Cosmopolitan attitudes through transnational social practices?

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Abstract   *Within the scope of the debate surrounding globalization, ever increasing attention is being directed to the growth of border-crossing social relations and the emergence of transnational social spaces on the micro-level. In particular, the question of how these border-crossing interrelations influence the attitudes and values of the people involved causes some controversy. Some assume that the increasing transnationalization of social relations will foster the development of cosmopolitan attitudes, while others warn that renationalization may also be a result. On the empirical level, the relationship between transnationalization and cosmopolitanism has so far only been addressed with regard to certain groups or specific circumstances. However, we assume that on the general level there is a positive relation between the two syndromes and address this question empirically on the level of the entire German population. On the basis of a representative survey of German citizens carried out in 2006, we find that people with border-crossing experiences and transnational social relations are more likely to adopt cosmopolitan attitudes with respect to foreigners and global governance. The analysis shows that this general interrelation remains stable even when controlling for relevant socio-economic variables.*

Globalization and the weakening of the nation-state are commonly portrayed as the most significant developments of our time (Albrow 1996; Appadurai 1997; Giddens 1990; Held et al. 1999; Robertson 1992). These processes entail a transformation of the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, with ever increasing cross-border interaction and the emergence of transnational social spaces. Whereas in

former times nation-state borders acted as interrupters of interaction – leading to a high density of internal communication and interaction and a significantly lower degree of interaction between nation-states – the dynamic of globalization is bringing about a new and unprecedented level of interconnectedness. Though the rate of cross-border interchange among individuals, institutions and societies has increased substantively over the last 30 years, there are also clear indications that these exchanges are geographically concentrated and that cross-border interactions are not necessarily global in character (Held et al. 1999; Zürn 1998). Nevertheless, more and more people are facing a transnationalization of their life-world. It has been argued that this will impact on their cognitive and attitudinal stances, and they might become more cosmopolitan (for example Hannerz 1990; Kwok-Bun 2002; Tarrow 2005).

However, neither the concepts of cosmopolitanism nor transnationalism have a distinct, universally accepted definition (Roudometof 2005: 113). In this article we understand transnationalism as being the extent to which individuals are involved in cross-border interaction and mobility. We depart from transnationalism research that focuses on migration only by taking into consideration the transboundary engagement of the *whole* German population. Cosmopolitanism, in contrast, is conceived as a particular worldview characterized by the capacity to mediate between different cultures, the recognition of increasing interconnectedness of political communities and the approval of political responsibility at the supranational and global level. In this way, we apply the concepts of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism at the micro-level and ask whether people's cross-border linkages and activities have an impact on their attitudinal stances. One guiding hypothesis would be that when simultaneously controlling for relevant socio-economic determinants, the individuals' transnational contacts and their cross-border mobility make good predictors for cosmopolitan attitudes. It is assumed that transnational experiences foster people's openness and tolerance and 'the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole' (Robertson 1992: 8). So far, despite being one of the key issues of the literature on cosmopolitanism, this link has not been scrutinized in detail. Our research is a first attempt to address this lacuna with survey data. The basis of our research is a representative survey undertaken in spring 2006 in Germany.

Transnationalization of social relationships

In a very broad understanding of the term, transnationalism refers to the existence of border-crossing work relations, communication networks, social interactions, every-day practices and all respective societal systems and regulations (Pries 2005). Like globalization research, studies using the transnationalism approach focus on the intensification, acceleration and expansion of global flows and networks of activity and interaction. But in contrast to common concepts of globalization, the literature on transnationalism stresses that the nation-state is not becoming obsolete in terms of framing, restricting and encouraging individuals' actions (Smith 2001: 3). Rather, it is hypothesized that global and national dynamics shape people's life-world *interactively* (Pries 2002: 270). Moreover, the term transnationalism does not

necessarily imply a global dimension of border-crossing activities, but rather spatially and regionally confined patterns of interaction. Studies interested in the emergence of transnational social 'spaces' and/or 'fields'[1] direct their attention to social practices and activities that establish links across the boundaries of two or more national societies. The objects of enquiry can be either individuals or aggregate units such as groups, organizations and networks (Faist 2000: 13). There is a common distinction here between transnationalism from 'above' (by corporate actors) and transnationalism from 'below' (by individuals or informal groups, for example migrants) (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). This article is assigned to the latter field of research, as we direct our attention to the *individual* cross-border linkages and experiences of the *entire* (German) population (cf. de Swaan 1995; Vobruba 1997).

Most analyses of transnational social relations have so far been restricted to migrants (for example Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Basch et al. 1994; Faist 2000; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Ong 2005; Pries 1998; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Vertovec and Cohen 1999),[2] transnational social movements and activism (for example Cohen and Rai 2000; Smith et al. 1997; Tarrow 2005), business networks (for example Yeung 1998), transnationally organized crime (for example Williams and Vlassis 2001) or elites (for example Sklair 2001). Migration studies have been especially successful in unfolding and applying the concept of transnational social spaces. However, a broader definition encompasses not only specific groups, but all types of interactions 'taking place among people and institutions in two or more separate "containers" or nation-states' (Roudometof 2005: 119). Today, transnational activities are no longer restricted to particular groups, but have become a broad and far-reaching experience affecting the everyday lives of many individuals. Therefore, when analysing the emergence of transnational spaces, it is necessary to take into account not only certain groups of people, but also the general population. However, there are hardly any empirical studies of transnational social relations that relate to the population as a whole.

The broader research project, upon which this article rests, explores the forms, frequency and intensity of transnational relations and transactions of German citizens based on a representative survey conducted in 2006 (Mau 2007). The data reveal that transboundary interaction on the individual level has become a mass phenomenon: almost half of all German citizens (47 per cent) regularly communicate privately with at least one person living in a foreign country. Disregarding transnational connections to Germans living abroad, still one-third of the population (29 per cent) is regularly involved in communication with foreigners living abroad (Mau and Mewes 2007a). Considering cross-border mobility, most of the citizens have been abroad themselves at least once during the last 12 months: 38 per cent once or twice, 20 per cent three times and more. Furthermore, more than one in ten (12 per cent) of the German population has spent a time period of three months or longer beyond the national borders (Mau 2007). In the following we will discuss to what extent these transnational experiences and relations may affect people's cognitive stances with regard to a proliferation of cosmopolitan attitudes.

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Cosmopolitan attitudes through transnationalism from below?

On a general level, cosmopolitanism can be described as an orientation, 'a willingness to engage with the other. It entails an intellectual and aesthetic openness towards divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity' (Held 1996: 103).[3] However, this understanding of the concept can be applied with very different meanings and to very different phenomena ranging from philosophical, ideological and ethical perspectives to individual attitudes, as well as to religions, cities and their cultural milieus (Roudometof 2005: 116). On the conceptual level, it is therefore helpful to distinguish between cosmopolitanism as a normative vision or an ideal and cosmopolitanism as an empirically measurable attribute of social phenomena (Beck and Sznaider 2006: 6). The conceptualization of cosmopolitanism as a political ideal derives from the Kantian tradition and aims at some form of world state, or federation of states (Brown 2005), which would involve the development of cosmopolitan or supranational law and forms of worldwide citizenship and governance (for example Archibugi and Held 1995; Brock and Brighouse 2005; Habermas 1997, 1998; Nussbaum 1994). Concepts like 'cosmopolitan nation', 'cosmopolitan democracy', 'cosmopolitan citizenship' or 'cosmopolitan society' are envisioned accordingly (Roudometof 2005: 116). Here, cosmopolitanism is a normative philosophical proposition that is based on a high level of reflexivity.

However, this meaning of cosmopolitanism nonetheless includes a variety of different uses of the concept within each category. Because there is no commonly shared definition of the term, it is important to make absolutely clear how the concept is applied in our analysis. In this article, we only focus on cosmopolitanism as an empirically measurable attitudinal stance. Hence, unlike some authors, we do *not* apply the concept of cosmopolitanism when describing certain actions and behaviour of people. Rather, we apply another concept – namely that of transnationalism presented above – to certain kinds of transboundary and intercultural actions and practices. Thus, our use of the concept is only in line with Beck and Sznaider's differentiation in so far as we understand normative cosmopolitanism as both intended and aspired to, while empirical 'cosmopolitanization' occurs as unintended and unseen *side-effects* of actions that are not intended as 'cosmopolitan' in the normative sense (Beck and Sznaider 2006: 7). However, we do not follow Beck's differentiation of cosmopolitanization and cosmopolitanism (Beck 2000, 2002). Since Beck considers phenomena and processes like transnational activities, lifestyles, news coverage or mobility as indicators of cosmopolitanization, our research question would in his conception turn into the following – somewhat tautological – one: does cosmopolitanization lead to cosmopolitanism? Instead of this, we sharply distinguish transboundary processes of social action and practices defined as transnationalism (see section above) from changes on the attitudinal level to which we refer as cosmopolitanism. Thus, we follow Robbins' (1998: 3) conception of 'actually existing cosmopolitanism' as cosmopolitan attitudes manifested in people's opinions, attitudes, values and orientation. In a similar way, we are in line with Roudometof (2005: 121), who points out that 'the presence of a cosmopolitan outlook (or that of its conceptual

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opposite, that of a local outlook) is conceptually distinct from the transnational experience' since 'transnationalism is an emergent property that is born out of internal globalization. It does not refer to qualitative feelings or attitudes, and it is not affected by what people think of it' (Roudometof 2005: 118).

In our conception of cosmopolitanism as a measurable attitude, we can distinguish three – presumably interconnected – dimensions (Held 2002: 58):

1. the recognition of the increasing interconnectedness of political communities in diverse domains, including the social, economic and environmental;
2. the development of an understanding of overlapping collective fortunes that require collective solutions locally, regionally and globally; and
3. the celebration of difference, diversity and hybridity while being able to reason from the point of view of others and mediate traditions.

People with cosmopolitan attitudes and values are characterized by their recognition of others because of their value and integrity as human beings, quite independently of their national affiliations. They share an open and tolerant world view that is not bound by national categories but is based on an awareness of our increasing economic, political and cultural interconnectedness, which they perceive as enriching rather than threatening. As a consequence, they tend to support evolving forms of global governance or supranational political regulation. In other words, cosmopolitans are individuals who are positive about the greater role of international bodies and their accountability for global problems.

In the literature, it is widely assumed that the increase in transnational experiences has a positive effect on the development of such cosmopolitan attitudes and orientations. Kwok-Bun (2002: 191) states for example that 'cosmopolitanism arises through the interrelated processes of increased connectivity and cultural contact.' Hannerz (1990: 241) proposes that: 'It is really the growth and proliferation of such cultures and social networks in the present period that generate more cosmopolitans now than there have been at any other time.' Tarrow (2005: 41 ff.) points out in a similar way that 'it is through people's relations to significant others that cosmopolitan attitudes are shaped. What is new in our era is the increased number of people and groups whose relations place them beyond their local and national settings without detaching them from locality.'

The processes of transnationalization[4] weaken traditional bonds and confront people more and more with foreigners and different cultures. These interactions and relationships have a socializing effect that entails mutual understanding, empathy and respect. Several studies have shown that personal contacts strongly influence perceptions and opinions about adjacent countries and their inhabitants. The more intensive the exchange and the more the knowledge of the other country is based on personal experiences, the more positive the attitudes are towards the respective other (Hartmann 1981). Furthermore, transnational experiences in everyday life are likely to foster an understanding of global interrelations and the acknowledgment of political responsibilities beyond the nation-state.

However, it is doubtful that all transnational experiences will catalyse cosmopolitan attitudes. As Beck (2002: 29), for example, points out: 'The fundamental fact that the experiential space of the individual no longer coincides with national space, but is being subtly altered by the opening to cosmopolitanisation should not deceive anyone into believing we are all going to become cosmopolitans.'

Processes of transnationalization may also be perceived as a threat causing insecurity and nationalistic reflexes. Contacts across a wide geographical range could entail a subversive force by loosening ascriptive relations without providing new references with sufficient stability and robustness (Habermas 1998: 126). On the political level, the partial release from traditional bonds and the protective frame of the nation-state may be perceived as a loss of accountability given that there are not yet equivalents to the vanishing power monopoly of the state on the transnational or global level.

Summarizing these basic arguments of the discussion, one can state that transnationalization may lead to cosmopolitanism – but it does not have to. There may be different forms of transnationalization with very different effects on the development of cosmopolitan attitudes, but also the same kind of transnationalization may have different effects on different individuals. So far, empirical studies that aim to explore the relationship between transnationalization and cosmopolitanism have been confined to specific transnational practices, circumstances or certain societal groups. We attempt to explore the relationship between the involvement in transnational social contexts and cosmopolitan attitudes on the general level by referring to data from a representative survey.

But what kinds of transnational experiences are of relevance here? Cosmopolitans have often been characterized as individuals who have moved physically and cognitively outside their origins and who represent a specific cultural type, or as people who have learnt to be comfortable in many different cultural settings (Hannerz 1990). Indeed, most definitions of cosmopolitans imply a connection between mobility and cosmopolitan attitudes. In many accounts cosmopolitanism is seen as 'a form of privilege, connoting the well travelled and culturally sophisticated, contrasted with the provincial and naïve' (Sypnowich 2005: 56). The social figure associated with this kind of cosmopolitanism is the Western traveller who can afford to visit other countries and to enjoy cultural diversity. Therefore, it has been suggested that cosmopolitanism 'frequently advances itself as a specifically intellectual ideal, or depends on a mobility that is the luxury of social, economic, or cultural privilege' (Anderson 1998: 268). However, contemporary mobility is no longer an exclusive privilege of the economic and intellectual elite but has turned into a (Western) mass phenomenon. With the general population being more and more mobile and thus being increasingly confronted with other cultures and contexts, we assume that this may foster cosmopolitan attitudes on a broader scale. Of course, today's mobility is not only restricted to physical, bodily travel. Moreover, it can be assumed that other kinds of travelling are also 'significant in creating the conditions for a cosmopolitan mode of being-in-the-world: … imaginative travel, to be transported elsewhere through the images of places and peoples encountered in the media; and virtual travel, transcending

geographical and often social distances through information and communications technology' (Szerszynski and Urry 2006: 115 ff.). These worldwide globalization and transnationalization processes in terms of an economic, social and cultural internationalization also entail an expansion of the spaces of agency and interaction (Albrow 1996; Giddens 1990; Held and McGrew 1993). Hence, cosmopolitanism could also arise as a consequence of the 'increase in interdependence among social actors across national borders' (Beck and Sznaider 2006: 6). More concretely, communication and interaction that transcend national borders are likely to contribute to a change of people's frame of mind. Thus, we do not think that cosmopolitan attitudes are only shaped by staying abroad or travelling but also by having regular contacts and relations with people living in other countries.[5]

As our following analysis refers to the German case, we also have to take into consideration the process of European integration when looking at forms of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. In the words of Daniele Archibugi (1998: 209), the European Union is actually 'the first international model that begins to resemble the cosmopolitan model'. However, there is only a partial overlap between Europeanization and the concept of cosmopolitanism. The latter is broader and more encompassing and, hence, exceeds European boundaries. Cosmopolitanism means that people conceive of the world as a whole, adopt universal ethics and exhibit a stance of openness towards people from other places and cultures. From Europeanization research we know that Europeans draw a line between fellow Europeans (and to some extent people from other OECD countries) and people from other parts of the world who still seem to be perceived as 'different' and/or 'untrustworthy' (Delhey 2004; Fuchs et al. 1993). Accordingly, a European identity might be 'nested' (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001) in a cosmopolitan one – but Europeanization must not be automatically equated with the spreading of cosmopolitan values.

In summary, one can suppose that transnational relations and exchanges foster a decrease in prejudices by changing perceptions of the other and supporting a vision of the world as a whole. However, not all reservations and resentments will disappear as a side effect of transnationalization and, depending on individual dispositions, tendencies of closure and separation still present a danger. But, generally, transnational practices should provide an opportunity for individuals to get to know other cultures, individuals and places, which is an important precondition to gradually broadening national perceptions towards gaining a more cosmopolitan outlook (Beck 2004). Therefore, we put forward the following guiding hypothesis: the more individuals are engaged in border-crossing activities and social networks, the more likely they are to adopt cosmopolitan attitudes.

Data and method

Our analysis draws on representative data from the *Survey Transnationalisierung 2006*, which was conducted within the scope of the research project 'Transnationalization of Social Relations' at the University of Bremen. This project, funded by the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* (German Research Foundation), aims to provide

information on processes of transnationalization at the individual level. While the majority of transnationalization research deals with the actions of particular groups, our research perspective takes into consideration the cross-border interactions and activities of the whole German population. Some 2700 people were interviewed by means of CATI[6] technique in collaboration with the IPSOS research institute (Mölln and Hamburg). The basic population included all Germans (bearers of citizenship) aged 16 or above living in Germany who possessed a telephone landline connection. The random sample was conducted in three steps according to the sampling design of the ADM (Arbeitskreis Deutscher Markt- und Sozialforschungsinstitute)[7]. Since the sample outcomes are not equally distributed, we have used a weighting factor that adjusts the unweighted sample structure to the official statistics. The weighting was undertaken on the basis of the characteristics age, gender, *Bundesland* (federal state), community size and education. Also, as regards the units of analysis, the weighting factor takes into account the transformation from a household-based sample towards an individual-based one. Finally, the original case number (N = 2700) was reproduced by standardization.

The respondents were asked questions about their involvement in transboundary interaction as well as about their attitudes towards political responsibility on the global level and towards different cultures and foreigners. To get a grasp of the assumed relationship between transnationalization and cosmopolitanism we have developed an index measuring the extent to which individuals are involved in transnational contexts. Because of the numerous possible transnational contexts in which people can be active, we concentrated our analysis on border-crossing transnational practices. These include short-and long-term stays in foreign countries as well as regular private contacts with people living abroad. Our data do not allow us to include the above-mentioned imaginative and virtual trips made possible through media and new information and communication technologies that also might shape and influence people's attitudes (for example Szerszynski and Urry 2006). Our analysis therefore only focuses on physical travel and transboundary interpersonal relationships.

For our calculations, we apply multivariate Ordinary-Least-Squares (OLS) regression models. Among the independent variables used in the estimations, the 'transnationality index' is our key variable. The index is a composite that consists of the number of private transnational relations, the number of times a respondent had been abroad in the 12 months before the time of the interview and the total time the respondent had lived abroad for a longer period (taking into account all stays that lasted at least three months). The first two variables contribute to the index in equal measure, the third was weighted more highly because of the greater importance of long-term stays (for further details: see appendix):

1. Number of regular and private transnational relations: 30 per cent.
2. Number of short-term stays abroad (less than three months): 30 per cent.
3. Long-term stays abroad (periods of three months or more, total time): 40 per cent.

If being involved in transnational interaction and practices does impact on cosmopolitan attitudes, this index measuring individual transnational involvement should have a noticeable positive effect on the different statements measuring cosmopolitan attitudes. The rounded index ranges from '0' to '10', a '0' indicating no transnational experience (devised for functional purposes only), whereas a '10' testifies to the highest degree of involvement in transboundary (inter-)action.

Taking into account that neither 'transnationality' nor cosmopolitanism is independent of an individual's socio-structural background, we also sample key background variables like age, gender, education, community size and whether the respondent lives in Eastern or Western Germany. As far as age differences are concerned, we not only assume that the younger generations are more bound into transnational activities, but also that they are more likely to adopt a cognitive openness towards the world (Edmunds and Turner 2005). Furthermore, we expect education to play a significant role in explaining agreement to statements measuring cosmopolitan attitudes. On the one hand, high educational attainment is generally associated with a stronger emphasis on libertarian ideas (Kriesi and Grande 2004: 406 ff.); on the other hand, our earlier findings reveal that there is a strong correlation between the degree of transnational involvement and the attained educational level at school (Mau and Mewes 2007b). In our models, education is measured in years needed to graduate from a particular (primary or secondary) school. The 'Global City' debate suggests that there are central urban nodes in the global economy 'where the work of globalization gets done' (Sassen 2003: 13). In these environments, people from various countries and cultures work and live together day by day. Unsurprisingly, they are assumed to be places of an aspiring cosmopolitanism (Featherstone 2002). Therefore, we employ the community size variable as a proxy measuring the effect of urbanization[8]. In terms of political orientations, numerous surveys reveal that it is still significant whether the respondents live in the western or eastern part of Germany (for example Falter et al. 2000; Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 2000). Another study in the context of our research project (Mau and Mewes 2007b) also reveals that *gender* interferes with 'transnationality', so we control for this dimension as well. By including all these covariates in the linear regression models, we will be able to determine whether an effect of 'transnationality' is due to correlations with the control variables or if border-crossing interaction 'truly' impacts on cosmopolitan attitudes.

To operationalize cosmopolitan attitudes, we distinguish two aspects that are close to those put forward by Held (2002: 58): (1) we evaluate the degree to which the respondents assign political accountability and responsibility to the world community, because we assume that such an assignment depends on recognition of the increasing worldwide interconnectedness as well as on an understanding of collective fortunes that require collective solutions; (2) for capturing the openness towards difference, diversity and hybridity, and the capacity to reason from the point of view of others, we ask the respondents about their attitudes towards foreigners living in Germany and their interest in having contacts with people living abroad.

In the following section, we do not aim at fully *explaining* individual attitudes of cosmopolitanism. Rather, our analysis aims at exploring whether transnational social

practices significantly contribute to a proliferation of cosmopolitan values. Also, we must concede that our cross-sectional data are not fully able to demonstrate firm causal relations that involve developments over time. Challenging our main hypothesis, one may argue that differences between individuals regarding the commitment to cosmopolitan values are responsible for different degrees of 'transnationality', rather than vice versa. We admit that such mechanisms may be at work but maintain that transnational and intercultural experiences indeed impact on the cognitive and normative horizon of individuals. Here we draw on results from psychological research interested in the effects of intergroup contact on attitudinal stances (for example Allport 1954; Amir 1969; Pettigrew 1998).[9] Moreover, with a broader sociological and historical understanding of the processes of transnationalization and the proliferation of cosmopolitan values, we assume a mutual reinforcement of both processes, with transnationalization furthering cosmopolitanism but cosmopolitanism also positively affecting the intensified engagement in transnational practices.

Supranational assignment of accountability

There is a problematic tension between the increasing global interdependence of economy, ecology, and culture on the one hand and the strongly nationally-rooted capacities of political organization and regulation on the other (Zürn 1998). One of the main obstacles to supranational regulation and governance is a lack of democratic legitimacy, for the institutionalized forms of political participation, interest aggregation and decision-making are still organized nationally. Every attempt to transfer political accountability to the supranational level has to deal with the question of how to ensure that political decisions beyond the nation-state are legitimate and democratic. In this context different possibilities are discussed, for example transnational referenda or the strengthening of civil society participation in supranational decision-making. Nonetheless, it is first of all necessary that the *demos* of the nation-states agree with a transfer of competence to the supranational level, accept a weakening of the nation-state and a restriction in national self-determination. Another barrier to supranational regulation is that there are hardly any incentives for governments to subscribe to a world domestic polity as long as the electorate does not honour such a change (Habermas 1998: 167).

   The question we are interested in here is whether the involvement of individuals in transnational relations and contexts of interaction influences the perception of a need for global political regulation. Our working hypothesis is: the higher the individual degree of transnational involvement, the stronger the willingness to assign accountability to the world community. In this way, transnationalization may be conceived as a social basis for an emerging world polity. Here, we have some kind of connection between empirical and normative conceptions of cosmopolitanism.

   To explore to what extent the respondents are aware of global interrelations and are willing to transfer national power to the supranational or global level they were asked: 'Today many problems are not solvable by single states, rather the world community needs to bear responsibility for them.' Possible answers ranged from full

disagreement (1) to full agreement (5).[10] We applied bi- and multivariate linear regression models, testing whether 'transnationality' (independent variable) positively impacts on the degree of approval to the quoted statement (serving as a dependent variable). The results of the regression analyses are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Assignment of accountability to the world society (linear regression models)

	Model I	Model II	Model III
Constant	4.290 ** *(155.71)*	3.436 ** *(21.833)*	3.560 ** *(22.107)*
Transnationality	0.095 ** *(4.786)*		0.074 ** *(3.473)*
Education		0.129 ** *(6.184)*	0.104 ** *(4.732)*
Age		0.115 ** *(5.507)*	0.112 ** *(5.371)*
Gender: man (woman ref.)		0.027 *(1.367)*	0.020 *(1.015)*
Region: West (East ref.)		0.003 *(0.142)*	–0.005 *(–0.271)*
Community size		–0.048 * *(–2.379)*	–0.055 ** *(–2.724)*
R² (adj.)	0.009	0.020	0.024
Number N	2515	2515	2515

Notes: The findings are weighted on the individual level. The standardised regression coefficients (β) are stated (or the unstandardized coefficient for constants), along with the corresponding t-values.
** significant at p < 0.01; * significant at p < 0.05.
Source: *Survey Transnationalisierung 2006.*

The findings in Model 1 (Table 1) support our hypothesis, without yet controlling for socio-structural variables. The degree of 'transnationality', which is measured by means of the made up transnationality index, affects the attitude towards the given statement at a highly significant level (β = 0.095, probability of error p < 0.01). Thus, in terms of the question of who should solve current problems, we can reason that the more individuals are engaged in cross-border activities and communication, the more

they will see the need for an accountability of the world community instead of the national government.

The second regression (Table 1, Model II) estimates the pure effects of the control variables. Besides the expected finding of the positive effect of education, we admit to being surprised at the negative impact of age and community size. In particular, the strong positive effect of age does not correspond to common hypotheses about the adoption of cosmopolitan attitudes. A plausible explanation for this finding might be that the positive effect of age stems from a *cohort* effect: conducting a comparison of means and an analysis of variance (ANOVA; factor: age groups; dependent variable: assignment to accountability), we observe that the cohort that grew up in the immediate post Second World War period (respondents aged 51 to 65) significantly reveals the *highest agreement* with the accountability item. Both, the younger and the older age cohorts score lower on average. Possibly, this result suggests that people born between 1941 and 1955 witnessed and reflected advancements in reference to international cooperation and the 'renewal' of cosmopolitan ideals (for example the formation of the United Nations in 1945 and the Declaration of Universal Human Rights in 1948). Also, it was this very cohort that brought forth a multitude of activists and supporters of the 1968 grassroots movement, a movement that neglected nationalist ways of coping with problems and conflicts arising from global supranational interconnectedness. Further research should be devoted to the question of whether this effect holds true for Germans alone or whether it is a universal phenomenon. As our analysis draws on cross-sectional data, we are unable to clarify if the age effect is a cohort effect only or if it is rather a stable intergenerational effect.

The last model (Table 1, Model III) contains our index as well as the socio-structural determinants that were introduced in the precedent estimation. The results confirm our hypothesis: the positive correlation between 'transnationality' and approval of the accountability-statement remains stable when monitoring the respondents' background at the same time. Although the effects of education ($\beta = 0.104$) and age ($\beta = 0.112$) are the strongest, our calculation indicates a highly significant effect of 'transnationality' ($\beta = 0.074$) that outweighs the impact of community size ($\beta = -0.055$). Finally, the calculation in Model III (Table 1) reveals that the gender and region (East/West) variables do not influence an agreement with the statement. Thus, the likelihood that individuals agree with a transfer of competence to the supranational level will be higher the better educated they are, the older they are, the more involved in transnational activities and relations they are and the smaller the community in which they live. Though cross-correlations of minor significance between the tested variables can be found[11] and the observed R-squared values are relatively low,[12] the individuals' involvement in transnational practices and social relations does make a significant contribution in explaining this specific aspect of cosmopolitan attitudes.

Attitudes towards foreigners

We subsequently tested the effect of individual involvement in transnational social relations on what Held (2002: 58) calls the celebration of difference, diversity and

hybridity. We therefore explored to what extent the degree of individual transnationality influences attitudes towards foreigners. In the course of globalization, individuals meet members from other ethnic or national groups with whom they communicate and establish relations in ever more frequent social contexts. Although one may not go as far to assume that national distinctions have become obsolete, new horizons have indeed emerged in relation to the interaction with different nationalities and trans-border experiences. This may entail learning processes that strive towards a greater emphasis on cosmopolitan values such as a reflexive distance from one's cultural affiliations, curiosity about, interest in and valuation of other cultures and customs as well as a belief in universal respect, tolerance and humanity (for example Anderson 1998; Held 2002; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). Differences in nationality, ethnicity or the same kind should not be reasons for subordination, discrimination or exclusion. The basic cosmopolitan consensus, therefore, is to affirm the other as different *and* equal (Beck 2004: 91 ff.).

Classic contact theory (Allport 1954) asserts that through contacts between different – especially ethnic – groups, prejudices are reduced and mutual understanding is promoted. Thus, the more extensive the contact with foreigners, the more positive the attitude towards them should be. With his intergroup contact theory, Allport has inspired extensive research and his basic assumption has received support across a variety of societies, situations, and groups (for example Amir 1969; Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2000). The role of contact and exchange was also found to be of explanatory value in the context of ethnopolitical conflicts (Chirot and Seligman 2001). However, not all kinds of interaction between different groups result in a positive relationship between them, in particular when the respective relationship is a tense one, such as in ethnic or cultural conflicts or situations of social competition. Heitmeyer (1989) argues for instance that the major reasons for xenophobic attitudes are insecurities caused by the processes of social transformation. Globalization and modernization imply a loss of certainty and security and may give rise to disorientation and fears of the future. Turning to xenophobia may be a possible reaction to these excessive demands. Allport has formulated four conditions under which contact has a positive effect: (1) equal status between the groups in the given situation, (2) common goals, (3) no competition between the groups, and (4) the sanction of authority for the contact. Empirical studies, however, found a considerable variability in the degree to which Allport's conditions contribute to positive contact outcomes (Pettigrew and Tropp 2000).

In real-life situations we do not know precisely whether the transnational experiences are in accord with Allport's conditions. As is well-known, the increase in contacts between natives and foreigners and the increased freedom of movement of individuals across national boundaries do not always flow smoothly. Different cultures, customs as well as social and cultural modes of expression collide. Indeed, transnational contacts and activities are multi-faceted. To explore how the involvement of individuals in transnational social relations and activities affect attitudes towards foreigners, we conducted linear regressions with different dependent variables acting as proxies for cosmopolitan attitudes. Our set of independent variables

estimating the considered statements is the same as in the first round of calculations. In an identical way as shown in Table 1, each model was calculated by including the different independent variables step by step. However, to get a clearer picture, Table 2 shows the complete regression model for each cosmopolitan attitude, including the 'transnationality index' and all of our structural determinants.

Table 2: Attitudes towards foreigners (linear regression models)

	Enrichment	Multi-cultural contacts	Universal equal rights
Constant	1.775 ** (8.583)	2.787 ** (13.329)	3.464 ** (15.316)
Transnationality	0.048 * (2.288)	0.173 ** (8.465)	0.024 (1.151)
Education	0.175 ** (8.029)	0.113 ** (5.361)	0.082 ** (3.733)
Age	0.023 (1.133)	-0.169 ** (-8.454)	-0.142 ** (-6.872)
Gender: man (woman ref.)	0.022 (1.125)	0.016 (0.816)	0.018 (0.907)
Region: West (East ref.)	0.028 (1.431)	0.039 * (2.036)	-0.002 (-0.114)
Community size	0.032 (1.621)	-0.019 (-0.960)	-0.015 (-0.768)
R² (adj.)	0.039	0.101	0.034
Number N	2515	2515	2515

Notes: The findings are weighted on the individual level. The standardised regression coefficients (β) are stated (or the unstandardised coefficient for constants), along with the corresponding t-values.

** significant at p < 0.01; * significant at p < 0.05.

Source: *Survey Transnationalisierung 2006.*

The first item labelled 'enrichment' measures the agreement to the statement: 'Foreigners living in Germany enrich the country with new ideas and new cultures.' Our results indicate that transnationalization *does* give rise to that particular aspect of

cosmopolitan attitudes (Table 2, column 1). Even when integrating the relevant control variables, the degree of cross-border interaction has a significant and positive effect ($\beta = 0.048$) on agreement with the statement. Apart from this, the extent of approval is strongly affected positively by education ($\beta = 0.175$). None of the other control variables (gender, community size, living in the eastern/western part of Germany) significantly impact on this particular attitude.

The second item 'multi-cultural contacts' measures the agreement with the statement: 'I would like to have more contact with people living in other countries' (Table 2, column 2). Here, both the individual involvement in transnational practices and networks ($\beta = 0.173$) as well as the respondents' age ($\beta = -0.169$) prove to be strong determinants. Referring to the positive effect of education ($\beta = 0.113$), we may conclude that approval to the given multi-cultural-contacts statement is particularly high among the transnationalized, young and educationally privileged. In addition, where the respondents live is important: people from Western Germany significantly tend to agree more frequently with the question ($\beta = 0.039$). Again, we neither observe an effect of gender nor one of community size on this item. We observed here the strongest of all measured effects of 'transnationality', already anticipating the results of the following estimation.

The third item, 'universal equal rights', also aims at capturing a fundamental cosmopolitan attitude by measuring the agreement with the following statement: 'Foreigners living in Germany should have the same rights as Germans on ALL levels' (Table 2, column 3). Here, the multivariate regression does not reveal a significant effect of the 'transnationality index', but only a positive effect of the variable education ($\beta = 0.082$) and a negative effect of the variable age ($\beta = -0.142$). However, the gradual inclusion of the control variables in the regression model revealed that the significant positive effect of 'transnationality' was substantially reduced when the variable education was added. Therefore, most of the effect of transnational involvement is explained by education as a central intervening variable. Thus, the likelihood that the respondents agree with the statement is at its highest when the respondents are young and well-educated. As shown above, our 'transnationality index' includes private relations to other persons living abroad as well as time periods in which respondents were living abroad themselves. When we solely test the influence of transnational relations (thus not taking into account stays or trips abroad), an independent significant effect is revealed. This illustrates that not all kinds of transnational practices have the same effect on cosmopolitan attitudes.

Our findings should not be misinterpreted in the sense that attitudes towards foreigners are only reducible to the frequency and intensity of interactions with them. Studies in this field have shown that factors like specific educational styles, group-related feelings of deprivation or a perceived competition for scarce resources have an important impact (Scheepers et al. 2002). By influencing attitudes, these factors may as well affect the likelihood of establishing transnational contacts. However, our findings suggest that inter-ethnic and inter-cultural relations promote the development of cosmopolitan values, as well as lower the level of prejudice, and improve the capacity to accept the other in his otherness as equal and to perceive cultural

differences as a source of enrichment. Yet, when it comes to granting equal rights to foreigners living in Germany the results differ and do not show a significant effect. Other research has shown, however, that contact *within* the country, be it in the neighbourhood, at the work place or within the family, does matter in the willingness to give rights to foreigners (Rippl 2003). As far as this item is concerned, therefore, it seems that cross-border activities are of less importance than multicultural contacts within the nation-state.

Conclusions

In this article we have tried to shed light on the relationship between transnationalization and cosmopolitanism. In the relevant literature, it is assumed most of the time that increasing transnational interconnectedness and mobility act as a catalyst for cosmopolitan attitudes. With life worlds leaving the confines of the nation-state and people becoming involved in a web of transnational contacts and practices, social and political concepts such as ideas of otherness and difference, collective fortunes and political responsibility are likely to change. Whereas the nation-state has been the sole and uncontested pivot of identity, belonging, political loyalty and accountability during its 'golden age', the proliferation of transnational interaction is broadening people's cognitive and normative horizons. However, in his programmatic article on the debate of the new cosmopolitanism, Roudometof (2005: 121) argued that 'the degree to which cosmopolitanism is related to the presence or absence of transnational experience is a relationship that can be … considered an open-ended question.'

Given the existing research lacunae, our research was a first attempt to address the question empirically. We have tested the relationship between transnationalization and cosmopolitanism by drawing on representative survey data from Germany (*Survey Transnationalisierung 2006*). From the questionnaire, we used four statements that the interviewees had to assess. These were treated as indicators for measuring two fundamental aspects of cosmopolitanism: (1) holding the view that more accountability should be assigned to the supranational and/or global level, and (2) tolerating and respecting foreigners and their cultures and values. Referring to the first dimension, the analysis thoroughly supports the thesis that involvement in transnational interaction leads to cosmopolitan attitudes. Even though we tested for determinants that are well known to cross-correlate with the individual degree of cross-border interaction (like age and education), the effect of 'transnationality' still remained stable and significant. To grasp the second dimension we estimated attitudes towards foreigners by means of linear regression, using the same set of variables. Though the degree of transnational involvement showed no effect in reference to the question, whether all foreigners living in Germany should have the same rights as Germans on all levels, being bound to border-crossing relations and activities *did* matter for the other two items. So, referring to the constructs 'cultural enrichment' and 'multicultural contacts', the data support our hypothesis. Again, simultaneously monitoring the respondents' socio-structural background did not change this result. Thus, on the very specific question on whether there is a positive correlation between

the transnationalization of life worlds and the cosmopolitanization of attitudes and values, our findings mostly suggest a positive association. Although we could illustrate such a positive relation, we were unable to determine the causal sequences of the impact in the relation between transnational practices and cosmopolitan attitudes because of the nature of our data. However, we assume – based on findings from the so-called contact theory outlined above – that there exists a strong causal path from transnational experience to cosmopolitan attitudes, which should be presumably stronger than the causal path the other way around. However, more in-depth analysis will be needed to specify the nature of this relationship in detail.

Our results may also be relevant to the debate on supranational governance. Since many public responsibilities are increasingly carried out by actors and institutions other than the classical institutions of the nation-state, it is still to be debated under which conditions they can acquire legitimacy and public acquiescence. Indeed, for all attempts to establish supranational forms of governance and political regulation, the issue of legitimacy and political support is viewed as crucial (Held 1995; Zürn 1998). The lesson to be learnt from our investigation is that social and cultural norms and expectations are not eternally and unchangeably tied to the nation-state, but vary with the individual's involvement in transnational interactions. The transnationalization of the society, therefore, is one of the processes underlying changing concepts of accountability and the assignment of responsibility. Even if many problems over the normative foundations of supranational power or of democratic participation still remain unsolved, our findings indicate that the ongoing social transformation facilitates a greater capacity of the citizen to become aware of issues arising from increased transnational interconnectedness, be it economically, socially or culturally.

Acknowledgements

Notes

1. In contrast to transnational social spaces, transnational social fields are more highly structured and involve the exercise of power relations by a multitude of agents and actors (Roudometof 2005: 127).
2. See Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) for a critical discussion on the literature on immigrant transnationalism.
3. However, cosmopolitanism was not always conceived in a positive manner, it has also had negative connotations: 'the cosmopolitan was also the target of xenophobia, disrespect, suspicion, and mistrust. Cosmopolitans were regarded as foreign, "dirty", and decadent, associated with Jews or "Bolsheviks", whom bigots sought to exclude' (Sypnowich 2005: 56). Or as Featherstone (2002: 1) points out: 'Equally harsh in its judgment of cosmopolitanism is the perspective which presents the cosmopolitan as dabbling rootlessly in a variety of cultures. This view of the cosmopolitan as voyeur, parasite, or some sort of cultural tourist again emphasises this incapacity to form lasting attachments and commitments to place and others, the inability to participate in a community for which one feels obliged to make sacrifices.'

4. Directing our attention to border-crossing interaction, we refer to studies which are most often embraced by the term 'transnationalism'. As experts in that particular research field themselves raised the objection that the original term fails to comprise the structural and processual character of the phenomenon (Pries 2002: 264; Szanton Blanc et al. 1995: 684), we use the term 'transnationalization' in reference to processes of transboundary interaction.

5. However, there is presumably a strong interrelation between these two dimensions. People who travel a lot or have lived abroad for some time are more likely to have significant relationships to individuals living in other countries than people who have not.

6. CATI: Computer-Assisted Telephone Interview.

7. The ADM is the Association of German Market Research Institutes.

8. The values of the variable 'community size' range from 1 to 6, indicating the following: 1 (up to 5000 residents); 2 (5001 to 20,000 residents); 3 (20,001 to 50,000 residents); 4 (50,001 to 100,000 residents); 5 (100,001 to 500,000 residents); 6 (more than 500,000 residents).

9. Here, the question is whether intergroup contact induces a reduction in prejudice or whether the opposite causal sequence – prejudiced people avoid contacts to outgroups – is operating (Pettigrew and Tropp 2000: 99). Most of the very few studies that have analysed this relationship on the basis of longitudinal research designs (e.g. Sherif 1966; Smith 1994) have shown that certain kinds of contacts are clearly the cause of reduced prejudice. Other studies, using statistical procedures to compare the fit of different path models (Pettigrew 1997; Powers and Ellison 1995; van Dick et al. 2004) have shown that prejudiced people indeed tend to avoid contact with certain kinds of groups. But they also found that the path from contact to reduced prejudices is stronger than the one leading from prejudice to contact.

10. Frequencies for the dependent variables (statements) are to be found in the appendix, Tables 3 to 6.

11. Finally, we tested the statistical model for multi-collinearity, revealing that all the independent variables that were used scored low in terms of the respective **V**ariance **I**nflation **F**actors (VIF < 1.25). As a rule of thumb, VIF-scores greater than three indicate that two or more independent variables are so highly correlated that only one of them should be used. So, none of the independent variables used here nor the ones in the following estimations (as they are the same ones) can be regarded as linearly dependent on one or more of the other regressors.

12. It is not our aim to fully explain the adoption of cosmopolitan values. Rather, we conducted OLS-models in order to explore whether transnationality brings about a positive effect on the adoption of cosmopolitan values at all. Thus, the low R-squared values are not at odds with our research interest. Partly, the comparatively low explanatory power of the regression models is also due to the observed left-skewness of the items' distributions of responses (see appendix).

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Appendix: Distribution of responses made to the statements measuring cosmopolitan attitudes

Table 3: 'Today many problems are not solvable by single states, rather the world community needs to bear responsibility for them.' (Assignment to accountability)

	Percentage
Totally agree	59.7
Rather agree	25.8
Neither agree nor disagree	5.3
Rather don't agree	4.9
Don't agree at all	2.3
Do not know	1.8
Not specified	.0

n = 2700

Table 4: 'Foreigners living in Germany enrich the country with new ideas and new cultures.' (Enrichment)

	Percentage
Totally agree	23.4
Rather agree	33.0
Neither agree nor disagree	17.0
Rather don't agree	17.1
Don't agree at all	7.6
Do not know	1.8
Not specified	.2

n = 2700

Table 5: 'I would like to have more contacts to people living in other countries.' (Multi-cultural contacts)

	Percentage
Totally agree	23.9
Rather agree	30.2
Neither agree nor disagree	14.9
Rather don't agree	19.8
Don't agree at all	10.1
Do not know	.9
Not specified	.1

n = 2700

Table 6: 'Foreigners living in Germany should have the same rights as Germans on ALL levels.' (Universal equal rights)

	Frequency
Totally agree	35.8
Rather agree	25.3
Neither agree nor disagree	10.7
Rather don't agree	16.7
Don't agree at all	8.9
Do not know	2.0
Not specified	.6

n = 2700

The composition of the 'transnationality index'

1. *Private transnational relations (30 per cent)*

Every respondent was asked whether he or she is in regular communication with foreign friends/acquaintances and/or relatives as well as with Germans living abroad. Detailed information about at most four persons in each of these three dimensions was gathered. The score of the sub-index 'transnational relations' refers only to the number of persons that are announced in the three categories, thereby not taking into consideration the *total* amount of possible contact partners. Each of the three categories increases the index at a maximum of 1, adding a value of 0.25 per person. For instance, an interviewee who indicated regular communication with two foreign relatives and three Germans living abroad boosts the index by 1.25 (2 x 0.25 + 3 x 0.25). Thus, the sub-dimension 'transnational relations' increases the index-value by 3 at most.

2. *Short-term stays abroad (30 per cent)*

Here we refer to the question of how often the interviewee went abroad for a period of less than three months during the last 12 months. The majority of Germans did cross the German borders during that time span: 37.8 per cent one or two times, 20.4 per cent three or more times. Yet 41.8 per cent of the interviewees declared that they had not set foot on foreign soil in the last 12 months. In terms of contributing to the index, respondents who stayed abroad more than twice increase the value by '3', whereas one or two stays boosted the value by '2'. If the response to this question was 'never', the value for this sub-index was zero. Thus, the highest value this sub-dimension can add to the index is 3.

3. *Long-term stays abroad (40 per cent)*

This sub-index takes into account all stays lasting three months or longer: 5.2 per cent of the respondents have spent 3 to 12 months of their lifetime abroad, whereas 6.2 per

cent have lived one year or longer outside Germany. Each interviewee could declare a maximum of five countries where he or she had lived before. For every country, we collected information about the total span of time the respondent had stayed there. For example, if a person stayed twice in Brazil, once for a year and once for four months, the interviewer coded 'Brazil, 1 year, 4 months', not taking into account that the respondent lived there twice (with a possible interruption of several decades or years). For purposes of our calculations, all of the five variables containing information about the time spent abroad were aggregated. The sub-index scores as follows: '0' for no long-term stays abroad, '2' for stays of an aggregate time of 3 to 12 months and '4' for all stays with a total time of 13 months and more.