It is true that some speculation is inherent in awarding damages. And although the Court does have some concerns about the generic nature of some of the opinions Dr. Smith will offer during trial, this does not mean his opinion should be altogether excluded. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that "[a]n expert witness-unlike other witnesses-is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation, so long as the expert's opinion [has] a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline." . . . Defendants have not fully convinced the Court that Dr. Smith's methods are flawed, unreliable, or unaccepted in his field. The jury is tasked with weighing the evidence after any vigorous cross-examinations that may occur, whereas the Court is tasked only with prohibiting "nonsense" opinions. . . . Dr. Smith's conclusions and calculations may be incorrect-however, they are still admissible.

Federal courts have long questioned the willingness-to-pay method's soundness and underlying premises. . . Courts and the academic community have also observed that value-of-life studies do not produce reliably consistent results. . . In fact, the "overwhelming majority" of federal courts have excluded testimony estimating hedonic damages.. . . Moreover, numerous courts have specifically excluded Dr. Smith's proposed testimony. . . This Court joins them [case citations omitted].   

Because § 231b(b) provides a clear formula for calculating [Tier I and Tier II retirement] benefits, Dr. Carpenter's opinion that the amount Norfolk Southern would have paid in Tier I and Tier II taxes should be considered as Ragan's lost income would mislead the jury. See Adams, 865 S.W.2d at 751 ("Any link between the taxes paid and the benefits is too tenuous to provide a true measure of plaintiff[']s loss."). . .Carpenter's expert report includes the value of Tier I and Tier II taxes Norfolk Southern would have paid . Norfolk Southern argues, and the Court agrees, that the only reason for including those amounts in the expert report would be to offer them as evidence of Ragan's lost income. Courts exclude opinion or testimony treating the employer's projected Tier I and Tier II tax payments as lost income to FELA plaintiffs. See Rachel, 891 F.Supp. at 429-30; Edwards v. Atchison, 684 N.E.2d 919, 924 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997);  Adams, 865 S.W.2d at 751; Cephus v. CSX Transp., Inc., NO. 1:14-CV-1891-SCJ, 2016 WL 10591433, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2016). . . [Carpenter] may, if he chooses, perform the appropriate calculations under 45 U.S.C. § 231(b) and offer his opinion that Ragan would have received the amount provided by that formula assuming he had worked to his natural retirement age.

The jury awarded Plaintiff solely for economic damages which consisted of lost wages. Because the damages were awarded pursuant to the FSAA and FELA, it is irrelevant whether the lost wages were for past or future earnings. The damages were necessarily connected to his service on the railroad. . . . Defendant is entitled to offset the damages award for Plaintiff's portion of RRTA taxes in the amounts of $8,680.00 for Tier I and $5,203.80 for Tier II taxes. Additionally, under the Court's holding in Loos, Plaintiff's award for lost earnings under his SAA claim are considered "wages" for purposes of medicare taxes.  Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to offset $2,030 for Plaintiff's share of Medicare taxes.

Under the Employers' Liability Act, where death is instantaneous, the beneficiaries can recover their pecuniary loss and nothing more; but the relationship between them and the deceased is a proper circumstance for consideration in computing the same. The elements which make up the total damage resulting to a minor child from a parent's examination where the beneficiary is a spouse or collateral dependent relative; but in every instance the award must be based upon money values, the amount of which can be ascertained only upon a view of the peculiar facts presented.. . . In the present case there was testimony concerning the personal qualities of the deceased and the interest which he took in his family. It was proper, therefore, to charge that the jury might take into consideration the care, attention, instruction, training, advice and guidance which the evidence showed he reasonably might have been expected to give his children during their minority, and to include the pecuniary value thereof in the damages assessed. But there was nothing -- indeed there could be nothing -- to show the hypothetic injury which might have befallen some unidentified adult beneficiary or dependent next of kin.

Because our review of the foregoing cases leads us to draw three conclusions. First, by its very nature the calculation of an award for lost earnings must be a rough approximation. Because a lost stream can never be predicted with complete confidence, any lump sum represents only a ‘rough and ready’ effort to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in if not injured. Second, sustained price inflation can make the award substantially less precise. Inflation’s current magnitude and unpredictability create a substantial risk that the damages award will prove to have little relation to the lost wages it purports to replace. Third, the question of lost earnings can arise in many different contexts. In some sectors of the economy, it is far easier to assemble evidence of an individual’s most likely career path than others.

Mack seeks to exclude Dr. Scott's opinion testimony on the value of statistical life ("VSL") as being unreliable and irrelevant. The Court joins with other courts in this district in finding that the VSL testimony is inadmissible. See Crouch v. Master Woodcraft Cabinetry, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-00078 KGB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172785, 2021 WL 4150206, at *4-5 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 13, 2021) (quoting Hannibal v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., No. 4:16CV00904 JLH, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134318, 2018 WL 3797500 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 9, 2018).

The Court accepts the opinions of Ralph Scott, Ph.D., economist. Dr. Scott sets the average lifespan for Jane Doe and provides calculations that federal agencies use to aid in valuation of loss of life. Based on the federal agency calculations, the average economic value for her loss of life expectancy is $228,341 per year. The Court finds those calculations to be helpful in reaching the Court's decision as to the value of the decrease in Jane Doe's lifespan because of Defendant's admitted and uncontroverted actions.

Regarding the tax returns: though plaintiffs bring a wrongful death claim, they do not seek damages based on lost income or earning capacity resulting from Mr. Herrera's death. Id. at 2; Doc. 88 at 2. Rather, they seek "compensatory damages for the value of [his] life, the loss of enjoyment of life, his pain and suffering before death, and punitive damages." Doc 103 at 2. Mr. Herrera's tax returns are not relevant to these sorts of damages. Defendants contend that Mr. Herrera's  "financial circumstances" deserve "a close[] look" if the jury is asked to decide the value of his life. Doc. 88 at 4-5; Doc. 111 at 3. The Court agrees that "[t]he jury may lawfully choose to reject Plaintiff's expert's opinion of the value of Mr. Herrera's life," but disagrees that Mr. Herrera's tax returns have any bearing on this value where plaintiffs do not seek damages based on lost earning capacity . . .As the New Mexico Supreme Court observed in Morga, "to tie an award of noneconomic damages to Plaintiffs' economic damages . . . is contrary to our existing law and would establish a dangerous policy of, in part, valuing human life based on a person's net worth." 2022-NMSC-013, ¶ 32, 512 P.3d at 787. Because Mr. Herrera's tax returns are not relevant, the Court will not compel plaintiffs to produce them.

Plaintiff seeks $50,000 in hedonic damages. [] "Hedonic damages are damages for the loss of enjoyment of life, or for the value of life itself, as measured separately from the economic productive value that the injured or deceased person would have had." []. [T]he Hawai'i Supreme Court stated:   

The measurement of the joy of life is intangible. A jury may draw upon its own life experiences in attempting to put a monetary figure on the pleasure of living. It is a uniquely human endeavor requiring the trier of fact to draw upon the virtually unlimited factors unique to us as human beings. Testimony of an economist would not aid the jury in making such measurements because an economist is no more expert at valuing the pleasure of life than the average juror. The loss of enjoyment of life resulting from a permanent injury is not subject to an economic calculation. [] Based on the statements from his declaration that Plaintiff continues to suffer from depression, anxiety, and trauma, the Court finds awarding $50,000 for loss of enjoyment of life is appropriate here. [] The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that the District Court award Plaintiff $50,000 in hedonic damages.