From
Slavoj Zizek, “Two Ways to
Avoid the Real of Desire,” in Looking
Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture (1992)
It is therefore totally misleading to locate the difference
between the classical and the hard-boiled detective as one of
"intellectual" versus "physical" activity, to say that the
classical detective of logic and deduction is engaged in reasoning while the
hard-boiled detective is mainly engaged in chase and fight. The real break
consists in the fact that, existentially, the classical detective is
not "engaged" at all: he maintains an eccentric
position throughout; he is excluded from the exchanges that take place among
the group of suspects constituted by the corpse. It
is precisely on the basis of this exteriority of his position (which is of
course not to be confused with the position of the "objective"
scientist: the latter's distance toward the object of his research is of
quite another nature) that the homology between the detective and the analyst
is founded. One of the clues indicating the difference between the two types of
detective is their respective attitudes toward financial reward. After solving
the case, the classical detective accepts with accentuated pleasure payment for
the services he has rendered, whereas the hard-boiled detective as a rule
disdains money and solves his cases with the personal commitment of somebody
fulfilling an ethical mission, although this commitment is often hidden under a
mask of cynicism. What is at stake here is not the classical detective's simple
greed or his callousness toward human suffering and injustice-the point is much
finer: the payment enables him to avoid getting mixed up in the libidinal
circuit of (symbolic) debt and its restitution. The symbolic value of payment
is the same in psychoanalysis: the fees of the analyst allow him to stay out of
the "sacred" domain of exchange and sacrifice, i.e., to avoid getting
involved in the analysand's libidinal circuit . . . .
The hard-boiled detective is, on the contrary, "involved" from the
very beginning, caught up in the circuit: this involvement defines his very
subjective position. What causes him to solve the mystery is first of all the
fact that he has a certain debt to honor. We can locate this "settlement
of (symbolic) accounts" on a wide scale ranging from Mike Hammer's
primitive vendetta ethos in Mickey Spillane's novels to the refined sense of
wounded subjectivity that characterizes Chandler's Philip Marlowe. (60-61)
Such an involvement entails the loss of the "excentric" position by means of which the classical
detective plays a role homologous to the "subject supposed to know."
That is to say, the detective is never, as a rule, the narrator of the
classical detective novel, which has either an "omniscient" narrator
or one who is a sympathetic member of the social milieu, preferably the
detective's Watsonian companion--in short, the
person/or whom the detective is a "subject supposed to know."
The "subject supposed to know" is an effect of transference and is as
such structurally impossible in the first person: he is by definition "supposed
to know" by another subject. For
that reason, it is strictly prohibited to divulge the detective's "inner
thoughts." His reasoning must be concealed till the final triumphal
denouement, except for occasional mysterious questions and remarks whose
function is to emphasize even further the inaccessible character of what goes
on in the detective's head. Agatha Christie is a great
master of such remarks, although she seems sometimes to push them to a
mannerist extreme: in the midst of an intricate investigation, Poirot usually asks a question such as "Do you know by
any chance what was the color of the stockings worn by the lady's maid?";
after obtaining the answer, he mumbles into his moustache: ''Then the case is
completely clear!"
The hard-boiled novels are in contrast generally narrated in the
first person, with the detective himself as narrator (a notable exception,
which would require exhaustive interpretation, is the majority of Dashiell
Hammett's novels). This change sudden it becomes evident that he has been
"played for a sucker." What looked at first like an easy job turns
into an intricate game of criss-cross, and all his
effort is directed toward clarifying the contours of the trap into which he has
fallen. The "truth" at which he attempts to arrive is not just a
challenge to his reason but concerns him ethically and often painfully. The
deceitful game of which he has become a part poses a threat to his very
identity as a subject. In short, the dialectic of deception in the hard-boiled
novel is the dialectic of an active hero caught in a nightmarish game whose
real stakes escape him. His acts acquire an unforeseen dimension, he can hurt
somebody unknowingly--the guilt he thus contracts involuntarily propels him to
"honor his debt."
In
this case, then, it is the detective himself-not the terrified members of the
"group of suspects"-who undergoes a kind of "loss of
reality," who finds himself in a dreamlike world where it is never quite
clear who is playing what game. And the person who embodies this deceitful
character of the universe, its fundamental corruption, the person who lures the
detective and "plays him for a sucker," is as a rule the femme
fatale, which is why the final "settlement of accounts" usually
consists in the detective's confrontation with her. This confrontation results
in a range of reactions, from desperate resignation or escape into cynicism in
Hammett and Chandler to loose slaughter in Mickey Spillane (in the final page
of I,
the Jury, Mike Hammer
answers "It was easy" when his dying, treacherous lover asks him how
he could kill her in the middle of making love). Why is this ambiguity, this
deceitfulness and corruption of the universe embodied in a woman whose promise
of surplus enjoyment conceals mortal danger? What is the precise dimension of
this danger? Our answer is that, contrary to appearance, the femme fatale
embodies a radical ethical attitude, that of "not ceding one's
desire," of persisting in it to the very end when its true nature as the
death drive is revealed. It is the hero who, by rejecting the femme fatale,
breaks with his ethical stance. (62-63)
And it is the same with the figure of the femme fatale in hard-boiled
novels and in film noir: she
who ruins the lives of men and is at the same time victim of her own lust for
enjoyment, obsessed by a desire for power, who endlessly manipulates her
partners and is at the same time slave to some third, ambiguous person, sometimes
even an impotent or sexually ambivalent man. What
bestows on her an aura of mystery is precisely the way she cannot be clearly
located in the opposition between master and slave. Al the moment she seems
permeated with intense pleasure, it suddenly becomes apparent that she suffers
immensely; when she seems to be the victim of some horrible and unspeakable
violence, it suddenly becomes clear that she enjoys it. We can never be quite
sure if she enjoys or suffers, if she manipulates or is
herself the victim of manipulation. It
is this that produces the deeply ambiguous character of those moments in the film noir(or in the
hard-boiled detective novel) when the
femme fatale breaks down, loses her powers of manipulation, and becomes the
victim of her own game. Let us just mention the first model of such a
breakdown, the final confrontation between Sam Spade and Brigid O'Shaughnessy
in The Maltese Falcon. As she begins to
lose her grasp of the situation, Brigid suffers a
hysterical breakdown; she passes immediately from one strategy to another. She
first threatens, then she cries and maintains that she did not know what was
really happening to her, then suddenly she assumes again an attitude of cold
distance and disdain, and so on. In short, she unfolds a whole fan of
inconsistent hysterical masks. This moment of the final breakdown of the femme
fatale-who now appears as an entity without substance, a series of inconsistent
masks without a coherent ethical attitude-this moment when her power of
fascination evaporates and leaves us with feelings of nausea and disgust, this
moment when we see "nought but shadows of what
is not" where previously we saw clear and distinct form exerting
tremendous powers of seduction, this moment of reversal is at the same time the
moment of triumph for the hard-boiled detective. Now, when the fascinating
figure of the femme fatale disintegrates into an inconsistent
bric-a-brac of hysterical masks, he is finally capable of gaining a
kind of distance toward her and of rejecting her.
The destiny of the femme fatale in film noir, her final hysterical breakdown, exemplifies
perfectly the Lacanian proposition that "Woman does not exist": she
is nothing but "the symptom of man," her power of fascination masks
the void of her nonexistence, so that when she is finally rejected, her whole
ontological consistency is dissolved. But
precisely as nonexisting, i.e.,
at the moment at which, through hysterical breakdown, she
assumes her nonexistence, she constitutes herself as
"subject": what is waiting for her beyond hysterization
is the death drive in its purest. In feminist writings on film noir we often encounter the thesis that the femme
fatale presents
a mortal threat to man (the hard-boiled detective), i.e., that her boundless
enjoyment menaces his very identity as subject: by rejecting her at the end, he
regains his sense of personal integrity and identity. This thesis is true, but
in a sense that is the exact opposite of the way it is usually understood. What
is so menacing about the femme fatale is not the boundless enjoyment that
overwhelms the man and makes him woman's plaything or slave. It is not Woman as
object of fascination that causes us to lose our sense of judgment and moral
attitude but, on the contrary, that which remains hidden beneath this
fascinating mask and which appears once the masks fall off: the dimension of
the pure subject fully assuming the death drive. To use Kantian terminology,
woman is not a threat to man insofar as she embodies pathological enjoyment,
insofar as she enters the frame of a particular fantasy. The real dimension of
the threat is revealed when we "traverse" the fantasy, when the
coordinates of the fantasy space are lost via hysterical breakdown. In other
words, what is really menacing about the femme fatale is not that she is fatal
for men but that she presents a case of a "pure," nonpathological subject fully assuming her own fate.
When the woman reaches this point, there are only two attitudes left to the
man: either he "cedes his desire," rejects her and regains his
imaginary, narcissistic identity (Sam Spade at the end of The Maltese
Falcon), or he identifies with the woman as symptom and meets his
fate in a suicidal gesture (the act of Robert Mitchum
in what is perhaps the crucial film
noir, Jacques Tourneur's Out of the Past). (65-66)