Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation:
How Minds Understand Minds
This page provides access
to work that was discussed at, inspired by, or is otherwise relevant to the
seminar "Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds,"
a National Endowment for the Humanities
Summer Seminar for College Teachers held at the University of Missouri -
St. Louis, from June 14 to July 16, 1999.
The seminar director was Robert
Gordon, co-originator (with Jane Heal) of the "Simulation Theory" of "folk
psychology". The theory of "folk psychology," i.e. of how ordinary people understand,
predict, and explain one another's actions, thoughts, and motivations, is of
considerable importance in contemporary Psychology, Cognitive Science, and Philosophy
of Mind, and is thought to be highly relevant to the understanding of psychological
disorders such as autism. The focus of this seminar was principally on the more
philosophical aspects of the issue.
For a brief introduction to the seminar topic, prepared by Professor
Gordon for prospective participants, click
here. For a more complete introduction to the topic by Professor Gordon,
see his entry on "Folk
Psychology as Mental Simulation" from the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, or the draft of his entry on "Simulation
Theory" (co-written with Joe Cruz) for the Encyclopedia of Cognitive
Science (forthcoming from Nature Publishing Group). For
an account of the leading rival theoretical position (sometimes called "theory
theory"), see "Folk
Psychology as a Theory" (by Ian Ravenscroft, also from the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
You will need Adobe Acrobat Reader to view any papers
that are in pdf format. Click
here to
get it (free).
Seminar Director, Robert Gordon
Selected articles:
Folk
Psychology as Mental Simulation (from the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
Simulation and the
Explanation of Action (html)
Autism and the "Theory of
Mind" Debate (html)
Sellars's Ryleans Revisited
(html)
Sympathy, Ethics, and the
Impartial Spectator (pdf)
Simulation and Reason Explanation:
The Radical View (html)
Unpublished Papers, Talks, Notes:
Draft entry on "Simulation
Theory" (co-written with Joe Cruz for the Encyclopedia of Cognitive
Science - forthcoming from Nature Publishing Group).
Developing Commonsense
Psychology: Experimental Data and Philosophical Data
Reason Explanations and
Counterfactuals
Representing Minds
Visiting Speakers:
Alvin Goldman
-
-
- The
Psychology of Folk Psychology
-
-
- Consciousness,
Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science
Jane Heal
Stephen Stich
-
-
- Reading
One's Own Mind. (by Stephen Stich &
Shaun Nichols)
- A Cognitive
Theory of Pretense. (pdf) (by Stephen
Stich & Shaun Nichols)
Abstract: Recent accounts of pretense have been
underdescribed in a number of ways. In this paper, we present a much more
explicit cognitive account of pretense. We begin by presenting a number of
real examples of pretense in children and adults. These examples bring out
several features of pretense that any adequate theory of pretense must
accommodate, and we use these features to develop our theory of pretense.
On our theory, pretense representations are contained in a separate workspace,
a Possible World Box which is part of the basic architecture of the human
mind. The representations in the Possible World Box can have the same content
as beliefs. Indeed, we suggest that pretense representations are in the same
representational "code" as beliefs and that the representations in the Possible
World Box are processed by the same inference and UpDating mechanisms that
operate over real beliefs. Our model also posits a Script Elaborator which
is implicated in the embellishment that occurs in pretense. Finally, we claim
that the behavior that is seen in pretend play is motivated not from a "pretend
desire", but from a real desire to act in a way that fits the description
being constructed in the Possible World Box. We maintain that this account
can accommodate the central features of pretense exhibited in the examples
of pretense, and we argue that the alternative accounts either can't accommodate
or fail to address entirely some of the central features of pretense.
* Other papers on Folk Psychology and Simulation Theory by Stich,
Nichols et al.
Seminar Participants:
Click on a name to jump to links to work by that participant.
An asterisk indicates that there is material currently available.
Click the BACK button to return here.
| Angela Arkway |
|
 |
-
-
Simulation,
Folk Psychological Explanation, and Causal Laws
Abstract: The assumption that commonsense
psychological explanations of behavior are causal underlies current debate
between simulation theory and theory theory regarding the nature of cognitive
mechanism responsible for our folk psychological practices. Theory theorists
claim that these explanations are subsumed by the covering law model of causal
explanation. Simulationists are not explicit about the nature of the explanations
produced by simulation. In what follows, I propose a set of plausible conditions
that a correct causal simulation-produced folk psychological explanation
will satisfy and point out two prima facie problems. In discussing a possible
solution, I discover that the latter incurs the need for some sort of causal
law. An examination of two likely candidates for these laws reveals that
neither is capable of playing the role required. I then suggest alternative
routes that simulationists might explore in order to provide simulation theory
with a sorely-needed account of the nature of the explanations produced by
simulation.
-
-
The
Simulation Theory and Explanations that 'Make Sense of Behavior'
Abstract: Underlying the current debate between
simulation theory and theory theory is the assumption that folk psychological
explanations of behavior are causal. Simulationists Martin Davies, Tony Stone,
and Jane Heal claim that folk psychological explanations are explanations
that make sense of another person by citing the thoughts important to the
determination of his behavior on a given occasion. I argue that it is unlikely
these explanations will be causal. Davis et al. base their claim on the
assumption that a certain isomorphism obtains between the cognitive mechanisms
of human beings. Investigation into the nature of the isomorphism required
reveals that it is of a sort that is unlikely to obtain. I suggest that in
order to maintain their challenge to theory theory, simulationists must either
motivate and describe a non-causal simulation-based account of folk psychological
explanation or else delineate a causal account that attributes a nonessential,
heuristic role to simulation.
| Brad Armour-Garb |
|
|
-
-
___
-
-
___
| Larry Beyer |
|
|
-
-
___
-
-
___
| Brad Cohen |
|
|
-
-
___
-
-
___
| Joe Cruz |
|
|
-
- Draft entry on Simulation
Theory (co-written with Robert Gordon for the Encyclopedia of
Cognitive Science - forthcoming from Nature Publishing Group).
-
- Simulation
& the Psychology of Sociopathy (pdf) (Continuing Commentary from Behavioral
and Brain Sciences (1997) 20:3, pp. 525-7)
| Steven Daniel |
|
|
-
-
___
-
-
___
| Jim Garson |
|
|
-
- Simulation and Connectionism:
What is the Connection?
Abstract: This paper concerns the relationship between connectionist architecture and the debate between simulation theory and the theory theory of folk psychology. It has been proposed that PDP models (connectionist models that employ distributed non-symbolic representations) are particularly well suited to simulation theory. So evidence that these models accurately describe brain processing would tend to discredit the theory theory. The purported linkage between PDP architecture and simulation theory is carefully examined. Problems are uncovered related to the nature of representation in simulation theory. It is argued that a minimal requirement for a version of simulation theory which counts as a meaningful hypothesis in cognitive science is that the brain contain propositional attitude representations which can be shared by different processors. However the argument for a link between PDP architecture and simulation theory depend on the idea that PDP models lack such shareable representations. So a defender of the the connection between PDP models and simulation theory is caught in a dilemma. If PDP models allow shareable representations, then arguments for a linkage fail, and if they do not, then PDP models are incompatible with versions of simulation theory that can be taken seriously in cognitive science. The upshot is that there are reasons for thinking that PDP architecture is the enemy of both TT and ST. It is more likely that PDP architecture recommends mechanisms for explaining folk psychological abilities that defy easy classification under TT and ST rubrics. So the contribution of connectionism may be to undermine faith in the relevance of the debate between theory theorists and simulation theorists, and to suggest an alternative.
| Brie Gertler |
|
|
-
- Simulation Theory
on Conceptual Grounds
Abstract: This paper provides an argument for
Simulation Theory ("ST") which is based on a thesis about mental concepts.
While this argument has not been articulated before, it captures the sort
of conceptual grounds which originally fueled ST, and which the recent emphasis
on empirical data in the debate with Theory Theorists has obscured. I begin
by articulating the thesis that mental concepts are indexical. The
role of indexical thought in avoiding pragmatic inconsistencies such as Moore
paradoxical utterances attests to the plausibility of this thesis. I then
show that this thesis underwrites a valid argument for ST, in that TT (Theory
Theory) cannot accommodate the indexicality of mental concepts. Next, I
demonstrate that ST's leading proponents are implicitly committed to this
premise and, moreover, that this commitment is part of what motivates them
to accept ST. The disagreements among simulation theorists derive from their
competing accounts of how, precisely, ST accommodates mental concepts'
indexicality. The paper's broader aim is to bring renewed attention to the
neglected conceptual dimension of the "ST vs. TT" debate.
| Chris Hill |
|
|
-
-
___
-
-
___
| Dan Hutto |
|
|
-
-
Dan
Hutto's Home Page
-
with links to his articles and information on his books.
-
-
Minding Our Language: The Role of Simulation in Linguistic Interpretation
-
From Inside/Out 1994.
| Louise Roeska-Hardy |
|
|
-
-
___
-
-
___
| Eric Schwitzgebel |
|
|
-
-
A Difficulty for Simulation Theory
Due to the Close Connection of Pretense and Action in Early
Childhood
(Revised version, August 3rd 2000)
Abstract: Much of the appeal of simulation theory
stems from the fact that a conscious process something like simulation seems
to underlie certain of our mental state attributions. However, if young children
consciously simulate, and if simulation is a form of pretense, then we should
expect them, at least sometimes, to act out their simulations. Since we do
not ordinarily see this, it follows that children either do not consciously
simulate or that simulation is further removed from pretense than its advocates
typically claim.
| Nigel Thomas |
|
|
-
-
Attitude
and Image, or, What Will Simulation Let Us Eliminate?
Radical Simulation Theory, propositional attitude eliminativism, and the
Perceptual Activity theory of imagery and imagination: recipe for a new slant on the mind-body
problem?
-
-
Imagination,
Mental Imagery, Consciousness, & Cognition.
-
Nigel Thomas' home page, with links to his articles, and other
relevant links.
| Bill Wilkerson |
|
|
-
- Simulation,
Theory and the Frame Problem: The Interpretive Moment.
| Julie Yoo |
|
|
-
-
___
-
-
___
Papers by Others:
Dôna Warren
Externalism and Causality: Simulation and
the Prospects for a Reconciliation. Published in Mind & Language.
Martin Davies & Tony Stone
Folk
Psychology and Mental Simulation. To appear in Contemporary Issues in
the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Anthony O'Hear - Cambridge University
Press.
Thomas Suddendorf & Claire M. Fletcher-Flinn
Theory
of Mind and the Origins of Divergent Thinking. Published in Journal
of Creative Behavior, (1997) 31: 169-179.
Paul Thagard & Allison Barnes
Empathy and Analogy.
Published in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, (1997) 36:
705-720.
John Barresi and Chris Moore
Intentional Relations
and Social Understanding. Published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
(1996) 19(1): 107-154.
Peter Carruthers
Autism
as Mind-Blindness: an elaboration and partial defence. Published in P.Carruthers
and P.K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996, 257-73.
Peter Carruthers
Simulation
and Self-knowledge. Published in P.Carruthers and P.K. Smith (eds.), Theories
of Theories of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 22-38.
Chris Jarrold, Peter Carruthers, Peter K. Smith & Jill Boucher
Pretend
Play: Is it Metarepresentational? Published in Mind and Language
(1994) 9: 445-468.
Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B. M. de Waal
Empathy: Its ultimate
and proximate bases. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2001.
Anyone who has, or knows of, other on-line articles on the debate over simulation theory and folk psychology, please email the webmaster, Nigel Thomas, to have a link added
here.
Simulation and Folk Psychology Links:
Anyone who has, or knows of, other sites devoted to simulation theory or folk psychology, please email the webmaster, Nigel Thomas, to have a link added
here.
Some
photographs from the seminar (courtesy of Joe Cruz).
A web site by
Webmaster: Nigel J.T. Thomas
