**}	-0.15 (0.10)
Indepdent	-0.18 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.11)
Conservative Media		0.97 (0.18) ^{***}		1.14 (0.18) ^{***}
Liberal Media			-0.38 (0.18) [*]	-0.67 (0.18) ^{***}
Media Consumption		0.05 (0.15)	0.37 (0.15) [*]	0.15 (0.15)
Political Knowledge	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.18 (0.10)
Education	-0.28 (0.12) [*]	-0.35 (0.12) ^{**}	-0.29 (0.12) [*]	-0.36 (0.12) ^{**}
Age	-0.02 (0.16)	0.04 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.15)
Female	0.11 (0.08)	0.17 (0.07) [*]	0.12 (0.08)	0.17 (0.07) [*]
Black	0.24 (0.17)	0.12 (0.15)	0.27 (0.17)	0.14 (0.15)
Hispanic	-0.05 (0.20)	-0.03 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.16)
Asian	-0.25 (0.23)	-0.22 (0.23)	-0.27 (0.22)	-0.28 (0.22)
Native-American	0.26 (0.23)	0.11 (0.25)	0.27 (0.22)	0.15 (0.22)
Mixed	-0.04 (0.23)	0.00 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.24)	-0.05 (0.19)
Other	0.33 (0.25)	0.15 (0.20)	0.35 (0.27)	0.16 (0.22)
Immigrant Citizen	0.11 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.18)	0.16 (0.16)	0.03 (0.17)
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.26 (0.34)	0.09 (0.23)	0.29 (0.35)	0.13 (0.23)
First Generation	0.30 (0.13) [*]	0.22 (0.12)	0.31 (0.13) [*]	0.24 (0.11) [*]
Second Generation	0.12 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)
Living in South	0.17 (0.08) [*]	0.10 (0.08)	0.15 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)
_cons	1.57 (0.22) ^{***}	1.58 (0.22) ^{***}	1.53 (0.22) ^{***}	1.68 (0.22) ^{***}
R ²	0.38	0.44	0.39	0.45
adj. R ²	0.37	0.42	0.37	0.43
N	764	760	759	757

Source: 2014 CCES. Note. Standard errors in parentheses. All indicators rescaled 0 to 1. Coefficients obtained using OLS Regression.

Two-tailed: ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

Table A-8. Marginal Change of Voter Fraud Perceptions Based on Continuous and Ordinal-Level Predictors Changing from 10th to 90th Percentile

<u>Independent variable</u>	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	<u>coef.</u>	<u>s.e.</u>	<u>coef.</u>	<u>s.e.</u>	<u>coef.</u>	<u>s.e.</u>	<u>coef.</u>	<u>s.e.</u>
Immigrant resentment	0.79	0.11 ^{***}	0.80	0.12 ^{***}	0.60	0.13 ^{***}	0.43	0.13 ^{***}
Negative Latino stereotype			-0.02	0.08	-0.02	0.08	-0.03	0.08
Undocumented Immigrant Warmth					-0.25	0.12 [*]	-0.18	0.12
Black resentment							0.50	0.15 ^{***}
Nationalism	0.04	0.10	0.00	0.10	0.05	0.10	-0.02	0.10
Political knowledge	-0.20	0.10	-0.21	0.10	-0.20	0.10	-0.18	0.10
Conservative Media	0.84	0.12 ^{***}	0.84	0.12 ^{***}	0.82	0.12 ^{***}	0.76	0.12 ^{***}
Liberal Media	-0.44	0.10 ^{***}	-0.44	0.10 ^{***}	-0.47	0.11 ^{***}	-0.42	0.11 ^{***}
Media consumption	0.06	0.09	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06
Education	-0.20	0.09 ^{**}	-0.20	0.09 [*]	-0.31	0.10 ^{***}	-0.29	0.10 ^{**}
Age	-0.02	0.09	-0.06	0.09	-0.05	0.10	-0.03	0.09

Source: 2014 CCES.

Two-tailed: ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

Table A-9. Results from Model of Voter Fraud Beliefs Including Interaction Between Party Identification and Black Resentment

	coef. (s.e.)
Immigrant Resentment	0.93 (0.20) ^{***}
Black Resentment	0.84 (0.26) ^{**}
Democrat	0.03 (0.23)
Independent	0.16 (0.31)
Democrat X Black resentment	-0.27 (0.30)
Independent X Black resentment	-0.24 (0.37)
Conservative Media	1.02 (0.16) ^{***}
Liberal Media	-0.57 (0.17) ^{***}
Media Consumption	0.07 (0.15)
Political Knowledge	-0.20 (0.10) [*]
Education	-0.30 (0.11) ^{**}
Age	-0.00 (0.14)
Female	0.12 (0.07)
Nationalism	-0.08 (0.16)
Immigrant Citizen	-0.04 (0.16)
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.10 (0.21)
First Generation	0.23 (0.11) [*]
Second Generation	0.14 (0.07)
Black	0.19 (0.14)
Hispanic	-0.05 (0.15)
Asian	-0.27 (0.22)
Native-American	0.28 (0.26)
Mixed	-0.11 (0.19)
Other	-0.11 (0.31)
Living in South	0.09 (0.07)
_cons	1.58 (0.26) ^{***}
R^2	0.43
adj. R^2	0.42
N	858

Source: 2014 CCES. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimated effects expressed as OLS regression coefficients. Larger and positive coefficients indicate a belief that voter fraud occurs very frequently.

Two-tailed: ⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

Table A-10. Results from Model of Voter Fraud Beliefs Including Interaction Between Race and Black Resentment

	coef. (s.e.)
Immigrant Resentment	0.88 (0.20) ^{***}
Black Resentment	0.78 (0.16) ^{***}
Black	0.24 (0.23)
Hispanic	0.45 (0.33)
Asian	0.19 (0.34)
Native-American	-0.49 (1.38)
Mixed	0.44 (0.25)
Other	-1.20 (0.93)
Black X Black Resentment	-0.08 (0.55)
Hispanic X Black Resentment	-0.87 (0.50)
Asian X Black Resentment	-0.87 (0.72)
Native American X Black Resentment	0.83 (1.46)
Mixed X Black Resentment	-0.84 (0.49)
Other X Black Resentment	1.38 (0.99)
Democrat	-0.16 (0.09)
Independent	-0.01 (0.10)
Conservative Media	1.00 (0.16) ^{***}
Liberal Media	-0.51 (0.16) ^{**}
Media Consumption	0.09 (0.14)
Political Knowledge	-0.19 (0.09) [*]
Education	-0.30 (0.11) ^{**}
Age	-0.02 (0.14)
Female	0.12 (0.07)
Nationalism	-0.09 (0.16)
Immigrant Citizen	-0.03 (0.16)
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.12 (0.21)
First Generation	0.19 (0.10)
Second Generation	0.15 (0.07) [*]
Living in South	0.09 (0.07)
_cons	1.64 (0.21) ^{***}
R ²	0.44
adj. R ²	0.42
N	858

Source: 2014 CCES. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimated effects expressed as OLS regression coefficients. Larger and positive coefficients indicate a belief that voter fraud occurs very frequently.

Two-tailed: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Table A-11. Results from Models of Voter Fraud Beliefs Using Immigrant Group Thermometer Ratings as Predictors in 2014 CCES

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>
Irish immigrant warmth	0.03 (0.04)			
African immigrant warmth		-0.08 (0.07)		
Chinese immigrant warmth			-0.06 (0.06)	
Mexican immigrant warmth				-0.12 (0.05)*
Black Resentment	0.31 (0.05)***	0.17 (0.08)*	0.23 (0.07)**	0.32 (0.07)***
Nationalism	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.12 (0.06)*
Democrat	-0.21 (0.10)*	-0.32 (0.17)	-0.27 (0.16)	-0.07 (0.15)
Indepedent	-0.04 (0.11)	0.10 (0.20)	-0.19 (0.19)	-0.03 (0.15)
Political Knowledge	-0.13 (0.04)**	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.07)*
Conservative Media	0.31 (0.05)***	0.36 (0.07)***	0.34 (0.08)***	0.28 (0.07)***
Liberal Media	-0.15 (0.05)**	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.28 (0.06)***	-0.10 (0.08)
Media Consumption	0.00 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.11 (0.05)*	0.01 (0.07)
Education	-0.08 (0.03)*	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.06)
Age	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)
Female	0.08 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.13)	0.24 (0.11)*	0.09 (0.11)
Black	0.27 (0.15)	-0.20 (0.26)	0.21 (0.19)	0.28 (0.24)
Hispanic	-0.03 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.30)	-0.30 (0.25)	-0.14 (0.29)
Asian	-0.32 (0.26)	-0.08 (0.37)	-0.54 (0.33)	-0.28 (0.43)
Native-American	0.29 (0.25)	-0.07 (0.36)	0.20 (0.22)	0.21 (0.30)
Mixed	-0.19 (0.19)	-0.59 (0.39)	-0.48 (0.39)	0.16 (0.25)
Other	-0.37 (0.37)	-0.15 (0.32)	0.34 (0.30)	0.48 (0.28)
Immigrant Citizen	0.03 (0.18)	0.07 (0.25)	0.09 (0.29)	0.47 (0.23)*
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.12 (0.22)	-0.76 (0.27)**	0.26 (0.33)	0.57 (0.26)*
First Generation	0.15 (0.12)	0.17 (0.18)	0.26 (0.16)	0.21 (0.17)
Second Generation	0.12 (0.08)	0.20 (0.18)	0.27 (0.12)*	0.26 (0.12)*
Living in South	0.16 (0.07)*	0.33 (0.13)*	0.02 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)
_cons	2.46 (0.09)***	2.59 (0.15)***	2.37 (0.13)***	2.31 (0.15)***
R ²	0.41	0.37	0.50	0.52
adj. R ²	0.40	0.31	0.45	0.48
N	789	253	269	271

Source: 2014 CCES. Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients obtained using OLS Regression with CCES survey weights. Interval and ordinal-level variables are standardized. Larger numbers on thermometer questions are coded to indicate warmer feelings.

Two-tailed: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A-12. Results from Models of Voter Fraud Beliefs Using Immigrant Group Thermometer Ratings as Predictors in 2014 CCES, Excluding Black Resentment

	Model 1	Model 1	Model 1	Model 1
	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>	<u>coef. (s.e.)</u>
Irish immigrant warmth	0.03 (0.04)			
African immigrant warmth		-0.09 (0.08)		
Chinese immigrant warmth			-0.09 (0.06)	
Mexican immigrant warmth				-0.18 (0.05)**
Nationalism	0.07 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	0.21 (0.06)***
Democrat	-0.41 (0.10)***	-0.41 (0.17)*	-0.37 (0.17)*	-0.33 (0.15)*
Indepedent	-0.09 (0.12)	0.03 (0.21)	-0.13 (0.19)	-0.12 (0.17)
Political Knowledge	-0.17 (0.05)***	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.16 (0.07)*
Conservative Media	0.39 (0.05)***	0.39 (0.07)***	0.42 (0.09)***	0.33 (0.07)***
Liberal Media	-0.22 (0.04)***	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.35 (0.06)***	-0.14 (0.08)
Media Consumption	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)
Education	-0.09 (0.04)*	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.05)*	-0.11 (0.06)
Age	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.05)	0.11 (0.06)
Female	0.12 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.14)	0.28 (0.11)*	0.14 (0.12)
Black	0.11 (0.15)	-0.29 (0.24)	0.13 (0.18)	0.11 (0.23)
Hispanic	-0.10 (0.17)	-0.19 (0.28)	-0.31 (0.26)	-0.02 (0.28)
Asian	-0.29 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.36)	-0.65 (0.31)*	-0.18 (0.35)
Native-American	0.46 (0.26)	0.06 (0.31)	0.43 (0.22)	0.23 (0.26)
Mixed	-0.19 (0.19)	-0.76 (0.30)*	-0.52 (0.34)	0.32 (0.21)
Other	-0.30 (0.42)	-0.04 (0.30)	0.42 (0.33)	0.46 (0.27)
Immigrant Citizen	0.00 (0.19)	0.08 (0.25)	0.13 (0.29)	0.44 (0.22)*
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.18 (0.19)	-0.76 (0.26)**	0.39 (0.39)	0.66 (0.24)**
First Generation	0.12 (0.11)	0.14 (0.17)	0.30 (0.16)	0.20 (0.18)
Second Generation	0.10 (0.09)	0.16 (0.19)	0.29 (0.12)*	0.28 (0.14)*
Living in South	0.13 (0.08)	0.32 (0.13)*	0.04 (0.13)	0.09 (0.12)
_cons	2.56 (0.09)***	2.65 (0.15)***	2.35 (0.14)***	2.44 (0.16)***
R ²	0.36	0.36	0.47	0.47
adj. R ²	0.34	0.29	0.42	0.42
N	789	253	269	271

Source: 2014 CCES. Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients obtained using OLS Regression with CCES survey weights. Interval and ordinal-level variables are standardized. Larger numbers on thermometer questions are coded to indicate warmer feelings.

Two-tailed: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A-13. Predictors of Public Election Integrity Ratings in the United States, 2012

Independent Variable	Votes Counted Fairly	Votes Counted Fairly	Election Officials Fair	Election Officials Fair
	coef. (s.e.)	coef. (s.e.)	coef. (s.e.)	coef. (s.e.)
Anti-Immigration Scale	.88 (.16)**	----	.85 (.16)**	----
Ethnocentrism	----	1.68 (.38)**	----	2.26 (.38)**
Racial Resentment	-.05 (.14)	-.0001 (.14)	.11 (.14)	.11 (.14)
Party Identification	-.07 (.12)	-.05 (.12)	.01 (.12)	.04 (.12)
Expected Obama to Win	-.30 (.07)**	-.33 (.07)**	-.31 (.07)**	-.33 (.07)**
Ideology	.33 (.15)*	.42 (.15)**	-.34 (.15)*	-.24 (.15)
Patriotism	-1.17 (.15)**	-1.15 (.15)**	-.49 (.15)**	-.48 (.15)**
Political Knowledge	-0.94 (.12)**	-1.00 (.12)**	-0.88 (.12)**	-0.92 (.12)**
Trust in Government	-1.37 (.16)**	-1.47 (.16)**	-1.75 (.16)**	-1.86 (.16)**
External Efficacy	-.64 (.13)**	-.70 (.13)**	-.57 (.13)**	-.64 (.13)**
Voted in 2012	-.29 (.07)**	-.28 (.07)**	-.54 (.07)**	-.51 (.07)**
Conservative Media	1.94 (.26)**	2.04 (.26)**	1.38 (.26)**	1.51 (.26)**
Liberal Media	-.09 (.36)	-.28 (.36)	-.40 (.35)	-.58 (.35)
News Consumption	-.18 (.13)	-.17 (.13)	-.27 (.13)*	-.28 (.13)*
Education	-.61 (.11)**	-.64 (.11)**	-.60 (.11)**	-.61 (.11)**
Family Income	-.37 (.10)**	-.38 (.10)**	-.23 (.10)*	-.26 (.10)*
Battleground State	.20 (.07)**	.18 (.07)*	.10 (.07)	.09 (.07)
State EPI	-.48 (.46)	-.34 (.46)	-.64 (.45)	-.51 (.45)
Internet Survey Mode	.41 (.06)**	.42 (.06)**	.34 (.06)**	.35 (.06)**
Hispanic	.43 (.10)**	.35 (.09)**	.49 (.10)**	.43 (.10)**
Non-Hispanic Black	.46 (.10)**	.52 (.10)**	.47 (.10)**	.54 (.09)**
Non-Hispanic Other Race	.63 (.15)**	.66 (.15)**	.48 (.15)**	.50 (.15)**
Observations	5,091	5,077	5,070	5,057
Pseudo R ²	.08	.08	.08	.08

Source: 2012 ANES. Note: Cell entries are ordinal logit coefficients. The dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate more pessimistic beliefs. Independent variables are scaled from 0 to 1.

Two-tailed: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Table A-14. Predictors of Public Election Integrity Ratings in the United States, 2012
Racial Resentment Removed

Independent Variable	Votes	Votes	Election	Election
	Counted	Counted	Officials	Officials
	Fairly	Fairly	Fair	Fair
	coef. (s.e.)	coef. (s.e.)	coef. (s.e.)	coef. (s.e.)
Anti-Immigration Scale	.86 (.15)**	----	.88 (.15)**	----
Ethnocentrism	----	1.68 (.37)**	----	2.33 (.37)**
Racial Resentment	----	----	----	----
Party Identification	-.08 (.12)	-.05 (.12)	.02 (.12)	.05 (.12)
Expected Obama to Win	-.30 (.07)**	-.33 (.07)**	-.31 (.07)**	-.33 (.07)**
Ideology	.32 (.15)*	.42 (.15)**	-.33 (.15)*	-.23 (.15)
Patriotism	-1.18 (.15)**	-1.15 (.15)**	-.48 (.15)**	-.47 (.15)**
Political Knowledge	-0.94 (.12)**	-1.00 (.11)**	-0.88 (.12)**	-0.93 (.12)**
Trust in Government	-1.36 (.16)**	-1.47 (.16)**	-1.76 (.16)**	-1.87 (.16)**
External Efficacy	-.63 (.13)**	-.70 (.13)**	-.58 (.13)**	-.65 (.13)**
Voted in 2012	-.29 (.07)**	-.28 (.07)**	-.54 (.07)**	-.51 (.07)**
Conservative Media	1.93 (.26)**	2.04 (.26)**	1.39 (.26)**	1.53 (.26)**
Liberal Media	-.07 (.36)	-.28 (.35)	-.44 (.35)	-.63 (.34)
News Consumption	-.18 (.13)	-.17 (.13)	-.27 (.13)*	-.28 (.13)*
Education	-.61 (.11)**	-.64 (.11)**	-.60 (.11)**	-.61 (.11)**
Family Income	-.37 (.10)**	-.38 (.10)**	-.23 (.10)*	-.26 (.10)*
Battleground State	.20 (.07)**	.18 (.07)*	.10 (.07)	.09 (.07)
State EPI	-.48 (.46)	-.34 (.46)	-.65 (.45)	-.51 (.45)
Internet Survey Mode	.41 (.06)**	.42 (.06)**	.34 (.06)**	.35 (.06)**
Hispanic	.43 (.10)**	.35 (.09)**	.49 (.10)**	.43 (.10)**
Non-Hispanic Black	.47 (.09)**	.52 (.10)**	.45 (.09)**	.53 (.10)**
Non-Hispanic Other Race	.63 (.15)**	.66 (.15)**	.48 (.15)**	.49 (.15)**
Observations	5,091	5,077	5,070	5,057
Pseudo R ²	.08	.08	.08	.08

Source: 2012 ANES. Note: Cell entries are ordinal logit coefficients. The dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate more pessimistic beliefs. Independent variables are scaled from 0 to 1.

Two-tailed: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.