Decisions Developed in 2018
January 21, 2018
Dedmon v. Steelman, 2017 Tenn.
LEXIS 720 (TN 2017). This decision held that the definition of
“reasonable charges” for hospital services under the Tennessee Hospital
Lien Act does not apply in personal injury cases. Therefore, plaintiffs
are free to submit evidence of the injured party’s full undiscounted
medical bills as proof of reasonable medical expenses. Defendants were
precluded from submitting evidence of discounted rates accepted by
medical providers as a result of insurance, but were free to submit any
other competent evidence to rebut plaintiff’s proof on the
reasonableness of the medical expenses as long as the proof does not
contravene Tennessee’s collateral source rule. Suggested by Christina
Tapia.
February 1, 2018
Otero County Hospital Association,
Inc., Quorum Health Resources, LLC, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 244
(United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico, 2017).
The Court defined a life care plan as follows:
A life care plan is a dynamic document,
based on extensive data analysis and research. A life care plan
provides information regarding a patient's current and future needs and
associated costs relating to a person's injury. To create a life care
plan, a life care planner takes a comprehensive review of the patient's
medical records and interviews the patient. A physical exam of the
patient is also performed. Based on this review, the life care planner
creates a life care plan that assesses the patient's current and
long-term needs, including physician follow up exams, diagnostic tests,
pain intervention needs, medications, medical devices, home assistance
needs, and any anticipated home modifications.
February 12, 2018
Lee v. Overbey, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 138766 (W.D. AR 2009). Federal Judge Robert T. Dawson
had allowed Dr. Stan V. Smith to testify about loss-of-life damages and
Dr. Gary Skoog had been proffered by defense as a rebuttal witness. The
Plaintiff moved to exclude Skoog’s testimony. Judge Dawson interpreted
Dr. Skoog’s report and deposition testimony to have argued that “it is
improper to utilize loss-of-life damages as compensation in
litigation.” Judge Dawson granted Plaintiff’s motion to preclude Skoog
from expressing his opinions regarding whether loss-of-life damages
should be recoverable under Arkansas law, but allowed Skoog to testify
in opposition to the methodology used by Smith to arrive at
loss-of-life damages. Note: This memorandum was apparently published
the first time on LEXIS in February of 2018.
Fielder v. J. V. Coleman Trucking, Inc.,
2018
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
13812
(N.D.
WV
2018).
This
order
is
the
response
of
Federal Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., to a number of motions in
limine posed by both the Plaintiff and the Defendant. A Defense motion
challenged the calculations of Dr. Clifford B. Hawley for Jason
Fielder’s “lost household services.” The order noted that “the loss of
ability to perform household services constitutes the loss of a
customary activity and is not subject to calculation as a matter of
law.” It criticized Hawley’s calculations as “unreliable as they are
based entirely upon generalized data not specific to the plaintiff.”
This challenge to Hawley’s testimony was rendered moot because the
Plaintiff had agreed not to elicit any opinions from Hawley regarding
the economic value of Fielder’s loss of household services. The order
indicated that the Plaintiff would, however, elicit testimony from Mr.
Fiedler, his wife and other potential witnesses regarding Mr. Fiedler’s
loss of household services and “will ask the jury to award an
appropriate amount for those losses.”
Rascon v. Brookins, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20088 (D. AZ 2018). This order of Federal Judge John J.
Tuchi allowed the testimony of Dr. Stan V. Smith’s calculations on loss
of future earnings were admissible, but his opinons with respect to
loss of life or loss of value of life in this wrongful death action
were not admissible. Judge Tuchi discussed the Ninth Circuit decision
of Dorn v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 397 F.3d 1183, 1195 (2005)
and said:
The Court agrees with the Ninth
Circuit's evaluation that Dr. Smith's quantification of hedonic damages
does not accurately project the value people place on the enjoyment of
life, but rather an altered figure that could reflect many different
government policy judgements. Further, even if the figure only
reflected what the public spends out of its own pockets on safety
devices, this spending "is probably influenced as much by advertising
and marketing decisions made by profit-seeking manufacturers . . .as it
is by any consideration by consumers of how much life is worth." Smith
v. Jenkins, 732 F.3d 51, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Mercado, 974
F.2d at 871). The Court finds that Dr. Smith's calculations are too
speculative and unconnected to how an individual values their life and
is therefore not sufficiently tied to the facts of the case and is
unhelpful to the jury in determining the "loss of value of life". Under
Rule 702, Dr. Smith's "loss of value of life" testimony is
inadmissible. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 ("scientific validity
for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other,
unrelated purposes"); Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1064 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) (ruling, after an extensive analysis of the methodology
involved, that Dr. Smith's testimony failed to survive Daubert analysis
and was unhelpful to the jury).
Morga v. FEDEX Ground Package System,
2018
N.M
App.
LEXIS
8
(N.M.
App.
2018).
This
decision
rejected
an
appeal
of
the trial court decision to award more than $165 million to
the plaintiffs for two deaths in an automobile accident. Most of that
value was in the form of compensatory damages for loss of enjoyment of
life and loss of consortium. The Court of Appeals said:
Defendants made a strategic decision to
entrust the jury with the decision of how to determine the value of a
life from the evidence presented, even going so far as to exclude
Plaintiffs' economist from providing testimony regarding "specific
damages for the value of a statistical life[,]" including "any numbers
offering a benchmark value as to human life." Defendants' counsel
specifically told the jury, " I am not going to submit to you a number,
because I agree the value of life--I don't want to insult anybody about
the value of life in this case. But you have to rely on you[r] own
conscious[] when you're looking at [the] value of life." We agree that
the damage awards in this case were very large. However, when an
experienced district court judge, who is familiar with juries in his
community, properly reviews the record and evaluates a motion for new
trial and a motion for remittitur; the fact that Plaintiffs' awards are
large does not transform Plaintiffs' undisputed evidence into something
illogical or insufficient. Furthermore, although Defendants were
afforded an opportunity to present evidence or testimony at trial to
guide the jury in their determination of the value of life and other
non-economic damages, Defendants specifically chose not to do so.
February 13, 2018
Henckle v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.,
2017
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
217367
(S.D.
FL
2017).
This
decision
excluded
the
testimony
of
economic expert Roderick Moe based upon his
inability to demonstrate that a method of using a period of 24 past
years to measuring growth rates for components of a life care plan
prepared by Dr. Lichtblau that would extend 24 years into the future.
(The term “mirror image approach” was not used in this decision, but
has been used by forensic economists to describe this method.) Judge
Donald M. Middlebrooks said:
There is no evidence that Moe's
methodology for calculating medical expense growth rates has a reliable
basis in economics, or is generally accepted by economists who study
the medical industry. First, Moe admitted that he is unaware of any
standard, treatise, expert analysis, or other authority that supports
his methodology. (Moe Dep., 83:20-84:4; 88:3-9). Second, he testified
that he is not aware of any studies that have tested his methodology,
nor has he tested his methodology. (Moe Dep., 88:12-19; 88:22-89:2).
February 19, 2018
Mercado v. Ahmed, 756 F. Supp.
1097 (N.D. IL 1991). This order of Judge James B. Zagel excluded
testimony of Stan V. Smith regarding an injured child’s loss of
enjoyment of life (hedonic damages). In reaching his decision to
exclude the testimony of Smith, Judge Zagel discussed said:
This kind of evidence is well described
in T. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Survive,
83 Nw. U.L. Rev. 876 (1989). In brief, Miller notes that economists are
researching the "ways to measure the value that individuals place upon
reducing the risk of dying" by examining the markets. Id. at
878-79. They examine "what people actually pay -- in dollars, time
discomfort, and inconvenience -- for small reductions in health and
safety risks." Id. at 879. Of particular significance, economists have
estimated the values people place on risk reduction based on the
following factors: 1) the extra wages employers pay to induce people to
take risky jobs; 2) the demand and price for products -- such as safer
cars, smoke detectors, houses in polluted areas, and life insurance --
that enhance health and safety; 3) the tradeoffs people make among
time, money, comfort, and safety -- in studies involving pedestrian
tunnel use, safety belt use, speed choice, and drivers' travel time;
and 4) surveys that ask people about their willingness to invest money
to enhance their health or safety. Id. at 880-81.
However, there is no basic agreement
among economists as to what elements ought to go into the life
valuation. There is no unanimity on which studies ought to be
considered. There is a lack of reliability. In fact, Smith was prepared
to testify based on seventy or eighty studies; Miller relies on
twenty-nine; in Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. Ill.
1985), Smith testified on the basis of fifteen studies. Smith
acknowledged that more studies could be done on the willingness-to-pay
issue. In particular Smith noted that further studies will focus on a
set of consumers to uncover when these consumers make or do not make
choices for safety, and these results may help establish validity. The
fact that the bottom lines of most studies (between less than $100,000
to more than $2,000,000) arguably do not wind up very far apart (by
some definitions of "very far") may be coincidence and not the result
of the application of a scientific method.
Survey of attitudes and views of others as a basis for concluding
something is true is not necessarily wrong. Some science as it
comes into court is the result of consensus by practitioners of some
area of expertise that a certain law of nature is correct. What is
wrong here is not that the evidence is founded on consensus or
agreement, it is that the consensus is that of persons who are no more
expert than are the jurors on the value of the lost pleasure of life.
Even if reliable and valid, the evidence may fail to "assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue" in a
way more meaningful than would occur if the jury asked a group of wise
courtroom bystanders for their opinions.
February 22, 2018
Griego v. Douglas, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26933 (D. N.M. 2018). Magistrate Judge Karen B. Molzen held
that:
Plaintiff fails to provide a persuasive
argument as to why this Court should depart from precedent and admit
expert testimony quantifying hedonic damages. The Court expressly finds
that any probative value of such quantifying testimony is substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury,
which collectively will be in the best position to make such an
assessment. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. On the other hand, the risk of undue
prejudice does not outweigh the probative value to the jury of
qualitative expert testimony regarding the concept of hedonic damages
and pointing out the areas to be considered in evaluating such damages.
Thus, testimony by Dr. McDonald on hedonic damages will be limited to
those areas only.
Judge Molzen also ruled that:
While neither party
addressed this specific topic in their filings, the probative value of
testimony explaining how governmental agencies use the valuation of
life in the context of public policy seems substantially outweighed by
the danger of confusing the issues. The trier of fact needs not know
how governmental agencies use such a valuation in order to grasp its
concept and apply it to the case at hand.
March 3, 2018
In the Matter of Parker Drilling
Offshore USA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32741 (W.D. LA 2018). This
was a ruling in a personal injury case under the Jones Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 30104, and general maritime law of the United States, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333. The economic expert for the plaintiff was Dr. Charles O.
Bettinger, III. The economic expert for the defendant was Dr. Kenneth
J. Boudreaux. The damages portion of the decision related to issues of
work-life expectancy and the use of a worker’s earnings history versus
amount being earned at the time of injury by the worker. On both
issues, federal judge Dee D. Drell held that Boudreaux was correct
under 5th Circuit standards. Regarding work-life expectancy, Boudreaux
had relied upon work-life expectancy tables produced by Ciecka, Donley
and Goldman, Journal of Legal Economics, Vols. 9, No. 3 (Winter
1999-2000) and 10, No. 3 (Winter 2000-2001), while Bettinger had
assumed that the plaintiff (Wilbert Mays) would have retired at “a
normal male retirement age of 65.” Regarding work-life expectancy,
Judge Drell said:
The court adopts Dr. Boudreaux's work
life average and not a "normal male retirement age." Dr. Bettinger's
assumption clearly does not take into account Mays' overall physical
condition nor does it consider interim labor separations which are
evidenced by Mays' own work history. These considerations are
consistently noted as reasons why the Fifth Circuit in Culver II and
the courts applying the Culver II framework adopt a work life average
rather than a retirement age as the proper standard.
The court adopted the Boudreaux earnings history approach rather than
the Bettinger current-amount-being-earned approach, saying:
The record evidence shows Mays' work
history was inconsistent and that he did not remain in employment
within the oil and gas industry for any significant period of time.
Thus, we determine a figure commensurate solely with his income in 2013
to be significantly inflated. We also find that Dr. Boudreaux's use of
an average of Mays' earnings over an eight year period is fair and
equitable as it even takes into consideration years where his pay was
much higher. Additionally, by taking an average of eight years, versus
the usual five, less weight is afforded to year five (2009) when Mays
did not earn any income.
In a footnote, a number of decisions were cited indicating that use of
averages based upon a worker’s earnings history was to be preferred.
Starling v. Banner Health,
2018 U.S. Dist LEXIS 28747 (D. AZ 2018). This order of Federal Judge
Neil V. Wake granted a defense motion to exclude the hedonic damages
testimony of Dr. Stan V. Smith in this wrongful termination case,
citing particularly Dorn v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 397 F.3d
1183, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (dictum), but also Stokes v. John Deere
Seeding Grp., No. 4:12-cv-04054-SLD-JAG, 2014 WL 675820, at *5 (C.D.
Ill. Feb. 21, 2014) (quoting Ayers, 887 F. Supp. at 1060). Smith had
assumed a 25 percent reduction in the plaintiff’s enjoyment of life
about which Judge Wake said:
Moreover, the arbitrariness of the
"conservative" 25 percent reduction is troubling. As before, Smith
"provides no explanation or method for calculating the conservative
factor based on data or theories originating from economic research,
leaving the Court with no option but to conclude that the conservative
value is derived through unmethodical, subjective 'eyeballing.'" . . .
Smith admits that he is conservative when approaching "matters that
don't have a high degree of specificity." (Doc. 216-1, Ex. A at
153:2-4.) Although experts need not be certain, Smith does not point to
anything justifying the manner in which he exercises this conservative
discretion.
Judge Wake also responded to Smith’s claim that approximately 224 state
and federal courts had admitted Smith’s hedonic damages testimony, as
follow:
Starling points out that Banner did not
offer a rebuttal expert opinion on Smith's methodology. The law does
not require it to offer such a witness. Starling also posits, based on
Smith's declaration, that Smith's "hedonic damages testimony has been
allowed by approximately 224 state and federal courts around the
country." (Doc. 230 at 12.) Yet Starling does not demonstrate that any
of those courts discussed or considered the cases discussed above and
in Banner's briefing. He does not describe Smith's role in those 224
cases or the testimony that Smith gave.
Banner Health also challenged Smith’s testimony about the lost earnings
of the plaintiff. Smith’s testimony about front pay was excluded on the
basis that front pay is an equitable remedy only to be determined after
a jury’s verdict, but that Smith could testify about back pay.
Case v. Town of Cicero, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148565 (N.D. IL 2013). This decision severe ly
limited the hedonic damages testimony of Dr. Stan V. Smith to
explaining what hedonic damages mean and the general factors that are
ordinarily considered as part of such damages. However, “No dollar
amount of damages may be cited, nor may Smith propose any methodology
by which the jury should calculate Nicholas’ hedonic damages.”
March 9, 2017
Smith v. Auto-Owner’s Insurance
Company, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6970 (D. N.M 2018). This was an
order of Federal Judge Stephan D. Vidmar that responded to a number of
different motions in limine, one of which was a request to exclude “any
expert testimony or evidence attempting to quantify hedonic damages.”
Judge Vidmar indicated that the plaintiff made no substantive argument
in opposition to this or eight other proposed exclusions and granted
all nine exclusions asked for by the defendant. The real focus of this
order was on testimony by medical providers, which was discussed in
greater detail. There was no indication in the decision that the
plaintiff had retained an economic expert to testify about hedonic
damages.
Burns v. Pohto, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 193142 (D. CO 2016). This decision involved the wrongful
death of a minor subject to Colorado law. U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y.
Wang described recoverable damages as follows:
The net economic loss, if any, incurred
in a wrongful death of a child is the reasonable value of any services
that J.B. would have provided and earning he might have made as a
minor, together with any support he might reasonably have been expected
to provide Plaintiffs after he became an adult, less the expenses
Plaintiffs might reasonably have incurred in maintaining J.B. and
providing him an education. CJI-Civ. 10:4 (2016). In addition, funeral
expenses are also recoverable as economic damages.
March 16, 2018
Ward v. Consolidated Rail Corporation,
2003
Mich.
App.
LEXIS
1865
(MI
App.
2003).
This
decision
involved
the
question of whether Tier I and Tier II payroll taxes are taxes or
contribution made by railroad workers that are analogous to private
pension payments in other industries. This court said:
Defendant relies on Norfolk &
Western Railway Co v Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493-495; 100 S. Ct. 755; 62
L. Ed. 2d 689 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled that in cases
brought under the FELA, the jury can be instructed regarding the effect
of income taxes on the plaintiff's estimated future earnings.
Evidently, defendant analogizes the taxes at issue in Norfolk with the
pension contributions in the instant case. Defendant also cites Rachel
v Consolidated Rail Corp, 891 F. Supp. 428, 431 (ND Ohio, 1995), in
which the court ruled that an economist must deduct pension
contributions from his calculations of a plaintiff's projected future
earnings. However, in Maylie v Nat Railroad Passenger Corp, 791 F.
Supp. 477, 488 (ED Pa, 1992), the court found that "because defendant
did not consent to inclusion of the value of the [plaintiff's] pension
as an item of damages, it was not error to refuse to reduce plaintiff's
lost wages by the amounts he would have had to pay in railroad
retirement taxes." The court stated that "it would be inappropriate to
deduct from plaintiff's lost salary taxes that, in effect, represented
plaintiff's contribution toward a pension without including, as an item
of damages, the value of that pension." Id. Here, there is no evidence
that defendant consented to the inclusion of lost pension benefits as
an item of damages. Therefore, under Maylie, no error occurred in the
instant case. Moreover, the [*31] Maylie court noted that the
Liepelt case was inapplicable to the issue of railroad pension
contributions. Id. at 487. See also Norfolk & Western Railway Co v
Chittum, 251 Va 408, 416; 468 S.E.2d 877 (1996).
March 24, 2018
Castro v. Melchor, 2018 Haw.
LEXIS 60 (HI 2018). This decision held that it was in error for the
trial court to have awarded hedonic (loss of enjoyment of life) damages
to the estate of an unborn fetus, but affirmed all other aspects of the
trial court decision. The trial court had awarded $250,000 for the
hedonic damages of an unborn fetus carried by Leah Castro, an inmate at
a state correctional facility. The decision discussed the interaction
of the state’s survival act and wrongful death act at some length in
arriving at this decision. An economist was not mentioned in the
decision.
March 25, 2018
Wisconsin Central LTD. v. United
States,
856 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2017). The 7th Circuit held that the value of
stock options paid to workers was subject to Railroad Retirement
payroll taxes, thus treating stock options as equivalent to money
payments for that purpose.
Union Pacific v. United States,
865
F.
3d
1045
(8th
Cir.
2017).
This
decision
reversed
a District Court
decision holding that Union Pacific was not owed a refund for railroad
retirement taxes paid by the Union Pacific from 1991 to 2007 based on
stock options paid to employees and ratification payments paid to
union-member employees for ratifying contracts between the union and
employer railroads. The 8th Circuit held that the language of the
Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RTTA) was limited to money paid for time
worked in railroad employment. Since stock was not “money” and
ratification payments were not paid for work provided, neither should
have been subject to railroad retirement taxes.
March 26, 2018
Toor v. Homegoods,Inc., 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24901 (D. NJ). The testimony of Dr. Anthony M. Gamboa
was excluded in response to a defense motion in limine. The defense
economic expert was Chad Staller, District Judge Anne E. Thompson
said:
The Court first turns to fit: whether
Dr. Gamboa's report and proffered testimony is a reasonable measure of
post-injury work life expectancy, as tailored to Mr. Toor. The
disability questions in the ACS are generalized, ambiguous, yes or no
questions. Question 17 asks, "Because of a physical, mental, or
emotional condition, does this person have serious difficulty
concentrating, remembering, or making decisions?" (ACS at 9, Ex. E, ECF
No. 20-5.) Subparts of question 17 and question 18 then ask whether
this "physical, mental, or emotional condition" limits the individual's
everyday activity. (Id.) These questions do not parse between types of
impairments or causes of disability, and there is no objective measure
for individuals answering the survey to determine what qualifies as a
condition or limitation. (See Defs.' Mot. at 16.)
The employment questions are similarly imprecise. Question 33 asks
whether someone was temporarily absent from a job, with the option
"Yes, on vacation, temporary illness, maternity leave, other
family/personal reasons, bad weather, etc.," or "No." (ACS at 10.)
Other questions ask how long the person has worked in recent time
periods. (Id.) As Defendants note, responses to these questions do not
"go to the issue of future employment," and "the answer does not give
any information about the reason for why someone is not working."
(Defs.' Mot. at 11.) Moreover, longitudinal data would better assist
the jury in determining. Mr. Toor's future work life expectancy. (See
id. at 15 ("Dr. Gamboa makes predictions about how long Mr. Toor will
work based upon . . . one year's worth of data . . . . Logically, the
ACS data cannot predict future work life data, as the ACS does not
follow individuals who respond to a given year's survey across
additional years.").)
Dr. Gamboa's proposed testimony based on the ACS is not a reasonable
measure of damages for Mr. Toor and his injury. Mr. Toor continues to
work as a software engineer, has lost no time at his job, and has
received a promotion. Generalized community data is insufficiently
tailored to these facts as presented, and therefore, will not assist
the jury in the determination of a damages award. Having found this
report is not an appropriate fit for this case due to its irrelevance
and lack of value to the jury, the Court need not address whether Dr.
Gamboa is qualified or whether Dr. Gamboa's ACS methodology is
reliable. (See Defs.' Mot. at 19-22; see also Vocational Economic
Assessment for Ali Toor at 14, 16 (report discussing how it meets the
evidentiary Daubert and Khumo requirements).) On balance, Dr. Gamboa's
testimony should not be admissible at the trial of this case.
March 29, 2018
Associated Terminals of St. Bernard,
LLC v. Potential Shipping HK CO. LTD, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51219 (E.D. LA 2018). This judge-tried ddecision provides a
particularly interesting discussion of what is required for a court to
award lost household services in a maritime case governed by the
Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). The court
focused on the types of evidence that needed to be provided, but was
not provided in this case by an injured plaintiff third party
intervenor Jamaal Ford. The court indicated that the record must
contain evidence of the household services that the injured person
provided before his injury, the household services the injured person
is now unable to perform, and the cost of those household services.
Judge Africk indicated that the only evidence provided in this case was
that Ford testified that he was unable to cut his lawn and was paying
someone $40 to do so, but did not indicate how often the lawn was being
cut. Life care planning expert Dr. Todd D. Cohen valued Ford’s
lost household services as “about $1,200, $1,300 per year,” which Judge
Africk found insufficient to support an award for lost household
services. Judge Africk awarded $120 per month to cover lawn cutting,
but indicated that this award did not cover “weed eating, car
maintenance, heavy home cleaning, cleaning gutters, picking up
branches,” for which there was no evidence provided.
April 1, 2018
Teenier v. Charter Communications, Inc.,
2017
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
115441
(E.D.
MI
2017).
The defense moved to
exclude the testimony of Dr. Frank Stafford on the basis of four
methods that the Court found inadequately explained to be admissible:
(a) Stafford had projected that the plaintiff would have worked to age
67 without any explanation for why he chose that age; (b) Stafford had
projected a future inflation rate of three percent, again without any
explanation for that assumed percentage; (c) Stafford had projected
loss of job-related fringe benefits, which the Court indicated did “not
appear to rise to the intellectual rigor expected from a forensic
economist;” and (d) Stafford had reported plaintiff’s earnings in a
manner inconsistent with plaintiff’s W-2's without offering any
explanation for the conflicting numbers. With respect to work-life
expectancy, the Court pointed out that Stafford had referenced an
article indicating a retirement age of just over 64.5 years, but did
not identify the study. The Court indicated that Stafford would have to
submit an amended report that corrected these deficiencies in order to
be allowed to testify, with the limitation that all information
provided in Stafford’s revised report must have been available at the
time Stafford’s report was issued to avoid any surprises.
April 4, 2018
Williams v. Central Contracting &
Marine, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56752 (S.D. IL 2018). This
was a decision of Federal District Judge Staci M. Yandle. Judge Yandle
found the testimony of Dr. Rebecca Summary, plaintiff’s economic
expert, to be credible with respect to plaintiff’s past lost wages and
fringe benefits, but noted that Dr. Summary had not identified what
minimum measure of future post-injury earnings Dr. Summary had assumed.
Judge Yandle rejected Dr. Summary’s calculations of past loss of
household services at $9,783 and future loss of household services at
$196,901 based upon the fact that she had not identified Williams can
actually perform. Judge Yandle noted that Williams had testified about
the wide range of functions he can perform around the house. Judge
Yandle also noted that Dr. Summary had relied upon “an unidentified
‘economics firm in Kansas City’ that takes the ‘American Time Use
Survey’ and for different categories of people (single male, married
male, etc.) provides ‘what the value of their household services would
be[.]’”
April 10, 2018
Plantation General Hospital v. Belzi,
2018
Fla.
App.
LEXIS
4650
(FL
App
2018).
An unnamed economist was not
permitted to testify about dollar values for lost companionship and
lost advice and counsel in a Florida medical malpractice wrongful death
action. The Court of Appeals indicated that: “The [Florida] Wrongful
Death Act allows recovery for loss of support and services, but places
loss of companionship and guidance within the same category as pain and
suffering, which are non-economic damages.” The Court of Appeals went
on to say:
The loss of consortium of a spouse
cannot be equated, as the economics expert sought to do in this case,
with a paid companion of a nursing home or assisted living patient. To
do so denigrates the marital relationship. "Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred." Laird v. State, 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977)
(quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14
L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965)). To suggest that such a relationship can be
replaced by a paid companion, thus creating an economic loss, is
contrary to all legal precedent; indeed, it goes against social and
moral understanding of the unique and special nature of the marital
relationship. The same may be said of the loss of companionship and
guidance of a parent for a child. While we recognize that the
legislative cap of $250,000 for both loss of companionship and pain and
suffering may appear woefully inadequate in circumstances of the death
of a spouse or parent, the supreme court has held the statute
constitutional. . . . Any change in that amount must come from the
Legislature.
April 24, 2018
Noel v. Inland Dredging Company, LLC,
2018
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
67768
(E.D.
LA
2018).
This memorandum granted a
defense motion to exclude testimony based upon the Gamboa Gibson
Worklife Tables by both vocational expert Glen Hebert and economic
expert G. Randolph Rice. Federal Judge Sarah S. Vance said:
Hebert's report quotes the Gamboa
Gibson treatise for the proposition that "[d]isability significantly
reduces both earnings and worklife expectancy," but Hebert does not
explain how plaintiff's particular disability is likely to affect his
individual work-life expectancy. Individuals can be classified as
disabled for many different reasons, with widely varying possibilities
of returning to work. Even assuming that the Gamboa Gibson tables
accurately reflect the average work-life expectancy of disabled versus
non-disabled populations, plaintiff fails to show that these tables can
reliably predict the future work-life expectancy of a specific person.
See Lackey v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 16-29, 2017 WL 129891, at
*10 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (excluding expert testimony based on the Gamboa
Gibson tables because the expert "grouped [plaintiff] with a wide range
of 'disabled' persons, with little to no regard for the type or
permanency of the injury, work history, or the ability and intention to
return to work"). Accordingly, the Court finds that Hebert's opinion as
to plaintiff's reduced work-life expectancy is unreliable, and thus
inadmissible.
Judge Vance indicated that Rice could also not testify based on the
Gamboa Gibson Worklife Tables, but that:
In the alternative, Dr. Rice calculates
plaintiff's future earnings if he continues to work for another 20.87
years. This reflects the future work-life expectancy of an individual
of plaintiff's gender, age, and education, according to a Bureau of
Labor Statistics study.34 The parties have not suggested that the
Bureau of Labor Statistics data is unreliable. Dr. Rice may rely on the
Bureau of Labor Statistics work-life expectancy data in his testimony
as to plaintiff's future economic loss.
April 28, 2018
Hartness v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106319 (E.D. AR 2008). In this
memorandum, Judge Garrett Eisele tentatively excluded the testimony of
Bob White, a vocational expert, that the plaintiff would have retired
at age 62. Judge Eisele said:
It appears, based on the record, that
Dr. Schoedinger has provided no opinions regarding Plaintiff's current
physical limitations, no disability rating, and has offered no medical
testimony to support the conclusion that Plaintiff must retire at age
62. Mr. White indicates in his Affidavit that "Mr. Hartness was advised
in 2006 by his treating doctor, George Schoedinger, M.D., not to
attempt to return to his railroad occupation." [Footnote removed] As
Union Pacific points out, however, this portion of Dr. Schoedinger's
deposition testimony simply states that Plaintiff "may be forced to
discontinue railroad work." But, this "may be" opinion is arguably
undercut by Dr. Schoedinger's subsequent decision to to return
Plaintiff to work without limitation. There is nothing in the record
before the Court to indicate that Dr. Schoedinger believes that
Plaintiff's medical condition will render him unable to perform his
current job duties beyond the age of 62.
In the absence of some medically supportable basis for his prediction
that Plaintiff will not be able to perform any work beyond the age of
62, the Court can not allow Mr. White to testify that in his opinion
Plaintiff's best case scenario is retirement at age 62. Plaintiff has
failed to establish that Mr. White, a vocational rehabilitation expert,
is qualified to make this prediction.
Judge Eisele indicated that he was willing to hold a pre-trial hearing
to consider whether White’s testimony would ultimately be
allowed.
May 2, 2018
Martin v. United States, 448
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. AR 1977). This FTCA case involved the wrongful
deaths of a number of individuals in an airplane crash. Several
different economic experts were involved, including Dr. Raleigh Ralls,
a well-known economic expert at the time. The decision was governed by
Arkansas law. In the decision, loss of financial support was determined
on the basis of after-tax income of the decedents.
May 3, 2018
Castro v. Melchor, 2018 Haw.
LEXIS 54 (HI 2018). This decision upheld the trial court and Hawaii
Court of Appeals decision to allow the estate of a viable unborn fetus
to recover $250,000 for the fetus’s loss of enjoyment of life and that
an award in that amount was not in error even though no evidence was
presented to justify that amount. An economist was not mentioned in the
decision. Earlier decisions of the Hawaii Supreme Court that loss of
enjoyment of life of decedents may be recovered, but economic testimony
regarding dollar amounts is not admissible.
May 5, 2018
Dorman v. Anne Arundel Medical
Center, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75560 (D. MD 2018). This case
involved losses resulting from a birth injury that would permanently
affect the child’s mobilitity. The plaintiff proffered testimony from
both Dr. Tanya Rutherford Owen, a vocational expert and Dr. Patricia
Pacey, an economic expert. Federal District Judge Marvin J. Garbis
denied a defense motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Owen, but
limited the testimony of economist Dr. Patricia Pacey to providing a
projection of the value of lifetime earnings of healthy male college
graduates and precluded her testimony regarding reductions in those
earnings based upon assumed disabilities of the plaintiff. Judge Garbis
explained his reasoning as follows:
It appears clear any possible economic
evaluation methodology would reasonably find that a mobility
disability, such as the one that B.M. has, will cause some future
income loss. The question is how that future income loss can be
reliably measured. The Court is troubled by the specificity of Dr.
Pacey's opinion that B.M. would suffer a "16.9%" loss of income over
his lifetime because Dr. Pacey's methodology does not appear to be
based on any equally specific analysis. Dr. Pacey used Census Bureau
data (and other sets of similar data) to compare the lifetime income of
(1) a healthy, able-bodied male with a college degree with (2) a
"moderately disabled" male with a college degree. Because disabilities
come in all types, this broad comparison of "healthy" to "moderately
disabled" is unreliable and speculative. As an example, Dr. Pacey does
not account for differences between mobility disabilities and cognitive
disabilities, or between mobility disabilities and other physical
disabilities such as eye or hearing disabilities. The nature of those
disabilities would naturally change the nature of any occupation that
those individuals choose. Dr. Pacey also does not adjust the data for
any other factors (beyond assuming that B.M. will get a bachelor's
degree), including, for example, the degree of disability, the age of
disability onset, or the nature of the relevant occupation.
Owen’s proffered testimony was based on a Vocational Worksheet that
explained four factors she used to arrive at her opinion that the
plaintiff child would “sustain some loss of earning capacity,” but no
details were provided in the decision. Judge Garbis’ cited two previous
decisions that are discussed in this paper: Kempf Contracting and
Design, Inc. v. Holland Tucker (2008) and Phillips v. Industrial
Machine (1999). Both of those decisions involved rejection of testimony
based on the Gamboa-Gibson disability worklife expectancy tables.
However, Judge Garbis did not explicitly indicate whether Dr. Pacey had
assumed a reduction in work-life expectancy for the child and, if so,
how much of a reduction, in arriving at her overall conclusion that the
child’s earning capacity had been reduced by 16.9%.
May 8, 2018
D’Ambrosia v. Lang, 985 So. 2d
800 (LA App. 2008). The Louisiana Court of Appeals described the role
of vocational expert Thomas Meunier in this case as follows:
A vocational rehabilitation
counselor considers age, academic achievement, and skill level involved
in the training, ultimate career goal, and physical ability to do that
type of job. With someone without an established earning capacity, a
vocational counselor typically considers tables used by governmental
entities as well as by his profession. Typically, he uses tables that
outline earnings and average earnings for different occupations.
He also looks at the physical demands
of an occupation--in this case an orthopedic surgeon. The United States
Department of Labor publishes The Dictionary of Occupational Titles
that describes the physical, intellectual, and aptitude demands of a
career. The Department of Labor also publishes an Occupational Outlook
Handbook which describes the demand for certain occupations, the
working conditions, and earnings by region.
Mr. Meunier uses work-life expectancy tables for people with severe
disabilities, and non-severe disabilities compared to people of the
same age and level of education. Through this means, he determines a
difference in work life. This can be done for a child, a teenager, or
someone who is still in school and who has not actually earned money.
It is accepted in his profession to be able to project those
types of earnings based on intelligence, physical ability, demand for
the occupations, and similar factors. He reviews information from the
treating physicians, such as functional impairments.
May 9, 2018
Critical Path Resources, Inc. v.
Cuevas, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 2253 (TX App. 2018). This decision
involved an explosion that injured Torres Rodriguez. One of the issues
the Court of Appeals addressed was the factual sufficiency for an award
of $3,810 for past loss of household services and $61,444 for future
lost household services to Branca Rodriguez. An economic expert was not
involved, but the Court held that “juries can apply their own
experience to estimate the value of household services that would have
been rendered by the injured person even without proof of their value.”
The award was to the wife of the injured man, who has had to provide
household services that her husband would have provided and will be
required to do so in the future.
May 11, 2018
Webster v. Center for Diagnostic
Imaging, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78018 (S.D. IN 2018). The
Plaintiff challenged Thomas Ireland’s use of Webster tax returns to
determine earnings losses the plaintiff. Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson
denied this motion in limine, saying:
The Court concludes that the general
method of using tax returns to determine the value of Ms. Webster's
lost wages is sound--indeed, the Court is hard-pressed to identify a
better way make such calculations. [Footnote removed.] However,
the issue of whether Mr. Ireland correctly computed calculations to
arrive at his conclusions will be left to the jury after the Websters
have been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine him at trial.
May 12, 2018
Parekh v. Argonautica Shipping Invs.,
B.V., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 341700 (E.D. LA 2018). This was a
maritime wrongful death action. The surviving widow tried to argue that
her husband had a work-life expectancy to age 75. Federal Judge Susie
Morgan said:
The Court finds, even weighing all
evidence in favor of Plaintiff, that she has not created a genuine
dispute of material fact regarding Captain Parekh's capability of
working longer than his statistical work-life average. Under Madore,
Plaintiff must provide "evidence that a particular person, by virtue of
his health or occupation or other factors, is likely to live and work a
longer, or shorter, period than the average."None of Plaintiff's
evidence does so. First, Plaintiff's self- serving affidavit is not
persuasive summary judgment evidence. The Fifth Circuit rejects
attempts to defeat summary judgment by the submission of self-serving
affidavits and testimony. [] Captain Parekh was employed in a highly
dangerous, physically demanding field. As the Fifth Circuit stated, an
employee in such a field "might have become disabled before [his
intended retirement] as a result of illness or some other misadventure
[]. [Plaintiff] presented no evidence that such events were
particularly unlikely given his health or other factors. In this
case, Plaintiff has likewise failed to provide evidence that "such
events were particularly unlikely" to occur with respect to Captain
Parekh. [Footnotes removed.] []
Without expert testimony, medical
records, or other valid summary judgment evidence to describe the state
of Captain Parekh's health and the nature of his duties, Plaintiff's
submissions do not amount to more than the assertion that Captain
Parekh "had no plans to retire and intended to work for the rest of his
life." This does not "fully develop[] the evidentiary basis for [a]
departure" from the work-life expectancy average. Although under
Deperrodil the Fifth Circuit does not mandate that Plaintiff hire a
vocational rehabilitation expert in order to meet the Madore standard,
Plaintiff must provide evidence that explains why Captain Parekh was
"likely to live and work [] longer" than the statistical average. The
Court finds Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine dispute of
material fact with regard to Captain Parekh's likelihood of working
longer than the average work-life expectancy. Defendant is
entitled to a ruling that Plaintiff may only recover loss of support
damages consistent with average work-life expectancy. [Footnotes
removed.]
Deperrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc.,
842
F.3d
352
(5th
Cir.
2016).
This was an appeal by a defendant of a
district court decision under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (LHWCA) that had projected the work-life of the
decedent to have been to age 75. In affirming the district court’s
determination of age 75 retirement, the court said:
Courts use work-life expectancy data to
calculate future earnings, unless there is evidence supporting a
variation from the average. E.g., Madore v. Ingram Tank Ships, Inc.,
732 F.2d 475, 478 (5th Cir. 1984). "Such an average is not conclusive.
It may be shown by evidence that a particular person, by virtue of his
health or occupation or other factors, is likely to live and work a
longer, or shorter, period than the average." Id. (emphasis omitted).
According to BLS data, dePerrodil had a
work-life expectancy of 72 years. At trial, however, dePerrodil
presented a vocational-rehabilitation counselor as an expert witness.
She interviewed dePerrodil on two occasions and reviewed his medical
history. She concluded it was "very reasonable" dePerrodil would work
until age 75; this conclusion was based on: dePerrodil's testimony that
he and his wife had an agreement he would work until age 75; his work
history; his earnings records; and his healthcare providers'
recommendations for future treatment. DePerrodil's expert economist
then provided the court with two calculations, one using BLS' age-72
work-life expectancy; the other, the vocational counselor's age-75
expectancy. With both calculations before it, the court awarded future
lost wages based on an age-75 retirement.
May 13, 2018
Faulkenberry v. Yost, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1248, 2018 WL 297615 (W.D. TX 2018). Regarding
work-life expectancy, Federal Judge Sam Sparks said:
At trial, Faulkenberry produced no
evidence as to work-life expectancy, except to testify he hoped to work
until age 65. Trial Tr. of Sept. 18, 2017 at 114. He did not offer
expert testimony as to his work-life expectancy, nor did he provide
testimony or evidence as to the average statistical work-life
expectancy of someone in his line of work. See Trial Tr. of Sept. 18,
2017 at 43 (testifying work at the chop shop required substantial
"physical strength" because inventory pieces weighed 25 to 50 pounds on
average); cf. Barto v. Shore Constr., LLC, 801 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir.
2015) (holding testimony plaintiff wants to work until a particular age
is insufficient to rebut presumption the average work-life expectancy
should apply). Finally, Faulkenberry presented no evidence of
applicable discount rates to allow the jury to properly discount the
award to present value.
Barto v. Shore Constr., L.L.C.,
801
F.3d
465
(5th
Cir.
2015).
At issue in this appeal by the
defense of the district court’s decision was the work-life
expectancy of the plaintiff. The 5th Circuit said:
A damages award for future lost wages
should generally be based upon a seaman's work-life expectancy, meaning
"the average number of years that a person of a certain age will both
live and work." Madore v. Ingram Tank Ships, Inc., 732 F.2d 475, 478
(5th Cir. 1984). "Such an average is not conclusive. It may be shown by
evidence that a particular person, by virtue of his health or
occupation or other factors, is likely to live and work a longer, or
shorter, period than the average." Id. "Absent such evidence, however,
computations should be based on the statistical average." Id.[]
[T]he district court noted that expert economists provided wage loss
estimates for work-life expectancies of age 55 to "age 67, which is the
Social Security requirement age for Mr. Barto." The district court then
said, "What I'm going to do is award something in the middle. I think
that's a reasonable estimation of his loss of future earning capacity."
Accordingly, the district court awarded Barto $300,000 for future lost
wages. McDermott argues that the district court erred by relying
upon an above-average work-life expectancy.
The 5th Circuit held that the trial court was in error using an above
average for work-life expectancy without supporting evidence and
reduced the award for lost future earnings to an assumed work-life
expectancy to age 55.8.
May 23, 2018
Seme v. Safran, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 199285 (D. NJ 2012). This was a motion granting a defense
motion in limine to exclude testimony of Andrew Verzilli on loss of
household services. Verzilli had assumed a 50% reduction in the
plaintiff’s ability to provide household services. Federal Judge
Joseph E. Irenas said:
Mr. Verzilli's assumption that
Plaintiff suffered a 50% reduction in her ability to perform household
chores has no factual basis in the record. Although Dr. Friedman
analyzed Plaintiff's ability to ballroom dance, waitress, and ride
motorcycles, he did not opine on Plaintiff's ability to perform
household chores. Moreover, Plaintiff's deposition testimony provides
no further factual basis with which to calculate the fraction of
household services. Plaintiff is currently able to perform. Mr.
Verzilli's assumption, absent some sort of factual foundation, will
only serve to mislead the jury. Accordingly, to the extent Mr.
Verzilli's opinion relies on the assumption that Plaintiff's ability to
perform household services was reduced by 50%, Defendants' Motion will
be granted.
May 28, 2018
Madore v. Ingram Tank Ships,
732 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982). This Jones Act decision contains three
elements of interest to forensic economists. It held that the Jones Act
does not allow the minor child of a personally injured seaman to
recover the child’s own loss of consortium, that the trial court was in
error for substituting a longer work-life expectancy than was shown in
(then) standard work-life expectancy tables and it was clear that
Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes are income taxes that should
be deducted when calculating earning capacity loss.
Regarding work-life expectancy, the Court said:
Both [James] Mandel and the defendant's
expert, Dr. Kenneth Boudreaux, testified that Madore had a worklife
expectancy of 25.8 years, basing their opinions on the worklife
expectancy rates compiled by the United States Department of
Labor. No evidence was adduced to show that Madore's personal
characteristics were likely to give him a longer worklife. Yet the
district court based the award on a worklife expectancy of 30.8 years,
presumably because Madore would reach age 65 at that time.
This was erroneous. Even if retirement age for Madore could be
anticipated to be age 65, it is far from certain that, even in the
absence of this injury, he would have continued to work until that
time. He might have, as some workers do, decided to retire
early. He might have become disabled before then as a result of
illness or some other misadventure. He might have died before
then. The phrase "work-life expectancy" literally reflects its
meaning: the average number of years that a person of a certain age
will both live and work. Such an average is not conclusive.
It may be shown by evidence that a particular person, by virtue of his
health or occupation or other factors, is likely to live and work a
longer, or shorter, period than the average. Absent such
evidence, however, computations should be based on the statistical
average.
Regarding payroll taxes, the Court said:
In computing the loss of future
earnings, gross earnings should not be used. Unless the amounts
the worker would have been required to pay in income taxes and social
security taxes is negligible [citation footnote removed] or should, for
some articulated reason, be disregarded, the lost income stream must be
computed after deducting the income taxes and social security taxes the
worker would have paid had he continued to work, for he is entitled
only to be made whole for what he has lost, his net income.
May 29, 2018
Mansil v. Midwest Emergency Medical
Services, P.C., 2018 Mo. App. LEXIS 539 (W.D MO App. 2018). This
was the first appellate case interpreting language added to the
Missouri Wrongful Death Act (Section 537.090) in an amendment dated
8/28/2006. The relevant amended language was:
If the deceased is under the age of
eighteen, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the annual
pecuniary losses shall be calculated based on the annual income of the
deceased’s parents, provided that if the deceased has only one parent
earning income, then the calculation will be based on such income, but
if the deceased had two parents earning income, then the calculation
will be based on the average of the two incomes.
Dr. Kurt V. Krueger had been permitted to testify regarding losses
suffered by Shelly Mansil, the mother of the decedent child, based on
his understanding of the meaning of this language in the Missouri
statute, which was challenged on appeal by the defendant. Judge Mark D.
Pfeiffer rejected that appeal, saying:
Dr. Krueger's calculation based on Ms.
Hughes's income was of sufficient weight to assist the jury in
determining an appropriate amount of pecuniary losses authorized under
section 537.090. Likewise, his methodology in reaching his estimate was
reasonable within the statute's plain language.
Given the nature of Dr. Krueger's challenged testimony as establishing
a rebuttable presumption under the statute, Midwest and Dr. Niedens had
the opportunity to challenge Dr. Krueger's testimony, to point out any
weakness and aid the jury in determining the appropriate weight to give
his opinion. See Deck v. Teasley, 322 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Mo. banc 2010).
In point of fact, Midwest and Dr. Niedens did successfully challenge
the evidence through cross-examination of Dr. Krueger as the jury's
award of pecuniary losses was much less than the section 537.090
presumed pecuniary loss calculation arrived at by Dr. Krueger.
June 6, 2018
Smith v. United States, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90530 (D. OR 2018). In this case, Smith had “generally
steady” employment from 1992 to through May of 2008, mostly in
construction jobs. He drew unemployment for an extended period
thereafter but had not returned to work at the time of his alleged
medical injury in November or December of 2013, supposedly at the time
when he was just about to seek new employment. Smith had a “relevant
medical history that include[d] obesity, diabetes mellitus,
hypertension and depression. Mr. Smith was 5 foot 6 inches tall and
weighed 283 pounds just prior to the events at issue in this case.” The
plaintiff economic expert Daniel Rubenson, Ph.D., projected Smith’s
lost earnings for a work-life expectancy of 18 years (starting at age
46.6) at $34,392 (Smith’s average earnings from 2005-2007) to show an
earning capacity loss of from $94,342 to $629,342. (Additional details
about Rubenson’s assumptions were provided in the decision.) Judge Mark
D. Clarke, however, said:
[G]iven the 5.6-year gap in employment
right before he was injured, it is very difficult to determine with any
degree of reasonable probability, any post-injury loss of earning
capacity. However, this Court does not find it unreasonable to think
that Mr. Smith, at age forty-one, may have returned to the work force
at least on some intermittent basis. But, it is speculative.[]
The Court finds that any post-injury earning loss, which is very hard
to predict, can be compensated by actually earning post-injury wages.
The Court therefore does not award any damages for loss of earning
capacity.
June 15, 2018
Neupauer v. United States,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203393 (M.D. PA 2017). This decision involved an
personal injury to Gary Neupauer at the age of 62. The plaintiff’s
vocational expert Patricia Chilleri testified that Neupauer was totally
disabled from labor market participation by his injury. She used the
Gamboa-Gibson work-life expectancy tables to project that he lost 4.6
years of work-life expectancy, which Judge Robert Mariani determined to
have a present value of $161,644. There was apparently no defense
challenge to the use of the Gamboa-Gibson tables.
June 17, 2018
Southard v. Belanger, 966 F.
Supp. 2d 727 (W.D. KY 2013). The defense challenged the admissibility
of the testimony of Sara Ford in this personal injury case primarily
based upon her use of a “one size fits all” table rather than
deficiencies in the earnings and work-life expectancy data that she
used in her projections. Regarding life and work-life expectancy, Judge
Joseph H. McKinley, Jr., said:
[T]o the extent that the Defendants
criticize Ms. Ford’s use of a United States Life Table by noting that
she “made an assumption that Plaintiff’s working career would have been
6.7 years shorter than it would have been if the accident had not
happened,” (see Mem. in Supp. of Mot. To Exclude [D.N 49-1], the Court
finds that the criticism fails. Courts have often found life tables to
be a reasonable estimate of life expectancy, even while acknowledging
that their predictions are not absolute. See, e.g., Knierem v. U.S.
Gov’t Dep’t of Navy, 802 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (citing
cases). Indeed, other than Defendant’s bald assertion, nothing
indicates that the table in Ms. Ford’s report is unreliable – or that
it fails to accurately portray the U.S. Censuse Bureau’s data.
June 18, 2018
Norfolk Southern Railway Company v.
Williams, 2018 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 101 (AL App. 2018). This
decision held that all of an FELA personal injury award of $360,488 was
subject to railroad retirement taxes (Tier I, Tier II, and Medicare),
resulting in tax withholding from the plaintiff’s award of $19,188.37.
The Alabama Court of Appeals said:
Because the entire $360,488 awarded to
Williams will be treated as pay for time lost for purposes of
determining her benefits under the RRA, we conclude that the entire
$360,488 should also be treated as pay for time lost for purposes of
the RTTA and, therefore, is subject to withholding of taxes. See
45 U.S.C. § 231(h)(2); Heckman; and Liberatore.
This decision was supported by four judges, with one dissent based on
the dissenting judge’s opinion that the tax exemption of personal
injury awards applies to payroll taxes as well as income taxes. The
plaintiff had made other claims for damages than lost earnings that
would not have been subject to payroll taxes, but did not specify how
much of the award was for lost earnings (“time lost”) and how much was
based on other claims. This decision provided an extensive review of
decisions regarding whether payroll taxes should be subtracted from
personal injury awards in FELA actions.
Munoz v. Norfolk Southern Railway
Company, 2018 IL App (1st) 171009; 2018 Ill. App. LEXIS 330 (IL
App. 2018). This decision of the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court decision that the tax exemption from income taxes on
personal injury awards applies to payroll taxes, rejecting Norfolk
Southern’s claims that it was required by law to withhold payroll taxes
from FELA awards even though not required to withhold federal and state
personal income taxes on such awards. This was the decision of two of
three judges on the Court of Appeals. The third judge dissented on the
basis that he believed that the award was subject to payroll taxes.
This decision provided an extensive review of decisions regarding
whether payroll taxes should be subtracted from personal injury awards
in FELA actions.
July 2, 2018
Bevan v. Valencia, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 108196 (D. NM 2018). This decision excluded the
defense hedonic damages testimony of Cheryl D. Willis, M.D., a forensic
adolescent psychiatrist, who was going to testify about dollar value of
the loss of life enjoyment of an adolescent who had committed suicide.
The court said: "Nowhere in her report does Willis explain her
methodology or its reliability, or how her expertise led to her
opinions."
Diperna v. Chicago School of
Professional Psychology, 2018 U.S. App 17426 (N.D. IL
2018). One of the parts of this decision was to uphold the trial
court's decision that Stan Smith's hedonic damages testimony would not
be helpful to the jury. Jennifer DiPerna was a student pursuing a
master's degree in clinical psychology at The Chicago School of
Professional Psychology (TCSPP), a private, non-profit institution.
After TCSPP disciplined DiPerna for posting an image to her personal
Instagram account that TCSPP considered offensive, DiPerna filed this
lawsuit alleging breach of contract and negligence. Subsequently,
DiPerna was dismissed from the program for plagiarism. Smith calculated
DiPerna’s loss of enjoyment of life resulting from these events. The
trial court granted summary judgement the defendant on all counts,
including the trial court’s determination that loss of enjoyment of
life damages were not available in a case of this sort.
Green v. Sears Protection Company,
2018
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
107161 (N.D. IL 2018). Defendants challenged the
admission of testimony regarding class certification from Christopher
Jackman. Plaintiff challenged admission of testimony regarding class
certification from Mark J. Hosfield. This order was a recommendation of
Michael J. Mason, U.S. Magistrate judge, that both challenges should be
rejected. With respect to Hosfield, Judge Mason said:
While plaintiffs argue that Hosfield
did not independently review the data contained on the spreadsheets
upon which he relied, Hosfield testified that information was
consistent with deposition testimony and exhibits that he reviewed.
(Mem. at Ex. 1, 137:17-23 and 140:1-3.) "[A]n expert witness is not
required to verify all the facts on which he relies." Tilstra, 791 F.3d
at 753; see also Minemyer v. B-Roc Representatives, Inc., No. 07 CV
1763, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103933, 2009 WL 3757378, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 29, 2009) ("[T]here is no overarching general requirement,
applicable in all cases, that a financial or economic expert
independently verify each entry or document on which he bases his
opinion."); Tuf Racing Prods., Inc. v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 223
F.3d 585, 591 (7th Cir. 2000).
July 5, 2018
Kaufman v. Cserny, M.D., 856
F. Supp. 1307 (S.D. IL 1994). This decision provides a clear
discussion regarding the availability of hedonic damages under the
Illinois Survival Action and the Illinois Wrongful Death Action.
Federal Judge J. Phil Gilbert said:
The second issue presented by this
motion to dismiss is whether or not "loss of enjoyment of life" or in
other words, hedonic damages is to be considered a distinct item of
damages, separate and apart from pain and suffering, under Illinois law
as requested in Counts VIII, IX and X. In determining the
recoverability of hedonic damages under Illinois law, it is important
to distinguish between claims brought under the Illinois Survival Act,
755 ILCS 5/27-6 (1992), and claims brought under the Illinois Wrongful
Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/1, 180/2 (1992). "A survival action allow
for recovery of damages for injury sustained by the deceased up to the
time of death; a wrongful death action covers the time after death and
addresses the injury suffered by the next of kin due to the loss of the
deceased rather than the injuries personally suffered by the deceased
prior to death." Wyness v. Armstrong World Indus., 131 Ill. 2d 403, 546
N.E.2d 568, 571, 137 Ill. Dec. 623 (1989). Based upon the few decisions
that have addressed the issue, it is clear that damages for loss
of enjoyment of life are not recoverable under the Illinois Wrongful
Death Act. Gonzalez v. City Wide Insulation, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6360
*1, No. 88 C 1299, 1990 WL 77525, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 25,
1990)(finding that Wrongful Death Act "does not provide for recovery of
hedonic damages for recovery of hedonic damages in light of the fact
that it was designed to 'compensate the surviving spouse and the next
of kin for the pecuniary losses sustained due to the decedent's
death.'"). However, such damages are recoverable in survival actions --
at least "to some extent. . . ." Fetzer v. Wood, 211 Ill. App. 3d 70,
569 N.E.2d 1237, 1245, 155 Ill. Dec. 626 (2d Dist. 1991).
From this description, it appears that a decedent could recover for
loss of enjoyment of life between the moment of injury and the moment
of death. An economic expert was not mentioned and there was no
discussion of methods for presenting hedonic damages testimony in this
decision.
July 20, 2018
Stachulski v. Apple New England, LLC,
2018
N.H.
LEXIS
133
(N.H. 2018). This decision held that awards for
hedonic damages and pain and suffering are available for cases
involving injuries that are not permanent injuries. Testimony at issue
was testimony of Dr. Seth Rosenbaum, who had testified at trial about
the plaintiffs loss of enjoyment of life and pain and suffering caused
by non-permanent injuries. The decision also reviewed case law in New
Hampshire regarding hedonic damages.
August 26, 2018
Bevan v. Valencia, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 108196 (D. NM 2018). This decision granted a plaintiff’s
motion in limine to exclude the report and testimony of Cheryl Wills, a
forensic adolescent psychiatrist, who was proffered as providing
testimony relevant to the hedonic damages of the plaintiff. Judge
Kenneth J. Gonzalez provided a Daubert evaluation of the testimony of
Wills and determined that Wills’ testimony would not be helpful to a
jury and would be “more unfairly prejudicial than probative” under Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
August 27, 2018
Streit v. Halverson, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 133136 (W.D. MO 2018). This opinion limited but did not
exclude the testimony of economic expert Dr. Stan V. Smith regarding
“impairment to wages” and loss of household services. Hedonic damages
were not an issue in this decision. Judge Willie J. Epps held that:
The Court finds Dr. Smith's
characterization of Plaintiff's spine injury as "disabling" to be a
medical opinion and the Court will preclude him from such a
characterization. Similarly, the Court will bar Dr. Smith from
suggesting that a disability can be inferred from Plaintiff's "back or
spine problems." Dr. Smith's opinion about the nature of Plaintiff's
injuries should be stricken, but the fact that the existence of a
disability could result in a net lost earning capacity is precisely the
type of opinion on which an economist may opine in a personal injury
case.
September 1, 2018
I. Perez v. United States,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124717; 2018 WL 3450348 (S.D. CA 2018).
This decision held that the Affordable Care Act (ACA), a child’s access
to TRI-CARE through his father, and other sources of care can be
mentioned under California’s collateral source rules as potentially
covering the child’s future life care needs. Regarding the Affordable
Care Act, the court said:
Defendants may seek to present argument
and evidence surrounding reasonable cost of reasonably necessary
medical care, including the availability of insurance benefits under
the ACA. In seeking to exclude evidence and argument that the ACA may
cover I. Perez's future care costs, Plaintiffs contend the argument is
speculative because Defendant provides no evidence to support the ACA's
viability. The Court finds Plaintiffs argument surrounding the
viability of the ACA goes to the weight of any evidence or argument
presented by Defendant on the issue. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion is
DENIED.
September 2, 2018
Lawrence v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125131 (E.D. LA 2018). This order
affirmed a decision to limit the testimony of economist Dr. Shael M.
Wolfson. To determine an earnings base for the lost earnings of
Lawrence, Wolfson had used Lawrence’s 2013 earnings as a base earnings
rate for his projections of lost future earnings and had ignored
earnings in 2014 and 2015 even though Lawrence was injured in December
of 2015. Wolfson has said in his report that he had been asked by
counsel to assume that 2013 earnings should be treated as an earnings
base. Federal Judge Lance M. Africk said:
The Fifth Circuit has never permitted a
plaintiff's expert to cherry-pick earnings from a year other than the
year the injury occurred without providing any rationale. In its
order granting GLDD's motion in limine in part, the Court noted
Lawrence's failure to provide such a rationale, observing that Lawrence
has not "provide[d] the Court with any explanation as to why the 2013
figure is a more reasonable starting point than, say, plaintiff's 2015
earnings, or an average across the four years."[ ] Additionally, the
Court expressed skepticism about the validity of the use of the 2013
figure.[ ] In his present motion, Lawrence once again fails to offer
any explanation as to why he asked Wolfson to deviate from the general
rule stated in Culver II. The Court thus concludes that Lawrence has
not suffered any injustice as a result of its prior order. [Footnotes
removed.]
September 11, 2018
Watts v. Cox Medical Centers,
376 S.W.3d 633 (MO 2012). This decision declared that a cap on
non-economic damages adopted by the Missouri legislature in §
538.210 violated the Missouri constitution. It also reversed and
remanded the trial court’s periodic payment schedule for the child’s
future medical expenses under § 538.220. The Missouri Supreme
Court held both that a trial court was entitled to determine how much
of an award must be paid in a lump sum, and that periodic payments must
be structured in a way that assures full recovery. On this latter
aspect, the Court said:
Watts asserts the section 538.220
periodic payment schedule was arbitrary and unreasonable in that it
does not assure full compensation due to the low interest rate and
50-year payment schedule. The jury, as required by section 538.215,
discounted Naython's future medical damages to present value. The
requirement that future medical damages be discounted to present day
value necessarily means that full compensation for those future damages
is, in large part, dependent on the statutory interest rate being the
same as the rate of health care inflation over the course of the
payment schedule. Watts offered expert testimony from two economists
who concluded that the 50-year payment schedule, coupled with a 0.26
percent interest rate, virtually guaranteed that inflation in health
care costs would result in Naython having insufficient funds to pay his
future medical costs. Under these circumstances, the periodic payment
schedule affords none of the financial security intended by the
statute. Although section 538.220.2 required the court to establish
some periodic payment schedule, once a present value reduction was
made, use of an inconsistent future damages interest rate guaranteed
that the jury's damages award would not actually cover Naython's future
medical damages and, therefore, would take from him the full value of
the jury's award. Consequently, the judgment is reversed and the case
is remanded. On remand, the court shall enter a new periodic payment
schedule that, consistent with the goal of reducing medical malpractice
costs, also ensures that Naython will receive the benefit of the jury's
award for future medical care.
September 12, 2018
Riggs v. Life Care Centers of America,
2018
U.S.
Dist. Lexis 113716 (E.D. WA 2018). This order of Chief
Federal Judge Thomas O. Rice granted a plaintiff’s motion for a tax
adjustment of $281,527, as calculated by economic expert William Brandt
and awarded Brandt $1,000 for costs of calculating the amount of this
tax adjustment in an after-trial determination. The defense had
presented contrary evidence through Dennis R. Reinstein, who had
projected the tax adjustment at $129,065.
September 24, 2018
Nilssen v. Osram Silvania, Inc.,
2007
U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5792. (N.D. IL 2007). This was a patent
infringement lawsuit brought by Nilssen that was won by Osram. As the
prevailing party, Osram was entitled to recover its costs in defending
against the patent infringement claims. This order of Federal Judge
John H. Darrah was issued in response to Nillsen’s objections to
Osram’s claims for reimbursement of costs. Various specific costs were
discussed in some detail, including costs of video-taping instead of
stenographic recording of deposition transcripts and costs of travel to
take the deposition of one of Osram’ss witnesses in Norway. Nilssen
also objected to fees paid to one of Osram’s experts in attending the
depositions of other Osram’s experts. Economic experts were not
mentioned in the decision. This decision was appealed to the District
of Columbia Federal Circuit and upheld in Nilssen v. Osram Silvania,
Inc., 528 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
September 25, 2018
Luwisch v. American Marine Corporation,
2018
U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 101371 (E.D. LA 2018). Federal Judge Susie Morgan
limited the testimony of Glenn Hebert, “a purported expert in
vocational rehabilitation” who used the Gamboa-Gibson work-life
expectancy tables to reduce Luwisch’s work-life expectancy by 5.5 to
5.4 years in calculating damages. Judge Morgan said:
In this case, Hebert quotes the Gamboa
Gibson study for the proposition that "[d]isability significantly
reduces both earnings and worklife expectancy," and then concludes that
Luwisch's disability has reduced his worklife by 5.4 to 5.5 years.
[Footnote removed.] Hebert utterly fails to justify how the Gamboa
Gibson data support this conclusion, however. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Hebert's opinion as to Luwisch's work-life expectancy is
unreliable and therefore inadmissible.
Judge Morgan extensively cited the opinion of Judge Vance in Noel v. Inland Dredging Co., LLC,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67768, 2018 WL 1911821 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 2018),
in reaching her decision.
The Medicine Company v. Mylan Inc.,
2017
U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 179107 (N.D. IL 2017). This opinion and
order of Federal Judge Amy J. St. Eve involved a bill of costs totaling
$276,193.89 for its costs as the prevailing party in a patent
infringement case. The Court awarded Mylan $217,632.88. This order
provides the rationale for that value. Judge Amy J. St. Eve cited
Chicago United Indus., Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106523 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2011) (collecting cases) as holding that:
"These courts have reasonably concluded that a ratio of 3 to 1
preparation to deposition time is reasonable in complex cases[.]" She
also denied plaintiff objections to paying for experts who did not
testify during the trial.
September 26, 2018
Mansil v. Midwest Emergency Medical
Services, 2018 Mo. App. LEXIS 539 (W.D. MO 2018). In this case,
Dr. Kurt Krueger had testified to damages to Joanna Hughes caused by
the death of her daughter during childbirth. Dr. Krueger projected a
value equal to the nominal value of the mother’s earnings as of the
death of the child, projected for the mother’s life expectancy, and
discounted to present value using a real discount rate. The court
described Krueger’s calculation as follows:
Dr. Krueger understood the plain
language of section 537.090 to mean "[t]hat the annual pecuniary loss
suffered by the reason of a death of a minor child is equal to the
annual income of the deceased['s] parent[]." He thus applied the
statutory provision by "tak[ing] what the parent is earning with what
their income is and I project that as a pecuniary loss starting upon
the date of death through the life expectancy of the parent." Dr.
Krueger then explained that he discounted this figure to arrive at his
present valuation of these economic losses. For this measure of
pecuniary losses, Dr. Krueger reached figures of $49,132 in past
economic losses and $294,856 in future annual pecuniary losses, for a
combined total of $343,988. Dr. Krueger then went on to testify that he
believed the section 537.090 presumed pecuniary loss amount was low and
did not appropriately account for other household consumption items.
Conversely, counsel for Midwest and Dr. Niedens cross-examined Dr.
Krueger and pointed out that the section 537.090 presumed pecuniary
loss figure calculated by Dr. Krueger should be decreased since it
assumed wage earning by an infant, which was unrealistic. Thus, both
sides were permitted to rebut the section 537.090 presumed pecuniary
loss calculation at trial.
The jury awarded past damages of $25,000 and future damages of
$100,000. On appeal the defense appealed on the basis that it was
unrealistic to assume that an infant had earnings equal to the average
earnings of her parent, as indicated in section 537.090 as a reputable
presumption. However, the defense had not presented its own expert to
rebut the presumption that Krueger’s figures were realistic and the
court pointed out that the jury had, in effect, rebutted Krueger’s
figures by arriving at awards that were lower than Krueger’s. An appeal
of this decision to the Missouri Supreme Court was denied.
September 27, 2018
LG Electronics v. Whirlpool Corp.,
2011
U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 121361 (N.D. IL 2011). This opinion and order of
Federal Judge Amy J. St. Eve awarded $411,029.12 in costs to Whirlpool
Corporation as the prevailing party in this commercial litigation.
Among other issues in the order was the reasonableness of various
Whirlpool expenses based on Whirlpool’s costs for experts in the
litigation. Federal Judge Amy J. St. Eve indicated that judges in the
Federal Northern District of Illinois had generally concluded that
expert charges for preparation for depositions should not exceed a 3 to
1 ratio and reduced amounts charged by five of Whirlpool’s experts for
preparations for depositions to a 3 to 1 ratio. She also held that work
done by experts who did not ultimately testify had to be paid for by
the LG, the losing party.
September 30, 2018
Lee v. Bueno, 2016 OK 97;381
P.3d 736 (OK 2016). This decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 3009.1 (2011), which modified the
Oklahoma collateral source rule to require that evidence of medical
costs in personal injury cases must be limited to amounts paid or owed
rather than costs billed, was constitutional under the Oklahoma
constitution. The concurring opinion by Justice Kauger is particularly
significant. Suggested by Christina Tapia.
October 1, 2018
Eliasen v. Hamilton, 111
F.R.D. 396, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22692 (N.D. IL 1986). The plaintiff
had hired both a valuation expert and an expert in the field of
petroleum engineering, but did not name the petroleum engineering
expert as a testifying expert. The valuation expert had not used or
relied upon the report of the petroleum engineering expert. The
defendant wanted to depose the non-testifying petroleum engineering
expert and to depose several of that expert’s employees. The court
allowed the non-testifying expert to be deposed, but limited the scope
of the deposition to exclude work done for the plaintiff or from
obtaining any documents made in preparation for trial. However, the
defense was permitted to explore information acquired or opinions
formed before the petroleum engineering expert was hired by the
plaintiff.
October 8, 2018
Burnette v. Eubanks, 2018 Kan.
LEXIS 546. (KS 2018). The Kansas Supreme Court reversed a Kansas Court
of Appeals ruling affirming $550,000 for “[l]oss of society, loss of
comfort, or less of companionship” that a decedent child would have
provided to his parents. The trial court and the court of appeals had
treated this loss as an “economic loss” not subject to the $250,000
maximum allowed for noneconomic damages in Kansas. The Supreme Court
developed the distinction between economic loss and noneconomic loss
based upon whether or not replacement for the loss could be purchased
in the commercial marketplace and held that there was no evidentiary
basis to award economic damages in this amount. The Court interpreted
its own decision in Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, 237 Kan.
503 (1985) to require “evidence about actual services lost, which were
understood to be of the type capable of being purchased, providing
in-home, rather than out-of-home, care for a disabled child; or things
that would have otherwise benefitted plaintiffs, e.g. guidance that
have contributed to the child’s ability to obtain future employment.”
Similar evidence had not been provided by the Burnette parents.
October 9, 2018
Barr v. United States, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171825 (S.D. IL 2018). Judge David Herndon described
the calculations of David Gibson of Vocational Economics as being based
on the following possible work-life expectancy assumptions:
Utilizing a reliable economic
methodology, the economic expert explained that if Barr had lived and
retired at ages sixty, sixty-five, or sixty-seven (the social security
age of full retirement) he would have earned less in retirement than if
he retired at age seventy as testified to by his wife.
Based on the credible testimony of Mrs. Barr, the Court finds that
Donald Barr would have worked at least until age seventy and so it is
that particular wage loss amount, as calculated by Mr. Gibson, that the
Court will focus on. [] Mr. Gibson was able to provide the Court with
the wage loss associated with the death of Donald Barr to age seventy
and net of his personal expenditures. Therefore, the Court finds the
wage loss in this case, proximately caused by the death of Mr. Barr, to
be one million, eighty one thousand, seven hundred and eighty two
dollars ($1,081,782.00).
This is of interest for two reasons: (1) Mr. Gibson did not use the
Gamboa-Gibson method for measuring the decedent’s work-life expectancy;
and (2) Mr. Gibson frequently does not subtract for personal
consumption in wrongful death cases in Illinois.
Markle v. United States, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95610 (N.D. WV 2015). In this case, the plaintiff
economic expert Daniel Selby, a CPA, used the Gamboa-Gibson work-life
expectancy tables.
October 12, 2018
Beim v. Hulfish, 216 N.J. 484;
83 A.3d 3 (NJ 2014). This decision interpreted the New Jersey Supreme
Court decision in Green v. Bittner
(1980), as follows:
In Green
v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980), the Court expanded
the category of pecuniary damages to include not only the loss of
future financial contributions but also the lost value of services such
as companionship and care and the loss of advice, guidance and counsel.
The Court, however, limited damages for companionship and advice
"strictly to their pecuniary element," with the value of the services
determined in accordance with "what the marketplace would pay a
stranger with similar qualifications for performing such services,"
with no value attached to the "emotional pleasure that a parent gets
when it is his or her child doing the caretaking rather than a
stranger." Id. at 12, 424 A.2d 210. Thus, in assessing both financial
and non-financial losses incurred because of a wrongful death, the
focus is on the value of what the decedent would have contributed to
his or her survivors during a continued lifetime. This Court has
never deemed a loss that fails to meet that definition to be a
"pecuniary" injury under N.J.S.A. 2A:31-5. (pp. 21-23)
October 17, 2018
Pham v. City of Seattle, 151
P.3d 976; 159 Wash.2d 527 (WA 2007). This was a four to three
decision of the Supreme Court of the state of Washington based upon
differences among the justices in the amount of attorney fees that the
successful plaintiffs were able to recover. The amount awarded by the
trial court for tax neutralization relating to back pay and front pay
was not at issue, but the Court held that tax neutralization was not
relevant to amounts awarded for non-economic damages, saying:
Front and back pay are damages that
replace compensation that the employee would have earned in due course
absent the discrimination. They are intended to place the plaintiff in
the same economic position he or she would have enjoyed absent the
discrimination. Moreover, plaintiffs asking for an offset to cover
adverse tax consequences resulting from a single lump sum payment of
front and back pay do not assume that the defense will pay their entire
tax burden for that recovery; they ask only to be compensated for the
additional tax consequences resulting from the lump sum character of
the payment. [References removed.]
While noneconomic damages for emotional distress are also intended to
compensate the plaintiff, they obviously do not replace a tangible
economic loss. Congress explicitly decided that noneconomic damages
were to be taxable when they are attributable to nonphysical injury,
and Congress placed this tax burden on the plaintiff. I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) (excluding damages, other than punitive damages, from gross
income only if such damages arise from personal physical injury or
physical illness). Under Pham and Lara's reasoning, a plaintiff would
retain no tax liability for noneconomic damages. Shifting the tax
burden on these awards entirely to the defendant simply goes too far.
October 29, 2018
Flowers v. Christiana Care Health
System, 2018 Del. Super. LEXIS 736 (DE Super. 2018). This order
granted a defense motion to exclude the opinion of the Plaintiff’s
economic expert on the following basis:
Plaintiffs' expert's report only
considers the estate's loss of Mrs. Flowers' Social Security income.
The economic loss report does not consider pension benefits Mrs.
Flowers was receiving on behalf of her late husband, and makes no
accounting for Mrs. Flowers personal expenditures. Without these facts
it is impossible to determine what, if any, economic loss Plaintiffs
have suffered from the unfortunate passing of Mrs. Flowers. The
expert's economic loss report, and anticipated testimony are
insufficient and will not assist the jury to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue.
November 21, 2018
Krepps v. NIJT(USA), Inc.,297
F.R.D. 579 (N.D. IL 2013). Matthew Krepps, a “Harvard trained
economist,” sought an order compelling the defendant to pay for Krepps’
regular billing rate for his testimony in deposition on his own expert
witness on his own behalf (between $2,000 and $7,000, depending on
length of time). Federal Magistrate Judge Jeffrey N. Cole, denied
Krepps’ request, saying:
[T]he Rule is quite clear that fee
shifting is mandatory unless "manifest injustice" would result. We
think that is exactly what would happen here were Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)
interpreted in the fashion urged by the plaintiff. For it would result
in the payment of money to a party acting as his own expert even though
he had incurred no cost that should in fairness be borne by the party
seeking his deposition. That is not appropriate cost shifting, but
rather the inappropriate subsidization of the other side's case.
November 23, 2018
White v. FCA US, LLC., 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196612 (E.D. MI 2018). In this case, the defense
argued that the Michigan Wrongful Death Act specifies that losses in a
wrongful death action are based on losses to statutory survivors and
sought summary judgement to that effect. The plaintiff argued that the
Michigan Products Liability Act Mich. Comp. Laws §
600.2945(c) allowed the estate of a decedent to seek loss of earnings
of a decedent, regardless of whether those earnings provided support
for survivors bringing the action. The Federal District Court held that
this has been a “vexing” question in Michigan Courts, but held that
Michigan law did not preclude the plaintiffs from claiming lost
earnings of a decedent, ruling that the Michigan Wrongful Death Act was
a composite wrongful death act and survival action. This decision would
support a proposition that the entirety of a decedent’s lost earnings
could be claimed in any wrongful death action under the Michigan
Wrongful Death Act.
November 24, 2018
CSX Corporation v. United States,
2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 32943 (11th Cir. 2018). This decision held
that neither railroad stock options to its employees nor railroad
provision of relocation benefits to its employees are subject to the
Railroad Retirement Tax Act.
November 27, 2018
Denney v. Kent County Road Commission,
317 Mich. App. 727; 896 N.W.2d 808 (MI App. 2016). The Michigan Court
of Appeals held that the highway exception to governmental immunity MCL
691.1402(1) creates a statutory exception to the Michigan
Wrongful Death Act, such that plaintiffs bringing an action under MCL
691.1402(1) can claim the entirety of a wrongfully killed decedent’s
earnings rather than just amounts that would have been provided in
financial support. This decision was appealed to the Michigan Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari in 894 N.W.2d 608. Suggested by William
King.
December 12, 2018
Gaddy v. Terex Corporation,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150478 (N.D. GA 2017). This U.S. District Court
decision was interpreting the Georgia collateral source rule and
related to the “amount’s billed” versus “amounts actually paid” issue
with respect to medical expenses. Federal Judge William S. Duffy, Jr.,
held that the defense economic expert Henry Miller, Ph.D., was not
permitted to testify directly to discounted amounts actually to be paid
be paid by Medicare and private insurance for the life care plan of the
plaintiff. However, Dr. Miller was permitted to testify regarding the
reasonable market value of the needed life care needs of the plaintiff.
Judge Duffy said:
Dr. Miller offers his report to rebut
the opinions of Plaintiff's expert, Ms. Gragg-Smith, regarding the
costs of Plaintiff's future medical care. Dr. Miller challenges Ms.
Gragg-Smith's use of the billed or charged rate to determine
Plaintiff's future medical expense needs. Dr. Miller's opinion
considered the rates paid by private insurers and government entities
to determine the reasonable value of Plaintiff's future care, using
these rates as a benchmark and recognizing that the large proportion of
the marketplace comprised of Medicare payments has an impact on prices.
He opines that, based on a study by a national healthcare actuarial
firm, private sector professional fees are paid at a rate equal to 128
percent of the Medicare rate for various services and items, including
therapies, catheter placement, laboratory tests, and surgical
procedures. Defendants state that, when discussing the market value of
Plaintiff's claimed future care, Dr. Miller will not reference any
private health insurance or government benefits available to Plaintiff.
The Court finds these opinions of the market rates paid for care by all
market payers do not violate the collateral source rule, because they
are not offered as evidence of payments by a third party to reduce the
defendant's liability for damages--they are instead offered to
establish the reasonableness of the amount of damages.
The Court also finds that Dr. Miller is qualified to opine on this
matter. His methodology is sufficiently reliable, because it relies on
his economic analysis of government-regulated fee schedules and
reputable studies performed by a well-established actuarial firm.
Finally, Dr. Miller's opinion will assist the trier of fact in
determining the reasonableness of Plaintiff's claimed future medical
expenses. Dr. Miller's testimony regarding the reasonable rate of
Plaintiff's future medical expenses is admissible.
December 20, 2018
Shank v. Whiting-Turner Contracting
Company, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213561 (N.D. OK 2018). The
testimony of Dr. Ralph Scott, plaintiff’s economic expert was excluded
on the basis that Dr. Scott’s testimony that the plaintiff was
completely disabled from future employment had no foundation in any
source examined by Dr. Scott.
December 27, 2018
Glisson v. Correctional Medical
Services, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216420 (S.D. IN 2018).
Judge Sarah Evans Barker granted a defense motion to exclude the
hedonic damages testimony of Dr. Stan V. Smith. Judge Barker held that
Dr. Smith had not reliably explained how he had arrived at an annual
value of $131,199 per year for life enjoyment from the Value of
Statistical Life literature, but also emphasized that:
[E]ven if Dr. Smith's methods of
calculation were reliable, the VSL studies on which his expert opinion
depends establish only how the overall value of a life is measured in
the field of economics, not how enjoyment of life is measured, which is
the relevant question the jury must resolve in awarding hedonic
damages.