Legal Decisions Developed in 2015
January 19, 2015
Hoyal v. Pioneer Sand Company, Inc.
188 P.3d 716 (CO 2008). In this decision, the Colorado Supreme Court,
en banc, held in a 7 to 3 decision that “evidence of a decedent’s
future income tax liability should not be considered when calculating
net pecuniary loss to a plaintiff in a wrongful death action.”
January 22, 2015
Ferguson v. Valero Energy Corp.,
2009
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
34888 (E.D. Pa. 2009). This is an opinion by
Judge Mary A. McLaughlin interpreting Delaware’s Wrongful Death Act and
Survivor’s Act as they apply to categories of damages. There is no
discussion of an economic expert in the decision. The case involved the
death of a single adult man who was living with, but not financially
supporting his father. The father sued for damages under the Delaware
Wrongful Death Act, but died before the father’s case was tried. The
decedent’s two brothers then sued for damages under Delaware’s Survival
Act. The court held that even though the decedent had not been
supporting his father, there was sufficient evidence that the decedent
had provided household services to assist his father. The estate was
allowed to seek recovery for the value of household services the
decedent son had provided for his deceased father. The judge also said:
“Delaware courts have consistently held that the Wrongful Death Act
allows the recovery of that portion of the decedent’s lost earnings
that would have been saved, over and above the decedent’s spending on
his maintenance, and passed on to his estate.” However, this
provision applied only between the moment of injury and the moment of
death, which was too brief in this case to have allowed earnings loss
damages to occur. The plaintiffs had sought “any and all hedonic
damages allowed for the loss of the decedent’s life and enjoyment of
future life as permitted by Delaware law or as evidence of the pain and
suffering and mental anguish” of the decedent. Judge McLaughlin’s
discussion of hedonic damages under the Survivor’s Act relied heavily
on the decision in Sterner v. Wesley College Inc., 747 F. Supp. 263 (D.
Del. 1990). Under Delaware law, any claim for hedonic damages has to be
as a part of pain and suffering and not as an independent category of
damages “at least under circumstances like those in Sterner and here,
where only a brief interval occurred between decedent’s injury and
death. . . .The Court therefore predicts that if Delaware law were to
allow for the recovery of hedonic damages for life’s pleasures and loss
of enjoyment of life, then the Survivor’s Act would allow recovery of
such damages only to the extent they were suffered for the period of
time between the injury at issue and the decedent’s death.
Revised listing.
Featherly v. Continental Ins.,
73 Wis.2d 273, 243 N.W.2d 806 (1976). This decision in related to
the earning capacity losses of Clyde Featherly as the result of an
automobile accident. His losses were presented to the jury in terms of
the lost profits of his business, which was determined to be inadequate
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, saying:
While there may be an award for the
loss of earning capacity measurable by loss of salary, if such
salary is truly a measure of earning capacity, a more difficult problem
is presented where one is self-employed and derives his income from the
profits of a business. Where there is a personal injury, tort law
in Wisconsin does not compensate for loss of profits per se. Loss
of profits is appropriate only if there is a clear causal relationship
to the value of the earning capacity. Loss of profits is not in itself,
under the circumstances here, admissible as a separate element of
damages or per se as proof of the value of earning capacity.
March 7, 2015
Figurski v. Trinity Health-Michigan,
2015
Mich.
App.
LEXIS 452 (MI 2015). This decision reversed the trial
court decision on the ground that the trial court should have permitted
plaintiff’s causation experts to testify, but agreed with the trial
court’s decision to allow testimony of Dr. Anthony M. Gamboa regarding
plaintiff’s future wage loss. Gamboa’s five-step method was described
in the decision in some detail and included his opinion that the
plaintiff child had no post-injury earning capacity. Dr. Gamboa
projected 36.6 years of work-life expectancy with a pre-injury high
school degree and 37.7 years with an Associate’s Degree. Gamboa’s
“total offset” method was based on a 5.2% wage growth rate for
1951-2011, with an earning capacity loss in the range between $2.2
million and $2.9 million, depending on educational achievement. The
decision also describes Gamboa’s growth rates of 3.2% from ages six to
12 and 5.2% thereafter for home health care workers in plaintiff’s life
care plan. The court said of Gamboa:
Gamboa was qualified as a vocational
rehabilitation expert. He held a number of degrees, including a
Master’s in Vocational Counseling and Ph.D. in an area that included
vocational counseling and education. Gamboa also received an MBA and
testified that he liked to focus on statistics. Gamboa had been with
Vocational Economics in one capacity or another since 1977. His work
there necessarily included offering expert opinions on the cost of
future care and compensation loss. He was a prolific writer in the area
of earning capacity loss and work-life expectancy.
March 10, 2015
Newill v. Campbell Transportation
Company, 2015 U.S. Dist. 4338 (W.D. PA 2015). This memorandum
from Judge Terrence F. McVerry denied a plaintiff motion to exclude the
testimony of economic expert Dr. Gary Skoog on the work-life expectancy
of a deck hand on a commercial vessel. Skoog’s testimony was based on
spreadsheets regarding retirement ages of deck hand provided by the
defendant, while the plaintiff argued that Skoog should have used the
Skoog-Ciecka-Krueger work-life expectancy tables that Skoog had
co-authored. Skoog had explained why those tables were not reliable
when applied to deck hands, but had not offered specific work-life
expectancies for deck hands. The court pointed out that the data relied
upon by Skoog had been provided to the plaintiff prior to Skoog’s
deposition and that the plaintiff had been able to vigorously question
Skoog about his opinions during Skoog’s deposition. The court held that
an expert’s opinion cannot be excluded based on an expert’s assumption
that “a person’s work-life will be of a certain length.” However, the
court held that Skoog should be precluded from testifying that payments
for maintenance may be credited against an award for past lost
wages.
Russell v. Allianz Life Insurance,
2015
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS 1946 (N.D. MS 2015). The Court excluded the
opinions of economic expert Robert Vance with respect to the lost
profits of Dugan Calvin Russell allegedly due to a termination of a
contract with Allianz Life Insurance Company. There were important
issues with how profits were calculated and with the manner in which
Vance calculated the work-life expectancy of Russell, who was 70 years
of age at the time of the alleged contract violation. Vance had
testified in deposition that he had relied upon work-life expectancy
tables produced by Skoog and Ciecka in other cases, but in this case
had taken into account subjective factors specific to Russell –
“current situation, health, hopes, abilities and the nature of the work
itself” – when generating his opinion regarding Russell’s work-life
expectancy, which Vance rated at ten years. Vance also claimed to have
relied upon work-life expectancy studies of self-employed workers
showing that work-lives were “typically five to ten years longer than
the work-life expectancy tables,” but did not provide citation to those
alleged other studies. The court said:
Vance’s failure to utilize the
Skoog-Ciecka study as an objective standard for estimating Russell’s
work-life expectancy does not, by itself, make his findings unreliable.
Rather, the problem with Vance’s report is that he also failed to use
any objective standard, including the self-employment work-life
expectancy studies he claimed to have used in other cases. In light of
Vance’s reliance on Russell’s self-serving testimony, and in the
absence of any indication as to how Vance might otherwise have arrived
at his work-life expectancy opinion, the Court is left with no basis
from which it can conclude that Vance’s ten-year estimate of Russell’s
work-life expectancy – nearly three times that suggested by the
Skoog-Ciecka study – is based on reliable methodology. Accordingly, the
Court concludes that Vance’s opinions based on this assumption are
unreliable under Rule 702.
March 28, 2015
Krohmer v. Dahl, 145 Mont.
491; 402 P.2d 979 (MT 1965). In this wrongful death action, the
Supreme Court of Montana agree with the trial court’s admission of
testimony by Dr. George Heliker of the University of Montana economics
department, saying:
This court agrees that the testimony
and exhibits of Heliker were speculative in nature, but no more so than
any other evidence that has for its purpose the proof of future action
or events. The issue before the trial judge, as seen by this
tribunal, was whether the testimony of Heliker should be allowed, in
order to give the jury some basis upon which to reach a conclusion in
regard to the possible future earnings of the decedent, or whether to
leave the jury unguided and hope that by their common knowledge and
sense of justice they might arrive at a more accurate estimation of
damages. It appears to us that in this particular case the
element of conjecture is reduced significantly by the admission of
expert testimony as to the possible future earnings of the decedent. It
also appears that this expert testimony is not only the best evidence,
but the only evidence available in this case to prove future earnings.
Turrieta v. Wyche, 54 N.M. 5
(N.M. 1949). In this personal injury action, the New Mexico Supreme
Court said about the testimony admitted in court from a person in the
profession for which the plaintiff was training, that:
No general rule can be formulated that
would properly control the admission of evidence to prove a man's
future earning capacity. It must be arrived at largely from
probabilities; and any evidence that would fairly indicate his present
earning capacity, and the probability of its increas`e or decrease in
the future ought to be admitted. This would include evidence of
age, intelligence, habits, health, occupation, life expectancy,
ability, the probable increase in skill, rates of wages paid generally
to those following his vocation, particularly so, where as in this
case, the injured person has fitted himself for, but has not entered
into, the work or business of his chosen vocation. (Citations omitted.)
It may be that such testimony is speculative, as asserted by defendant;
but no more so than any that has for its purpose the proof of future
action or events. It is all problematical at best. It is
not questioned that mortality tables are admissible, but possibly
not one time in fifty would the life expectancy of any individual come
within a year of the actual length of his life. It is, to say the
least, problematical whether he would continue to live, continue in
health, continue to work, continue to work with much the same effort
and ability he has shown in the past, continue to have the desire and
the opportunity to work. Also, that the amount of wages paid him
and those following his occupation generally in the past, will
continue to be paid; that the wage scale will not be materially
affected by depression, strikes, inflation, or war; that interest rates
will remain much as they are. However "speculative" such
testimony may be, it is the best that can be produced to establish
earning capacity over a period of years. A jury of twelve average
citizens ordinarily can be depended on to assess damages fairly, after
they have heard and considered such evidence.
May 12, 2015
Gressett v. Central Arizona Water
Conservation District, 2015 LEXIS 42806 (D. AZ 2015). The jury
concluded that the defendant had violated the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) and awarded damages. This decision provides the judge’s
orders with respect to amounts awarded for liquidated and compensatory
damages. Among other issues considered was whether the plaintiff was
entitled to a tax neutral (“grossed up” award). The court explicitly
rejected a tax neutral award saying about the plaintiff’s economic
expert, Paul Bjorklund’s projections:
Bjorklund produced four tables. The
Court believes the estimates based on mitigation at Plaintiff's
then-current pay as a paralegal are most appropriate to use in this
case because the mitigation assumption is based on actual earnings by
Plaintiff, and personalized historical data is preferable to
descriptive statistics concerning an entire profession. The Court also
deems Bjorklund's tables incorporating income tax effects to be
needlessly complicated and the Court is aware of no authority requiring
it to adjust awards so that the effects upon the recipients are
tax-neutral vis-à-vis the position the recipient would have been
in had she not been wronged.
May 14, 2015
Meek v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 2015 MT 130 (MT 2015). The plaintiff appealed a
District Court pre-trial ruling that held that amounts originally
billed for the medical expenses of Judy Meek before her death could not
be presented to the jury. The court by a 6 to 1 margin held that the
District Court was in error in excluding testimony about the amounts
originally billed, and said:
[I]f at trial Meek introduces evidence
of Judy Meek's medical bills the defendants may contest the
reasonableness of those bills as a measure of damages. If so, evidence
of the amount that Medicare pays to other health care providers for the
same or similar service could be relevant to that issue, as long as
there is no evidence or argument that Judy Meek was covered by Medicare
or other insurance, or that Medicare or an insurer paid any part of her
medical expenses. Those matters may be considered only by the District
Court and only after a verdict, as provided in § 27-1-308(3), MCA.
May 22, 2015
Ashford v. Wal-Mart Stores,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5845 (S.D. MS 2013). This is an opinion granting
in part and denying in part defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the
testimony of Dr. George Carter on earnings loss, fringe benefit loss
and household services loss. The court granted a motion in limine to
exclude testimony based on the assumption that the plaintiff was
totally disabled by a slip and fall injury, but denied excluding any of
Carter’s calculations altogether. Judge Halil Suleyman Ozerden drew a
distinction between Davis v. ROCOR International, 226 F. Supp. 2d 839
(2002), in which the testimony of an economist was excluded based on
the economist drawing his own conclusions about the percentage lost of
household services and the current case in which the 75% loss being
assumed was a percentage testified to by the plaintiffs. Judge Ozerden
cited a 2011 Journal of Legal Economics paper in support of Carter’s
use of Dollar Value of a Day for his household services calculation.
May 23, 2015
Passmore v. Barrett, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 66225, (N.D. IN 2015). This is the denial of a Motion
to Bar Opinion Testimony from Stan Smith. Smith initially offered
opinions in this wrongful death action about the decedent’s “loss of
value of life; and loss of society or relationship,” which defendants
argued were not permitted under Ind. Code § 34-23-1-1. The
plaintiff agreed to withdraw those categories, but defendants continued
to challenge Smith’s testimony on “loss of wages and employee benefits
and loss of household/family housekeeping and house management
services.” The Court agreed with Plaintiffs that those damages are
allowed under Ind. Code § 34-23-1-1 and denied the defense motion
to exclude Smith’s testimony on those damages. The Court indicated that
defense could file a motion requesting an extension to retain a damages
expert to counter the testimony of Smith.
May 27, 2015
Gradia v. Tanner, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 28446 (D. N.M. 2002). Judge William Deaton limited the
testimony of Dr. Allen Parkman on hedonic damages, as follows:
This matter comes before the Court upon
Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Allen
Parkman Regarding Loss of Value of Life or Hedonic Damages [docket no.
27]. In responding to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff relies in part on
Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23443, which is
attached to his response. In Smith, Judge Vazquez found that the
economic studies which purportedly would allow valuation of hedonic
damages by an expert would fall into the category of social science and
would not require a Daubert analysis of the proposed testimony since
the proper analysis would be under Fed. R. Evid. 702. Judge Vazquez
went on to find that the use of the economist's testimony for
purposes of placing a value on hedonic damages would not be reliable
and that it would be unhelpful and confusing to the jury; therefore,
Judge Vazquez did not allow the economist to place a value on the
hedonic damages suffered by the Smiths. However, Judge Vazquez did
allow the expert in her case to give testimony explaining hedonic
damages. I agree with the approach and logic taken by Judge Vazquez in
the Smith case. While I will not allow the expert in this cause, Dr.
Allen Parkman, an economist, to testify regarding the value of the
hedonic damages suffered by Plaintiff's deceased, I will allow him to
explain the nature of hedonic damages. Also, Dr. Parkman may give his
opinion as to the economic loss to the estate caused by the death of
Jay Gradia.
June 1, 2015
Castrillon v. St. Vincent Hospital
and Health Care Ctr., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69530 (S.D. IN
2015). This memorandum from Judge William T. Lawrence excluded
the testimony of Stan V. Smith on both the Plaintiff’s hedonic damages
and wage loss. With respect to hedonic damages, Judge Lawrence said:
Even assuming Dr. Smith arrives at his
"value of life" number in a scientifically reliable way, reducing it
by, say, 25 percent would arrive at the value of a life that has been
cut short by 25 percent, not at a life that is of the same duration but
25 percent less enjoyable. In order to be useful to the jury, Dr. Smith
would have had to start with the value of the enjoyment of the
Plaintiff's life but-for the events at issue in this case and then
reduce that figure by the percentage of enjoyment she has lost;
instead, he started with what he purports to the overall value of her
life. Dr. Smith offers no explanation why he believes the value of a
person's life is the same as the value of the enjoyment of a person's
life, and, as the First Circuit held [Citing Smith v. Jenkins, 732 F.3d
51, 66 (1st Cir. 2013)], "[t]hat Dr. Smith may equate [the two] is not
enough to bridge that gap." Accordingly, Dr. Smith's testimony
regarding hedonic damages lacks a factual basis and therefore fails to
satisfy Rule 702 and will not be admitted. [Footnotes removed from
quotation.]
On wage loss, Smith had made speculative assumptions with respect to
both the Plaintiff’s pre-injury earnings and post-injury earnings that
Judge Lawrence rejected, particularly given that the Plaintiff was
earning more at present than projected by Smith.
June 10, 2015
Simms v. United States, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69456 (S.D. WV 2015). This decision provides a
detailed explanation for how the collateral source rule applies to
Medicaid in terms of offsets allowed to the United States for its
contributions to care for child who was wrongfully born on February 25,
2008. It also provides extended discussion of the life care
expectancy reports of physicians on both sides of the case and by
non-physician life expectancy experts on both sides of the case. Dr.
Robert Shavelle was the defense’s non-physician life expectancy expert
and Dr. Michael Freeman was the plaintiff’s non-physician life
expectancy expert. Both Shavelle and Freeman were referred to
respectfully as “epidemiologists.” Based on all of this evidence the
Court made its own decision that the life expectancy of the injured
child, now seven years of age, was to age 21.
June 12, 2015
Sam v. Smith, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74476 (S.D. MS 2015). This is a memorandum granting defendant’s
motion in limine to exclude the testimony of plaintiff economic expert
Dr. Robert W. McLeod. Judge William Barbour, Jr., went through
the earnings record of the plaintiff’s decedent year by year, which
included very little income in the last two years before the decedent’s
death, and said:
Although there is no evidence that
Smith had worked in the behavioral health field for over three years,
and there is no evidence that she was seeking employment in that field,
McLeod has proffered expert opinions regarding Smith’s loss of past and
future income based on her “Projected Employment” as a Director of
Behavior Health Programs. McLeod further opines that Smith would have
held a position in her “Projected Employment” from the date on which
she died (i.e., January 8, 2011) through August 31, 2019, and that she
would have had starting a starting salary of $167,501.
June 13, 2015
Liberatore v. Monogahela Railway
Company, 2015 Phila. Ct. Comm. PL. LEXIS 123 (Common Pleas Court
of Philadelphia County, 2015). Judge George W. Overton quashed three
appeals made by the Consolidated Rail Corporation and Norfolk Southern
Railroad to the judge’s order that the jury verdict be paid in full at
$87,500 rather than after subtraction for two liens and alleged RRB
taxes of $10,521.75, which reduced the award to $52,172.65. Thus, the
defendants were ordered to pay $87,500 to the plaintiffs. The judge had
held previously that Heckman v. BNSF, 286 Neb. 453 (Neb. 2013) and
Phillips v. Chicago Cent. & Pac. R. Co., 853 N.W.2d (Iowa 2014)
were “unpersuasive,” “as other courts have,” citing Mickey v. BNSF, 437 S.W.3d 207 (Mo.
2014). Heckman and Phillips had held that a reduction for Tier I
and Tier II taxes for the employee contribution were appropriate.
Mickey had held that reduction for payroll taxes was not appropriate.
June 19, 2015
Strayton v. Delaware Health
Corporation, 2015 Del. LEXIS 288 (DE 2015). Diane Strayton
suffered serious burn injures while a resident at Harbor Healthcare, a
skilled nursing center. She brought a medical negligence suit for
damages, including cost of medical care to treat her burns. Without
Medicare coverage, she would have been billed $3,683,797.11. Medicare
paid Strayton’s health care providers $262,550.17 “in full satisfaction
of Strayton’s hospital stay and other care.” The trial court limited
Strayton’s recovery for this portion of her claims to the $262,550.17
that was actually paid. She appealed and the Delaware Supreme Court
ruled as follows:
We conclude that the collateral source
rule does not apply to amounts required to be written off by Medicare.
Where a healthcare provider has treated a plaintiff covered by
Medicare, the amount paid for medical services is the amount
recoverable by the plaintiff as medical expense damages.
June 22, 2015
State ex rel Children, Youth &
Families Dep’t, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 67 (N.M. App. 2015). This
decision is an appeal from sanctions by the Children, Youth and
Families Department (CYFD) imposed as a result of “contumacious”
refusal to comply orders of the district court. CYFD had made housing
arrangements for two children that the district court had specifically
forbidden. In determining the amount of sanctions to be imposed, the
district court had allowed Stan Smith to present hedonic damages
testimony. The Court of Appeals noted that Alberico/Daubert standards did not
apply in New Mexico courts to “expert testimony by an economist that is
based solely upon experience and training.” Thus, the Court of
Appeals held that the distict court did not err in not applying the
Alberico/Daubert standard for scientific reliability of the economist’s
testimony. The Court of Appeals, however, added that: [T]he basis of
Smith’s opinions provided rich fodder for cross
examination.”
Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics,
800
F.2d
1390 (5th Cir. 1986). One of the issues an appeal from a U.S.
District court in Louisiana was whether or not the defendant’s
economist should have deducted social security taxes in computing lost
future earnings. The 5th Circuit said: “[O]ur cases establish that
social security taxes should be deducted in computing future earnings.”
Pickle v. International Oilfield
Divers, 791 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1986). The 5th Circuit noted
that: “IOD correctly argues that the district court erred in not
deducting social security taxes from its estimate of Pickle’s future
income.
Gaston v. G & D Marine Servs.,
631
So.
2d 547 (LA App. 1994). Dr. Melville Z. Wolfson had calculated
gross earnings before “income taxes and Social Security taxes” to be
$54,361 and after income taxes and Social Security taxes at $46,570.
The trial court awarded the plaintiff $54,361 and the Court of Appeal
reduced the award to $46,570.
Cappiello v. Exxon Corp., 695
So. 2d 1097 (LA App. 1997). The Court of Appeal amended the trial court
award in a maritime personal injury action to subtract for FICA taxes
at 7.65%. The plaintiff economic expert, Dr. Randolph Rice, had not
subtracted FICA taxes, but the court had awarded exactly the amount Dr.
Rice had recommended, The Court of Appeal reduced that amount by
$38,000 based on those taxes.
August 1, 2015
Olson v. Olson Estate, 2008 SD
39; 751 N.W.2d 706 (SD 2008). The South Dakota Supreme Court deferred
from deciding whether loss of prospective inheritance is recoverable in
a wrongful death action in South Dakota. The decedent on whose behalf
this action was brought was Edda Olson, the sister of the decedent,
both of whom were killed in the same automobile accident. Thus this was
the estate of a decedent sister suing the estate of her decedent
brother for losses resulting from her death. The Court said:
In this case, we need not decide
whether recovery of a prospective inheritance will be recognized in
South Dakota The question need not be decided because, even if
recognized, Elda could not have proved that she had such a claim.
She had no claim to a prospective inheritance because Glenn's will
contained a common disaster clause expressly providing that Elda was
entitled to no inheritance unless she survived Glenn by thirty days, a
fact that did not occur. Therefore, under Glenn's will, Elda was
considered to have predeceased Glenn, and Elda was entitled to no
inheritance. Thus, Elda's Estate could prove no loss of prospective
inheritance as a matter of law.
G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99715 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). This decision involved vocational
expert Kenneth Reagles and economic expert Dr. Frank Tinari on the
plaintiff side and economic expert Dr. Bernard F. Lentz on the defense
side. The plaintiff child was Hispanic, which was not taken into
account in a material way be Reagles and Tinari on the plaintiff side,
but had been taken into account by the defense expert Lentz. Judge
Weinstein held that it was a matter of federal law under what he called
“the McMillan Rule” that ethnicity cannot be taken into account in
projecting the lost future earnings of an injured child. This was
based on the decision in McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247
(E.D.N.Y. 2008), which involved a black plaintiff. Judge Weinstein
discussed reasons why race or ethnicity should not be taken into
account at great length in this decision.
August 18, 2015
Collier v. Simms, 366 S.W.2d
499, 500 (Mo. App. 1963). The issue before the court was whether a
wife, who was not employed outside the home, could recover damages in
Missouri for impairment of her physical ability to perform her domestic
services. On this matter the court said:
We take it to be axiomatic that to
impair the ability to work of any human being (husband, wife, bachelor
or spinster) is to injure a personal right, quite apart from any
monetary loss, which might result from such impairment. Any
physical inability of a housewife to perform domestic duties must
necessarily mean a physical inability to work and labor. Put
another way, if a housewife may not be permitted to recover damages for
physical inability to perform her domestic duties, then it follows, as
night follows day, that a housewife may not recover for physical
inability to work and labor. This simply cannot be, and is not,
the law. If it were the law, then every woman, upon becoming a
housewife, would thereby deprive herself of the right to recover for
any impairment of her inability to work and labor and perform her
domestic duties.
August 23, 2015
Wolfe v. Kansas City, 334 Mo.
796; 68 S.W.2d 821 (Mo.1934). This decision described the meaning of
“earning capacity” in Missouri as follows:
“It seems plain that wrongful
interference with any capacity or function of a human being should be
compensated for, aside from any existing need for the exercise of such
capacity or function. The vicissitudes of life may call upon any person
to put forth every effort to serve himself or those who are dependent
upon him. In many if not all cases of series personal injury the public
may have an interest, and its welfare may require that the injured
person be compensated for the wrong done to him, thus in a measure
lessening the demand which may be made upon the public. Impaired
ability to work is in itself an injury and deprivation, distinct from
any loss of earnings it entails and the sufferer is entitled to
compensation for it. It may be treated as part of the mental suffering
resulting from the injury and as due to the consciousness of impaired
power to care for one’s self. In the nature of the case the sum which
will compensate for such damage is not ascertainable by mathematical
computation; it must be fixed by the jury with respect to the evidence
and the probabilities, and should be sufficient to compensate therefor.
(Italics ours.).” The quotation marks are correctly included because
the Missouri Supreme Court was quoting the court of appeals decision
that it was affirming.
September 4, 2015
Stayton v. Delaware Health Corporation,
117
A.3d
521 (Delaware, 2015). The Delaware Supreme Court held in this
decision that a plaintiff can only recover the amount actually paid by
Medicare in full satisfaction of past medical expenses caused by an
injury. It held that the Delaware collateral source rule does not apply
in this circumstance. The amount that the hospital and other health
care providers would have charged was $3,683,797.11, but Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) actually paid was $262,550.17. The
decision discussed at some length different approaches taken by other
states to this same question.
On balance, we believe the better
course is to treat the amount paid by Medicare as dispositive of the
reasonable value of healthcare provider services. Delaware has followed
the Restatement (Second) of Torts in its application of the collateral
source rule. The fact that treating the amount paid as dispositive is
consistent with § 911 of the Restatement gives us confidence that
the approach we adopt today is not only administrable but fully
consistent with the common law tort principles underlying Delaware's
collateral source rule.
October 26, 2015
Nomat v. Motta, 215 IL App
(1st) 14102-U; 2015 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2024. This decision of the
Illinois Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision on various
grounds. Two grounds were of interest to forensic economists. First,
the Court of Appeals rejected the lost earning capacity testimony of
Dr. Charles Linke on the ground that Linke had based his projection of
lost earnings on pay rates in a job that had been offered to the
plaintiff, but the plaintiff had rejected prior to his injury.