

Race, Class and Religion in the Southern Realignment

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Abstract

Many studies have documented a secular partisan realignment in southern politics, particularly the movement of southern whites to the Republican Party. This has spawned an ongoing debate about the main sources of this realignment. The most common explanation emphasizes racial attitudes and the politics of civil rights. However, some recent studies provide two alternative explanations: (1) economic attitudes and class politics; and (2) religion and the politics of moral values. To date, few studies assess the relative impact of all three factors – many examine one or two of these factors, but not all three simultaneously. We use the series of surveys conducted by the American National Election Studies through 2008 to examine the degree to which issues and values related to race, economics, and morality predict partisanship among southern whites over the past several decades. We find that a wider array of policy attitudes and values predict partisanship today than in the past.

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Party identification is a critical concept in voting behavior. Partisanship often indicates a “standing decision” to vote for a particular party’s candidates on Election Day (Key 1966). Often defined as a relatively stable attitude, partisanship can shape the way people view the world of politics (Campbell et al. 1960). Thus, the large movement of southern white voters to the Republican Party over the last fifty years is one of the most striking examples of Key’s (1959) concept of secular realignment in the United States. Growth in the GOP coalition in the South has developed over many decades, and it may not have reached its high point yet (Hayes and McKee 2008; Black 2004; Schaller 2006). There is less agreement about the causes of the GOP realignment in the South. The most conventional explanations emphasize racial politics, but several recent studies argue that economic interests and religious values are important factors.

We examine the correlates of partisanship among white voters in the South to test whether competing explanations carry more weight in different time periods. We find that conservative Protestants have increased in Republican identification to the point where they are indistinguishable from mainline Protestants, in the South and outside the South. In addition, while attitudes toward race and morality were at best weak predictors of white partisanship in the 1980s, these attitudes are now more substantial determinants of the party identification of white voters in the United States.

Partisan Realignment in the South

Once the base of the Democratic Party’s New Deal coalition, the South has become

a Republican Party stronghold in recent elections. More specifically, white voters (the majority race in each state of the former Confederacy) have shifted their allegiance away from the Democratic Party over a long period of time (Stanley and Niemi 2006). It is remarkable how steady the movement has been. Figure 1 indicates a steady change in southern white partisanship by decade over the last sixty years.¹ While Democrats dramatically outnumbered Republicans in the 1950s, by the first decade of the 21st century the GOP has developed a clear party identification advantage. Each decade brought further erosion in Democratic Party identification and similar growth in Republican Party identification. This almost linear pattern is a textbook example of secular realignment. The Republican Party now enjoys a significant advantage in party identification among white southern voters, and the South is the most Republican region of the country among white voters (Black and Black 2007, 46). By comparison, party identification has not changed as significantly among non-southern whites during the same period. As Figure 2 indicates, identification with each party among non-southern whites has hovered between 40 and 50 percent over the last six decades. Thus, the South is the primary location of significant gains made by the GOP in the last fifty years.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here]

Party identification is something of a lagging indicator of partisan change. Changes in voting behavior are sometimes more evident before changes in party identification during realignments (Gamm 1989). The changing fortunes of the two major political parties in the South can also be seen in election outcomes. While Democratic candidates for president carried a majority of southern states in the 1940s and 1950s, the results are quite different now. Neither Tennessee native Al Gore in 2000 nor John Kerry in 2004

¹ We define the South as the eleven states of the former Confederacy.

carried a single southern state in their campaigns as Democratic candidates for president. In the 2008 presidential election Barak Obama, a black Democratic candidate, reversed the tide somewhat by carrying three southern states (Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia). However, according to data from the ANES surveys and the national exit polls, Obama's share of the southern white vote in 2008 was not significantly better than what Al Gore and John Kerry earned in the two previous elections. In fact, Obama did worse than John Kerry among white voters in some southern states (Persily, Ansolabehere, and Stewart, 2010).

In addition, Republicans now hold a majority of southern seats in the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, and the GOP is nearly even with Democrats in holding state legislative seats in the South (Bullock 2009, 10). As a result, the South has assumed a prominent role in the organizational base and leadership of the Republican Party.

Given the meager performance of the Republican Party fifty years ago in the South, the South's critical place in the GOP today is remarkable. However, explaining the Republican Party ascendance in the South has generated significant scholarly debate. Studies by Abramowitz and colleagues (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Knotts 2006) note a growing correspondence between ideology and partisanship, particularly in the South. Over time, conservatives have increasingly identified with the Republican Party. The scholarly debate to some degree involves whether conservative ideology is defined primarily by race, economics, or moral values.

Race, Class and Morality in the GOP Realignment in the South

The most common explanations for the realignment of southern white voters have emphasized the central role of race and the politics of civil rights. Key (1949) first noted the importance of race in southern politics, mainly in Democratic primary elections in the first half of the 20th century. Since then, many argue that when the leadership of the national Democratic Party shifted more in favor of civil rights, most notably in the 1960s, a white backlash ensued, particularly in the South. Carmines and Stimson (1989) argue that in the wake of passage of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts, the ideological terms “liberal” and “conservative” came to be defined in terms of race when debate focused on the federal government’s role in promoting civil rights. As a result, desegregation attitudes of party identifiers polarized sharply after 1963-65 civil rights era—the “critical moment” in their dynamic model of issue evolution. Their evidence indicates that political elites first polarized over civil rights, with Democratic politicians adopting a more liberal posture and Republicans a conservative position. Then, as party positions on civil rights issues became clearer to voters, whites with conservative racial attitudes shifted toward the Republican Party.

Many scholars note the centrality of race in the region’s political conflicts fueled the GOP’s “southern strategy” for winning presidential elections and building party support among white voters (e.g., Aistrup 1996; Black and Black 1992, 2002; Green, Palmquist, and Shickler 2006; Hillygus and Shields 2008). Others replicate Key’s approach and find evidence of conservative racial attitudes and Republican Party gains in southern states or counties with large concentrations of black voters (Giles and Hertz

1994; Glaser 1994, 1996). Recent historical studies of politics in the 1960s and 1970s also emphasize the primary role of race and a white backlash against civil rights in explaining the mass movement of white voters to the Republican Party, particularly in the South (Perlstein 2001; Kruse 2005; Lassiter 2006; Lowndes 2008).

Hood, Kidd, and Morris (2004, 2008) examine race in southern politics in terms of group control of political party organizations. According to their theory of relative party advantage, the enfranchisement and mobilization of southern African-American voters made it harder for conservative whites to remain in control of local Democratic Party organizations. In addition, the Republican Party was beginning to build more viable organizations and field candidates to challenge Democrats in many parts of the South after the 1960s. The combination of these two developments gave the Republican Party an advantage in appealing to southern whites with conservative views on racial issues. They find that electoral support for the Republican Party increased the most in states with the greatest mobilization of black voters. In a more recent study, Hood and colleagues (2008) extend their data to 2004 and find a reciprocal relationship between Republican Party performance and black voter mobilization in southern states with the largest black populations (mainly in the Deep South).

Finally, Valentino and Sears (2005) link the GOP realignment in the South to the racial attitudes of southern white voters. They make a distinction between older “Jim Crow racism” (based on beliefs about legalized racial discrimination and inferiority of blacks) and “symbolic racism” (which combines racial resentment and beliefs that blacks do not uphold traditional American values). Valentino and Sears find that Jim Crow racism has declined significantly, including in the South, and does not account for the

movement of white voters to the Republican Party. In contrast, symbolic racism has not declined and is more prevalent in the South. Furthermore, they find that the impact of symbolic racism on the partisan identification and presidential voting of southern white voters has increased over time. Knuckey (2005; 2006) reaches similar conclusions about the impact of symbolic racism on GOP identification among southern whites in the 1990s. The symbolic racism concept has been debated for some time (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Tarman and Sears 2005). Nevertheless, race remains the most common factor in explaining partisan realignment in the South. In particular, explanations emphasizing racial politics suggest that the movement of southern whites toward the Republican Party accelerated after the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and subsequent GOP campaigns using race policies to target southern white voters.

A growing revisionist literature emphasizes the importance of income and economic attitudes as critical sources of growth in Republican identification and voting in the South. The revisionists suggest that economic development and conventional class cleavages, rather than race, are the most important source of Republican political gains in the South. These studies argue that rapid economic growth cultivated a new class-based political cleavage in the South as high-income and middle-income whites came to see their economic interests aligned with GOP policies. (Scher 1997; Shafer and Johnston 2006). Some studies challenge theories of racial politics more generally, not just in the South. Abramowitz (1994) directly confronts Carmines and Stimson's (1989) theory of issue evolution on civil rights issues. Abramowitz finds that social welfare and national security attitudes, rather than racial attitudes, explained the movement of white voters away from the Democratic Party in the 1980s.

Some note that movement to the GOP in the South, and a growing relationship between income and Republican identification in the South, began in the 1950s, before the civil rights politics of the 1960s (Nadeau and Stanley 1993; Stonecash 2000; Nadeau et al. 2004; Lublin 2004; Shafer and Johnston 2006; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). At the same time, a growing voting cleavage defined by social welfare attitudes emerged in the South (Shafer and Johnston 2006). The movement of conservative southern whites to the Republican Party thus contributes to growing party polarization in the nation. Importantly, however, economic explanations of political change suggest that the Republican realignment in the South began before the 1960s, perhaps prior to more recent “sorting” of partisanship and ideology (Levendusky 2009).

A more recent portion of the voting behavior literature emphasizes cultural issues and religious conservatism as important factors in American politics, and particularly in the GOP’s southern realignment. In response to growing policy differences between the parties on moral issues, the mass public has become more polarized (or sorted, to use Fiorina’s language) along party lines in terms of religious adherence and opinions on cultural issues, such as abortion (Adams 1997; Carmines and Woods 2002; Carsey and Layman 2006; Brewer and Stonecash 2007). Given the relative importance of religious institutions in the South, it is remarkable that some accounts of partisan change in the South have neglected these factors.

Kellstedt, Guth, Green, and Smidt (2007) define two important concepts for understanding the role of religion in southern voting behavior. First, religious traditions refer to major faith communities or denominations. Evangelical Protestants, who tend to view the Bible as the sole religious authority and hold orthodox religious beliefs, are a

key constituency (Jelen 2006). Second, religious commitment denotes the importance of one's religious beliefs and how often one attends worship services. "High commitment" religious citizens also tend to be more open to GOP appeals on social issues. As Kellstedt and colleagues note, the share of high commitment evangelicals among southern white voters has increased, particularly since the 1990s. The South now has the largest share of evangelical Protestants of any region in the country (Black and Black 2007, 54).

Furthermore, since the 1960s high commitment evangelicals in the South have shifted toward the GOP in voting and party identification (Kellstedt et al. 2007). The 2008 presidential election continued the trend, when one estimate indicates that eighty-six percent of southern white evangelicals voted for John McCain (Green et al. 2009).

Some accounts of political change in the South note the prominence of the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC). SBC ministers serve as important leaders of public opinion among whites. For example, Guth (2005) examines the increasing GOP activism of SBC ministers after 1980. In "issue evolution" fashion, SBC lay members (particularly those with high levels of religious commitment) moved toward the Republican Party after the SBC clergy (Kellstedt et al. 2007; Green et al. 2009). Thus, religious leaders may be partly responsible for party change in the South. In summary, cultural and religious explanations of voting behavior suggest that the movement of southern whites to the GOP accelerated since the 1970s, when social issues such as abortion and gay rights became more salient in American politics.

In reviewing the literature on partisan realignment in the South, not all studies give equal billing to each of the three major explanations discussed above. For example, the important study by Shafer and Johnston (2006), emphasizing economics, gives short

shrift to religious and cultural factors. Similarly, in another study emphasizing race, the authors acknowledge inadequate controls for income and religion (Valentino and Sears 2005, 687). There are exceptions. Hood et al. (2004) test several hypotheses emerging from each of the main theoretical perspectives. Lublin (2004) assesses the relative contributions of economic, racial, and cultural issue attitudes on the partisanship and voting behavior of southern whites. He observes increasing partisan polarization in all three issue domains. Lublin's analysis indicates that economic attitudes were the strongest predictor of partisanship and voting among white southerners through the mid-1980s. However, abortion and racial attitudes gained strength and almost equaled the impact of economic attitudes on partisanship and voting by the 1990s. A similar study by Knuckey (2006) finds that Republican Party identification among southern whites in the 1990s is predicted by a combination of moral beliefs, racial attitudes, economic issues, and general conservatism. Black and Black (1992, 141-175) also note the growing importance of religious conservatism to help explain the movement of southern white voters to the Republican Party. Finally, Hillygus and Shields (2008), find that the GOP southern strategy shifted from racial issues to moral issues after the 1980s as a way to appeal to conflicted Democratic voters (see also Miller and Schofield 2003).

The steady movement of southern white voters toward the Republican Party is undeniable and has been occurring now for more than fifty years. Given the extended length of this secular realignment in party identification and voting, it may reflect the combined effects of all of the contributing factors noted above. Each explanation hints at a different starting point for partisan realignment in the South. Class-based explanations identify the start in the 1950s. Race-based explanations tend to identify the 1960s as the

starting point. Religious and cultural explanations for party change suggest movement after the 1970s. It may be that all three factors have played an important role at different points in sustaining a partisan change that has continued for some 50-60 years. In particular, it may be that religious and cultural factors play a more important factor in explaining Republican identification in more recent years. If all three factors (race, economics, and religion) do a better job of accounting GOP identification in recent years, that would provide more evidence for Layman and Carsey's (2002) theory of conflict extension in American politics. As partisan conflict extends into new issue domains, older cleavages are not displaced but remain in place to make for a more polarized polity (see also Brewer 2005).

Data and Methods

We examine predictors of white partisanship in the South and non-South using accumulated data from the American National Election Studies through the 2008 election. We use the seven-point scale to measure party identification, running from -3 (strong Democrat) to +3 (strong Republican). In the graphs we use a three-category measure of partisanship, with Independent leaners classified as partisans.

We begin by examining changes in Republican identification among three different categories of religious affiliation for white voters. Using the ANES religious denomination codes, we follow Campbell's (2002) coding scheme to create separate indicators for mainline Protestants, conservative Protestants (sometimes described as Evangelicals), and a third category for other religions (primarily Catholics and

unaffiliateds). See the appendix for more discussion of the religion coding. Figure 3 shows Republican identification among the three religious groups by decade for southern whites. A similar trend in advancing GOP identification is evident for all three groups in the South. In each decade, conservative Christians and other religious whites lag behind mainline Protestants, until the 2000s when conservative Christians jump slightly ahead of the mainline group. From the 1990s to the 2000s mainline southern whites hold steady in their Republican identification, while conservative Christians in the South show a big increase in GOP identification. This suggests that perhaps religious issues helped spur continued Republican growth in the South in the last decade.

Figure 4 shows the same calculations of partisanship by religious traditions for non-southern whites. Outside the South a different pattern emerges. There has been essentially no change in Republican identification among mainline Protestant whites outside the South. In contrast, conservative Protestants and those practicing other faith traditions (mainly Catholics) show significant movement toward the GOP in the 1980s and 1990s. As in the South, however, mainline and conservative Protestants have now reached parity in Republican identification. Again, this leads us to expect that religious values and issues have become a more important predictor of partisanship in the South and outside the South.

We next estimate fairly simple models of partisanship based on the three theoretical perspectives described above (race, morality, and economics). We use ordinary least squares regression to explain variation in the seven-point party identification variable, with separate analyses for southern whites and non-southern whites. In addition, we continue the approach indicated in the figures by conducting separate analyses in each

decade, to test for changes in predictors of partisanship over time.

We attempt to measure an issue component and a values component for each perspective, so that each perspective provides two independent variables in the regression model. For the most part, each component is a scale created by taking the average of responses to several related survey questions. Since most of the morality and race measures are not available until the 1980s, this section is limited to the last three decades.² For the morality perspective, we create a moral values scale based on four items and a moral issues scale based on three issue questions, on abortion, gays in the military, and homosexual anti-discrimination laws (see the appendix for more details on variables used for each scale). Given the way the moral values scale is created, we expect a negative association with partisanship (meaning that voters with conservative values are more likely to be Republican). The moral issues scale is coded so that positive values indicate more conservative issue attitudes. Thus, the moral issues scale should be positively correlated with our party identification measure.³

For the race perspective, we create a symbolic racism scale, or racial resentment scale (Kinder and Sanders 1996), using the same four variables as Valentino and Sears (2005). This allows us to test whether symbolic racism has an increasing effect on white partisanship when more robust control variables are included in the estimation. We also create a race issues scale based on two items (the government aid to blacks and fair treatment questions). Based on the direction of the scales, we expect a negative correlation between the symbolic racism scale and partisanship (meaning that whites with

² Some of the measures we use are missing from the 1996, 1998, and 2002 ANES surveys, so those years are excluded from the analyses.

³ Initially, we included the dummy variables for conservative and mainline Protestants in the model. The coefficients for those variables were not statistically significant. Thus, the two variables were dropped with minimal impact on the other results.

more conservative racial attitudes are more likely to identify with the Republican Party). The race issues scale is coded such that we expect a positive association between the race issues scale and partisanship.

For the economic perspective, we create an economic issues scale out of two items (the guaranteed jobs and government health insurance questions). The ANES cumulative file does not include a battery of questions to create an economic values measure in multiple survey years. As an alternative, we use family income as a proxy. Several studies find that income, rather than occupation, is a more effective measure of social class (Bartels 2008; Brewer and Stonecash 2007; Dalton 2008). Our measure of family income is a five-category ordinal variable, with higher values indicating more income. Thus, income should be positively correlated with Republican identification. The economic issues scale is coded in a way that it should be positively associated with Republican identification.

Our model of party identification includes two control variables. We include age as a control, with the expectation that older voters of the New Deal and Great Society generations are more likely to identify as Democrats. Finally, we estimate each model once with ideology and once without ideology. We do this to get a sense of which of the three main factors tend to be subsumed by generalized conservative ideology. Our ideology measure is the seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement scale. Higher values indicate more conservative voters, so the ideology measures should be positively correlated with partisanship.

Results

Our model estimates for the party identification of southern whites are presented in Table 1. We find that the two economic factors are fairly consistently associated with party identification. The coefficients for income and economic issues are in the expected positive direction, usually statistically significant, and approximately the same magnitude in each decade. Thus, economic issues and interests are stable predictors of southern white party identification over the last thirty years.

For the morality perspective, we see that the effects of moral values and moral issues on southern white partisanship increase over time. The coefficients for moral values and moral issues are in the expected direction, but generally not statistically significant until more recently. Moral values and moral issues are only weakly associated with the party identification of southern whites in the 1980s, but the associations are much stronger in the 2000s. In fact, in the most recent decade the impact of the two morality variables are substantively similar to the impact of the two economic factors.

For the race perspective, we find a similar pattern in that the effect of symbolic racism on southern white partisanship increases over time. In the 1980s, more conservative attitudes on the symbolic racism scale are associated with Democratic party identification. This relationship is reversed in the 1990s and 2000s. This provides some support for Valentino and Sears' (2005) conclusion that symbolic racism has become more important in explaining the voting behavior of southern white citizens. The race issues scale has the expected positive regression coefficients, but these effects fail to reach statistical significance in any decade.

In the South, conservative Protestants are indeed more conservative than mainline Protestants on both morality and race scales, but not on the economic measures. Thus, our results suggest that the growing importance of moral values, moral issues, and symbolic racism in predicting partisanship is what helped bring conservative Protestants to parity with mainline Protestants in Republican identification.

When controlling for ideology, many of the effects get weaker. In particular, the morality and race effects are reduced more substantially than the economic effects when ideology is included in the model. This is partly due to the increasing correlation between several of the scales and ideology among southern whites. Among southern whites, the correlation between ideology and moral values increases from $-.35$ in the 1980s to $-.51$ in the 2000s. The correlation between moral issues and ideology increases from $.19$ in the 1980s to $.29$ in the 1990s. We see similar movement for symbolic racism ($r = -.19$ in the 1980s; $r = -.32$ in the 2000s) and for economic issues ($r = .30$ in the 1980s; $r = .40$ in the 2000s). Among southern white voters, the correlation is relatively weak ($r = .04$ in the 1980s; $r = .10$ in the 2000s). This indicates that for southern white voters ideology partly subsumes the other three factors, especially morality and race.

At the same time, ideology is a strong predictor of white partisanship even when controlling for race, morality and economics. While there are other unmeasured political domains that are likely associated with conservative ideology and partisanship (particularly national security attitudes), it is unlikely we would substantially reduce the impact of ideology by including other factors in the model. Ideology appears to be more than the sum of its constituent issues and values.

It is also worth noting that the impact of symbolic racism on southern white

partisanship is not statistically significant in recent decades when controlling for ideology and more reliable measures of economic and morality factors. This may cast some doubt on the robustness of the conclusions in the Valentino and Sears (2005) study on southern politics.⁴

Table 2 presents the model estimates for the party identification of non-southern whites. Overall, there are many similarities to the model estimates for southern whites. As in the South, by the 2000s a broader range of economic, morality, and race attitudes help account for white party identification in the non-South. In addition, economic issues have a strong and statistically significant association with partisanship outside the South in all three decades. There is some indication that the impact of moral issues and symbolic racism increases over time as well. Finally, age has a similar impact on white partisanship in both regions, with older Americans tending to identify with the Democratic Party. The main difference is that family income is a less reliable predictor of partisanship outside the South than in the South in recent decades. Also, moral values and moral issues appear to have a stronger impact on white partisanship outside the South in the 1980s.

Conclusion

The Republican realignment in the South is one of the most important developments in American electoral politics in the last half century. It has altered the competitive position of the two major parties in the United States. It has invigorated the

⁴ If we remove the race issue scale from the model, then symbolic racism is a statistically significant predictor of southern white partisanship in the 1990s and 2000s, even after controlling for ideology.

activist base of the Republican Party and fostered the rise of a series of GOP leaders from the South. The realignment has also recalibrated strategic calculations for the two parties in presidential elections and in races for the House and Senate. Therefore, it is important to understand the sources of this realignment.

We find that differences in the party affiliation of broad categories of religious faith traditions have narrowed substantially, in the South and especially outside the South. Today, conservative Protestants and mainline Protestants are very similar in terms of party identification. The recent GOP gains among conservative Protestants stand out, suggesting that religious values and cultural issues may have become more important predictors of partisanship.

Overall, we find that attitudes related to race, economics, and moral values are more reliable predictors of party identification in the 2000s compared to the 1980s. This pattern holds in the South and outside the South. The goodness-of-fit of the models of party identification improve with each passing decade. Partisanship seems to be supported by a broader array of values and issues than in the past. Republican candidates have a broader palette at their disposal in drawing up appeals to conservative audiences. These results seem to be consistent with Layman and Carsey's (2002) theory of conflict extension in American party politics.

Appendix – Variable Measures

Using the ANES 2008 Time Series study appended to the ANES Cumulative File, we created scales to measure several value orientations and issue attitudes. The survey questions and variable number used to create each scale are listed below. For each scale, we calculated the average score among the answered items in the series. We also describe below how we created the measures for Conservative Protestants and Mainline Protestants.

Religious Affiliation

An important part of this study is the ability to place respondents into broad religious categories that accurately reflect deeply held beliefs that may impact political behavior. Doing so over the time frame of this study is difficult for two reasons. First, there is a lack of consensus about how to measure these variables. A common approach uses denominational affiliation along with measures of attendance, belief, and views of the Bible (Laymen and Green 1997). Another approach relies solely on denominational affiliation and groups the denominations into larger groups: Mainline, Evangelical, Catholic (Campbell 2002). The second complication is the change in religion variable coding in ANES surveys. Before 1990, the NES coded denominations based on historical relationships and a limited number denominational families. After 1990 this approach was changed and the number of denominations coded in the NES increased substantially.

We have adopted the measurement approach used by Campbell (2002). We create separate dummy variables for white Mainline Protestants and for Conservative Protestants. A residual category captures other religious traditions and the non-religious. This approach was chosen because it offered a substantial advantage. The questions needed to develop a more fine tuned analysis were added to the NES since the 1980's. This would substantially limit our ability to track religion's impact over the longest period possible.

Moral Value Scale

Item	ANES Study	
	Cumulative File	2008 Time Series
Newer Lifestyles Contribute to Society Breakdown	VCF0851	V085140
Should Adjust View of Moral Behavior to Changes	VCF0852	V085139
Should be More Emphasis on Traditional Values	VCF0853	V085142
Tolerance of Different Moral Standards	VCF0854	V085141
Scale $\alpha = .62$ High scores mean more liberal values		

Moral Issues Scale

Item	ANES Study	
	Cumulative File	2008 Time Series
When Should Abortion Be Allowed	VCF0837	V085086
Favor/Oppose Gays in Military	VCF0877a	V083212x
Law Against Homosexual Discrimination	VCF0876a	V083211x
Scale $\alpha = .64$ High scores = more conservative positions		

Symbolic Racism Scale

Item	ANES Study	
	Cumulative File	2008 Time Series
Blacks Should Not Have Special Favors	VCF9040	V085143
Conditions Make it Difficult for Blacks	VCF9039	V085144
Blacks Must Try Harder	VCF9041	V085146
Blacks Gotten Less Than They Deserve	VCF9042	V085145
Scale $\alpha = .73$ High scores = more liberal views		

Economic Issues Scale

Item	ANES Study	
	Cumulative File	2008 Time Series
Guaranteed Jobs and Income Scale	VCF0809	V083128
Government Health Insurance Scale	VCF0806	V083119
Scale $\alpha = .55$ High scores = more conservative positions		

Race Issues

Item	ANES Study	
	Cumulative File	2008 Time Series
Aid to Blacks	VCF0830	V083137
Government Ensure Fair Treatment	VCF9037	V085079a
Scale $\alpha = .61$ High scores = more conservative positions		

Demographic Questions

Family Income: VCF0809 (Cumulative File), V083249 (2008)

Race: VCF0106 (Cumulative File), V081102 (2008)

Ideology

Liberal/Conservative Ideology: VCF0803 (Cumulative File), V083069 (2008)


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
Figure 1
Party Identification of Southern Whites by Decade
ANES 1952-2008



Note: Leaners are coded as party identifiers.

Source: Niemi, Weisberg, and Kimball, forthcoming


Figure 2
Party Identification of Non-Southern Whites by Decade
ANES 1952-2008



Note: Leaners are coded as party identifiers.


Source: Niemi, Weisberg, and Kimball, forthcoming

Figure 3
Republican Party Identification of Southern Whites by Religious Affiliation
ANES 1964-2008



Note: Leaners are coded as party identifiers.

Figure 4
Republican Party Identification of Non-Southern Whites by Religious Affiliation
ANES 1964-2008



Note: Leaners are coded as party identifiers.

Table 1
Predictors of Party Identification of Southern Whites

Independent Variables	1980s		1990s		2000s	
Family Income	.15*	.11	.18***	.13**	.22***	.21***
	(.09)	(.11)	(.05)	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)
Economic Issues Scale	.30***	.23***	.30***	.23***	.33***	.18***
	(.06)	(.07)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.06)
Moral Values Scale	-.20	-.04	-.44***	-.20**	-.33***	.05
	(.13)	(.15)	(.07)	(.08)	(.10)	(.12)
Moral Issues Scale	.11*	.11*	.02	.01	.28***	.18**
	(.05)	(.06)	(.03)	(.03)	(.08)	(.09)
Symbolic Racism Scale	.21*	.30*	-.19**	-.11	-.29***	-.17
	(.12)	(.14)	(.07)	(.08)	(.10)	(.11)
Race Issues Scale	.04	-.03	.06	.07	.04	.06
	(.07)	(.08)	(.04)	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)
Age	-.018***	-.011***	-.028***	-.028***	-.014***	-.008
	(.006)	(.007)	(.004)	(.004)	(.005)	(.005)
Ideology		.52***		.53***		.64***
		(.10)		(.05)		(.07)
Constant	-1.26**	-2.91***	-1.08***	-2.79***	-1.77***	-4.02***
	(.49)	(.64)	(.28)	(.33)	(.37)	(.46)
N	472	338	1007	799	548	405
Adjusted R ²	.10	.18	.20	.32	.26	.37
Root MSE	1.97	1.91	1.86	1.72	1.78	1.65

Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

***p<.01, two-tailed

**p<.05, two-tailed

*p<.1, two-tailed

Table 2
Predictors of Party Identification of Non-Southern Whites

Independent Variables	1980s		1990s		2000s	
Family Income	.08 (.05)	.03 (.05)	.18*** (.03)	.16*** (.03)	.07 (.05)	.05 (.05)
Economic Issues Scale	.31*** (.03)	.24*** (.04)	.32*** (.02)	.24*** (.03)	.36*** (.04)	.22*** (.04)
Moral Values Scale	-.39*** (.07)	-.19 (.07)	-.55*** (.04)	-.29*** (.04)	-.44*** (.07)	-.05 (.08)
Moral Issues Scale	.08*** (.03)	.05* (.03)	.08*** (.02)	.04** (.02)	.33*** (.05)	.16*** (.06)
Symbolic Racism Scale	-.09 (.06)	.01 (.07)	-.09** (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.20*** (.07)	-.01 (.07)
Race Issues Scale	.06 (.04)	.05 (.04)	.08*** (.03)	.03 (.03)	.09** (.04)	.08* (.04)
Age	-.007** (.003)	-.008** (.003)	-.011*** (.002)	-.012*** (.002)	-.017*** (.003)	-.012*** (.003)
Ideology		.59*** (.05)		.58*** (.03)		.76*** (.05)
Constant	-1.46*** (.29)	-3.35*** (.32)	-1.85*** (.18)	-3.56*** (.21)	-1.61*** (.27)	-4.00*** (.32)
N	1340	1126	2889	2449	1134	792
Adjusted R ²	.12	.26	.21	.34	.28	.50
Root MSE	1.92	1.77	1.82	1.70	1.74	1.49

Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

***p<.01, two-tailed

**p<.05, two-tailed

*p<.1, two-tailed