Madame Butterfly Symposium Abstract Lecture
UMSL Center for Humanities - April 17Elizabeth P. Tsunoda
Puccini's opera, Madame Butterfly, raises a number of questions about American behavior toward Japan and the Japanese. Although the story directly addresses American behavior at the personal level, we might also see in it a symbol of traditional Japan victimized by the West in general and the United States in particular. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to consider the question: Has the United States, historically, played Lt. Pinkerton to Japan’s Madame Butterfly? It seems to me that we have--not in the sense that our policies toward Japan have been dishonorable, but in the sense that we have had a tendency to cloak them in idealistic terms which, in effect, misrepresent our intentions. Instead of acknowledging that our policies are meant, as they should be, to protect and advance our national interests, we cast ourselves in a nobler role. In so doing, we raise expectations that we are not prepared to fulfill. In that sense, it seems to me, Japan has had reason, historically to feel led on and then betrayed by the United States.
Our prewar relations with Japan are one case in point, particularly our role first in encouraging and then in attempting to block Japanese imperialism. Although Japanese imperialism was the immediate cause of World War 11 in Asia, and Japan bears the burden of responsibility for that outcome, Japan's early aggressions in Asia were precipitated by the American opening of Japan in 1853. Dragged into a world dominated by Western imperial powers and one in which international power relations were structured by the politics of imperialism, Japan's early efforts to acquire an empire of its own were defensive in character, and modeled on the practices of the Western powers. The United States played an active part in encouraging these efforts, particularly at the time of the Formosa invasion in 1874 and again in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-05. We adopted that policy primarily in order to protect the balance of power in Asia: Japan was a counterweight to Russia in Korea and Northeast China. But, both when we opened Japan in 1853, and in supporting Japanese imperialism at the turn of the century, we professed noble intentions, and we encouraged Japan to believe that we were disposed in a particularly friendly manner toward Japan and the Japanese. Our policies toward Japan after 1905 seemed an abrupt about-face. Japanese expansion into Manchuria after 1905 jeopardized American business ambitions in that area and also seemed likely to upset the balance of power in Asia in its own right. At the same time, Japanese immigration into the United States precipitated bitter feelings of resentment. To many Japanese, these changes in American policy reflected racism pure and simple--a conclusion reinforced by Woodrow Wilson's refusal to include a racial equality clause in the covenant of the League of Nations at the time of the Parts Peace Conference in 1919. Moreover, Wilson's efforts to dismantle imperialism and replace it with a new and highly idealistic world order seemed, in the practical case, to be a device for victimizing Japan. In the context of our professions of friendship and idealism, American policies toward Japan after 1905 seemed hypocritical and self-serving and, in short, a betrayal. In much the same way, we gave Japan cause to feel betrayed during our occupation of Japan after World War II.
In the early years of the occupation, we set out to "demilitarize and democratize" Japan--to make Japan over in our own image. While our purpose was to make Japan a responsible member of the international community and prevent a recurrence of Japanese militarism, the idealistic rhetoric associated with this early reform phase of the occupation was interpreted by many Japanese as a commitment. During the latter half of the occupation, they charge, the United States reneged on its commitment in what they term the if reverse course." Perpetrating another about-face, we undid the earlier reforms, sacrificing Japan's interests to our own policy ends after the onset of the Cold War. Again, it seems to me, there was nothing dishonorable in our policies themselves, but that our earlier rhetoric gave Japan reason to feel betrayed when our policies changed to address new threats to our national interests.
Our tendency to gloss policies taken in our national interest in more idealistic terms may also breed resentment in connection with our present defense agreements with Japan. We signed the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in 1952 because it gave the United States the means to protect our interests in the Pacific as well as the peace and stability of that region--and it continues to serve that purpose today. Whereas both American and Japanese leaders appear to view our defensive alliance in those terms, many Americans do not. Instead, they assert, we have selflessly undertaken to defend Japan--a favor which Japan has exploited and not appreciated--and we should stop being so generous. This attitude is exactly the kind of posture that has marred our relations with Japan historically, for it misrepresents our intentions and implies a commitment, or at least raises expectations, that we Will certainly not be prepared to fulfill unless it is in our national interests to do so.
It seems to me, in sum, that we have had a tendency historically to represent our policies toward Japan not ' just as a in marriage of convenience, but as a noble and long-term commitment. In that sense, we play the part of Lt. Pinkerton, and it has not served us well.
